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YALE 
HISTORICAL STUDIES 



PUBLISHED UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE 

Department of History 
from the income of 

THE FREDERICK J. KINGSBURY 
MEMORIAL FUND 



COLBERT'S WEST INDIA 
POLICY 



By 



STEWART L. MIMS 

Assistant Professor of History 
in Yale College 




New Haven: Yale University Press 

London : Henry Frowde 

Oxford University Press 

MCMXII 



t^ 



Copyright, 1912, by 
Yale University Press 



Printed from type, 600 copies, July, 1912 



eCLA316857 






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TO THE MEMORY OF 
EDWARD GAYLORD BOURNE 

WHOSE PROFOUND LEARNING AND MANLY QUALITIES 

INSPIRED HIS PUPILS TO TRY TO FOLLOW 

IN HIS FOOTSTEPS 



PREFACE 

Some five or six years ago in a course offered to grad- 
uate students of Yale University by the late Professor 
Edward Gaylord Bourne, I became much interested in the 
so-called economic causes of the American Revolution. I 
found then, and have continued to find, much inspiration 
in the work of Mr. George L. Beer. All of that author's 
work shows a thorough and comprehensive grasp of the 
forces and ideas which directed and gave shape to the 
commercial-colonial policy of Great Britain. Study con- 
vinced me, however, that neither Mr. Beer nor any other 
writer had worked out or clearly presented a most striking 
economic fact which was of considerable importance in 
the commercial history of the British North American 
colonies, namely, the rapid growth and expansion during 
the eighteenth century of the French West Indies, the 
most important of which were Martinique, Guadeloupe, 
and the western half of St. Domingo. 

Mr. Beer and some of his predecessors have pointed 
out the fact that New England traders obtained from 
these islands their most important supply of molasses for 
their rum distilleries, which became of great importance 
to their economic and commercial life, and that they also 
found in these same islands a profitable market for large 
quantities of lumber, of "West India" cod and other salt 
fish, of live stock and food-stufFs. It is, in fact, writ large 
in the Molasses Act of 1733 and again in the Sugar Act 
of 1764 that the trade between these two groups of colo- 
nies had become of such great importance as to arouse 
the opposition of the British West India planters and to 
cause the British government to take steps to interrupt. 



PREFACE 

or at least to discourage, this trade so seriously as to 
render it unprofitable. Many students are already famil- 
iar with the violent protests of Massachusetts and of 
Rhode Island against George Grenville's policy, and have 
seen in them an indication of the importance of the trade. 

The French West Indies, however, have remained but 
a name. Students have watched New England ships sail 
with their cargoes of fish, lumber, live stock and food- 
stuffs and have let them, so to speak, disappear into the 
unknown, whence they saw them reappear with cargoes 
of sugar and molasses. None has seen fit to follow them 
to Martinique or to Guadeloupe or to St. Domingo to catch 
a glimpse of the great prosperity of these islands and to 
learn the secret of their extraordinary development which 
enabled the French to drive the English from the sugar 
markets of Europe and made of them the most profitable 
market which New England traders could find. 

It was in quest of this secret that I set out some three 
years ago for France to find, if possible, buried away in 
unprinted manuscripts the story of the economic and 
commercial development of the French West Indies which 
no one had ever tried to tell, but which I believed was, 
nevertheless, one of both interest and importance. 

M}^ immediate interest in the story lay rather in that 
part of it which had to do with the eighteenth century, 
when these islands first became of any considerable impor- 
tance, and to that I first turned my attention. But even 
at the beginning of my work, I found it quite impossible 
to deal intelligently with many questions of the eighteenth 
century without knowing something more accurate than 
was to be found in any printed work of the commercial 
policy which had directed and shaped the growth of the 
islands during the preceding century. The result was that 
I decided to make a thorough study of the early period 
for myself as a foundation for my later work. 

viii 



PREFACE 

It was in this way that I came to write the present 
study for the ministry of Colbert and will offer shortly 
another of similar character for the period 1688-1715. 
I hope that these two studies will make it possible to 
present more intelligently a later study for the reign of 
Louis XV, in which I shall deal with the story of the trade 
between the New England colonies and the French West 
Indies. 

It was with much hesitation that I decided to make the 
bold venture of writing a volume which dealt with any 
phase of the ministry of Colbert. His name and his work 
have attracted so many scholars of great ability that I 
naturally felt some misgiving in exposing myself to such 
a body of critics. A more serious objection was the fact 
that I had never made any thorough study of Colbert and 
had collected material on his ministry merely to aid me in 
writing an introduction to a volume on the later period 
which I had in mind. But as I found at the end of my 
researches that I had amassed enough notes from unpub- 
lished, and in some cases, unexplored material which would 
permit me to state the problem confronting the great min- 
ister in the reorganization of the French West India colo- 
nies and to give an account of the measures he took to 
solve it, I was subjected to the temptation of expanding 
my introduction into a volume. The temptation grew 
stronger when I realized that no serious student had ever 
tried to study in detail any single problem which Colbert 
encountered in his efforts to build up colonial commerce. 
I yielded to the temptation. 

An attempt has been made, therefore, in the present 
volume to present the results of my study and to offer 
them for what value they may have for special students 
of Colbert and for those interested in the history of the 
West Indies. I have tried to present the essential lines 
of Colbert's commercial policy toward the French West 



PREFACE 

Indies, as they are traced in the legislation and corre- 
spondence of the period. For the most part, I have done 
so without comment or criticism, permitting the documents 
in many cases to tell their own story. I have left to more 
competent hands the task of stating the larger principles 
of economy which guided Colbert in framing his more 
comprehensive plan for the upbuilding of French indus- 
tries and French commerce. That task can not well be 
performed until more detailed studies have been made on 
many subjects which are related to the history of his com- 
mercial and industrial policy. I shall feel amply rewarded 
for my work, if the contents of this volume prove of value 
to him who undertakes this larger and more important 
task. I regret very much that I have not been able to 
treat many questions which would prove both interesting 
and profitable to students of the West Indies. Thus, such 
questions as the cost of production of sugar, the fluctua- 
tion of its price, the methods employed in its cultivation, 
the great social transformation wrought by its introduc- 
tion as a staple product in the islands, or others, such as 
the cost of slave labour, the system of land grants, colo- 
nial currency, the sources of capital invested in the islands, 
as well as all questions of administration and kindred 
questions have been either entirely omitted or touched 
upon only superficially. This has been done, partly 
because the material found proved inadequate for a satis- 
factory treatment of these questions, and partly because 
I have attempted to present here primarily a study in 
imperial policy and not a study in West India history. 
The history of the French West Indies did not, in fact, 
become important until the eighteenth century. Their 
production and their commerce during the seventeenth 
century were small and a detailed history of either would 
be of minor interest. The policy which was pursued by 
Colbert, however, to stimulate their production and to 



PREFACE 

increase their commerce with the mother country proved 
of permanent value, because it laid the base for the marvel- 
lous development of Martinique, Guadeloupe, and espe- 
cially St. Domingo, in the eighteenth century. This is 
the justification offered for placing the emphasis upon 
questions of imperial policy and upon conditions within 
the islands only as they affected or were affected by that 
policy. 

I have yielded, perhaps unwisely, to the temptation of 
devoting too much space to the history of the West India 
Company. New material found in the Archives Coloniales 
at Paris made it possible to state more accurately many 
old facts and to add many new ones concerning its history. 

An examination of the bibliography and footnotes will 
reveal the sources from which my study has been drawn. 

I am under obligations to many who have aided me in 
my work. I shall always recall with much pleasure the 
kindness shown me by many librarians and archivists in 
Paris and in the various ports of France where my work 
called me. To M. Nicolas and M. Wirth of the Archives 
Coloniales ; to M. Stein and M. Bourgin of the Archives 
Nationales ; to M. Charles de La Ronciere, the sympathetic 
and obliging conservateur of the Bibliotheque Nationale, 
at Paris ; to M. Leon Maitre, late archivist of the Archives 
Departementales de la Loire Inferieure, whose patience and 
willingness to aid me in unravelling the tangles in the ad- 
miralty records of Nantes were inexhaustible ; to M. Cul- 
tru, charge de cours at the Sorbonne, who proved an 
inspiration to me many times during my stay at Paris ; to 
H. P. Biggar and his assistant, M. Beauchesne, both of 
whom were ever ready to communicate any information, 
relating to my subject, which they found in the Canadian 
correspondence ; to one and all I wish to express my grati- 
tude. Of my own countrymen, I am indebted to Mr. 
Waldo G. Leland of the Carnegie Institution, whose 



PREFACE 

sojourn at Paris coincided with my own and who was 
ever wilHng to aid me ; to my colleague, Professor Emer- 
son D. Fite of the faculty of Yale College, for sug- 
gestions ; to Mr. Andrew Keogh of the Yale University 
Library, for suggestions and aid in the arrangement of 
the bibliography. I am under special obligations to Pro- 
fessor George Burton Adams for making possible the pub- 
lication of this volume in its present form. I am most 
indebted to Professors Wilbur C. Abbott and Max Far- 
rand for their kindness in reading my manuscript, going 
over it patiently with me and offering many invaluable 
criticisms. I am grateful to Mr. E. Byrne Hackett of the 
Yale University Press for his patience and kindness in 
aiding me in the many problems which arose in the trans- 
formation of my work from manuscript to its present 
form. Finally I should not fail to express here my ever- 
lasting gratitude to him to whose memory this study is 
dedicated. It was he who first inspired me to begin my 
work. I only wish that I could offer something worthy 
of the inspiration which he imparted while still among us 
and of the hallowed memory which he has left to us his 
former pupils. 



CONTENTS* 

Page 
Preface ........ vii 

Introduction ........ 1 

Chapter I 

The Establishment of the French in the West Indies 

and the Commencement of Trade, 1 626-1 660 . 14 

Chapter II 
The Awakening and the Period of Preparation . . 52 

Chapter III 

The Establishment of the West India Company. Its 

Concessions, Privileges and Composition . . 68 

Chapter IV 
The West India Company, 1664-1665 ... 83 

Chapter V 
The West India Company, 1666-1667 . . .123 

Chapter VI 
The West India Company, 1668-1670 . . .150 

Chapter VII 

The West India Company, 1670-1674. Its Trade in 

Slaves, Salt Beef, Live Stock. Its Downfall . l65 



For detailed reference see Index, 
xiii 



CONTENTS 

Chapter VIII p^^^ 

The Exclusion of Foreign Traders . . . .182 

Chapter IX 
The Fight Against the Dutch 195 

Chapter X 
Freedom of Trade and the Rise of the Private Trader 225 

Chapter XI 
Colonial Exports — Tobacco ..... 249 

Chapter XII 
Colonial Exports — Sugar ..... 260 

Chapter XIII 
Colonial Imports — Indentured Servants and Slaves . 281 

Chapter XIV 
Colonial Imports — Food-StufFs . . . .310 

Chapter XV 

Colonial Imports — Live Stock, Lumber, Manufactured 

Goods .326 

Chapter XVI 
Conclusion 332 

Bibliography . . . . . . .341 

Index S65 



XIV 



COLBERT'S WEST INDIA POLICY 



INTRODUCTION 



*' A aS / cast my glance throughout the length and breadth 
JLm. of France to find out what is the condition of its com- 
merce, I am dumfounded to see into what a low state it has sunk. 
I am seized with a feeling of disgrace and of sorrow, when I see 
the greater part of our merchants idle, our sailors without 
employment, our harbours without vessels, and our ships 
wrecked and stranded upon the beach. . . . Like Diogenes 
I might carry a lantern at noontide in our cities and our ports 
in search of a French merchant."^ 

Thus wrote Jean Eon, a Carmelite, at Nantes, in 1646. 
It is only one of many striking passages in his interesting 
book, Le Commerce honorable, which describes in mourn- 
ful numbers the state of France of his day. The pessi- 
mism which is breathed into his book was only too well 
justified by the deplorable condition into which the indus- 
trial and commercial life of France had sunk at the eve 
of Colbert's ministry. The industries, established under 
the stimulating economic policy of Sully and fostered by 
Richelieu, were in a state of decadence. The woollen 
industry had almost ceased to exist in Languedoc, which 
had been its most thriving center. The Dutch and 
English, the latter of whom had formerly brought their 
wool to France to be manufactured, had established manu- 
factories of their own and had largely supplanted the 
French as furnishers of woollens to the markets of Europe. 
The silk mills of Tours and Lyons were declining. The 
foundries, the forges, the factories of steel, and the tan- 
neries had been almost abandoned.^ "So that instead of 
gaining large sums as they did in former times, the French 

'^ Le Commerce honorable, Nantes, 1646, p. 20. 

2 G. Martin, La grande Industrie en France sous le rkgne de Louis 
XIV, Paris, 1899, Chap. I. 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

gain nothing, for much specie is leaving the kingdom and 
none enters."^ 

The navy and merchant marine, too, were in a most 
deplorable condition. "The power of the king by land is 
superior to that of all others in Europe, by sea it is infe- 
rior. . . . France has not at the present hour SOO ves- 
sels in good condition in her ports."* The number of 
vessels even for coasting trade was certainly small.^ The 
inquest ordered to be made in 1664 by the conseil des 
finances at the suggestion of Colbert, to find out "the 
number and quality of vessels which were in the ports of 
the realm," showed that in all the ports of France there 
was a total of only 2368 vessels, representing an aggregate 
tonnage of 129,605 tons.^ There were only 829 vessels 
of more than 100 tons. Some of these even were too old 
or disabled for service.^ So that Colbert probably knew 
whereof he spoke, when he remarked that France had not 
at that time 200 vessels in good condition in her ports. 

The Dutch were at the height of their maritime suprem- 

3 P. Clement, Lettres, instructions et memoires, II, 1, cclxvii, Dis- 
cours sur les manufactures du Roy, a memoir by Colbert in 1664. 

4 Clement, II, 1, cclxxi, Colbert, Memoire sur le Commerce. 

5 "That is a fact which is very easy to prove by visiting our coasts 
and our harbours, where one sees so many foreign ships that the small 
number of French ships is lost from sight. Thus for ten or twelve of 
our ships one may count fifty or sixty belonging to foreigners." Le 
Commerce honorable, p. 30. 

6 There were: 1063 of 10 to 30 tons; 345 of 30 to 40 tons; 320 of 
40 to 60 tons ; 178 of 60 to 80 tons ; 133 of 80 to 100 tons ; 102 of 100 
to 120 tons; 72 of 120 to 150 tons; 70 of 150 to 200 tons; 39 of 200 
to 250 tons ; 27 of 250 to 300 tons ; 19 of 300 to 400 tons. Bib. Nat. 
MSS., 500 Colbert, 199, contains the results of this most interesting 
inquest. Detailed information is given in the reports made from the 
different ports. It is a mine of information which has not been thor- 
oughly exploited. 

7 Thus it is recorded in the inquest made at Nantes that La Pel- 
lagye, a vessel of 140 tons, built at Croisic in 1648, "was fit for nothing 
except to be torn to pieces." 

2 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

acy. Colbert estimated that out of a total of 20,000 ves- 
sels in the merchant marine of Europe, 16,000 belonged 
to them. They had become the great carriers of Europe. 
Their cities had become the great entrepots of interna- 
tional trade. Their ships were upon every sea and in every 
harbour to take advantage of every opportunity to profit 
by trade and transport. The ports of France were no 
exception to the rule. They, too, were frequented by great 
numbers of Dutch traders. For the item of transport 
alone in the coastwise and foreign trade, the French paid, 
according to Colbert's estimate, an annual tribute of 
4,000,000 livres. Commerce also was almost entirely in 
their hands. 

"It is certain," remarked Colbert, "that with the exception 
of a certain number of vessels which go from Marseilles to 
trade in the Levant, no commerce exists in the kingdom. This 
is true even to the point that in the islands of America, 
occupied by the French, there are 150 Dutch ships annually 
which carry on trade with them, importing food-stufFs pro- 
duced in Germany and goods manufactured in Holland, and 
exporting sugar, tobacco and dye-woods. They carry these 
latter commodities to Holland, which, after manufacturing and 
paying an import and export duty upon, they bring to France 
to sell."^ 

Jean Eon estimated, in 1646, that the "balance of 
trade" was against France in her dealings with all the 
principal nations of Europe. He justified this statement 
by the following statistics: 

Holland:^ 

Imports from .... 21,445,520 livres. 

Exports to ..... 16,701,466 livres. 

8 Clement, II, 1, ccbcxi. 

^ Le Commerce honorable, pp. 28 ff. The details of the imports 
from and exports to Holland were as follows: 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 



Great Britain and Ireland: 

Imports from 

Exports to 
Portugal : 

Imports from 

Exports to 
Italy: 

Imports from 

Exports to 



15,372,000 livres. 
12,904,100 livres. 

4,992,500 livres. 
5,851,950 livres. 

4,124,500 livres. 
3,020,000 livres. 



Holland, Imports from: 

Pepper, cinnamon, nutmeg, mace, ginger, etc. 
Sugar ....... 

Medicine, drugs, etc. .... 

Precious stones, cottons, woollens, ebony, plumes, 

etc. 

Indigo, Brazil wood, camphor, gums 

Swedish copper, Polish lead, tin, ironware, etc 

Cannon, powder, firearms 

Russian leather, furs, etc. 

Linen, flax, tar, Norwegian timber . 

Herring, salt salmon, whale oil 

Butter, cheese, tallow, etc. 

Total 

Exports to: 

Wine, cognac, brandy 

Wheat, other grains ..... 

Salt 

Cloth, linen from Normandy and Brittany and 
Guienne ....... 

Olive oil, olives, from Marseilles and Provence 
Laces, paper, glass, thread .... 

Honey, preserved fruits, etc. .... 

Total 



The author states that these statistics were compiled from memoirs 
in the principal ports of France and represent the average for five 
years and states that "they have been carefully compiled by reliable 
persons who understood the theory and practice of trade." 



3,193,130 livres. 


1,885,150 livres. 


842,080 livres. 


1,835,200 livres. 


1,035,320 livres. 


1,500,000 livres. 


1,235,000 livres. 


675,300 Uvres. 


1,700,170 livres. 


454,300 livres. 


200,000 livres. 


21,445,520 livres. 


6,192,632 livres. 


3,450,450 livres. 


2,488,750 livres. 


1,583,432 livres. 


715,177 livres. 


915,525 livres. 


355,500 livres. 


16,701,466 livres. 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

An explanation of the inferiority of the French in trade 
was suggested by the same writer : 

"The French have long since entertained a very disparaging 
opinion of commerce,, which they consider suited only to 
debased souls. . . . Every one aspires to gain honour and 
leisure and believes that neither the one nor the other is to be 
enjoyed in the pursuit of commerce. This is the opinion which 
the majority of Frenchmen hold and especially those of the 
tiers etat, who have means and desire to elevate their children 
to the most honourable stations. They cultivate in them no love 
for trade or give them no instruction in matters of commerce^ 
but send them to colleges where they pass many years in the 
study of the sciences. To be sure instruction is very good and 
necessary in the moulding of a virtuous life and in rendering 
one of service to God^ the king and the state. Nevertheless, 
the energy of our young men is wasted in these colleges and 
they are fitted only for a life of elegance, of idleness, and of 
no service to the state. For as soon as they leave college, 
some give themselves over to the pursuits of love, which Diog- 
enes calls the affair of those who have nothing to do. . . . 
Others spend their time playing at jeu-de-paumes to sweat at 
their pleasure and thereby gain an appetite to eat up in a 
short time all their patrimony. Others take to cards and dice, 
and thus pass their days and nights in foolishly dissipating 
the fortunes which their fathers have acquired by hard work. 
Still others pass their time in drink-shops. . . . Our young 
are thus reared to lead an idle and spendthrift life. . . . The 
indifference of the French to commerce comes not only from 
the small esteem and the little inclination which they have for 
it, but also from the fact that they are strongly diverted by 
ambition. . . . They have ambition to acquire the offices of 
justice which the state in its need has created in great numbers, 
so that the majority of those who are rich and have means 
to carry on commerce abandon it, in order to acquire such posi- 
tions for their children. . . . It is for this reason that for 
the maintenance of trade there remain only those of low estate, 
who, by reason of their moderate means, are unable to buy 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

offices from the state^ and who for the same reason are incap- 
able of carrying on an extensive trade and are forced to confine 
themselves to retail trade^ or at best^ to the coasting trade, both 
of which are of small value to the nation in comparison with 
foreign commerce which brings us gold and silver and many- 
other things necessary and useful for our life. Whenever, 
from that small number of Frenchmen who are engaged in 
foreign commerce, some one amasses a fortune, which is the 
very moment when he is the most capable of pursuing foreign 
trade, he abandons it in order to place his children in some 
office of state."^" 

From this picture the author turns his eyes toward the 
life of other nations : 

"From the age of fifteen and twenty, they [the Dutch] are 
to be seen upon the quais loading and unloading cargoes, or 
in the stock-exchanges engaged in business, or in the market- 
places choosing and buying the best products. . . . Thus 
from their youth they form habits of trade, become endowed 
with skill which insures their success. . . . They learn for- 
eign languages and, like the ancients, acquire by conversation 
a knowledge of those things which are the most beautiful and 
the most necessary for the enjoyment of life and its spiritual 
welfare." 

There is to be found in these two passages an explana- 
tion of the decadence of commerce in France, which gives 
a profound insight into the very difficult problem that 
confronted Colbert in his determination to build up 
national industries and national trade. The life of the 
nation was centered in the court, in the attainment of 
rank and places as high as possible in the great social and 
political hierarchy of the ancien regime. A man's worth 
seemed measured by the amount of success which he had 
met with in this pursuit. Commerce was considered an 
occupation below the dignity of the well-bred. A mer- 

10 Ibid., 44 ff. 

6 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

chant who met with success forsook his calHng to become 
another satelHte in the mad whirl of office-seekers, cour- 
tiers and dilettantes. Ministers, warriors, artists, littera- 
teurs, officials, noblemen, the clergy, were all received with 
favour at the court and throughout the kingdom, but the 
merchant was regarded with disfavour or indifference. 

The importance of this fact did not escape Colbert. In 
his memoir on commerce, read in the first session of the 
conseil de commerce presided over by the king on August 
3, 1664, he exposed the poor state of commerce in the 
realm and then proposed the remedies. It was not by mere 
chance that the following recommendations came first to 
the great minister's mind : 

"Receive with special marks of favour and protection all 
merchants who come to the court. 

"Aid them in everything which concerns their commerce. 
Permit them to present their cause in person before the council 
of His Majesty, when they are involved in cases of impor- 
tance. 

"Let there be always some merchants in the suite of His 
Majesty. "^^ 

These recommendations are ample proof that commerce 
was not an honourable calling in France, and that the 
conditions described by Jean Eon persisted. The fact 
offers at least a partial explanation of the deplorable 
state of commerce in the realm. But wherever one may 
search for the causes and whatever explanation one may 
offer, it is certain that Mazarin willed to Colbert a France 
in a state of industrial and commercial decadence. 

At Mazarin's death Colbert was at first made intendant 
of finance (March 16, 1661). He rapidly rose in the 
king's favour. In January, 1664, he was made surinten- 
dant des hdtiments et manufactures, in 1665, controller- 

11 Clement, II, 1, cclxxi. 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

general, and finally, in 1669, minister of the marine, thus 
uniting in his hands all the important branches of admin- 
istration except that of war. But from the first he exerted 
a large influence upon the direction of affairs. For the 
first three years of his service to the king his time was 
largely absorbed by the prosecution of the "affair Fou- 
quet" and by the reorganization of the finances of the 
kingdom. It was not until 1664 that he had worked out 
a large plan for the upbuilding of industry and the estab- 
lishment of commerce. In that year he showed character- 
istic energy. He organized the conseil de commerce ; he 
framed the high protective tariff of 1664 ; he developed a 
comprehensive plan to restore industry and create manu- 
factures, to build up a strong navy and merchant marine; 
and he organized the East and West India Companies. 
Most of the details of this plan have been made so familiar 
by the studies of Joubleau, Clement, Neymarck and others, 
as to make it unnecessary to restate them here. It will 
be permitted to recall, however, that the development of 
over-sea commerce occupied the most important place in 
the great minister's plan for the regeneration of France : 

"The happiness of a people consists not only in a consider- 
able diminution of taxes, such as has been made within the 
last few years, but even more in the maintenance of commerce 
which alone can bring into the kingdom an abundance that will 
serve not as a means of luxury to the few, but as a blessing to 
the many. Commerce stimulates manufactures, by opening 
markets for their products and gives employment to a large 
number of people of almost every age and sex. It is thus an 
agent which harmonizes an abundance of temporal things with 
the spiritual welfare of a people, for idleness begets wrong- 
doing, while hard work fortifies one against it. After a care- 
ful examination of all the means to bring happiness to our 
subjects and after much reflection over a subject of such impor- 
tance, we have been more and more convinced that over-sea 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

commerce is the means. It is certain^ both from sound reason 
and from the experience of our neighbours, that the profit 
gained much outweighs the toil and pain expended therein."^^ 

These words may or may not have been written by Col- 
bert, but they may be taken as representing his ideas, for 
he remarked later, in speaking of the East India Company, 
that it was the most difficult enterprise which the king had 
undertaken since he began to rule, and the success of which 
would prove the most glorious and the most advantageous 
for the welfare of the realm/^ Again in the preamble of 
the tariff of 1664 it is remarked that although measures 
had been taken to build up commerce within the realm, yet 
most attention had been paid to the upbuilding of naviga- 
tion and foreign commerce which was "the only means of 
making the kingdom prosperous. "^^ It is quite certain 
from the constant attention which Colbert paid to the 
establishment of such a commerce that these ideas were his 
own and that upon them this policy was founded. 

The success of the Dutch with their wealth and power 
upon the sea exerted a large influence upon his mind. He 
attributed their success to trade, asserting that the Dutch 
East India Company had assets amounting to no less than 
800,000,000 livres ; that Holland had become the entrepot 
in Europe for the rich trade with the Indies ; and further- 
more that the Dutch had made themselves masters of the 
trade with the ports of the Baltic, with the French West 
Indies, and of the carrying trade of Europe. 

Colbert decided to organize two large companies which 
would at least dispute with them the trade with the two 
Indies. There is something stupendous in the way in which 
he projected the East and West India Companies. To 
the one he assigned, as the field for its activity, the vast 

12 The preamble of the letters-patent of the East India Company. 

13 Clement, III, 2, Ixv. 

14 Ibid., II, 2, p. 789. 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

expanse from the Cape of Good Hope eastward even to the 
straits of Magellan, including all the East Indies, China, 
Japan, and all the oriental seas; to the other, he granted 
immense territories in the three continents of North Amer- 
ica, South America and Africa, and many prosperous 
islands in the West Indies. Is it not in a sense a new 
demarcation line by which the world is split in twain and 
a half given to each company for its exploitation? 

Of the two companies, Colbert considered the East 
India Company of greater importance. Its organiza- 
tion became a matter of great moment. Charpentier, a 
member of the Academy, was called into service to paint 
in glowing colours the paradise at Madagascar which 
offered its hospitable shores to serve the company as a base 
for trade with the rich Orient.^^ The king, the queen, the 
queen-mother, the princes of royal blood, noblemen, offi- 
cials of high rank, subscribed for varying sums. A verit- 
able campaign was pursued by Colbert to persuade or 
force judges, revenue-farmers, intendants and merchants 
throughout the kingdom to subscribe to the funds of the 
company. Everything was done to make the enterprise 
appear attractive as an investment. National pride was 
appealed to by pointing out the success and superiority 
of the Dutch in the oriental trade. Special rights were 
offered to subscribers of 10,000 and 20,000 livres. In 
short, the organization of the company was made an affair 
of state. 

The organization of the West India Company was not 
regarded as a matter of such importance. It had no Char- 
pentier to describe its brilliant prospects, no queen or 
queen-mothers, no princes and very few noblemen to 
appear as its sponsors and supporters. This point is of 
some importance, because it shows clearly that Colbert 
expended much more effort in the organization of the 

15 Charpentier, Le Discours d'un fiddle sujet, Paris, 1664. 

10 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

former company and expected much larger results from 
it. In this he was destined to be disappointed, for the 
West India Company yielded much larger results and in 
the light of these results deserved much more attention 
and much more financial support than it at first received 
at the hands of the minister. 

The problems of the two companies were quite different. 
That of the East India Company consisted in the creation 
of trade with the far-distant Orient. The attempts which 
had been made already in 1604, 1611, 1615 and 1642 had 
proved practically fruitless, so that at the commencement 
of Louis XIV's personal reign all the products of the 
Orient came by the way of Holland or of England. There 
were thus no precedents to guide the new company except 
those of failure and of ill-omen. The seriousness of this 
is proved by the fact that the company spent the first four 
years of its existence battling with the problem of estab- 
lishing an entrepot at Madagascar as a base of its opera- 
tions to build up trade with the Orient. All of its pre- 
liminary expeditions, representing a large expenditure of 
money, got no farther than Madagascar, and it was not 
until 1669 that one of its vessels returned directly from 
the Indies to France.^^ 

The problem of the West India Company was also to 
prove exceedingly difficult. The long list of companies, 
organized since the sixteenth century for the exploitation 
of different parts of the territory of the new company, 
was a long list of failures and augured ill for the success 
of the enterprise. But the task before it was not so con- 
structive in character as that of the other company. The 
route to Canada was well known, for many hardy sailors 
of the ports of France were engaged in the fisheries of 
Newfoundland, and Canada was a French colony. The 

16 P. Kaeppelin, La Compagnie des Indes Orientales et Frangois 
Martin, Paris, 1908, Chap. I. 

11 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

French Antilles contained in many cases prosperous colo- 
nies and a good trade already existed. A French settle- 
ment had been recently made at Cayenne. On the west 
coast of Africa, French trading-posts were already estab- 
lished. So that the new company fell heir to many valu- 
able assets and had as its problem, rather, the union of 
those separate colonies in its hands and development of 
their resources. This difference may account, in a meas- 
ure, for the greater stress which Colbert laid upon the 
organization of the East India Company, but the princi- 
pal reason remains that he regarded that company as of 
much greater importance. 

In addition to these two companies, Colbert, during the 
course of his ministry, organized for various purposes five 
other commercial companies, namely, the Company of the 
North, the Company of the Levant, the Company of the 
Pyrenees, the first and second companies of Senegal. 

The Company of the North was organized in 1669 with 
the purpose of building up a trade with the ports of 
Northern Europe, especially with those of the Baltic, and 
thus of making France independent of the Dutch trader. It 
was granted a monopoly of trade with Holland, the coasts 
of Germany, Sweden, Norway, Muscovy, and other coun- 
tries of the North. De Lagny, who was later to become 
director of commerce, and Colbert de Terron, intendant 
at Brouage, were especially charged with the direction of 
the enterprise. Premiums were offered for the exportation 
and importation of cargoes to and from the North. The 
king agreed to take on liberal terms, masts, lumber, tar, 
and other articles necessary for his navy. 

It was in this same year that Colbert formed the plan 
of organizing a new company to re-establish commerce 
with the Levant. An idea of the importance which he 
attached to this enterprise maybe gained from a letter 
which he wrote to one of its prospective directors : 

13 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

"I beseech you to consider the affair as one of the greatest 
importance to the interests of the nation and one in which^ con- 
sequently, I feel the greatest concern. I feel sure that you 
will apply yourself with the utmost diligence in order that the 
enterprise may succeed in accordance with my wishes. "^^ 

Letters-patent were issued to the Company of the Levant 
in July, 1670. Its capital was fixed at 3,000,000 livres 
and the king agreed to furnish one-fourth of it.^^ 

The Company of the Pyrenees was organized in 1671, 
in preparation for the war with the Dutch, in order that 
the royal marine might not lack masts and lumber, sup- 
plied ordinarily by trade with the North, which might be 
interrupted during the war. 

Finally, in 1673, a company was organized for the ex- 
ploitation of Senegal and another for the same purpose 
in 1679 and 1681. Their history is recorded below. 

All of these companies received the attention of Colbert 
and were organized to do a very definite work in the ful- 
fillment of his larger plans. Their history is interesting, 
not so much for what they actually accomplished, as for 
the insight which they give into what he wished to accom- 
plish and attempted to do. It reveals the vast importance 
which Colbert attached to foreign and colonial commerce. 

17 Clement, II, 2, p. 507. Letter to Sir Dallier, January 9, 1670. 

18 Bonassieux, Les Grandes Compagnies de Commerce, p. 179. 



13 



CHAPTER I 

The Establishment or the French in the 

West Indies and the Commencement 

OF Trade, 1626-1660 

T N the year 1625 there set sail from Dieppe a small brig- 
■*• antine, armed with four cannon and equipped with a 
crew of thirty or forty men, "all of whom were good sol- 
diers, well seasoned and well discipHned." It was com- 
manded by Pierre d'Esnambuc and his companion of for- 
tune, Urbain de Roissey. The latter was known among 
the English as the "pirate of Dieppe" and records exist 
of some of his piratical exploits.^ It may be that the two 
captains sailed as pirates, bent upon finding some prey 
on the high seas and that their sojourn shortly afterwards 
at St. Christopher was only an incident in their voyage. 
Thus the beginning of colonization by the French in the 
West Indies, which resulted from this sojourn, would seem, 
as de La Ronciere affirms it to be, the result of an adven- 
ture. It may be, on the other hand, that the two captains 
sailed with definite intentions, for it was affirmed in the 
permission granted them the following year to estabhsh a 
colony that these two captains had been in search for some 
fifteen years "of some fertile lands in good clime which 
could be colonized by the French." As pirates or as 
founders of colonies, they set sail to the westward. Near 
Jamaica they encountered a large Spanish galleon from 
which, after three hours of fighting, they escaped. They 
sought refuge with their badly damaged vessel at St. 

1 See Du Tertre, Histoire generate des Antilles frangaises, I, 3ff.; 
de La Ronciere, Histoire de la marine frangaise, IV, 649 ff.; Breard, 
Documents relatifs a la marine normande, pp. 179, 212, 213; Pierre 
Margry, Pierre d'Esnambuc. 

14 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

Christopher, where they arrived probably in the summer 
of 1625. 

Much to their surprise, certainly much to their joy, 
they found a small band of Frenchmen already established 
there and living in peace with the savages. It was a band 
composed of those who from time to time had sought refuge 
in the island. Thus in their number was Chantail, a 
refugee from an unsuccessful expedition to Cayenne. 
D'Esnambuc was hailed with joy as "an angel from 
heaven" and during his sojourn in the island he came to 
be "loved as a father, honoured as a chief and obeyed as a 
master."^ The island proved particularly attractive to 
him. Its situation impressed him as excellent, its soil as 
fertile and well adapted to the cultivation of tobacco. 
The members of the little colony were favourably disposed 
toward the plan of remaining in the island to form a per- 
manent settlement. D'Esnambuc promised them that he 
would return to France, seek additional funds and come 
back to live with them. He straightway loaded his vessel 
with excellent tobacco and some articles obtained in trade 
from the Indians and set sail for France. He arrived at 
Dieppe probably in the summer of 1626. 

After selling his cargo at good profit, d'Esnambuc 
turned his face toward Paris to plead his cause. He 
appeared clad in such excellent attire and gave such a 
good account of his voyage that all with whom he talked 
were convinced of the excellence of the island and of the 
profit to be gained by its settlement. Thanks to the influ- 
ence of some friends, he obtained an interview with Riche- 
lieu. The great cardinal was so favourably impressed that 
he decided to aid d'Esnambuc to carry out his plans. 

The act of association for the organization of the Com- 
pany of St. Christopher was drawn up and signed on 
October 31, 1626. It bore the signature of Richelieu, 

2 Du Tertre, I, 4. 

15 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

for the sum of 10,000 livres, of which 8000 livres were to 
be paid by the gift of a vessel ; of Ruse d'Effiat, intendant 
general of the marine, for 2000 livres ; of de Flecelles and 
Bardin-Royer, presidents des comptes, each for 2000 
livres ; and of four others for a total of 7000 livres. The 
initial subscriptions amounted to only 22,000 livres, but 
the associates pledged their credit to the amount of 45,000 
livres. It was proposed to expend the capital of the com- 
pany for the purchase and equipment of three vessels. 
The purpose was declared to be the settlement of "the 
islands of St. Christopher, Barbuda, and the others at 
the entrance of Peru," situated between the 11th and 18th 
degrees north latitude and not already occupied by Euro- 
peans. The establishment of trade and the conversion of 
the natives to the Holy Catholic faith were the declared 
motives. A monopoly of trade for forty years was 
granted to the company.^ 

On the same day, October 31, 1626, a formal permit 
was issued to the two captains to return to St. Christo- 
pher. They straightway left Paris, d'Esnambuc going 
into Normandy and de Roissey into Brittany, in order to 
enlist settlers. The former succeeded in enlisting 322 
men, whom he embarked in La Catholique, a vessel of 250 
tons belonging to the company, and the latter, 210 men, 
whom he embarked in La Cardinale and La Victoire. 
D'Esnambuc set sail from Havre near the end of January 
and rejoined de Roissey in Brittany, whence "this little 

3 The text of the act of association is to be found in Du Tertre, 
op. cit., I, 8-11, and in Moreau de Saint-Mery, Loix et Constitutions, 
I, 18-19. The clause of the document defining the concessions of the 
company reads as follows: "Pour faire habiter et peupler les isles de 
St. Christophe et la Barbade et autres situ6es a I'entree du P6rou." 
The Antilles were very frequently referred to in the seventeenth cen- 
tury as the "isles du Perou." See Breard, op. cit., 145. As to the 
term "la Barbade," it is used somewhat loosely to refer either to Bar- 
buda or to Barbadoes. 

16 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

fleet, composed for the most part of poor people gathered 
here and there and very little accustomed to the fatigues 
of the sea, set sail on February M, 1627."* 

They had not gone 200 leagues upon the sea, before 
provisions began to fail. Limited rations of water and 
food were meted out. Sickness set in and death began 
to claim many victims. After more than two months the 
three vessels anchored at Sandy Point, at the western end 
of St. Christopher. Of the seventy embarked in La Cardi- 
nale, only sixteen had survived the voyage. More than 
half of those embarked in the other vessels had died during 
the passage. Those who remained were more dead than 
alive. Thus the fleet which had been awaited by the little 
band at St. Christopher and which, according to their 
hopes, was to bring them not only strong companions to 
aid them, but also an abundant supply of food and of 
other things necessary for their comfort, arrived at last 
in a deplorable state of poverty. The great joy which 
they had felt at the appearance of the ships was changed 
into bitter disappointment, and then bitter disappoint- 
ment into pity, as they saw the poor wretches totter upon 
their feeble limbs, as they were set ashore. 

D'Esnambuc and de Roissey divided the colony between 
them, the former going to the western end of the island, 
and the latter to the eastern. Between the two settle- 
ments were the English under the command of Thomas 
Warner, who had come to the island almost simultaneously 
with the French. Four hundred of them had lately landed 
fresh and strong from England. A treaty was made 
which fixed the boundaries and assured peace between the 
two nations. 

De Roissey was straightway sent back to France with 
La Cardinale to implore aid from the company. He 
arrived at Roscou in Brittany toward the last of Septem- 

4 Du Tertre, I, 15. 

17 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

ber, 1627. Instead, however, of hastening his prepara- 
tions to return and carry aid to the distressed colony, he 
allowed himself to be persuaded by de Razilly to take 
part in a secret expedition into the Irish Sea. De Razilly 
assured him that a vessel had already been sent to carry 
aid to the colony.^ In fact, a vessel had been sent, but 
unfortunately its cargo of provisions was so badly dam- 
aged during the voyage, that the colony received very 
small benefit therefrom. It was not until the following 
spring that de Roissey returned to St. Christopher in 
command of La Cardinale and another small vessel, both 
of which had been equipped at the cost of 3500 livres 
furnished by the company. Of the 150 new settlers carried 
by the two vessels, many died during the voyage and the 
colony again received but small aid. Shortly afterwards 
another vessel was sent out by the company, this time with 
120 new settlers. Again the few survivors were more of 
a tax than an aid to the colony at their arrival. 

There was such need that d'Esnambuc decided to go to 
France himself to plead the cause of the colony. Richelieu 
seems to have been touched by the account which he gave 
of the colony's suffering and of the danger which it ran of 
being crushed by the English. In addition, he was 
aroused by the report which reached him that the Spanish 
king was planning to send the powerful fleet under the 
command of Fadrique of Toledo by way of St. Christopher 
on its way to Brazil and that orders should be given to 
crush the new French settlement. He therefore commanded 
a strong fleet to be equipped and sent to the defense of the 
king's subjects. 

On June 25, 1629, a squadron of ten vessels under the 
command of Cahuzac sailed from Havre for St. Christo- 
pher.^ Three hundred new settlers were sent out with the 

5De La Ronciere, op. cit., IV, 652-653; Du Tertre, I, 21. 
6 De La Ronciere, o'p. cit., IV, 653-654. 

18 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

fleet at the expense of the company. The fleet arrived in 
the island at the end of August. Cahuzac quickly forced 
the English to respect the treaty which they had made 
with d'Esnambuc, and relieved the colony from the con- 
stant fear of being crushed by a stronger neighbour. 
Unfortunately, however, he grew impatient at waiting 
for the Spanish fleet and set sail to seek his fortune in the 
Gulf of Mexico. This proved disastrous, for the Spanish 
fleet appeared at the end of October, composed of 35 large 
galleons and 14 merchant vessels armed for war, and 
attacked the settlement at the eastern end of the island. 
In spite of the courage shown by some, such as the young 
du Parquet, the cowardice of de Roissey rendered the task 
of the Spaniards easy. The French fled in wild disorder 
to gain the western end of the island. At their arrival 
they declared that all was lost, that the Spaniards were 
in pursuit and that all must flee for their Kves. De Rois- 
sey demanded an immediate convocation of the council of 
war and threatened to have d'Esnambuc stabbed, if he 
opposed the plan of flight. In spite of d'Esnambuc's 
opposition, the whole colony embarked in two vessels 
which were at Sandy Point and sailed for Antigua. Un- 
favourable winds and tides drove them to St. Martin. 
Thence de Roissey, in spite of the protests of d'Esnambuc, 
set sail with one of the vessels for France. He was 
imprisoned in the Bastille by the orders of Richelieu. As 
for d'Esnambuc and those who remained faithful to him, 
after a brief sojourn at St. Martin and after vain eff^orts 
to settle in the islands of Antigua and Montserrat, they 
decided to return to their former settlement. This proved 
easy from the fact that the Spaniards had left no troops 
to maintain their possession of the island and from the 
fact that d'Esnambuc had the good fortune to find at 
Antigua a French vessel under the command of Giron, 
who had deserted the fleet commanded by Cahuzac during 

19 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

its sojourn at St. Christopher. By aid of this vessel the 
Httle colony was re-established in its old quarters.^ 

Thus, at the beginning of 1630, the French were re- 
commencing the colonization of St. Christopher. Of the 
1100 or 1200 settlers who had been sent out, only 350 
remained after four years of toil and struggle. The 
expenditures had been great, the returns small, the results 
discouraging. Henceforth, the company made but few 
efforts to send aid and the settlement was largely left to 
its fate. In spite of the heroic efforts of the brave leader, 
it would probably not have survived, had aid not come 
from another quarter. 

In 1628, even while d'Esnambuc was on his way to 
France to seek aid, there arrived at the coast of St. Chris- 
topher, so Du Tertre relates, a ship from Zeeland : 

"The Dutch captain, finding the tobacco most excellent, 
traded with the French, even letting them have some merchan- 
dise on credit. He encouraged them to work, consoled them in 
their misery and urged them to prepare a quantity of tobacco 
for him, promising them that he would come back in six months 
with a supply of food-stuffs and of everything of which they 
had need. Our Frenchmen, seeing themselves thus succoured 
by foreigners in the midst of their necessity, regained their 
courage and began straightway to clear their lands, to plant 
crops which would furnish them food, to cultivate tobacco and 
to build houses."^ 

It is thus that the historian records the appearance of 
the iirst Dutch merchant to trade with the French settled 
in the West Indies. One naturally pauses before the fact, 
for it is the beginning of a trade which increased rapidly 
and became the chief artery of the economic life of the 
French West Indies for nearly half a century. It was no 
mere chance that the vessel was Dutch. How many times 

7 This account has been taken from Du Tertre, I, 38-31. 

8 Du Tertre, I, 23. 

20 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

in the colonial history of the seventeenth century one finds 
the Dutch merchant arriving to bring help and comfort 
to a colony all but abandoned by the mother country. 
He seems ubiquitous. He is in the distant Orient, on the 
coasts of Africa, in South America, in Mexico, in North 
America, everywhere in the islands, sometimes trading at 
ports which he himself has established, sometimes and very 
often with colonies which other nations have founded. He 
seems omniscient. He knows the way to everywhere and 
is acquainted with the needs of all. The French, the Span- 
ish and the Portuguese were much superior as explorers, 
the English as permanent colonizers, but the Dutch were 
the traders par excellence of the seventeenth century. As 
such, they rendered just as valuable services to the perma- 
nent conquest of the New World as did the others as 
explorers and colonizers. They nursed many a colony 
through its years of infancy and nourished many another 
through a stage of weakness, until its life was assured. 

Following the re-establishment of the colony at St. 
Christopher in 1630, d'Esnambuc became thoroughly dis- 
couraged at the failure of the company to send aid. The 
resolution was taken to abandon the island. Accordingly 
only a very small amount of food-stuffs was planted in 
order that the harvest of tobacco might be as large as pos- 
sible. Six months later, however, the plan of returning was 
abandoned and naturally enough, the food supply began 
to fail. Famine set in. All were suffering and "would 
have perished, had not divine Providence sent back the 
Dutch captain who had traded with them the year before. 
He brought them flour, wine, meat, shirts, cloth, and in 
general, a supply of all things of which they had need and 
he gave it to them at six months' credit, contenting him- 
self with the amount of tobacco which they had on hand."^ 
The merchant sold this tobacco so advantageously at his 

9 Du Tertre, I, 36. 

31 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

return to Holland that some merchants of Flushing and 
of other Dutch ports decided to establish a regular trade 
with St. Christopher. Henceforth they sent so many ships 
there that all the needs of the colony were satisfied. "It 
is true to say," Du Tertre remarks, "that without the 
aid of the Dutch our colonies would never have survived."^" 

The influence of this upon the colonists at St. Chris- 
topher was quickly felt. Thoughts of leaving their plan- 
tations were abandoned. The attention of all was con- 
centrated upon the cultivation of tobacco, "they thought 
of nothing else than to produce good merchandise in order 
to attract the Dutch. They no longer took the trouble 
to send anything to France. "^^ 

The directors of the Company of St. Christopher com- 
plained bitterly of the fact that the Dutch were absorbing 
all the trade, saying that they had made considerable 
advances for the establishment of the colony and that it 
was not fair that foreigners reap the benefit therefrom. 
The planters replied that if they were forced to respect 
all the regulations and obligations which the company 
wished to impose upon them, and to rely upon it to fur- 
nish them with necessary provisions, they would not have 
a shirt upon their backs ; and that it was necessary to 
trade with the Dutch. In order to silence these com- 
plaints, the company decided to equip La Cardinale, and 
sent it to the relief of the colony. It arrived at St. Chris- 
topher with a cargo of food-stuffs in 1631, but "in such 
small quantities that the planters thought that the com- 
pany was making fun of them."^^ They were more firmly 
resolved than ever to trade with all who brought them aid. 

To protect the company both against the Dutch and 
the private French trader, a royal declaration was issued 

10 Du Tertre, I, 37. 

11 Ibid. 

12 Ibid., I, 40. 

22 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

on November 25, 1634, which forbade trade in the islands 
except with a written permit from the directors.^ The 
declaration apparently had no effect. Less than three 
months later the directors confessed that the company 
was bankrupt and unable to continue its commerce. The 
company was entirely too small and the field of its activ- 
ity too limited to command the attention of the stockhold- 
ers and none of them took any interest in its affairs. A 
petition was made to the king to permit the formation of 
a new company with increased capital and larger con- 
cessions. It was thus that the Company of St. Christo- 
pher came to an end. On the whole, it was a distinct fail- 
ure, but it must be recorded that with its capital and 
under its nominal administration, at least, a permanent 
settlement had been made by the French in the West 
Indies, from which, in the following period, other settle- 
ments developed and the power of the French was definitely 
established in the Antilles. So far as commerce was 
concerned, the company proved itself unable to satisfy 
the needs of the planters and after the first three or four 
years of its existence, left the field entirely free to the 
Dutch. 

The Company of St. Christopher was reorganized at 
the beginning of 1635 under the name of the Company 
of the Isles of America. The most notable additions to 
its personnel were Berruyer and Nicholas Fouquet. The 
former was "captain of the sea-ports of Veulette and 
petite Dalle-en-Caux." The latter, a "conseiller du roy," 
became one of the directors, not only in his own name but 
also as representative of the interests of Richelieu. During 
the first five years the meetings of the directors were held 
at his apartments.^^ It is impossible to estimate the impor- 
tance of the role which he henceforth played in the coloni- 
zation of the West Indies. 

13 Arch. Col., F2, 19, passim. 

23 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

The contract for the organization of the company was 
signed at the hotel of Richeheu, rue St. Honore, on Feb- 
ruary 12, 1635, and was confirmed b}^ letters-patent of 
March 8. Permission was granted to continue the coloni- 
zation of St. Christopher and to settle any other islands 
not occupied by European powers between the 10th and 
30th parallels north latitude. The company assumed the 
obligation to transport, or have transported, to the islands 
of its concession, during the course of twenty years, at 
least 4000 persons. For the satisfaction of this obliga- 
tion the number already at St. Christopher was to be 
counted. Article 10 of the letters-patent accorded a 
monopoly of trade for twenty years.^* 

It is impossible to state with precision the amount 
of work which the company accomplished, but it is certain 
that a notable advance was made during its existence 
in the occupation of new islands and in the increase of 
the power of the French in the West Indies. The narra- 
tives of Mathias du Puis, of Bouton, and especially of 
Du Tertre, enable one to say that the company showed 
considerable activity in the importation of new settlers 
and indentured servants. From the register, containing 
the minutes of the meetings of the directors from January 
31, 1635, to September 4, 1648, some idea may be gained 
of the efforts which it made to promote plantation and 
to establish regular trade.^^ 

Even before the formation of the new company, de 
I'Olive, the lieutenant of d'Esnambuc at St. Christopher, 
formed the plan of establishing a new settlement in one 

14 "During the space of twenty years no subject of His Majesty 
other than the said associates shall trade in the ports, harbours and 
rivers of the said islands except by the permission of the directors, 
under penalty of confiscation of vessel and cargo to the profit of the 
company." The text of the letters-patent is to be found in Moreau 
de Saint-Mery, I, 29-36; and in Du Tertre, I, 46-55. 

15 The register is to be found in Arch. Col., F2, 19. 

24 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

of the three islands of Guadeloupe, Martinique or Domi- 
nica. During the course of the year 1634, he sent the 
trusted Guillaume d'Orange^^ to make explorations in the 
three islands. Satisfied by the information thus gained, 
he set sail for France and arrived at Dieppe at the close 
of that year. Shortly after his arrival, he made the 
acquaintance of du Plessis, who had made the voyage to 
the West Indies with Cahuzac in 1629, and who had 
recently formed the plan to return to St. Christopher at 
the head of a band of new settlers. Du Plessis was easily 
persuaded to join de I'Olive in his larger scheme. They 
went to Paris together in order to gain the permission of 
Richelieu and of the new company. 

A contract was signed with the company on February 
14, 1635, whereby de I'Olive and du Plessis were bound to 
transport, within three months, to the one of the three 
islands chosen, 200 men, to construct dwellings and store- 
houses, to build one fort the first year, and another the 
foUoTvdng. After the first year and for the five succeeding 
years, 100 men were to be sent out annually and fifty for 
the four years there^^fter. The company reserved the 
right to send on its own account whatever number of 
settlers it chose, and stipulated that the two contractors 
should grant lands to such settlers and furnish them food 
during the first year of their residence in the islands. 
Only Frenchmen of the Catholic faith were to be trans- 
ported to the proposed colony. During the first six 
years every male inhabitant was to pay to the company a 
tax of sixty pounds of tobacco or forty pounds of cotton, 
according as the one or the other was planted in a given 
year. For the four succeeding years, the tax was to be 
100 pounds of tobacco and fifty pounds of cotton. An 

16 See an interesting study recently made of him by le Vicomte du 
Motey, Guillaume d'Orange et Us Origines des Antilles Frangaises, 
Paris, 1908. 

25 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

additional tax of one-tenth was to be paid on all other 
products. After the first six years the cultivation of 
tobacco was to be permitted only on alternate years and 
the maximum production for a planter in any one year was 
not to exceed 900 pounds. Commerce with foreigners was 
to be strictly forbidden. During the space of ten years de 
I'Olive and du Plessis were to enjoy the command of the 
colony, conjointly, if only one island was occupied, sepa- 
rately, if two were occupied.^^ 

A sub-contract was let by de I'Olive and du Plessis, 
whereby some merchants of Dieppe agreed to transport 
to Guadeloupe, in the space of ten years, 2500 men, all 
of whom were to be French Catholics. In return the mer- 
chants were to enjoy, during six years, the right to levy 
a tax of twenty pounds of tobacco on all those whom they 
transported. They were also to enjoy a monopoly of 
trade.^^ 

De I'Olive and du Plessis set sail from Dieppe on May 
25, 1635, in command of two vessels with 550 men on 
board. After an unusually good voyage of one month 
and three days they arrived at Guadeloupe and decided 
to establish the colony in that island. From the first, suf- 
fering was most acute. Famine set in and many died 
from hunger. It was the same old story of lack of prep- 
aration. The merchants of Dieppe had not supplied the 
vessels with adequate provisions. Even those furnished 
were of poor quality, for the meat and salt fish were in a 
state of putrification. No store of beans or peas or cas- 
sava plant to serve for planting had been provided. For 
no less than five years most deplorable conditions reigned 
at Guadeloupe. The famine became so great at times, 
according to Du Tertre,^^ that some ate their own excre- 

17 Du Tertre, I, 66-69. 

18 Ibid., I, 70-71. 

19 Ibid., I, 80. 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

merits and it was reported that one poor wretch was found 
gnawing the arm of a dead comrade. To add to these 
miseries, the colony was often attacked by the savages. 
No aid came from France. The merchants of Dieppe 
became frightened at the prospects of loss and refused 
to carry out their contract. The young colony was con- 
sequently left to suffer from want of supplies. It fell a 
victim also to misrule and rebellion, so that Mathias du 
Puis remarked that during the six years of his residence 
he saw more rebellions, persecution, oppression of the 
innocent in Guadeloupe than in the whole of a great 
empire. 

In spite, however, of these trying years, the settlement 
at Guadeloupe proved permanent. By 1642, emigration 
from the ports of France to the island was noticeable.^^ 
The development of the colony was very satisfactory in 
the following period. 

The estabhshment of a French settlement at Martinique 
dates from this same year, 1635. D'Esnambuc, having 
decided to take possession of that island, chose about one 
hundred of the most experienced planters of his colony, 
men who were thoroughly acclimated to the tropics and 
hardened to the labour of clearing lands and tilling the 
soil. He equipped them with good firearms and ammuni- 
tion and with all sorts of farming utensils. Sprouts of 
the cassava plant and potatoes, as well as a supply of 
peas, beans and other grains for planting, were given them. 
The little colony set sail from St. Christopher at the 
beginning of July and arrived at Martinique about a week 
later. A fort was built and du Pont was placed in com- 
mand. Du Pont was captured a short time afterwards 
by the Spaniards and was succeeded by du Parquet, one 

20 Mathias du Puis, Relation de Vetahlissement d'une Colonie 
frangaise. 

21 Du Tertre, I, 308. 

27 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

of d'Esnambuc's nephews. He was, according to a con- 
temporary, "a brave gentleman well endowed with all the 
qualities necessary for the situation," and lived in such 
good fellowship with the savages that they called him the 
great captain and their "compere. "^^ 

With the administration of du Parquet there began an 
era of steady development of the new colony. The com- 
pany in France was so contented with what he accom- 
plished that it appointed him, at the close of 1637, lieuten- 
ant-general of Martinique. De Poincy, the successor of 
d'Esnambuc and governor-general of the islands, wrote 
Fouquet in 1639 that there were 700 men at Martinique 
capable of bearing arms.^^ Bouton stated in 1640 that 
there were about 1000 Frenchmen in the island.^* The 
history of the early years of this colony furnishes a con- 
trast to that of Guadeloupe. It was a striking proof of 
the immense advantage of founding new settlements with 
men who had already been acclimated to work in the 
tropics. 

Following this successful establishment of a colony at 
Martinique, an expedition was sent out from St. Chris- 
topher to take possession of the island of Tortuga, or la 
Tortue, an island off the northern coast of St. Domingo. 
The English had already made a settlement there as early 
as 1631, but were surprised by the Spaniards in 1635 and 
driven out in 1638. They returned, however, shortly 
afterwards, together with some of the French from St. 
Domingo. In 1639 there appeared at St. Christopher a 
Frenchman from Tortuga to inform de Poincy that the 
French were being maltreated by the English and implored 
aid. He gave the assurance that the island could be very 

22 J. Bouton, Relation de I'Etablissement des Franqais depuis Van 
1635 en I'Isle de la Martinique, 39; also Du Tertre, I, 104. 

23 Arch. Col., F2, 15, Letter from de Poincy to Fouquet, August 
16, 1639. 

24 Bouton, op. cit., 41. 

28 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

easily captured and made a French possession. De Poincy 
promptly seized the opportunity of getting rid of the 
Protestants at St. Christopher, and at the same time 
received favourably the idea of establishing a new colony. 
He proposed the affair to Levasseur, the chief of the 
Protestants, and offered to bear half of the expenses of 
the enterprise. His proposal was accepted. A small bark 
was fitted out and forty or fifty Huguenots, under the 
command of Levasseur, sailed for Tortuga. They made 
a landing in that island near the end of August, 1640. 
The English were easily driven out and the French took 
possession. From the first Levasseur ruled with an iron 
hand and evidently tried to make his government entirely 
independent both of de Poincy and of the company, for 
the directors in their meeting of March 2, 1644, voted that 
de Poincy be instructed "to surprise Levasseur in the 
island of Tortuga."^^ Levasseur seems, however, to have 
remained in control of the colony until his assassination 
in 1652. 

Some of the French who had been chased from St. Chris- 
topher in 1629 by the Spaniards settled on the northern 
coast of St. Domingo, but not until the ministry of Col- 
bert did their settlement develop into anything more than 
a small colony of freebooters and buccaneers which main- 
tained a small trade in hides with the Dutch.^^ 

A very considerable emigration from the ports of Nor- 
mandy and Brittany made this expansion and development 
of new colonies possible. From the port of Honfleur alone 
more than 600 indentured servants went out to the West 
Indies between January, 1637, and June, 1639.^'^ The 

25 Arch. Col., F2, 19, fol. 466. 

26 Charlevoix, o'p. cit., II, 6. 

27 Breard, op. cit., 187 £F. Some contracts by which servants bound 
themselves to captains of ships and to the Company of the Isles of 
America have been published by Breard, and by du Motey, Ouillaume 
d'Orange et les Origines des Antilles Frangaises. 

29 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

total population of the French W'est Indies was estimated 
in 1642 to be more than 7000.^^ This increase in territory 
and population was accompanied by a corresponding 
increase in production and commerce. 

It has already been noted that the most important pro- 
duction at St. Christopher was tobacco. Its cultivation 
was also begun in the other colonies at their occupation 
and, as in that island, it became the chief production. The 
increase in production was so great that the price of 
tobacco fell. The company tried to prevent this by limit- 
ing the maximum production by any individual planter 
to 900 pounds annually and by forbidding its cultivation 
on alternate years.^^ De Poincy made an agreement in 
1639 with the English governor that no tobacco should 
be planted by the planters of either nation during the 
period of one and a half years, and he issued an ordinance 
on May 26, ordering that all tobacco actually planted 
be uprooted.^*^ Another solution attempted was to diver- 
sify the crops. Thus, instructions were sent to Sieur 
Gentilly, general agent at St. Christopher, "to force all 
the planters in St. Christopher as well as at Martinique, 
to plant a large quantity of cotton.""^^ Similar instruc- 
tions were sent to the agent at Martinique in the following 
year.^^ When the orders were given in 1638 to limit the 
plantation of tobacco to alternate years, instructions were 
sent to the islands that cotton, roucou, or other things 

28 It was so stated in the preamble of the letters-patent which 
renewed the privileges in 1642. Du Tertre, I, 209. 

29 Arch. Col., F2, 19, fols. 335, 339. 

30 Du Tertre, I, 143-144. This order and agreement were also sent 
to Guadeloupe, but de I'Olive refused to obey it and he was sustained 
by the directors on the ground that an enforcement of it in that 
island would be a violation of the contract with the merchants of 
Dieppe. 

31 Arch. Col., F2, 19, fol. 109, September 3, 1636. 

32 Ibid., fol. 119. 

30 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

be planted.^^ A proposal to cultivate indigo was favour- 
ably received by the company in 1643.^ 

But it was in the cultivation of sugar-cane that the 
future prosperity of the islands lay and it was to this 
that the directors devoted much attention about 1640. 
In their session of October 6, 1638, they discussed the pro- 
posal made by a Sieur Turque to undertake the produc- 
tion of sugar and other merchandise. The directors 
offered free passage for him, his wife and six men, with 
exemption from ordinary taxes in the island, provided 
that he plant no tobacco, but only sugar-cane and other 
products, and provided that he depart during the course 
of the current year.^^ No record has been found that 
Sieur Turque ever went to Guadeloupe to carry out any 
such plan. But in April, 1639, the company accepted 
the proposal of Trezel, a Dutch merchant of Rouen, to 
carry out a somewhat similar plan for Martinique.^ 

33 Ibid., fol. 339. 

34 Ibid., fol. 464. 

35 Ibid., fol. 341. 

36 The entry in the register of the company is as follows: "After 
having taken note of the proposal made by Sieur Trezel of Rouen for 
the cultivation of sugar-cane and for the establishment of mills for 
the manufacture of sugar in the island of Martinique, and after 
having heard the aforesaid Sieur Trezel regarding his plans therefor, 
it was ordered that Mess. Martin and Chanut draw up a con- 
tract with him with the following stipulations: 2400 arpents of land 
to be granted by the company for the establishment of necessary 
building and the plantation of sugar-cane; a monopoly of the culti- 
vation of sugar-cane in the aforesaid island of Martinique for the 
remainder of the current year and for six years following; the monop- 
oly to be protected by the imposition of the penalty of confiscation 
and fines on all those who attempt to violate it; . . . the said six 
years to be prolonged in case of war; . . . the privilege of estab- 
lishing one or two plantations of sugar-cane in the island of Guade- 
loupe without, however, a monopoly of its production in that 
island; ... a premium of one-tenth of all sugar and other pro- 
ducts to be paid directly to the company and one-fortieth to some 
person designated by the company; the sugar produced to be trans- 

31 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

Trezel sailed almost immediately to carry out his plans.^^ 
He evidently found the task before him much more difficult 
than he had anticipated, for he demanded more liberal 
terms before he was willing to carry out his contract. The 
company made several concessions, the most important of 
which were: That the double tax of one-tenth and one- 
fortieth was not to be paid during the first six years ; and 
that at the expiration of the six years, the planters of 
Martinique who cultivated sugar-cane were to pay a tax 
of one-tenth to Trezel from 1645 to 1651 ; that he was 
permitted to employ fifteen of his men in the plantation of 
tobacco ; and that he was allowed to trade with foreigners 
in sugar, tobacco and other products in exchange for food- 
stuffs for the nourishment of his men.^ In the following 
year (1641), the company granted him free passage on 
one of its ships for three men and four tons of merchan- 
dise "in consideration of the great expense to which Sieur 
Trezel has been forced and of the promise which he gives 
of setting up a sugar-mill in the island of Martinique. "^^ 
In 1642 Trezel complained of bad treatment, stating that 
"all his utensils had been scattered and that under pre- 

ported only to France and its sale to foreigners to be strictly for- 
bidden; no cultivation of tobacco to be permitted; at the expiration 
of the aforesaid six years only the tax of one-tenth to be imposed by 
the company and the monopoly to cease and all the planters of the 
said island of Martinique thereafter to enjoy the liberty to plant 
sugar-cane at their pleasure." Arch. CoL, F2, 19, fol. 354, April 6, 
1639. See also fols. 35 flP. 

37 His presence and the manner of his reception are indicated in a 
letter written by du Parquet under the date of August 17. "I was 
delighted at the arrival of Sieur Trezel. I hope that by the aid of 
God he will succeed in the production of sugar. As to the orders 
which you have sent that no one else is to be permitted to cultivate 
sugar-cane, it is not necessary to give them as there is no one here 
rich enough to do so. If, however, some one makes an attempt, I 
shall at once forbid him to continue." Du Tertre, I, 109. 

38 Arch. Col., F2, 19, fol. 388. 

39 Ibid., fol. 416. 

33 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

text of certain debts, his plantation had been sold," that 
thus all the expenditures which he had made for the manu- 
facture of 50,000 pounds of sugar were lost. The direct- 
ors instructed the company's agent at Martinique to inves- 
tigate the statements of Trezel and at the same time to 
consider the advisability of re-establishing the enterprise on 
the basis of one-third being owned by the company, one- 
third by du Parquet, and one-third by Trezel.^° This plan 
did not materialize, for only a few months later the follow- 
ing entry was made in the minutes of the company: 

"As the contract made with Sieur Trezel has not had the 
success hoped for, owing to the weakness and bad faith of the 
contractor, the company, being unwilling that a matter of 
such great importance be postponed longer, is hereby resolved 
to furnish the funds for the establishment of the enterprise."*^ 

In accordance with this resolution it was decided to 
purchase sixty negroes, and to obtain forty or fifty work- 
men of all sorts for the construction of necessary buildings 
and for the other work necessary for the cultivation of 
sugar. Guadeloupe was chosen as the island best suited 
to the enterprise. It was further resolved to find "some 
person of distinction" to whom the management of the 
work could be confided.*^ The choice fell upon Charles 
Houel, one of the stockholders of the company.*^ He had 
recently returned from a voyage to the West Indies, made 
under the orders of the company "in order to gain a per- 
fect knowledge of all which was going on in the islands and 
to render the company a faithful account thereof, and 
particularly in order to find some island where he might 

40 Ibid., fol. 178. 

41 Ibid., fol. 472. 

42 Ibid., fol. 439. 

43 Du Motey, Guillaume d'Orange, 153. "Charles Houel, ecuyer, 
sieur de Petit-Pre . . . fils d'un riche financier Louis Houel, sieur 
de Petit-Pre, conseiller du Roi, controleur general des salines du 
Brouage et traites de Saintonge." 

33 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

establish himself."^* Houel was made governor of Guade- 
loupe and entrusted with the entire management of the 
enterprise. All the clerks, workmen and slaves of the com- 
pany were placed under his orders. He was granted one- 
tenth of all the sugar to be produced in the island.^^ 

A contract was made with Rozer, a merchant of Rouen, 
to deliver sixty negroes at Guadeloupe at the rate of 200 
livres apiece, one-third of the entire sum to be paid imme- 
diately and the other two-thirds after their delivery. In 
October following, Rozer demanded the payment of the 
8000 livres and the payment for two additional slaves 
which had been sold to de Leumont, the company's agent 
at St. Christopher.^^ 

The cultivation of sugar-cane was definitely begun at 
Guadeloupe in accordance with these plans.*^ No monop- 
oly was asserted by the company, for all the planters 
were encouraged to begin the plantation of sugar-cane 

44 Du Tertre, I, 207. 

45 Arch. Col., F2, 19, fol. 449. 

46 Prompt payment was demanded on the ground that the negroes 
"had cost more than was expected by reason of the fact that the 
Dutch were making large demands for them at the coast of Guinea." 
Ibid., fol. 462. Houel claimed, in 1648, that he had furnished the 
funds for the purchase of these slaves and demanded the cession of 
Marie Galante, where he might take the "sixty negroes which the 
company seemed unwilling to pay for" and establish himself as 
proprietor. Du Tertre, I, 441. 

47 A contemporary traveller observed that "Mess, of the Com- 
pany of the Isles of America possessed at Guadeloupe a large plan- 
tation of sugar-cane which I saw. They have also a good mill which 
was being prepared when I was there and which has since been com- 
pleted according to information which I have received. Eighty 
negroes have been sent there in addition to the 100 which I saw 
myself and more land has been acquired, so that M. Houel told me 
that he hoped to manufacture 150,000 pounds of sugar annually." 
Bib. Nat. MSS., Fran?., 18593, fols. 367-368. The relation cited at this 
reference was probably written about 1647, see Jacques de Dampierre, 
Essai sur les sources de I'histoire des Antilles franqaises, 149 
Paris, 1904. 

34 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

by the offer of exemption from the tax of sixty pounds of 
tobacco during the first year.^ 

It seems probable that Trezel re-established his planta- 
tion and sugar-mill at Martinique, for on June 3, 1644, he 
was granted free permission to send vessels to the islands 
during the space of six years, free passage for six tons of 
merchandise on a ship then being equipped by the com- 
pany at Dieppe, and finally he was granted an exemption 
from all taxes on sugar produced by him during the^ear 
1647.'' 

Plans to begin the cultivation of sugar-cane at St. 
Christopher were contemporaneous. In 1639, de Poincy 
proposed such a plan and it was promptly accepted by 
the directors in their meeting of June 1.^° De Poincy, 
however, met with obstacles. Thus he wrote to the direct- 
ors in the following year: 

"We haven't enough land to produce roucou and cotton. 
They are products which occupy too much space. I admit 
that the soil is suited to the production of both. . . . The 
planters do not know or wish to know anything except how 
to produce tobacco^ unless some one first shows them the way. 
What I say about the cultivation of roucou and cotton is also 
true of sugar-cane. In regard to that there is another diffi- 
culty. It is the lack of water which is absolutely necessary 
and of which we have no supply except that from a small 
brook. . . . This lack could of course be supplied, so far as 
power to turn the mills is concerned, by the employment of 
horses or of oxen, but it would still be necessary to have a 
supply of water. "^^ 

48 Arch. Col., F2, 19, fol. 452. 

49 Ibid., fol. 472. 

50 Ibid., fol. 357. Two months later the exclusive privilege of 
manufacturing brandy in the islands of Martinique and St. Chris- 
topher was granted to a M. Fagues. It is possible and even almost 
certain that it is there a question of the manufacture of brandy from 
sugar-cane. See fol. 362. 

51 Arch. Col., F2, 15, letter from de Poincy, November 15, 1640. 

35 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

This difficulty proved only temporary, for only a few years 
later both Pelleprat and de Rochefort make special men- 
tion of the production of sugar at St. Christopher.^^ De 
Rochefort remarked that de Poincy had three mills for 
crushing- cane on his principal plantation, and three more 
on another in the quarter of Cayonne, and that all six of 
these mills were turned by oxen or horses, except one which 
was turned by water. He added that all the principal 
planters had followed the example of their governor by 
planting sugar-cane.^^ 

It is not to be supposed for a moment that the planta- 
tion of sugar-cane had become general, as yet, in any of the 
islands. Maurile de St. Michel, who was in Guadeloupe 
in 1647, remarked that Houel, the governor, raised sugar- 
cane, but that the average planter raised tobacco.^ But 
the fact that the plantation of sugar-cane had been begun 
in all the islands was most significant and was the most 
important single fact connected with the administration 
of the Company of the Isles of America. The broad road 
to the future had been opened and the economic develop- 
ment of the islands was assured. It remains to trace the 
development of commerce which accompanied the increase 
in population and production. 

In the beginning, the new company seems to have 
intended to assert its monopoly and undertake to carry on 
the commerce with the islands in its own ships. It estab- 
lished agents at Nantes, St. Malo, Dieppe, Havre and La 
Rochelle, and in the islands at St. Christopher, Guade- 

52 Le Pere Pierre Pelleprat, Relation des missions des PP. de la 
Compagnie de Jesus dans les Isles et dans la Terre Ferme de VAmSr- 
ique, Paris, 1665, pp. 8-9. 

53 Cesar de Rochefort, Histoire naturelle et morale des Antilles de 
FAmSrique, p. 312. 

54 F. Maurile de St. Michel, Voyage des Isles Camercanes en 
I'Amerique et une relation diversifiSe, p. 41. 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

loupe and Martinique.^^ The directors gave instructions 
that the planters be prevented from buying anything from 
the English except live stock or cotton, and from selling 
their tobacco to them, and in general from trading with 
foreigners, so far as it was possible, and finally from 
returning to Europe in Dutch and English vessels or from 
sending their merchandise thither by such vessels. ^^ Pri- 
vate French traders were forbidden to trade in the islands 
except by first obtaining a passport from the company. 
IJassports were granted on condition of returning directly 
to Dieppe or Havre, and of providing on the outward voy- 
age free passage for three servants belonging to the com- 
pany and free transport for "a certain number of tons of 
merchandise," and on the return voyage free transport for 
ten tons of merchandise for every 100 tons of the vessel's 
tonnage.^^ 

In view of the fact that the company attempted to 
assert its monopoly, the question is naturally asked what 
it did to satisfy the needs of the planters through its own 
efforts. "I have not been able to find out," says Du 
Tertre,^^ "the details of the succour which this company 
sent out to St. Christopher, but there is every appearance 
that it was considerable and that many settlers were 
enlisted at Dieppe and Havre." But the principal aid 
which the company sent out to the islands was in the shape 
of new settlers, for there is some evidence that the com- 

55 Arch. Col., F2, 19, fols. 155, 257, 109, 119, 159, 167. 

56 Ibid., fols. 109, 119, 159, 167. 

57 Ibid,, fol. 89. These conditions were not always enforced, how- 
ever, for there are several cases where others were substituted. Thus, 
a permission was granted to a captain of La Rochelle in 1637, on 
condition of carrying out six muskets and of bringing back a "certain 
quantity of tobacco for the company." Fols. 293-296. The company 
insisted on private traders having passports. It ordered prosecution 
of a captain in 1635 and another in 1637 for infractions of this rule. 
Ibid., fol. 253. 

58 Du Tertre, I, 58. 

37 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

pany's activity in matters of trade, properly speaking, 
was not important. Although mention is made from time 
to time of vessels belonging to the company going out to 
the islands,^^ the company came to depend more and more 
upon private French and foreign traders to supply the 
needs of the islands. Permits to trade seem to have been 
granted freely. Thus they were given to merchants at 
La Rochelle in 1637, 1638, 1642, to some at Nantes in 
1637 (2), 1639 (S), 1643, 1644.^" In a general assembly, 
held December 2, 1637, the company decided that stock- 
holders could send vessels to the islands on the same con- 
ditions as other individuals.^^ But the results of the activ- 

59 Thus it is noted in the minutes of August 25, 1635, that one of 
its vessels was captured on its way from St. Christopher with a cargo 
of tobacco (fol. 251). Under the date of July 1, 1637, mention 
is made of the arrival of a vessel at Nantes from St. Christopher with 
a cargo of tobacco likewise (fol. 296). On July 28, 1641, free trans- 
port of four tons of merchandise and three men on a vessel being 
equipped at St. Malo or Dieppe. A similar thing was done on June 
3, 1644, for a vessel being equipped at St. Malo (fols. 417 and 473), 
It is not certain but very probable that in both cases it was a question 
of vessels belonging to the company. On May 14, 1640, the directors 
ordered that a letter be written to de Poincy to inform him that the 
vessel lately sent out from St. Malo had been captured. Near the 
close of 1641 the company made a contract with Rozer, a merchant 
of Rouen, to send in partnership with him a cargo of merchandise to 
the islands. For this purpose a vessel of 200 tons was chartered at 
La Rochelle. In the following year, before the return of the vessel, 
the company offered to pay Rozer 36,000 livres for his share, which 
represented only an original investment of 18,000. The vessel was 
bringing a cargo of tobacco, the price of which had risen recently 
(fol. 418). Again, at the close of 1642, the directors decided to equip 
a vessel of 100 tons and send it to the islands (fol. 438). Unless 
some oversight has been made, these are all the indications which the 
minutes contain of the expedition of vessels to the islands. Of course, 
one cannot be certain that the minutes contain a complete list of all 
the vessels which were sent out. But it is probable that the reason 
why more indications are not given is that the company sent very 
few vessels to trade with the planters. 

60 Arch. Col., F2, 19, fols. 170, 293, 306, 352, 325, 444, 473. 

61 Fol. 315. 

38 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

ity of the private French trader were not great and the 
planters relied more and more completely upon the Dutch 
for their supplies. 

It will be recalled that the company gave instructions 
to exclude foreigners. But in actual practice, it either 
permitted foreign trade, by reason of its inability to assert 
its monopoly, or tolerated it, by reason of the fact that 
it was unable to supplant the Dutch in the satisfaction of 
the planters' needs. It permitted it in the case of Trezel, 
for on April 4, 1640, the directors permitted him to barter 
tobacco, sugar, or other products for food-stuffs in trade 
with foreigners. It tolerated it in the case of trade at St. 
Christopher. De Poincy made a contract with Mess. 
de Ruberque, merchants of Middleburg, whereby they 
agreed to furnish all things of which the island had need. 
"In order to facilitate this trade de Poincy permitted 
them to send an agent and construct a store at Sandy 
Point. This agent, thanks to the profit which he assured 
to de Poincy, was permitted to monopolize almost the 
entire trade of the island."^^ The minutes of the company 
contain a very interesting item of evidence which shows 
that the foreigner became the mainstay of the planters. 
On September 13, 1641, the directors took the following 
action : 

"In consideration of the fact that according to the memoirs 
of M. de Poincy and the letters from the agents in the islands, 
the planters are entirely without supplies, which are ordinarily 
brought them by the Dutch and English traders, who have 
ceased to come of late, by reason of the fact that the planta- 
tion of tobacco has temporarily ceased [due to the ordinance of 
May, l6S9], and that the lack of these necessities has caused 
sickness, it is hereby resolved to send relief to the islands." 

This is a most categorical statement that under normal 
conditions the supplies of the planters were furnished by 
62 Du Tertre, I, 165-167. 

39 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

foreigners, and it is not without significance that the com- 
pany took the resolution to send a vessel to the islands 
more for the sake of relieving suffering than for the pur- 
pose of carrying on commerce. The foreigner was not 
long absent and the company again subsided into inactiv- 
ity. Near the close of the period of the company's rule 
in the islands, which came to an end in 1648, the Dutch 
seem again to have almost completely monopolized trade. 
They had built up a lucrative commerce and their vessels 
were going to the islands in ever increasing numbers. 

In spite of this development of the islands the Company 
of the Isles of America proved a failure and was bankrupt 
in 1648. Du Tertre attributed its downfall to two prin- 
cipal reasons, namely, civil warfare and the triumph of 
the personal interests of the individual governors at the 
expense of those of the company. Both of these causes 
require a moment's explanation. 

At the death of d'Esnambuc in 1634, the company 
appointed Sieur de Longvillier de Poincy, a chevalier in 
the order of St. John of Jerusalem and chief of the squad- 
ron of the king's vessels in Brittany, as lieutenant-general 
of all the French islands of America. He arrived at St. 
Christopher in February, 1639, and seems to have begun 
almost immediately an administration which promoted his 
own personal interests rather than those of the company. 
In 1640, as has been noted already, he made a contract 
with a Dutch firm of Middleburg to furnish all supplies 
necessary at St. Christopher. He attempted, according 
to Du Tertre, to monopolize all the trade of the island. 
For this purpose he forbade the inhabitants to board ves- 
sels which came to St. Christopher, in order that he might 
buy all the merchandise imported into the island and sell 
it to the planters at a profit. He employed no less than 
seven clerks for the distribution of goods thus bought. 

40 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

In addition he laid heavy taxes upon the people so that 
"he and his clerks grew very rich at the expense of the 
poor planters who groaned under the monopoly. "^^ 

The company decided to replace him in 1644 and sent 
out as his successor Sieur de Thoisy. From the moment 
of de Thoisy 's arrival in the islands, in November, 1645, 
de Poincy refused to acknowledge him and straightway 
prepared to defend himself by force of arms. A civil war 
broke out, which spread to all the islands. St. Christo- 
pher, Guadeloupe and Martinique suffered most from the 
conflict. De Poincy was able not only to remain in control 
of St. Christopher, but forced his rival to embark for 
France in January, 1647. The authority of the com- 
pany was thus defied and it was too weak to reply. It 
was, however, not merely humiliation that the company 
suffered, but in addition its revenue from taxation in the 
islands was cut off. No revenue came from St. Christo- 
pher during the struggle, for de Poincy held all with an 
iron hand in that island, and the planters of the other 
islands, "profiting from the state of affairs, refused to pay 
taxes to the company."^ 

As to the selfish rule of the several governors, it is cer- 
tain that de Poincy at St. Christopher, Houel at Guade- 
loupe, du Parquet at Martinique, and Levasseur at Tor- 
tuga had all the power in their hands. It has just been 
seen that de Poincy was strong enough to defy the com- 
pany and rule his island in accordance with his own wishes. 
It has also been noted that efforts to bring Levasseur into 
obedience proved fruitless. He apparently maintained no 
relations with the company whatever. Houel's voyage to 
Guadeloupe in 1646 was made as much in his own interests 
as in those of the company. He was seeking an island 
where he might make his fortune. He was a stockholder 

63 Du Tertre, I, 123, 166, 290. 

64 Ibid., I, 439. 

41 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

and easily succeeded in having himself appointed governor 
of the island. He furnished a large part of the capital 
for the establishment of the sugar industry, a fact which 
gave him an upper hand in his relations with the company. 
When the complaint was made that the company was 
receiving no revenue from Guadeloupe, he replied that 
he had employed his own capital to make the affairs of 
the company succeed, and that the company was his 
debtor and not he the company's. When it became a ques- 
tion of disposing of the several islands in 1648, Houel 
wrote to his brother-in-law, de Boisseret, instructing him 
to buy the island of Guadeloupe in partnership with him, 
assuring him that for the year 1650 he would produce at 
least 100,000 pounds of sugar and a large quantity of 
tobacco.^^ This statement shows very conclusively that if 
the company was receiving no revenue from Guadeloupe, 
it was due, not to the fact that the island was not pro- 
ductive, but rather to the fact that Houel was guarding 
the proceeds for himself. Du Parquet, at Martinique, 
seems to have been the only one of the governors who 
administered affairs in the interest of the company. 

The downfall of the company was undoubtedly due in 
part, and perhaps principally, to these causes. It may 
have been due also to the fact that its capital was too 
small and that the directors paid too little attention to 
its affairs. But whatever may have been the causes, it is 
certain that the company was in a bankrupt state in 1648. 
The revenue from the islands had become small, the com- 
pany had been deeply humiliated from the defeat admin- 
istered by de Poincy and creditors had become very press- 
ing. A special general assembly of the stockholders was 
called to deliberate over the crisis. It was held on the 
first Friday of June, 1648. After having taken into con- 
sideration that the several governors had become masters 

65 Du Tertre, I, 443. 

42 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

of the islands, that the officers of the company were no 
longer respected, and that in order to lift it out of its 
embarrassments it would be necessary for the stockholders 
to subscribe 4000 livres for each share held, it was decided 
to sell the several islands. 

In accordance with this decision, Guadeloupe, together 
with Marie Galante, Desirade and the Saints, was sold to 
Houel and de Boisseret (September 4, 1649) for 60,000 
livres, Martinique, with St. Lucia, Grenada and the Grena- 
dines, to du Parquet (September 27, 1650) for 50,000 
livres, and St. Christopher to the Knights of Malta (May 
24, 1651) for 120,000 livres.^^ Thus was inaugurated a 
period of proprietary rule, which lasted until the estab- 
lishment of the West India Company in 1664. It is not 
the purpose here to recount the history of the islands 
under this regime of proprietary rule, but merely to call 
attention to the most important facts which bear directly 
upon the development of trade and industry. 

The expansion which has been noted for the period 
1635-1648 continued for the period 1648-1664. In 
March, 1648, de Poincy, on learning that the Spaniards 
had abandoned the island of St. Martin, sent his nephew 
with 300 men to take possession of it. The Dutch sent a 
similar expedition from St. Eustatius about the same time 
and for the same purpose. By a treaty of March 23, the 
two nations agreed to divide the island between them, 
about two-thirds going to the French and one-third to 
the Dutch. The island of St. Bartholomew was occupied 
in the same year by a small colony of fifty or sixty men 
sent out from St. Christopher. It was abandoned in 
1656, after a furious attack by the savages, but reoccupied 
in 1659. In 1650, de Poincy placed one of his lieutenants, 
de Vaughan, in command of some 160 of the bravest men 
at St. Christopher and ordered him to attack the Span- 

66 Du Tertre, I, 443 ff. 

43 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

iards at St. Croix and take possession of the island. De 
Vaughan was successful and in the following year 300 
more men were sent out to establish a permanent colony .^^ 

From Guadeloupe an expedition occupied, in October, 
1648, the groups of small islands lying between it and 
Dominica, known as the Saints, and in the same year 
Marie Galante was occupied.^^ 

At Martinique du Parquet was not idle, but also took 
part in the movement of expansion. In 1648, a small col- 
ony was sent to St. Lucia, but the island was occupied 
more with the idea of preventing its occupation by another 
nation than with that of founding a productive colony. 
In June, 1650, du Parquet himself set sail with a well- 
equipped colony of 200 men to take possession of Grenada. 
After a successful occupation he reinforced the colony 
in the following year by sending 300 additional settlers. 
The island was sold in 1656 to de Cerillac, in whose hands 
it remained until its cession to the West India Company in 
1664.^^ 

This expansion in territory was accompanied by a 
growth in population. The population of the French 
West Indies was estimated in 1642 to be more than 7000,^° 
and in 1655, Pelleprat, a Jesuit missionary, estimated it 
to be 15,000 or 16,000 Frenchmen and 12,000 or 13,000 
slaves. ^^ 

There was also a very notable increase in the production 
of sugar. Biet stated that, according to reports which 
he had received from the islands, there were planters who 
produced 10,000 pounds of sugar per week and that the 
poor planters, which he had seen in 1654, had become 

67 For all of these facts concerning the colonies founded from St. 
Christopher see Du Tertre, I, 409-413, and II, 33, 33, 37. 

68 Ibid., I, 425 fp. and II, 40-41. 

69 Ibid. 

70 Ibid., I, 209. 

71 Pelleprat, op. cit., 3, 15, 54. 

44 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

"little lords. "'^^ A memorialist of 1660 noted that a large 
amount of sugar was being produced in the islands and 
that it had supplanted tobacco as the most important 
product/^ De Tracy wrote to Colbert in 1664 that so 
much land was being devoted to the plantation of sugar 
that the islands were suffering from a failure to plant 
food-stuffs/* Colbert himself stated in 1664 that the 
Dutch carried away with them from the French West 
Indies annually, 2,000,000 livres worth of sugar and 
1,000,000 livres worth of tobacco, cotton, dye-woods, 
indigo, etcJ^ This increase in production had been made 
possible by a large importation of indentured servants and 
still more of slaves. "Traders bring many ships every 
year laden with slaves. Three arrived at Martinique last 
year [1654] which disembarked 600 or 700.'"' St. Chris- 
topher and Guadeloupe were perhaps no less favoured, 
for the same writer observes that de Poincy at St. Chris- 
topher had no less than 600 or 700 slaves on his 
plantations.'^^ 

Trade steadily increased under proprietary rule. 
French traders seem to have profited very little from it, 
however. A few vessels went out from Dieppe, Havre, St. 
Malo, Nantes and La Rochelle.^^ The principal trade of 

72 Antoine Biet, Voyage de la France Equinoxiale en Visle de 
Cayenne entrepris par les Frangois en I'annee MDCLIII, Paris, 1664, 
314-315. 

73 Arch. Nat. Col., Cg, 2nd series, I, Relation des isles de I'Amerique. 

74 Du Tertre, III, 98. 

75 Clement, op. cit., II, 1, cclix, Discours sur les manufactures. 

76 Pelleprat, op. cit., 54-55. 

77 Ibid. 

78 Pelleprat made the voyage to the islands in 1651 in a vessel from 
La Rochelle. Op. cit., p. 27. Du Tertre notes the presence of a ves- 
sel from Nantes at St. Domingo in 1659. Du Tertre, III, 131. 
L'Aurore (200 tons), from Dieppe, was on a voyage to the West 
Indies in 1664. Bib. Nat. MSS., 500 Colbert, 199, fols. 101-108. In 
the same year, Le Phenix (60 tons), Le Petit Soleil (50 tons), and Le 
St. Antoine (140 tons), all from St. Malo, were in the islands. Ibid., 

45 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

these vessels, especially those of the northern ports, was 
in indentured servants/^ Foreigners, for the most part 
Dutch, controlled almost all the rest of the trade. 

Pelleprat remarked that foreigners brought wine, beer, 
brandy, oil, butter, salt-meat, biscuit, cloth and every- 
thing else necessary for the planters, and took in exchange 
tobacco, sugar, indigo, ginger, tortoise shell, and other 
articles.^" Biet, during his short sojourn in the islands 
in 1654, remarked that the ships of all nations were trad- 
ing in the harbours of Guadeloupe.^^ Maurile de St. 
Michel, in a chapter on the establishment of the Carme- 
lites at Guadeloupe, states that during the voyage of 
Fathers Cosme and Innocent in 1648, from France, no less 
than thirty passengers died, and during that of Father 
Athanase, in 1650, forty-five died. He stated that the 
deaths in each case were due to the "filth and infection of 
our vessels," and added that the safest thing to do was to 
go to Holland to embark in a Dutch vessel, because the 
Dutch cleaned their ships often, fed passengers well and 
did not take such a large number aboard.^^ Du Tertre 
made the outward voyage in 1654 in a Dutch ship from 
Texel and returned the following year in another to Flush- 
ing. Father Feuillet came from St. Christopher to Flush- 
ing by a Dutch vessel in 1658. Houel returned to 
France by another in 1664.^^ 

It was the Dutch who saved Martinique from disaster 
in 1654. In that year the attacks of the savages were so 
persistent that "the island was on the point of succumbing 
to the ferocious brutality of the barbarians and the rebel- 

fols. 237-260. Three vessels from Nantes, one of 140 tons, another of 
200, another of 250, were there the same year. Ibid., fols. 221-234. 

79 Du Tertre, II, 464. 

80 Pelleprat, op. cit., 8. 

81 Biet, op. cit., 315. 

82 De St. Michel, op. cit., 328. 

83 Du Tertre, I, 508, 528, and III, 79. 

46 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

lion of the slaves, when God sent four large Dutch vessels 
armed for war to their aid." The Dutch landed 300 
soldiers, drove off the savages and saved the colony from 
calami ty.^^ A memorialist of 1660 remarked that the 
French trader was subjected to such heavy duties that it 
was no longer possible for him to compete with his Dutch 
rival in the trade with the island. He stated that the 
Dutch were importing all sorts of merchandise and offered 
them much cheaper than the French and that they offered 
much lower rates for the transportation of freight from 
the islands to Europe.^^ Formont, a Parisian banker, who 
had interests in the islands and who had engaged in trade 
there, remarked in a memoir, written in 1662, that the 
trade with the French West Indies had become so impor- 
tant that they sent no less than 100 or 120 large vessels 
there annually.^^ Colbert himself estimated that out of a 
total of 150 vessels which traded in the French Antilles in 
1662, three or four at most sailed from the ports of 
France.^^ 

De Rochefort asserts that the trade with St. Christo- 
pher and the other islands had led to the establishment of 
"rich and powerful firms at Middleburg and Flushing," 
and that the trade of these islands had become, for the 
traders of these towns, what the mines of Peru were for 
the Spaniards. The merchants of Flushing called the 
French planters "our planters."^ The relation between 
them became intimate. "The planters a few years ago hav- 
ing expressed the fear that in case of rupture between 
France and Holland they would suffer heavy losses, the 
Dutch straightway offered them the right of bourgeois and 

84 Du Tertre, I, 469. 

85 Arch. Nat. Col., Cg, 2nd series, I, Relation des isles de I'Amerique. 

86 Ibid., Memoire du Sieur Formont pour montrer I'utilite du com- 
merce des isles et les moyens de le bien etablir. 

87 Lavisse, Histoire de France, VII, 1, 235, note 1. 

88 De Rochefort, op. cit., 311. 

47 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

granted them insurance policies in firms of Amsterdam, 
Middleburg and Flushing. "^^ The most important plant- 
ers of Martinique accepted the offer, and by paying twelve 
livres a year received insurance for all of their property. 
In 1657, when a rupture between the two nations seemed 
imminent, the Dutch sent post haste a frigate to the islands 
to assure the merchants and planters that no matter what 
happened, their property would be as safe as if it were in 
Dutch possessions. 

Du Tertre recounts an incident which occurred in 1663 
at St. Christopher, which gives a very good idea of the 
immense importance of Dutch commerce in the islands at 
that date: 

"In the year 1663 there occurred something most remarkable 
in this island [St. Christopher]. It was the conflagration of 
all the storehouses belonging to the Dutch merchants. More 
than sixty were consumed with all the merchandise which they 
contained. The loss was estimated at more than 2^000,000 
livres. . . . The island suffered very much during four or 
five months, because all the salt beef and bacon, wine, oil, 
brandy, flour, cloth, and other goods w^re entirely burned, 
so that the planters were deprived of all these things in a 
single day and were forced to await aid from Holland, which 
had always proved their refuge in time of necessity. The 
Dutch did not fail them, in spite of their own losses, for they 
had no sooner received news of the disaster than they freighted 
a large number of vessels with all sorts of merchandise. . . . 
Such a large quantity of supplies was imported that some poor 
Dutch merchants, who had brought a quantity of meat, wine 
and brandy, which could not be preserved a long time, were 
forced to sell them at a loss of one-third. "^° 

Du Tertre does not fail to explain the superiority of the 
Dutch and the reason why the French planters regarded 

89 Du Tertre, II, 464. 

90 Ibid., I, 586. 

48 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

them with favour. At the close of his second volume he 
devotes a most interesting chapter to the subject of trade. 
The chapter has all the greater significance, when it is 
recalled that the author spent some years of his life as a 
sailor and had made many voyages to and from the islands, 
a fact which gave him ample opportunity to observe and 
to know whereof he spoke in discussing matters of navi- 
gation and trade.^^ A passage from it is as follows: 

''There is to be found in the storehouse of the islands every- 
thing of which the planters have need. Merchants take pains 
to have such an assortment of merchandise that the planter 
is not obliged to go from store to store in order to find all 
that he desires. Everything is much dearer than in France^ 
for a pair of slippers sometimes costs 100 pounds of tobacco^ 
that is to say fifteen livres in money. I have had merchants in 
France tell me that those who understand well the needs of 
the planters can make a profit of 100 per cent on the merchan- 
dise which they import into the islands. 

"It is undoubtedly for that reason that the Dutch offer goods 
much cheaper^ for they are contented with much less profit and 
offer goods brought from France even at less cost than the 
French merchants. Notwithstanding the great losses which 
they have suffered, amounting in some cases to the shipwreck 
of thirty to forty ships in a single year, they have never per- 
mitted themselves to be rebuffed, but have always furnished the 
islands abundantly with all things of which they had need. 
That is the principal reason wherefore our planters abandoned 
trade with the ports of France and placed all of their affairs 
in the hands of the Dutch. To this reason must be added the 
excess of duties which must be paid in France on goods 
imported from and exported to the colonies. In some cases 
such duties exceed the cost of the goods. ... I have seen 
poor planters indebted for more than 100 ecus after paying 
duties on shipments to France on which they had hoped to 
realize a profit of 5,000 livres. 

91 See Dampierre, op. cit., 108, for a very interesting sketch of his 
life. 

49 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

"Besides all of these reasons, the greater part of all the 
French vessels which went to the islands before the formation 
of the West India Company, were in such a bad state that there 
was no security for their cargoes. The Dutch, on the other 
hand, had a goodly number of large, beautiful vessels and were 
often satisfied with half of that which the French demanded 
for the transportation of freight. There is no occasion for 
surprise, therefore, if all the products of our islands were 
laden in their ships. 

"So that if we consider the matter closely, we will under- 
stand that not only our planters are justified in placing their 
affairs in the hands of the Dutch, but also that the Dutch, who 
are the best informed traders in the world, have persistently 
sought to maintain this trade by reason of the profit which 
they found therein. The freedom of the ports of Holland has 
also attracted our planters, and besides, the Dutch merchants 
have shown such affection and such fidelity in their relations 
with our planters that they have become masters of all the 
affairs of the islands. "^^ 

Thus at the eve of Colbert's ministry, the French were 
in possession of no less than fourteen islands in the West 
Indies, the most important of which, St. Christopher, 
Guadeloupe, and Martinique, were already well cultivated 
and productive, and another, St. Domingo, was capable 
of wonderful development and was destined to become the 
most productive colony of aU. The importation of ser- 
vants from France and of slaves from the coast of Africa 
had made possible a notable development in the productiv- 
ity of the colonies. Sugar had become an important pro- 
duct and had already begun to serve as a solid base for the 
prosperity of the islands. The poor little planter of the 
small tobacco patch, with his few servants about him^ had 
been replaced by the "little lord" of the large plantations 
of waving sugar-cane who had many slaves to do his 
bidding. The small number of vessels which came in 

92 Du Tertre, II, 460. 

50 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

former times only at the tobacco harvest, came now in 
great numbers and at all seasons. 

The profit of all this development, however, had passed 
into the hands of the Dutch. Most of the capital which 
had made possible the development of the sugar industry 
had been furnished by them. Dutch ships brought slaves 
from the coast of Africa in abundance and thus made pos- 
sible increased production. Dutch traders and Dutch ships 
were everywhere, to import and export all the merchan- 
dise of the French West Indies. For a whole generation 
they had been knitting, one by one, the ties which bound 
the planters closer and closer to them. Now by gratitude, 
now by affection, now by personal interest, the French 
planter had become attached to Holland. Politically these 
fourteen islands were under the rule of French proprietors 
and were theoretically in the possession of the French king, 
but industrially and commercially they were in the pos- 
session of the Dutch. 

It remained for Colbert to bring them under the verit- 
able rule of the French king and lay hold of their riches 
for the profit of the nation. 



51 



CHAPTER II 

The Awakening and the Period of 
Preparation 

rriHE fact that the commerce of the French West Indies 
-*■ had become relatively important and was in the 
hands of the Dutch did not fail to attract attention in 
France before the beginning of Colbert's ministry. The 
important part which Fouquet played in the affairs of 
Company of the Isles of America has already been noted. 
It was at his apartment that the meetings of the directors 
of the company were most frequently held and it was to 
him that colonial governors addressed their correspond- 
ence. Thanks to the favour of the queen-mother, he re- 
ceived in 1652 the very important appointment of surin- 
tendant des finances and came to play a capital role in 
the affairs of the kingdom. His interest in the affairs of 
the West Indies continued, for he maintained a plantation 
at St. Lucia and another at Martinique. He sent two 
vessels from Belle Isle with cargoes of workmen and sup- 
plies and implements for the cultivation of his plantation 
in the latter island in 1661.^ At the moment of his dis- 
grace, as he recounts in his Defences, he had formed a large 
plan: 

"I was thinking of nothing else [he is speaking of his estab- 
lishment at Belle Isle] than of the establishment of a commer- 
cial company and of building up the colonies. I had already 
talked with the king in regard to my plans. I had orders from 
the late Cardinal Mazarin^ as well as from Cardinal Richelieu^ 
to occupy myself with the matter of the American colonies. 

1 Gabriel Marcel, Le Surintendant Fouquet, Vice-Boi d'Amerique, 
p. 15. 

52 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

De Feuquieres^ d'Andilly, Lavocat^ Clement^ Chanut, some 
merchants and I were on the point of forming a company. 
That is why I lent money to de Feuquieres for the office of 

Viceroy of America I hoped to render a great service to 

His Majesty by taking away from foreigners the commerce 
of the islands which they had usurped and at the same time to 
find a , good investment for the revenue derived from Belle 
Isle."2 

This passage shows very clearly that Fouquet was a pred- 
ecessor of Colbert in his plans to drive out the Dutch and 
to reserve the trade of the islands for Frenchmen. 

Others called attention to the importance of taking 
some steps to accomplish the same thing. A memorialist 
of 1660 presented the matter as follows: 

"As for that which regards trade, it is to be remarked that 
the heavy duties which French captains and merchants are 
obliged to pay to the king make it impossible for them to con- 
tinue to trade with the Antilles, because the Dutch not only 
import there all sorts of merchandise and offer them for sale 
at much lower prices than the French, but they also demand 
much less for the transportation of freight from the islands 
to Europe." 

The remedy suggested by the writer was the creation of 
one or two free ports in France, where all the merchan- 
dise, either exported to or imported from the islands, might 
be free from duties.^ 

Formont, a Parisian banker, wrote a memoir in 1662 
which is of unusual interest in giving the point of view of 
a man of affairs : 

"The commerce of the islands of St. Christopher, Martin- 
ique, Guadeloupe and others under the king's dominion is so 
profitable and so considerable that if it were once established 

2 Eecueil des defenses de M. Fouquet, Amsterdam, 1665-1667, tome 
III, 360. 

3 Arch. Nat. Col., Cg, 2nd series, I, Relation des Isles de I'Amerique. 

53 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

in France and carried on by Frenchmen^ as could easily be 
done, the king, as well as all his subjects, would derive 
great profit therefrom not only by gaining a market for a 
large quantity of merchandise produced in France, but also by 
the importation of colonial products which would serve as a 
means of exchange with the ports of the Baltic. 

"The great number of vessels which Dutch merchants con- 
stantly send to the French islands is proof that trade with 
these islands is very profitable, for otherwise they would not 

send 100 or 120 large ships there every year In order 

that the French may profit from this commerce it is necessary 
to exclude all foreigners from the privileges of trade there, 
as the Dutch, Spanish and English have done in regard to 

their colonies In this way the French could enter into 

the possession of all this trade and the other nations would 
have no right to make objections because they were excluded. 
.... Inasmuch, however, as France is not in condition to 
undertake all of the trade of the islands immediately, it seems 
wise to permit the Dutch to continue to trade for a season. 
To establish this trade upon a solid basis in France, His 
Majesty, if it so pleases him, should first issue a declaration 
exempting from all import duties all products brought from 
the islands in French bottoms." 

Formont explains the importance of this latter sugges- 
tion by pointing out the fact that the import duties were 
most unreasonable and prohibitive of trade. Thus sugar, 
which sold for 30 livres the cwt., paid a duty of almost 12 
livres; tobacco, selling for 20 livres the cwt., paid 10 
livres, and ginger, which sold for 5 livres, paid a duty of 
about 12 livres. In Holland, on the other hand, these 
same products paid only a uniform duty of 5 sous the 
cwt. This was why the Dutch had been able to increase 
their navigation, to establish a large number of refineries 
where they refined the raw sugar imported from the 
French West Indies, and to manufacture the tobacco 
from the same islands, and to re-export this tobacco and 

54 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

this sugar into the ports of the Baltic, into Flanders and 
even, in great quantities, into France. Without some 
such measure to take the burden off the French trader 
and thus place him on a fairer basis of competition with 
his Dutch rival, Formont asserted that "it was impossible 
to draw the trade of the islands to France and to take 
it out of the hands of the Dutch, who had become abso- 
lute masters of it." Formont closed his memoir with a 
warning: "If one continues to abandon this commerce 
to the Dutch, these colonies, which have cost the lives of 
so many Frenchmen to establish, will, to the disgrace of 
the nation, be lost forever."* 

The author of another memoir, bearing the date of 
1663, wished to accord two years of grace for the Dutch 
to settle up all their affairs in the islands, and to organize 
a French company, composed of very rich persons, to 
carry on this trade. He proposed that this company 
should equip, annually, four ships at Dieppe with cargoes 
of cloth, hats, shoes, stockings, tinware, etc., and a certain 
number of other vessels in the same port to fetch slaves 
from the coast of Angola and Guinea ; three more at 
Havre and one at Honfleur with the same cargoes as at 
Dieppe; two at St. Malo with cargoes of cloth, bacon 
and brandy ; four at Nantes with wine, brandy, bacon 
and cloth ; three at La Rochelle with the same articles ; 
and finally one at Bordeaux or Bayonne with wine, dried 
fruit, olive oil and fuel oil. One is incidentally impressed 
with the distinctly national character which the writer 
wished to give to the proposed commerce.^ 

A proposal was made in 1663 by Sir Nacquart, an 
admiralty officer at Dunkerque, "to form a new company 
for trade with the French islands of America." It is so 

4 Arch. Nat. Col., Cg, 2nd series, I, M6moire du Sr. Formont. 

5 Ibid., series F (Com. des Col.), I, Memoire des moyens qu'il 
faudrait tenir pour empescher aux estrangers le negoce des Isles de 
I'Amerique et de I'utilite a la France. 

55 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

out of harmony with what Colbert attempted to do, when 
he turned his attention to the problem, and at the same 
time throws such an interesting light on the strong hold 
that the Dutch had upon the trade with the islands that 
it deserves a moment's notice. Nacquart proposed to form 
a company which would equip its vessels at Amsterdam, 
"where ships and cargoes of goods suitable for the trade 
are to be had much better and much cheaper than at any 
port in France." The company should make it a rule, 
while its vessels were being loaded at Amsterdam, to post 
the news when they would call at Havre, "in order that 
those who are accustomed to send servants to the islands 
may have them in readiness." It should also make an 
agreement with the Dutch West India Company, whereby 
permission would be granted to send its vessels to Cura9ao 
and Bonaire to get live stock for the planters.^ It is not 
difficult to understand why the plan was not seriously con- 
sidered. 

All of the memoirs just cited may have been written 
spontaneously by their authors as an attempt to awaken 
the interest of the government in establishing trade with 
the richest colonies which France possessed, and to arouse 
it to the danger of losing them forever, if action were not 
taken promptly to save them. They may have been writ- 
ten, on the other hand, in response to requests by Colbert 
for information or advice which he desired to have to aid 
him in the solution of the difficult problem before him. 
There is an item of evidence to support the latter view. 
A memoir entitled "Memoire instructif de I'estat present 
du gouvemement de la Martinique," and bearing the date 
of 1663 is endorsed, "En response a une demande de M. 
Colbert."'^ It was written by Count d'Estrades, viceroy 

6 Arch. Nat. Col., Cg, 2nd series, I, Proposition au Roy d'une 
nouvelle compagnie a establir pour le commerce des isles fran9aises 
de I'Amerique. 

7 Arch. Nat. Col., Cg, 2nd series, I. 

56 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

of America, in response to a letter written to him bj 
Colbert on September 21, 1662.^ This fact certainly 
proves that Colbert was seeking information and advice 
in regard to the islands at least as early as the date of 
his letter. The supposition is very natural that the other 
memoirs, which date from almost the same time and are 
preserved in the same carton as the d'Estrades memoir, 
were also written in response to his requests. It is also 
possible that these memoirs represent only a part of the 
total number written. In any case Colbert's attention 
was being called to the fact that France was in posses- 
sion of some rich colonies from which she was deriving 
no benefit and near the close of 1662 he began to make 
definite plans in regard to the islands. 

During the course of the year 1662, the report reached 
France that the administration of Martinique had become 
corrupt, that the island was in a state of anarchy, and 
that more than 1000 planters had left it.^ Colbert wrote 
to d'Estrades for definite information in regard to the 
matter. D'Estrades confirmed the report and at the same 
time took occasion to recount the history of the state of 
the island. At the death of du Parquet in 1658 the gov- 
ernment of the island had fallen into the hands of Sieur 
de Vaudroque, the uncle and guardian of his children. 
After four years of his administration, justice had become 
corrupted by his constant interference in order to protect 
his own personal interests and those of his friends ; police 
regulations were no longer observed; taxes were imposed 
arbitrarily and unequally. 

"All of these disorders not only prevent the growth of the 
island, which is capable of a development ten times greater 
than it has yet received^ but also will probably work its total 
ruin from the fact that it will so weaken it as to subject it 

8 Arch. Nat. Mar., B2, I, fol. 109 verso. 

9 Ibid. 

57 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

to foreign attack, or to cause the decrease of its commerce, 
which can thrive only under a regime that guarantees law and 
order, or to subject it to rebellions and internal strife/' 

In regard to the cessation of trade, d'Estrades stated 
that both the Dutch and French traders were already 
abandoning the island in great numbers, "some of whom 
are so determined under the present conditions to leave 
that they have withdrawn their affairs with losses estimated 
at eight, ten and twelve thousand livres."^^ 

The matter was all the more serious in Colbert's mind, 
because he regarded Martinique by reason of its location, 
the conveniency of its harbours and the fertility of its 
soil, as the most important of the French Antilles, and the 
one which could best be utilized as the military base from 
which the king's power could be maintained and as the 
entrepot for trade with the others. Colbert said to 
d'Estrades that it was of the utmost importance "to 
form a prompt and wise plan of doing something which 
would insure the authority of the king and prevent the 
deterioration of the island. "^^ 

The forming of the plan, or at least its execution, was 
not prompt because the season was "too far advanced," 
when Colbert wrote his letter to d'Estrades in September, 
166S, to send anyone to Martinique before the following 
spring. As a matter of fact, more than a year elapsed 
before anything was actually done. In the mean time 
Colbert had formed the plan of sending "a man of ability 
and of authority" to visit not only Martinique, but also 
all the other French possessions in America in order to 
assert that king's authority and to bring them into closer 
relations with the realm.^^ 

10 Arch. Nat. Col., Cg, 2nd series, I. 

11 Arch. Nat. Mar., B2, I, fol. 109. 

12 Arch. Nat. Mar., B2, 2, fol. 132. "Je connois bien a la verit6 
qu'il seroit du service du Roy d'apporter un remede a la trop grande 

58 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

The logical choice of such a man would have fallen upon 
Count d'Estrades, viceroy of all the French possessions 
in America, but he had recently been sent as ambassador 
to Holland and was not available. Alexandre Prouville 
de Tracy was chosen in his place. De Tracy was at this 
time about sixty years old, having been promoted in 1651 
to the rank of lieutenant-general,^^ and had "grown grey 
in the most glorious campaigns of His Majesty's army."^* 
He was a seasoned soldier, a man of exceptional character, 
of a most remarkable sense of honour for the period, a 
loyal subject and a most conscientious official. Colbert 
never made throughout his career a more happy choice 
of a man for the performance of an important task. 

De Tracy's commission bore the date of November 19, 
1663. He was made "lieutenant-general in all the lands 
of our obedience situated in North and South America 
and in the islands of America." As such, he was given 
supreme command by land and sea of all the forces of 
His Majesty in America, as well as supreme judicial power 
in all cases whatsoever. He was instructed to administer 
the oath of allegiance to all the governors, members of 
the conseils souverains and the three estates, and "to 
establish the power of the king," and "to make all the 
people obedient unto him."^^ 

auctorite que les gouverneurs des Isles de rAmerique ont usurpee, 
mais comme I'on ne peut pas le tenter sans avoir en main des forces 
suffisantes pour se faire obeir et ne pas mettre en compromise 
I'auctorite de Sa Majeste, je vous diray en secret que je prends des 
a present des mesures pour cela et que Fannee prochaine ou la 
suivante j'espere que nous pourrons armer une escadre de vaisseaux 
afin de I'envoyer dans les Isles non seulement pour fortifier nos 
colonies, mais meme pour y establir un bon ordre dans I'administra- 
tion de la justice de la police et de tout ce qui pourra procurer aux 
habitants de ces quartiers-la une liberte entiere dans leur commerce." 

13 Clement, I, 5, note 3. 

14 Du Tertre, III, 17. 

15 The text of de Tracy's commission is to be found in Du Tertre, 
III, 17-19. 

59 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

De Tracy set sail from La Rochelle on February 26, 
1664. He accompanied de La Barre, who was just leav- 
ing France with a colony to establish a French settlement 
at Cayenne. After remaining with de La Barre a short 
time to see that all went well with the new colony, he set 
sail for Martinique, where he arrived the first of June. 
He remained in the West Indies, for the most part in 
Guadeloupe and Martinique, until the close of the follow- 
ing spring. He then proceeded to Quebec, arriving there 
on June 30, 1665, and remaining in Canada until August 
26, 1667, when he set sail for France. Colbert was so 
pleased with the way that he acquitted himself of his 
work that some two years later in a letter to a governor 
in the East Indies he cited him as a model. He there 
spoke of him as having given a "new life to Canada and 
the West Indies."'' 

The task before de Tracy in the West Indies was gigan- 
tic. He had not cast anchor at St. Pierre (Martinique) 
before certain planters and officers came aboard to ask 
redress against the injustice of the governor and they 
were so favourably impressed with his personality and the 
way in which they were received that they declared, on 
returning ashore, that he was an "incomparable man who 
would make the islands flourish under his administration."'^ 
The planters were so deeply in debt to the Dutch and to 
one another that there were many lawsuits to be settled. 
The courts were in such a state of corruption and confusion 
that de Tracy was forced to undertake the arduous task 

16 Clement, III, 2, p. 434, Letter to M. de Mondevergue, Mar. 30, 
1669. For an account of de Tracy's work in Canada, see Th. Chapais, 
Jean Talon, Intendant de la Nouvelle France (1665-1672), 64 ff. 

17 The facts related here, unless otherwise stated, are taken from 
Du Tertre, III, passim. Du Tertre was perhaps acquainted with 
de Tracy and certainly had access to the journal which he kept during 
his sojourn in the islands, for he says in one place, "tout ceci est 
tire mot par mot du register de M. de Tracy," p. 77. 

60 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

of judging cases personally. He showed such diligence 
and such impartiahty in his decisions that "even those 
who were condemned went away content and praised him." 
His rectitude as a judge was maintained by the scrupulous 
way in which he refused all manner of favours. He refused 
both at Martinique and at Guadeloupe to lodge at the 
chateau of the governor. He refused to accept any pres- 
ents, even those of fresh meat, confining himself to a diet 
of salt meat and leading a most frugal life. His conduct 
in this respect was so extraordinary that Colbert wrote 
to him in the following terms : 

"If it is true that it would have been an error on your part 
to have failed to render an exact account of the disorders which 
reign in the islands^ it is equally true that it would have been 
wrong for you to conceal the fact that you are leading such a 
frugal life and observing such rigid discipline. Although the 
sacrifices which you are making by refusing to accept the 
presents of refreshments^ which are being offered you, and by 
confining yourself to a diet of salt meat, might prove prejudicial 
to your health and hence detrimental to the advancement of His 
Majesty's service, yet I am compelled to tell you that it has 
proved entirely agreeable to him to see that one of his com- 
manders knows how to adjust himself to an austere life, which 
so few know how to do. His Majesty has not been able to praise 
enough to his satisfaction the good discipline which has char- 
acterized the conduct of your soldiers, who have not even turned 
aside from their line of march to take an orange from the 
premises of a farmer. If this proof of their self-restraint and 
of their obedience to their commanders has won the admiration 
of the planters in the islands, it is certain that it has not failed 
to call forth here praise for their chief. The great number 
of suits, which you have settled by forcing payments to poor 
servants and artisans at the hands of the little tyrants who 
have grown rich by the sweat of those poor wretches, has also 
given us cause to praise your zeal and your charity."^^ 

18 Arch. Nat. Col., Cg, 2nd series, I, letter from Colbert to de 
Tracy, September 22, 1664. This letter is of unusual interest in giving 

61 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

De Tracy published an ordinance on June 19, 1665, 
which put an end to the chaos that had been reigning in 
Martinique under the arbitrary rule of Vaudroque. Cred- 
itors were protected by being empowered to lay claim upon 
the movables and even the slaves of their debtors. Uni- 
formity in weights, measures and currency was re-estab- 
lished. Servants and slaves were protected against the 
tyranny of their masters. As a protection against the 
abuse of power by governors, permission was granted to 
emigrate to any other French colony. Arbitrary taxes 
were abolished and all officers were forbidden to levy other 
taxes than those which were wont to be levied during the 
administration of the late du Parquet.^^ 

From Martinique de Tracy passed to Guadeloupe, 
where in a remarkably short time he put an end to the 
unrest and discontent caused by the strife between Houel 
and his nephews. Houel was put aboard a vessel and sent 
to France to answer for his conduct to the king. Arbi- 
trary taxes were aboHshed and du Lion was placed in 
command of the island. Order and peace were completely 
restored. De Tracy accomplished similar work in the 
other islands. 

Contemporaneous with the mission of de Tracy was 
Colbert's approval of the plan to organize the Company 
of Cayenne. Only very superficial facts of the formation 
of that company seem to be known, for it has almost 
escaped notice that it was connected with a much larger 
plan. 

Lefebvre de La Barre presented to Colbert, probably 
at the close of 1662, a plan for the "formation of a com- 
pany for the establishment of the colony at Cap du Nord 
et Cayenne,'' to be composed of some twenty members and 

an insight into what de Tracy was doing in the islands and at the 
same time in disclosing what Colbert wished to have accomplished. 
19 The text of this ordinance is to be found in Du Tertre, III, 71-76. 

63 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

capitalized at 200,000 livres. He said that it would be 
more prudent to organize only a small company, because 
the success of the enterprise depended upon keeping it 
secret from the Dutch, who would become jealous at once 
and try to thwart its plans. Besides it would be difficult 
to enlist a large number of subscribers for the enterprise, 
as two attempts of the French to establish colonies at 
Cayenne had already proved failures.^" De La Barre pro- 
posed two chief ends for the company to realize, (1) the 
establishment of a strong colony at Cayenne and the 
occupation of the coast between the Amazon and the 
Orinoco, (2) the establishment of a trade with the French 
Antilles. In regard to the latter he was very explicit: 

"As soon as a good post has been established and a colony 
of 500 or 600 men has been founded, the company intends to 
strengthen itself by enlarging the number of its members and 
increasing its capital. It will then equip 10 or 12 ships for an 
over-sea trade. I mean by that, trade with the Antilles and 
the mainland, which has become important. It will be very 
easy to do this for, inasmuch as the risk is very small to under- 
take a trade which merchants of every nation of Europe carry 

on every day, new members will not be difficult to find 

The small company in this way, together with the support of 
the king and that of his ministers, will become large and 
powerful. Its ships will find not only a good port of refuge 
at the coast for its vessels, but also a supply of provisions. 
.... One will be able in less than two years to take possession 
of the trade of the islands and drive out the Dutch who will 
have no right to complain. This trade amounts to more than 

20 In regard to the j ealousy of the Dutch, there is a very interest- 
ing passage in an anonymous letter dated at Amsterdam, January 
24, 1664, "Mess. d'Amsterdam apprenans le dessein que Ton a en 
France de faire une descente dans I'isle de Cayenne ou lis ont une 
colonie de 2000 en prennent de Tombrage et y envoyent a ce qu'on 
dit plus de vaisseaux et de gens de guerre." Bib. Nat. MSS., 500 
Colbert, 203, fol. 405. 

63 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

6,000,000 livres annually. These two plans are so closely 
united that the one cannot succeed without the other."^^ 

It seems very clear from this passage that de La Barre 
in the proposal for the establishment of a colony at 
Cayenne was at the same time proposing the commercial 
conquest of the French Antilles. His suggestion of the 
utilization of Cayenne as a basis for the establishment of 
trade with the Antilles was not a good one, for expe- 
rience proved that Cayenne was far too much to the lee- 
ward to make such a thing practicable. In regard to his 
other suggestion, however, that the smaller company 
serve as a basis for the formation of a larger one, it was 
actually adopted by Colbert. 

One naturally asks what sources of information de La 
Barre had at his command in the formation of such a 
plan. Du Tertre remarked that he "derived nearly all 
of his information in regard to the enterprise from Sir 
Bouchardeau, a man of honour and intelligence, who in 
the voyages which he had made to the mainland of South 
America and to the islands had acquired a certain knowl- 
edge which gave him a reputation as being very well 
informed in regard to the affairs of America. "^^ Bouchar- 
deau became a member of the company and undoubtedly 
aided de La Barre in carrying out his plans, for he went 
with him to Cayenne on the initial voyage in 1664. A 
memoir of 1662, found among the documents relating to 
the history of Cayenne, proves, however, that information 
was sought elsewhere and probably utilized. The memoir 
is anonymous and it is impossible to say to whom it was 
addressed, but it is improbable that it was not commu- 
nicated both to de La Barre and Colbert. The author 
states that he had just returned from a voyage to Havre 

21 Arch. Col., Ci4, I, fols. 85 ff. 

22 Du Tertre, III, 13. See also a note on Bouchardeau in Arch. 
Col., Ci4, I, fol. 84, "B. a este deux fois sur les lieux." 

64 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

and Dieppe and that at the former place he had conferred 
with a captain, Paul Languillet by name, and at the latter 
with "a friend," in regard to Cayenne. Captain Lan- 
guillet had made a voyage to Cayenne in 1660-1661 in 
the employment of the Dutch. He reported that at that 
time there were about thirty or forty men and women at 
Cayenne, and that one hundred and twenty slaves had 
recently been imported to cultivate the soil. In addition 
there were about fifteen or twenty families of Jews who 
were planters. The fort which had been built by the 
French (in 1652) was now under the command of Langue- 
dek, a Dutchman, and had been named Nassau. Large 
quantities of cane had been planted and some land had 
been cleared for the cultivation of tobacco, which sur- 
passed in quahty that of Brazil. Cotton and roucou grew 
naturally there and the cassava-plant could be easily made 
to grow, as could indigo. This settlement had been made 
by individuals and not by the Dutch West India Company. 
In addition to this information, given by the captain, the 
memorialist volunteered the following reflections: 

"You will not take it amiss^ if I repeat to you what I have 
already said in regard to enterprises of the French in establish- 
ing colonies. Captain Languillet has confirmed my opinion by 
saying that those who have previously tried to make a settle- 
ment at Cayenne failed^ because its leaders conducted them- 
selves with too little gentleness and with too much ostentation 
and pretentions and paid too little attention to production. 
He is of the opinion that failure awaits other attempts unless 
these faults are eliminated. Most of those who formed part 
of the last expedition were lazy and knew not how to work^ 
a fact which caused disorders in the colony. To insure success, 
there is more need of a good fatherly leader who will know how 
to direct workmen than of a captain, all decorated with plumes 
and accompanied by blasts of trumpets, who knows how to 
command soldiers. . . . Experience teaches that the enter- 

65 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

prises of the French have served merely for blazing the trail 
for other nations. "^^ 

Colbert straightway approved the plan presented by 
de La Barre, pledged his support and gained the favour 
of the king for the enterprise.^* Inspired by this encour- 
agement, de La Barre communicated his design to 
Pelissary, one of the treasurers of the marine, who in 
turn communicated it to Bibaud, one of his friends. These 
three, after conferences with Bouchardeau, decided to 
form a company. They succeeded in enlisting some fifteen 
others and raising a subscription of 200,000 livres.^^ 
Letters-patent were issued in October, which granted to 
the company the mainland of South America between the 
Amazon and the Orinoco, together with the island of 
Cayenne, and also a monopoly of commerce.^® 

The company sent out its first expedition from La 
Rochelle on February 26, 1664. It was composed of two 
vessels belonging to the king, Le Breze (800 tons) and 
Le Terron, and of four belonging to the company, two 
flutes of 300 tons each, a fly-boat of 120 tons and a frigate 
of 150 tons.^^ There were aboard, according to a con- 
temporary English writer, "near 1500 passengers and 
soldiers to recover and assert the French title as to these 
islands [Antilles], as to Canada and Cayenne,"^^ but there 
were aboard, according to Du Tertre, who perhaps was 
more accurately informed, only "1200 healthy strong 
men."^^ A food supply for one year was taken in the 

23 Arch. CoL, C14, I, fols. 190-194. 

24 Du Tertre, III, 13. 

25 A list of the stockholders is to be found in Arch. Aff. Etr., M6m. 
et Doc, Amerique, V, fols. 41-43. 

26 The text of the letters-patent is to be found in ibid., fols. 46-50. 

27 Bib. Nat. MSS., Mel. CoL, 119 bis, fol. 917, letter from Colbert 
de Terron, Mar. 16, 1664. 

28(7aZ. St. Pa., Am. 8;; W. I., 1661-1668, 898. 
29 Du Tertre, III, 33. 

66 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

cargo. The fleet arrived at Cayenne in May. The Dutch 
offered no opposition, but accepted a peaceful settlement 
by which they were paid something for their plantations 
and left the French in possession of the islands.^^ Posses- 
sion was taken of the mainland on May S2. The news was 
published in France in July that de La Barre had met 
with success, that there were already three villages in- 
habited by three hundred families and that there "were 
large plantations of sugar-cane, so that according to ap- 
pearances a profitable commerce could be built up in a 
short time."^^ 

With the establishment of the colony at Cayenne and 
the mission of de Tracy to all the French Colonies of 
America, came to an end the period of preparation. The 
ships which bore de La Barre and de Tracy had hardly 
disappeared beneath the horizon before Colbert began to 
put in operation his larger plans for the upbuilding of 
commerce with the colonies across the seas. 

30 The treaty is to be found in Arch. Col., C14, I, f ols. 74, 90. The 
contract made with the Dutch governor granted him 21,850 florins 
for his plantation. The following items were given: A very beautiful 
and excellent plantation, situated at Matoury, together with ten 
houses, a quantity of sugar-cane ready for the mill and other planted 
some 10 months ago and a large crop of cassava-plant, 8000 florins; 
a tract of land with cane, 6000 florins; 26 trained negroes, 6850 
florins; 1 dwelling-house and kitchen, 1000 florins. 

31 Gazette, 1664, p. 761. 



67 



CHAPTER III 

The Establishment of The West India 

Company. Its Concessions, Priyileges 

AND Composition 

TT^XACTLY at what date the project to establish the 
-■--' West India Company took form in the mind of Col- 
bert, it is impossible to say with absolute precision. Un- 
fortunately a letter written to Colbert by Berthelot, who 
was soon to become one of the general directors, was not 
dated by the author. It is endorsed in another hand, how- 
ever, "Mars, 1664," and very probably is of that date. A 
passage of that letter is as follows : "You may count defi- 
nitely upon me for the enterprise of establishing trade with 
Cayenne and the acquisition of the islands of St. Christo- 
pher, Martinique and Guadeloupe and other things which 
will be done to sustain and extend this trade. "^ If the 
date of this letter is really March, it is possible to say 
that the plan to form a company for trade with the Amer- 
ican colonies was made not later than that time. The 
plan was certainly formed before April 17, for on that 
day the members of the old Company of the Isles of Amer- 
ica were commanded to bring before a specially appointed 
commission all papers bearing upon the sale of the several 
islands to proprietors. The preamble of the arret which 
gave this order stated very clearly that the king had 
decided to have the islands transferred "into the hands of 
a strong company, which would be able to equip a number 
of vessels in order to colonize and furnish them with all the 
merchandise of which they had need."^ 

1 Bib. Nat. MSS., M^l. Colbert, 119, fol. 794. 
2Moreau de Saint-Mery, I, 98-99. 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

Letters-patent were issued in May, 1664. To the com- 
pany were granted the mainland of South America from 
the Amazon to the Orinoco, together with the island of 
Cayenne, all the French West Indies, Canada, Acadia, 
Newfoundland, and "other islands and the mainland of 
North America, from the north of Canada to Virginia 
and Florida," and finally, the western coast of Africa 
from Cape Verde to the Cape of Good Hope. 

All lands within this concession, conquered and colonized 
by the company during the space of forty years, as well as 
the Antilles, already inhabited by the French, were granted 
with full and perpetual property rights. For the West 
India islands sums were to be paid to the several proprie- 
tors which would represent the original purchase price plus 
a certain amount for improvements and increased value, 
to be determined by commissioners appointed by the king. 
No other claims based on concessions made to former com- 
panies were to be considered valid. The company became 
full suzerain of all the aforesaid lands with no other obli- 
gation than that of acknowledging the king as its lord. 
At each change of king "a crown of gold of the weight of 
thirty marks" was to be' presented to the new king. At 
the end of the forty years, it was empowered to dispose 
freely of all the aforesaid lands together with all forts, 
vessels, merchandise, etc., on the condition, however, that 
no sale thereof be made to foreigners without the special 
permission of the king. It was empowered to build forts, 
to manufacture ammunition, to levy troops, to build and 
equip whatever number of ships it chose, with the privi- 
lege of flying the royal pennant at their masts. It was 
further given the power to appoint governors, judges, all 
sorts of officials for the administration of the lands in its 
concession, and to make all sorts of regulations, as well 
as the power to declare war and make treaties with non- 
European kings and princes. The king pledged the sup- 

69 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

port of his arms and of his vessels to defend the company 
against the attacks of foreigners. 

A monopoly of trade was granted for the space of forty 
years. A single exception was made to this in the case of 
the fisheries of Newfoundland to which all the subjects of 
His Majesty were to be admitted without exception.^ A 
premium of thirty Kvres was offered by His Majesty for 
every ton of merchandise exported to the colonies from 
France and forty livres for every ton imported into France 
from the colonies. This was changed almost immediately 
afterwards to an exemption from half the import and 
export duties usually paid on such cargoes.* A right of 
entrepot was granted, whereby colonial products might 
be re-exported into foreign countries free from all export 
duties. Exemption was accorded from all import and 
export duties on ammunition, food supplies and other 
things necessary for the building and equipment of the 
company's vessels. Sugar, refined in any refineries estab- 
lished by the company, might be exported to foreign mar- 
kets free of duty, if shipped in French bottoms. 

The company was to be composed of the stockholders 
of the Company of Cayenne, of all French subjects of 
whatever quality and estate, and finally of all foreigners 
who chose to subscribe. Subscriptions could be made for 
3000 livres or more. A subscription of 10,000 livres gave 
the right to attend the general assemblies of the company 
and of exercising deliberative power therein, and one of 
20,000 made one eligible as general director and conferred 
the right of bourgeois. Officials subscribing 20,000 livres 
were freed from the obligation, imposed by the royal 

3 This exception is easily explained by the fact that too many 
interests of all the principal ports were centered in this industry. A 
study of the inquest of 1664, referred to above, reveals the fact that 
a great majority of the vessels suited to ocean voyages were engaged 
in the fisheries. Bib. Nat. MSS., 500 Colbert, 199. 

4Moreau de Saint-Mery, I, 114. 

70 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

declaration of December, 1663, of residing in the locali- 
ties where the duties of their offices were to be discharged. 
Foreigners, contributing the sum of 20,000 livres, acquired 
and enjoyed the rights of native-born Frenchmen during 
the time that such a sum remained to their credit in the 
company. If this time were prolonged to twenty years, 
the enjoyment of these rights would become permanent.^ 
The administration of the company's affairs was vested 
in a central bureau at Paris and in subsidiary bureaux in 
the provinces wherever interests demanded their establish- 
ment. The former was to be composed of nine general 

5 Colbert made one serious attempt to interest foreigners in the 
company and thus to enlarge the narrow limits of its personnel. On 
being informed that an effort had been made by the Spanish king to 
attract the German princes to trade with the Indies, he drew up a 
memoir on the subject, in which he attempted to show that the French 
could offer much greater advantages. The most interesting passages 
of the memoir are the following: "If the kings of the North and the 
princes of the Empire are of a mind to consider seriously the estab- 
lishment of trade with the two Indies, the king is able to make them 
propositions which are safe, solid and much more advantageous than 
aU those which the Spaniards can propose. His Majesty has recently 
formed two large companies, one for trade with the West Indies, 
which already has a capital of 4,000,000 livres and fifty vessels employed 
in its commerce, the other for trade with the East Indies, which has a 
capital of 10,000,000 livres and employs more than thirty vessels. . . . 
The former is at present in possession of the islands of St. Christo- 
pher, Martinique, Guadeloupe, Marie Galante, the Saints, St. Croix, 
Grenada, Tortuga, and other islands, in which there are at present 
20,000 Frenchmen; of a considerable settlement in the island of 
Cayenne of 1000; of Canada, where there are more than 5000 French- 
men; of Newfoundland, with 200, and finally of a settlement on the 
coast of Africa [Senegal]. The kings and princes who wish to enter 
into this company may do so for considerable sums. In order to 
give a proof of the king's good will. His Majesty will furnish double 
the amounts furnished by them. His Majesty will also grant them 
the privilege of being represented by a director in the central bureau 
of the company's administration at Paris." C16ment, II, 2, p. 429. 

The plan of making a settlement on the coast of South America 
seems to have been seriously considered at one time by the electors 
of Mayence and of Bavaria. Du Fresne, who was in Germany at 

71 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

directors who were to be elected in a general assembly of 
stockholders, three each year for a term of three years in 
such a way that at the end of each election six old and 
three new ones remained. The latter were to be composed 
"of merchants and of none others." The capital of the 
company was not fixed. Subscriptions were to be received 
during the period of three months, counting from the first 
of June. 

The letters-patent thus provided for the organization 
of a gigantic commercial company with an immense field 
for exploitation, with complete and extensive powers, and 
with enticing inducements to attract subscribers. 

the beginning of 1665 in quest of iron-workers for the establishment 
of foundries in France, was charged by Colbert with the task of 
interesting the German princes in his proposal. He wrote from 
Wiirtzburg on January 29, 1665, exposing at length the Elector of 
Mayence's ideas in regard to the matter and his willingness to under- 
take in the following spring a settlement under the protection of the 
West India Company. In August the two electors of Bavaria and of 
Mayence made the following proposals: 

1. Concession of one degree of territory on the coast of Guiana. 
2. The said land to be held as a fief from the king of France. 3. 
Shipments to be made from France. 4. Full liberty within the said 
concession. 5. The right to sub-feofiP. 6. Privilege of making a 
contract with the West India Company for the transportation of 
settlers and of provisions. 7. Privilege of buying slaves, either 
at the coast of Africa directly or from those to whom the com- 
pany granted the privilege of that trade. 8. Privilege of trading 
with all French colonies in America and with the French in Europe. 
Arch. Col., Ci4, II, fols. 197-199. All of these proposals were granted. 
To Article 6, however, a condition was made that the ships of the 
West India Company alone could be used for commerce with the pro- 
posed settlement; and one also to Article 7, that slaves should be 
bought only from the company. No record has been found that 
there was a sequel to these negotiations with the Electors. Attention 
has been called to them because they show that Colbert made one 
serious attempt, at least, to give a larger development to the narrow 
personnel of the West India Company. His efforts proved fruitless, 
however, and it remained an enterprise directed for the most part by 
officials who had never had the necessary experience to manage its 
affairs wisely. 

72 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

Their official registration met with opposition at the 
hands of the proprietors of the several West Indies. First 
of all, they paid no attention to the arret of April 17, 
which ordered them to bring all papers concerning the 
purchase of the islands before a designated commission, or 
yet to a similar arret of May 8. Their opposition con- 
tinued throughout the months of May and June. Becha- 
meil, who had been especially charged by Colbert with the 
organization of the company, wrote on July 1 : 

"I thought that I should be able to notify you today of the 
ratification of the letters-patent which had been agreed upon 
Saturday evening by the presidents [of Parlemenf]. The 
commissioners and M. Ferrand, reporter, in a meeting held 
this morning agreed to abide by the decision of the presidents, 
but at the moment of their adjournment they found them- 
selves surrounded by Mesdames Champigny, Houel and de 
Cerillac with their families, who said that they had filed 
protest against the registration of the letters-patent. They 
cried out loudly against the concession which the king had 
made of their possessions in control of which one wished to 
place the company, even before it paid anything or guaranteed 
them against loss." 

Bechameil added that it was of the utmost importance to 
prevent Parlement from forcing the company to make 
satisfactory settlements with the proprietors before enter- 
ing into the possession of the islands.^ Another letter from 
the same person on July 10 states that a satisfactory con- 
tract had been made with M. and Mme. de Champigny for 
the cession of their share of Guadeloupe and of the islands 
of Marie Galante and Desirade. The opposition of Houel 
for the cession of his share of Guadeloupe, and that of de 
Cerillac for the cession of Grenada continued. No agree- 

6 Bib. Nat. MSS., Mel. Colbert, 122, fol. 13, and also fol. 137, for a 
letter of July 3, in regard to the same matter. 

73 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

ment was yet made with the Knights of Malta for the 
cession of St. Christopher/ 

In spite, however, of this opposition of the proprietors, 
the letters-patent were officially registered in the Parle- 
ment of Paris on July 11, and on the 27th of the same 
month at the Chambre des Comptes. The company was 
thus empowered to enter into the possession of the lands 
of its concession, before contracts had been made for their 
transfer, for such contracts were not made until several 
months later.^ 

No contract was made with Houel for his possessions at 
Guadeloupe. He refused to sell and remained theoretically 
in control of them until the edict of revocation of the West 
India Company in 1674, when they were declared annexed 
to the royal domain.^ 

Before attempting to follow the history of the company 
in the exploitation of its grant, some questions of capital 
importance may be asked. Of whom was the company 
composed? Who were its directors to guide it in the con- 
quest of the commerce of such a vast field? Whence came 
the funds placed at its disposal? 

7 Ibid., fol. 353. 

8 They were as follows: One on November 28, 1664, with the Com- 
pany of Rouen, whereby the possessions of that company on the west 
coast of Africa (Senegal), together with its ships and merchandise, 
were ceded for the sum of 150,000 livres (Chemin Dupontes, Les 
Compagnies de colonisation en Afrique occidentale, p. 33) ; one in 
July, 1665, whereby the Knights of Malta agreed to cede the islands 
of St. Christopher, St. Martin, St. Bartholomew and St. Croix for the 
sum of 500,000 livres tournois; one on August 25, with M. and Mme. 
de Champigny for the cession of their share of Guadeloupe and of 
Marie Galante and Desirade, for 120,000 livres; another on August 
27, with de Cerillac for Grenada in payment of 100,000; one with the 
Sir Dyel d'Enneval on August 14, whereby Martinique was ceded for 
240,000 livres. For the statements regarding the contracts with the 
Knights of Malta, with the de Champignys, de Cerillac, see Du Tertre, 
III, 250, 266-267; for that with d'Enneval, see Arch. Col., F2, 17, 
Contract d'acquisition de la Martinique. 

9 Du Tertre, III, 267, and Moreau de Saint-Mery, I, 283. 

74 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

Fortunately a list of all the subscriptions, made from 
the beginning, June 2, 1664, until December 27, 1669, 
the date of the last subscription, has been preserved in 
the national archives at Paris. Under the date of June 
2, appear the names of no less than twenty-three persons 
whose subscriptions, varying from sums of 10,000 to 30,- 
000 livres, amount to the formidable total of 520,000 
livres.'^" It is upon this fact that a recent French writer, 
M. Chemin-Dupontes, has asserted that the West India 
Company met with success at the hands of public sub- 
scribers.^^ We are forced, however, to disagree with the 
assertion. 

In the letters-patent, issued on October 12, 1663, for 
the formation of the Company of Cayenne, the names of 
its members are given. There are sixteen and all of them 
appear on the list of June 2. Thus sixteen out of a total 
of the twenty-three names are accounted for. Did the 
remaining seven also belong to the Company of Cayenne? 
Evidence points to that conclusion. In the first place, 
the names of the sixteen stockholders appear three times 
in the letters-patent, and in each case a blank space is 
left at the end of their enumeration, as though the list 
were not yet complete and more names were to be added 
later. Berthelot, a revenue farmer, wrote to Colbert some 
time before the formation of the West India Company that 
he could count upon his support in the affair of the main- 
tenance of trade with Cayenne and of the acquisition of the 
French West Indies and added : "I shall pass the rest of the 
day with M. de Rambouillet [not legible], my asso- 
ciates, and I shall let you know the results of my inter- 
view."^^ The names of both Berthelot and de Rambouillet 

10 This list is to be found in Arch. Nat., G7, 1312, Estat general 
de toutes les actions de la Compagnie des Indes Occidentales. 

11 Chemin-Dupontes, of. cit., 36. 

12 Bib. Nat. MSS., Mel. Colbert, 119 his, fol. 794. 

75 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

appear on the list of June 2, for the sums of 30,000 livres 
each. It is impossible to say for certain that these sub- 
scriptions were not made with a view to the establishment 
of the West India Company, but Berthelot's letter rather 
implies that the subscriptions were made to the Company 
of Cayenne. If that is true, it means that at least eight- 
een out of the twenty-three subscribers of June 2 to the 
West India Company were stockholders in the earlier 
company. As to the remaining five no information has 
been found.^^ Thus, although it is impossible to say that 
all the twenty-three subscriptions of the list of June 2 
represent subscriptions made to the Company of Cayenne, 
there is a strong probability that such was the case. This 
means that the so-called favourable reception at the hands 
of the public, noted by M. Chemin-Dupontes, was nothing 
more than a simple transfer to the books of the new com- 
pany of the capital stock of the Company of Cayenne. 
Such a transfer had been ordered by an arret of May 30 : 
"The company, which has been formed for the coloniza- 
tion of the island of Cayenne and of the mainland of 
South America, is hereby dissolved, and the funds sub- 
scribed to that company hereby become the property of 
the West India Company."^^ 

It remains to be asked whether the members of the 
earlier company increased their original subscriptions at 
the formation of the Company of the West Indies. Du 
Tertre states that each of the twenty stockholders of the 
Company of Cayenne subscribed originally 10,000 livres, 
or a total of 200,000 livres, but pledged their credit for 
an additional 10,000 livres, or for a total of 400,000 
livres. De La Bar re, who certainly had more opportunity 

13 Du Tertre asserts that the Company of Cayenne was composed 
of twenty, but that may be a rough statement which means eighteen 
as well as twenty-three. Du Tertre, III, 13-14. 

14 Arch. Nat., E, 1717, fol. 163. 

76 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

to know the facts, states, however, in a memoir, written 
probably on the eve of the formation of the company, that 
all the associates were "resolved to furnish to the amount 
of 30,000 livres each, according to needs and circum- 
stances."^^ Whether such "needs and circumstances" 
arose before the formation of the West India Company, 
we do not know. The initial expedition which the com- 
pany sent to Cayenne was a large one and must have cost 
a considerable sum to fit out. It was composed of no less 
than four vessels belonging to the company, two of which 
were of 300 tons, and of over 1200 soldiers and settlers. 
It was much larger than the first fleet sent out by the 
West India Company at the end of the year. How great 
an expenditure of funds this required it is not possible to 
say, but it may well be that the stockholders were called 
upon to increase their original subscriptions in order to 
insure the strength and success of the establishment of the 
colony. Of the twenty-three subscriptions of June 2, there 
are eleven of 30,000 livres, five of 20,000 livres, four of 
15,000 Hvres, and three of 10,000 Hvres. This might 
mean that all but three of the stockholders found it neces- 
sary to increase their original subscriptions to finance the 
enterprise. In that case, the somewhat formidable sum 
of 520,000 livres for one day's subscription represented 
nothing in the way of capital for the new company except 
the value of the new settlement at Cayenne and did not 
furnish the ready cash which is so necessary in launching 
a commercial enterprise. 

This explains why the West India Company did not 
send out its initial expedition before December, some seven 
months after its letters-patent were granted. It would 
likewise explain the letter of distress which Bibaud, one 
of the directors, wrote to Colbert on June 10: 

15 Arch. Col., Ci4, I, fol. 85. 

77 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

"I feel obliged to say to you, Monseigneur, that the small 
fund which the company has at present and the poor prospects 
which it has of obtaining more, unless it is aided by the king, 
will ruin its reputation. It is certainly an excellent affair 
and one of the best that has ever been proposed in France. 
There are very few merchants of the seaports who would not 
subscribe to the enterprise, if they saw that our force was in 
proportion to the grandeur of the design. They know as well 
as we that four or five millions are necessary to make the 
company strong enough for that and to prevent it from fail- 
ing. That is why those merchants instead of uniting with us 
are talking publicly of our weakness." 

Bibaud added that a delay on the part of the king to 
come to the aid of the company meant ruin.^^ In spite of 
the urgent appeal of Bibaud, the royal treasury remained 
closed throughout the year 1664, and public subscriptions 
came in exceedingly slowly. Thus, for June 3, there was 
one of 10,000 livres, another on August 18 for 15,000 
livres, and that was all until September 7. That is to 
say, if we except the sum of 520,000 livres entered on the 
subscription list of June 2, which has been under discus- 
sion, the total subscriptions for the three months of June, 
July and August amounted to only 25,000 livres. If the 
books of the company had been closed on the first of Sep- 
tember, as was provided by the letters-patent, the com- 
pany, whose task was the commercial conquest of a hemi- 
sphere, would have had at its disposal about enough money 
to pay a first-class clerk. 

The months of September, October, November and 
December were more productive. During the month of 
September, there were four subscriptions of 20,000 livres, 
four of 10,000 livres and one of 3000 livres, making a 
total of 123,000 livres; during the month of October, 
there were ten subscriptions for a total of 123,000 livres ; 

16 Bib. Nat. MSS., Mel. Colbert, 121, fol. 365. 

78 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

in November, eight for a total of 71,000 livres ; in Decem- 
ber, ten for a total of 121,000 livres. This made a grand 
total of 438,000 livres for the four months. 

Although the fact that the subscriptions of these four 
months showed a marked increase over those of the three 
preceding months might be taken as indicating that public 
interest had at last been aroused in the enterprise, it is 
much more probable that the difference is to be accounted 
for by the fact that Colbert had created, in the meantime, 
the East India Company and had begun to wage a verit- 
able campaign for subscriptions to that enterprise. The 
story is too old to be repeated here of how Colbert brought 
pressure to bear upon revenue-farmers, judges, courtiers 
and officials to make them contribute funds. The long list 
of names of these classes among the stockholders of that 
company proves the success of his efforts. Colbert recom- 
mended to the king, in his famous Memoire sur commerce, 
of August, 1664, that both the East and West India Com- 
pany receive the hearty support of His Majesty and that 
everything be done to encourage them. A comparison of 
the lists of stockholders of the two companies will show 
that out of a total of thirty-six who subscribed to the 
West India Company during the months of September to 
December, seven also subscribed to the East India Com- 
pany. This is a very strong indication that the new sub- 
scriptions to the West India Company were a result of 
Colbert's campaign of browbeating and intimidation, and 
that they were made out of a spirit of complacency to the 
king and to his powerful minister, rather than from any 
great interest in the company. 

At the close of the year 1664, the nominal capital of 
the West India Company was 983,000 livres. For reasons 
already assigned, it is probable that not more than half 
of this amount represented ready capital for the com- 
pany's use. This was quite insufficient to insure success. 

79 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

Before continuing the inquiry as to the subscriptions which 
were made to the company in the following years, it may 
be asked who were the subscribers and from what classes 
they came. 

Of the first twenty-three names on the subscription list, 
representing, as we have seen, the stockholders of the 
Company of Cayenne, information has been gleaned from 
various sources in regard to twenty. Of the twenty, 
only two were merchants and all the rest occupied various 
positions in the administrative hierarchy of the realm. 
Thus there were Bechameil, a secretary of the conseil 
d'etat, Matharel, a secretary in the department of the 
marine, Menjot, one of the secretaries to the king, Col- 
bert de Terron, intendant at Brouage, de La Sabliere and 
Berthelot, revenue-farmers, etc. Very Httle information 
has been found in regard to the thirty-six new names which 
appear on the list from June 3 to December 31. The occu- 
pations of only nineteen are known. But of these, only 
four were merchants and the remaining fifteen were offi- 
cials of various rank. 

The point is of capital importance not only for the com- 
pany under consideration, but also for all commercial com- 
panies organized during the reign of Louis XIV. Failing 
to gain support of merchants, either because they were too 
poor, or because they were not willing to risk their money 
in such enterprises, Colbert and his successors resorted very 
often to the expedient of launching such commercial enter- 
prises by employing government officials and employees, 
men for the most part without experience in such matters 
and ignorant of the conditions of the trade which they 
attempted to carry on. That fact accounts for the failure 
of many a company and has received as yet too small 
attention at the hands of historians. 

In 1665, the total subscriptions amounted to 1,604,360 
livres. Of this sum, the king subscribed 187,000 livres 

80 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

on March 26; 100,000 livres on April 22; 100,000 livres 
on May 16, June 22, July 31 ; 300,000 livres on Septem- 
ber 4, and 500,000 livres on December 4, making a total 
for the year of 1,387,000 livres ; Colbert himself subscribed 
30,000 livres ; the President of the Parlement of Paris 
8000 livres ; des Forges, a revenue-farmer, 8000 livres ; 
three members of the company increased their holdings by 
subscriptions amounting to a total of 22,000 livres. This 
leaves only 149,360 livres subscribed during the year by 
individuals of whom no information has been found. 

The total subscriptions for the two years, 1666-1667, 
amounted to 1,846,440 livres. Of this sum the king con- 
tributed 1,135,000 livres; the fermiers des aides, 200,000 
livres; the fermiers des gabelles, 150,000 livres; 278,940 
livres were paid to the company by various farmers of the 
department of justice. All these sums made a total of 
1,773,940 livres, leaving only a remainder of 72,500 livres 
for the two years, subscribed by individuals of whom no 
information has been obtained. 

The total subscriptions for the year 1668 amounted to 
only 144,000 livres, of which the king subscribed 100,000 
livres ; the salt-farmers at Paris, 10,000 livres ; the farmers 
of fines imposed by the Chambre de Justice at Paris, 6500 
livres; making a total of 116,500 livres and leaving only 
27,000 livres for subscriptions by individuals. 

For 1669, the total was 944,545 liv. 8s. 6d. Of this the 
king contributed 404,545 liv. 8s. 6d. The remaining sum 
was all subscribed by members of the company, evidently 
as the result of corporate action which may have been 
dictated by Colbert. 

Thus of the grand total of 5,522,345 liv. 8s. 6d., the 
king furnished no less than 3,026,545 liv. 8s. 6d. Almost 
all of the remainder was furnished by revenue-farmers, tax- 
collectors and officials, acting in the great majority of 
cases under the orders of Colbert. Only very insignificant 

81 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

sums were furnished by merchants or others capable of 
directing such an important enterprise. The West India 
Company was thus, from the first and remained through- 
out its history, a commercial enterprise created by the 
government, supported by it and directed by the king's 
greatest minister. The almost unlimited powers which had 
been bestowed upon it by its letters-patent were powers 
only in name. It was subjected at every moment to the 
orders of Colbert and became the puppet of his will. In 
a word, the company was maintained and controlled by 
the state to perform a national service and to make pos- 
sible the success of a national policy. 



82 



CHAPTER IV 

The West India Company^ 1664-1665 

COLBERT imposed a difficult task upon the West 
India Company. He wished by a stroke of the pen 
to exclude the Dutch from the islands and to have the com- 
pany satisfy at once the needs of the trade which they had 
been accustomed to carry on. He chose the somewhat 
plausible excuse of the danger of admitting Dutch vessels 
to the island while the pest raged at Amsterdam. Accord- 
ingly an arret of September 30, 1664, forbade the govern- 
ors of the islands to receive Dutch vessels, and "the trade 
with the Dutch began to stop, . . . and the inhabitants 
to sufFer."^ 

Preparations to trade were made by the company imme- 
diately after the granting of its letters-patent. Bechameil, 
Matharel, Bibaud, Bouchet, Berthelot, Dahbert and Jac- 
quier, all members of the Company of Cayenne, became 
the first directors of the new company. Bechameil was espe- 
cially charged by Colbert with the direction of affairs and 
seems to have kept him constantly informed of what was 
being done. On June 5, he reported in person the details 
of the company's preparations. On June 28, he wrote: 
"In obedience to your orders I shall tell you that the West 
India Company is busy buying merchandise for the cargoes 
of the two vessels which are being equipped for the 
islands."^ Two days later in another letter he complained 
that his colleagues were showing indifference to the com- 
pany's affairs, but added that progress was being made 

1 Arch. Nat., E, 1717, fol. 209; Du Tertre, III, 92. 

2 Bib. Nat. MSS., Mel. Colbert, 119, Berthelot to Colbert, June, 
1664. 

83 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

and that he personally was working persistently at the 
task.^ Another letter of July SI informs us that an expe- 
dition to the islands was being prepared at La Rochelle, 
and one on July 24 declared that within three or four days 
the cargoes for this expedition would be complete, but 
added: "We are expecting every day the arrival of our 
three vessels which are to come from Holland and Bayonne. 
If they arrive at the time which we expect them, they will 
be ready to sail for the islands on August 1."* 

Either the "three vessels from Holland and Bayonne" 
did not arrive or other obstacles arose which prevented 
them sailing, for, as a matter of fact, the first expedition 
of the company did not sail from La Rochelle until more 
than four months later. This delay may have been due 
to the fact that the company, as has been shown, did not 
have adequate funds at its command to equip an expedition 
at such an early date. In the meantime, something had to 
be done to supply the pressing needs of the islands. The 
situation was all the more exacting, because news which 
Bechameil received was rather disconcerting : 

"I have received intelligence from Holland that no ves- 
sel has sailed for the islands for a long time, and that none 
will be sent because it is feared that our company will pre- 
vent them from discharging their cargoes."^ 

There seems very little doubt that the Dutch had con- 
siderably diminished the number of vessels which they sent 
ordinarily to the islands, for Du Tertre tells us that suf- 
fering was great there.^ One might explain this diminu- 

3 Ibid., 121 bis, fol. 1010. 

4 Ibid., fol. 809. 

5 Bib. Nat. MSS., Mel. Colbert, 122, fol. 699. 

6 Du Tertre notes the arrival of two Dutch vessels at Martinique 
two months later. One of these vessels had a cargo of 300 slaves, the 
other a cargo of horses from Curasao. "This aid, brought by the 
Dutch at a time when need was so great, reopened the wound which 
had been made by the rupture of commerce with them." Du Tertre, 
III, 101. 

84 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

tion by saying that it was due to the approaching struggle 
with England, or yet, as has been suggested, by the fear 
that the West India Company would assert its monopoly 
and prevent Dutch vessels from discharging their cargoes. 
A letter from Matharel, one of the directors of the com- 
pany, written on July 22 to Colbert, suggested another 
explanation of more than passing interest : 

"There is reason to believe that the Dutch have delayed 
sending several vessels which had already been partly freighted 
for the islands^ because they feared to find an opposition on 
the part of our company to the sale of their merchandise and 
to the freighting of their vessels for the return voyage. I 
am of the opinion that with these motives there is mixed a 
bit of malice aforethought with the desire to cause by this 
means a dearth of supplies in the islands and to make the 
planters cry out against our company^ if it cannot supply 
promptly the aid and refreshments which they need. M. 
Bechameil^ who is of the same opinion^ will inform the other 
members of the fact and they will not fail to take measures 
to meet the situation."^ 

Bechameil was of the opinion that to meet the crisis the 
merchants of La Rochelle, Dieppe and Havre, who were 
accustomed to send vessels to the islands, should be com- 
pelled either to send some on their own account, or to char- 
ter them to the company.^ No records have been found, 
however, which show that this suggestion ever bore fruit. 
The first fleet of the company was not ready to sail before 
the middle of December. On December 13, de Chambre, 
the general agent of the company for the islands, wrote 
that four vessels were ready to sail and that for "the most 
part they were new, mounted by one hundred pieces of 
artillery, well equipped in every respect, well laden with 

7 Bib. Nat. MSS., M61. Colbert, 133, fol. 793. 

8 Ibid., fol. 699. 

85 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

cargoes of food supplies and merchandise for the islands."^ 
Aboard the flag-ship, UArmonye, was de Chambre, on the 
vice-admiral, the St. Sebastien, were de Clodore, the new 
governor of Martinique, his wife, priests and curates, and 
clerks who were to be charged with the distribution and 
sale of the company's merchandise. 

The fleet sailed from La Rochelle on December 14, with 
favourable winds. The third day out a storm arose which 
separated all the vessels, but they were all reunited except 
Le Mercier, which was seen no more by the others, until 
their arrival at Martinique. On reaching the Canaries, 
La Suzanne left the other two in order to pursue her way 
to Cayenne, for which her cargo was intended. UArmonye 
and the *S'^. Sebastien called at the Cape Verde Islands to 
pay their compliments to the Portuguese governor and 
thus prepare the way for good relations between him and 
the company. This done, they continued their route to 
Martinique, where they arrived in February, 1665.^° 
There they found Le Mercier, which had sailed with them 
from La Rochelle, Le Terron, a vessel of the king, which 
had sailed also from La Rochelle a short time before them 
with a cargo of provisions for the troops of de Tracy, 
and La Fortune, a vessel belonging to the company which 
had sailed from Nantes about the middle of December.^^ 

9 Ibid., 134 bis, fols. 454-455. The fleet was composed as follows: 

Passengers 
Can- Crew 
Tons non Soldiers 

L'Armonye (flying the Admiral's pennant) 300 34 160 

St. Sebastien (Vice- Admiral's) . . .250 16 153 

Le Mercier 400 16 130 

La Suzanne 300 16 160 

The fleet had thus a total of 1250 tons, was armed with 72 cannon and 
had on board 593 persons. Du Tertre, III, 160. 

'^^ Relation de VAmerique, I, 14. 

11 Arch. Nat. Col., C7, I, letter from du Lion, April 8, 1665; 
Gazette, 1665, No. 156. 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

The arrival of these five large vessels, with cargoes of 
food supplies and of merchandise, was hailed with joy. 
For a moment the bitterness, which had been felt at the 
news that the islands had been placed in the hands of a 
company, was forgotten. When the sale of merchandise 
began, the planters gathered in great numbers from all 
parts of the island. Everyone sought to have a supply 
of wine, of salt meat, of powder, of lead, of cloth, of shoes, 
of hats, and of everything of which they had need. The 
willingness of the company to grant credit seemed un- 
bounded. Consequently nothing seemed too dear to buy. 
The worst knaves and the most insolvent planters were 
the loudest in their demands and bought the most. Many 
persons who would not have been given a pound of salt 
meat on credit by the Dutch, received a whole barrel from 
the company. The distribution of merchandise was made 
with such confusion, that to those who had demanded salt 
meat was bailed out brandy.^ 

The extravagance which the company displayed on this 
occasion was due to lack of judgment and to failure to 
protect its interests. It had chosen a corps of employees 
who were unprepared for their duties. De La Barre insists 
that for this fact the directors were not to be blamed, as 
they were forced "to take those who offered to go into 
a land so little known as yet and the directors believed that 
they had accomplished much in being able to find persons 
who were willing to make a voyage which appeared, even 
to the most hardy, a great undertaking."^^ The agents 
who were chosen believed that the company was under 
obligations to them for their willingness to go to the 
islands, and they conducted themselves as though all were 
owed to them and they owed nothing to the company. 
Whatever may be the explanation of the choice which was 

12 Du Tertre, III, 166-167. 

'^^ Relation de VAmSrique, I, 15-16. 

87 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

made of inexperienced and, as events proved, of rather 
insolent agents, two very deplorable facts resulted from 
it. In the first place, the affairs of the company were 
very poorly administered and serious financial losses were 
inevitable from such a scene as the debut at Martinique; 
in the second place, the haughty character and the domi- 
neering spirit of these agents alienated the planters, for 
de La Barre remarked "that their severity, presumption 
and foolish pride destroyed in the planters all the respect 
which they might have had for the company."^* 

The relatively small amount of supplies furnished by 
the company caused dissatisfaction. "It seemed like a 
drop of water upon the tongue of a man with a fever."^^ 
The planters began to murmur and cry out against the 
company, saying that it could not satisfy their needs 
itself and yet prevented the Dutch from doing so. Still 
greater was the disappointment and still greater the dis- 
content, when the St. Sehastien and UArmonye sailed 
from Martinique without discharging their cargoes. It 
was then that the planters began to consider more closely 
the West India Company and began to fear the renewal 
of suffering which the islands had experienced under the 
earlier companies. They cursed it and expressed openly 
their sorrow at the exclusion of Dutch traders. If there 
had been some means of escape, many would have left the 
island. Efforts to silence these complaints and to calm 
this spirit of discontent proved ineffective. A rebellion 
was threatened and would probably have broken out at 
once had not de Tracy been at Martinique and exerted 
his influence for the company .^^ 

It was indeed fortunate that de Tracy was still in the 
islands and that the inauguration of the company could 

14 Ibid., pp. 17-18. 

15 Du Tertre, III, 16T. 

16 Ibid. 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

take place under his high authority. The dignity of the 
high commission which he held from the king, and the 
sterling qualities which he possessed as a brave soldier and 
an honest man, inspired both fear and love for him among 
the planters of the islands. 

February 19, 1665, was chosen as the day for the 
formal ceremony of the company's inauguration at Martin- 
ique. On that day, in obedience to official summons by 
de Tracy, the conseil souverain, the clergy, the nobility, 
representatives of the tiers Stat assembled in the market- 
place before the Chamber of Justice. They were sur- 
rounded by a great crowd of the common people. De 
Tracy appeared and, accompanied by de Chambre and de 
Clodore, entered the Chamber, followed by the different 
estates. Only a small part of the common people could 
gain admission to the hall. 

After the assembly was called to order, de Chambre 
arose and declared that he was bearer of the king's 
proclamation which made the West India Company lord 
of the islands. In presenting it to de Tracy, he demanded 
in the name of this company that it be read and officially 
registered and that the company be placed in possession 
of the island of Martinique. The registration of the proc- 
lamation was forthwith made. The acquiescence of the 
whole assembly was obtained on the condition that the 
interests of the children of du Parquet, the former pro- 
prietor of the island, be safeguarded. De Tracy there- 
upon declared the company in possession of the island. 
De Clodore then presented his credentials and was declared 
governor. Oaths of fidelity to the king, to the company 
and to de Clodore were straightway taken by the conseil 
souverain and the three estates. Whereupon, de Tracy 
expressed his high esteem for de Clodore and exhorted all 
to accord him their obedience and their support. A reply 
by de Clodore formally ended the ceremony. 

89 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

The assembly quit the hall and gathered in the square, 
where several barrels of wine furnished by the company 
had been tapped. The health of the king was drunk amid 
the shouts of the people, "Vive le Roi!" and the booming 
of the cannon of Fort St. Pierre. "The health of the com- 
pany was drunk even by the planters, for wine makes all 
the world akin." Feasting followed, and the same toasts 
were drunk with joy. Thus the day passed, and the West 
India Company had entered, apparently under good aus- 
pices, into the possession of Martinique.^^ 

On the morrow, February 20, de Tracy, with de Cham- 
bre, sailed for Guadeloupe. Here on March S, before an 
assembly composed of the three estates, he declared the 
company in possession of the island and renewed in its 
name the powers of du Lion as governor .^^ In the months 
following, the company took formal possession of St. 
Christopher, St. Martin, St. Croix, St. Bartholomew, St. 
Domingo, Marie Galante and Grenada. 

Nowhere does the inauguration of the company seem 
to have been received with joy or without murmur. At 
St. Christopher, so we learn from a letter written by de 
Sales, the governor, the oath of allegiance to the company 
was taken with a pronounced lack of enthusiasm, some of 
the important planters absenting themselves from the 

17 Du Tertre, III, 168. 

18 Arch. Nat. Col., C7, I, Prise de pos. de I'isle de la Guad. We 
learn from a letter written by du Lion to Colbert under date of April 
8, that this ceremony was followed, as at Martinique, by drinking and 
feasting: "We left the hall to gather in the square, where several 
barrels of wine had been tapped, and there we had the honor to drink 
the health of the king amid the shouts of 'Vive le Roi !' and the boom- 
ing of cannon. We then attended the banquet offered by the West 
India Company to the most important persons of the island. It was 
spread beneath an arbor which had been prepared at the Place 
d'armes. . . . There were eighty-two covers on each side which 
proved insufficient. . . . Courtesy, order, entertainment and rejoic- 
ing characterized the occasion." Arch. Nat. Col., C7, I. 

90 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

ceremony on purpose not to take it. The principal offi- 
cers and planters assembled and drew up a series of ten 
articles, in which they sought a guarantee that the rights 
which they had enjoyed under the proprietorship of the 
Knights of Malta would be respected by the company .^^ 
The great majority of these articles concerned questions 
of taxation and feudal dues. Article 6 demanded that 
the relations with the English should continue unchanged, 
that is to say, that trade should be carried on freely 
between the two nations. The articles were presented 
to de Chambre and his response demanded. In reply to 
Article 6, he said that it would be impossible to recog- 
nize the principle of free trade between the two nations, 
but added: "Nevertheless, as it would not be reasonable 
to let the planters remain in need, the said agent agrees 
that, whenever there is not to be had in the stores of the 
company any articles of which the planters have need, 
they may demand a permit from the general agent, which 
shall be granted freely, and they may forthwith purchase 
the said articles either from English merchants, or wher- 
ever else they choose."^" 

At the coast of St. Domingo and the island of Tortuga, 
the company encountered long and bitter opposition. 
In spite of the heroic efforts of the able governor, 
Ogeron, whom the company had placed in command, the 
untamed spirit of the buccaneers and freebooters refused 
to submit to the rule of a commercial company. 

At Guadeloupe the planters, although in a spirit of 
submission, viewed the departure of the Dutch with sad- 
ness. Du Lion wrote to Colbert on April 8, 1665 : "The 
liason of the planters with the Dutch is still dear to them 
[the planters]. The oldest and well-to-do inhabitants are 
Dutch and have always maintained a correspondence with 

19 Du Tertre, III, 255. 

20 Ibid., p. 265. 

91 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

Holland. I have already informed you that these islands 
received much aid from these foreigners. . . . Most of 
the excellent sugar-mills which we have here were built 
from capital furnished by the Dutch." Du Lion closed 
this interesting letter by expressing the hope that the 
company would send enough vessels to satisfy the needs 
of the planters.^^ 

It was, however, at Martinique, the most important and 
the most central for trade with the islands, that the West 
India Company met with the spirit of greatest opposition. 
Its inauguration in the island, described above, was auspi- 
cious only in appearance. In reality there was much mur- 
muring among the people. The very evening following 
the ceremony, the spirit of revolt against the company 
was manifest. Some shots were fired. De Tracy, how- 
ever, persuaded that there was no immediate danger, 
sailed for Guadeloupe on the morrow. But the sails of his 
vessels had not long disappeared from view before a revolt 
broke out. 

One of the chief clerks of the company, du Buc by name, 
went into the district, Precheur, situated immediately to 
the north of St. Pierre, to establish a warehouse for the 
sale and storage of merchandise. He found a very pro- 
nounced spirit of antagonism. There were murmurings 
against the company, because it sold its merchandise too 
dear. Soon after his arrival he was attacked by a little 
band of rebels, led by one Rodomont. He succeeded in 
gaining his boat and making his escape amid a shower of 
stones and the cries of rebellion : "Aux armes ! Vive M. du 
Parquet ! Narque de la compagnie !" Du Buc immediately 
reported the affair to de Clodore, who at once took prompt 
action, fearing lest the revolt become general. He gave 
orders to different captains to hold their troops in readi- 

21 Arch. Nat. Col., C7, I, April 8, 1665; also ibid., letter May 11, 
1665. 

92 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

ness and sent one, whom he trusted, into the infected quar- 
ter to learn the state of affairs. The captain reported 
at his return that Rodomont and some five or six of his 
immediate followers were preparing a general revolt and 
that for this purpose they were going from house to house 
to gain adherents. The governor sent de Laubiere, his 
lieutenant, to take into custody the young du Parquet, 
in order to prevent the rebels from placing him at their 
head and from using him as a pretext for revolt against 
the company. Then de Clodore, at the head of a small 
body of troops, marched against the mutineers. 

The spirit which characterized the governor's actions 
during the first trying months of his service to the com- 
pany may be very well illustrated by the following incident, 
occurring at this time and related by Du Tertre: 

"A captain who apparently would not have been sorry to 
see the rebellion succeed^ had the boldness to ask the governor, 
just before he started on his march_, whither he was going, say- 
ing that everyone was in revolt, and asking if there were some 
enemies to fight in the island. The governor, who was not a 
man to be frightened by such questions, replied proudly: T 
am going to chastise the seditious and I'll fire a pistol at the 
head of the first person who fails to respond to his duty. As 
for you follow me !' Whereupon he forced the captain to fol- 
low him^ which he did without daring to say a word."^^ 

Thanks to the vigour and the promptness of attack, the 
resistance offered by the rebels was small. The principal 
leaders were promptly arrested. Rodomont was hanged 
and three of his companions were condemned to the galleys, 
another was banished, the rest were pardoned. Thus 
ended the first rebellion against the company. De Clo- 
dore suppressed it before it had a chance to become well 
organized, and for this he received warm commendation 

22 Du Tertre, III, 189. 

93 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

from Bechameil, in the name of the company, and from 
Colbert, in the name of the king.^^ 

In the meantime, the company had not been idle in 
France. Special boards of directors were chosen at Rouen 
and La Rochelle. Agents or correspondents were estab- 
lished at Honfleur, Havre, Dieppe, St. Malo, Nantes, Bor- 
deaux, and in Holland. Contracts were let for the con- 
struction of vessels in different ports of France. By early 
summer of 1665, "two very beautiful ships" had been 
launched, and two others were to be ready by the end of 
the year. At St. Malo another large vessel was being 
built for the company. On the eve of its completion, in 
November, 1665, fire destroyed half of its hull.^* Many 
more vessels were purchased. Janon, the French consul at 
Middleburg, seems to have been charged with the purchase 
of vessels for the company. Thus, on April 17, 1665, he 
wrote to Colbert as follows : "There arrived here, two or 
three days ago, a French crew from Havre, sent to me by 
the West India Company to man a vessel, which, in accord- 
ance with its orders, will take cargo at St. Malo and sail 
thence for the West Indies. "^^ A week later he wrote that 
some Flemish merchants had bought a vessel of 260 tons 
which he had intended to buy for the company .^^ One of 
the directors affirmed in a memoir that before the end of 
the year 1665 the company was in possession of fifty-two 
vessels.^^ 

23 Pierre Margry, Les Seigneurs de la Martinique in Revue Mari- 
time et Coloniale, vol. 58, publishes a letter written by de Chambr6; 
see Du Tertre, III, 192-193, for the texts of the two letters. De Cham- 
bre remarked that, in the opinion of all the islands, de Clodor6 had 
conducted himself most admirably in the affair. 

24 Arch. Col., Fg, IT, Memoire de la Compagnie des Indes Occid. 
sur I'Etat ou elle se trouve, 1665; Bib. Nat. MSS., Mel. Colbert, 133, 
fol. 328, Letter from Bechameil to Colbert, November 14, 1665. 

23 Bib. Nat. MSS., M61. Colbert, 138 his, fols. 898-899. 

26 Ibid., fol. 1048. 

27 Arch. Col., F2, 15, Memoire, 1665. 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

All accurate records of the vessels sent out to the islands 
and of their cargoes has, perhaps, been lost for ever by 
the disappearance of the company's registers. The Ga- 
zette has preserved, however, some important informa- 
tion.^ A dispatch of January 23, 1665, from La Rochelle, 
noted sailings for the island of vessels belonging to the 
company, as follows: one from Bordeaux on January 8, 
one from Texel (in Holland) about the same time, and 
two from La Rochelle on the 15th. The dispatch added that 
twelve more vessels were being equipped at La Rochelle 
for trade with the islands, "for," it remarked, "the com- 
pany has undertaken a commerce which formerly gave 

28 In a dispatch of December 21, 1664, from La Rochelle, the 
following news is given: "A few days since, there sailed from this 
port with favourable winds, seven vessels for the Islands of America. 
They form a part of the vessels which the West India Company is 
having equipped here and in several other ports of France for its 
commerce. The Sieur Chambre, general agent of the said company, 
was aboard, as were also the governor, the lieutenant, and other offi- 
cers which the company sent out to take possession of the islands and 
to establish trade. There was also a large number of passengers. 
Many, in fact, were obliged to remain behind, but will sail on the six 
large vessels which the same company is diligently preparing together 
with some of the most important merchants of this city who have an 
interest in it." Gazette, 1664, No. 156. 

This will be recognized at once as the description of the sailing of 
the first fleet, which has been noted above. It will also be remarked 
that it differs very much from the information which has been 
reported from Du Tertre, for that historian states that only four 
vessels composed the first fleet and the Gazette says seven. Inasmuch 
as Du Tertre gives such definite details in regard to the tonnage, 
equipment and number of persons aboard each vessel, one would be 
inclined to suppose that the account given in the Gazette was pur- 
posely exaggerated in order to stimulate subscriptions to the com- 
pany. If one adopted such a view, the reliability of later reports 
found in the Gazette would be seriously called in question and all 
information gleaned from that source would be of doubtful value. 
Fortunately a letter, written by de Chambre to Colbert, on the eve 
of departure of the fleet from La Rochelle, makes it possible 
to reconcile the two accounts. "There are ready to sail from this 
port several vessels belonging to the West India Company, L'Har- 

95 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

employment to 100 or 120 ships. It will send out to the 
islands at least eight or ten each month. "^^ From Dieppe 
came the news that on January 14 there sailed from that 
port two vessels which had been equipped by orders of 
the company's directors at Rouen. Other vessels, belong- 
ing to the company, it stated, had sailed from the same 
port only a few days before. Four more vessels would be 
prepared to sail at the end of the month.^^ There is thus 
indicated by the Gazette a total of eight ships sailing 
for the islands during the month of January, 1665. 

The company had, however, allowed its expenditures to 
run far ahead of the amount of money subscribed to it or 

monie, Le St. Sebastien, Le Mercier and La Suzanne, all of 300 to 
400 tons. . . . There has already sailed a little vessel named Le 
Cheramy, to carry dispatches to M. de Tracy. She carried also a 
cargo of merchandise. Another vessel, named Les Armes de la Com- 
pagnie, which is almost laden and is of 500 tons, will sail in five or 
six days. This makes six vessels without counting the one belonging 
to the king, named Le Terron. Another vessel, named La Marie, of 
about 400 tons, which is being equipped in this port, will sail in about 
fifteen days." Bib. Nat. MSS., Mel. Colbert, 134 bis, fols. 454-455. 

It is to be noticed that in the first part of this letter, the informa- 
tion which Du Tertre gives about the sailing of the first fleet is 
entirely confirmed. It remains to be seen if the report printed in the 
Gazette is also confirmed. The dispatch in the Gazette is dated at 
La Rochelle on December 21, a week after the sailing of the fleet. 
De Chambre remarked that Les Armes de la Compagnie would be 
ready to sail on December 18 or 19, which would make a total of six 
vessels going to the islands without counting Le Terron, which had 
sailed a few days before the fleet, and arrived at Guadeloupe on 
February 3. (Arch. Nat. Col., C7, I, letter from du Lion, April 8, 
1665.) It is possible that Les Armes de la Compagnie sailed before 
December 21, as de Clodore thought it would do, and that the writer 
of the dispatch from La Rochelle included it and Le Terron in his 
count, so that he reported that seven vessels had sailed for the islands. 
This would seem to offer a plausible explanation of the lack of agree- 
ment between the dispatch printed in the Gazette and the account 
given in Du Tertre. It enables one to accept with more conviction 
the later reports which appear in the Gazette. 

29 Ibid., 1665, p. 109. 

30 Ibid. 

96 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

placed at its disposal. It is necessary only to recall what 
has been recounted in a former chapter to know that the 
total subscriptions for the year 1664 amounted only to 
983,000 livres, and that probably of this sum only about 
500,000 livres, at most, represented funds which could be 
expended by the company. It was not with such a com- 
paratively small sum that the purchase of many vessels 
and of many cargoes could be made. 

The directors frankly admitted that their expenditures 
had been much larger than their funds. They justified 
their conduct to Colbert in the following way : 

"Inasmuch as the first design in the establishment of the 
said company was to exclude from the islands the Dutch trad- 
ers^ who were in control of commerce, and as it was not possi- 
ble to do that except by sending at once enough merchandise 
for the subsistence of the planters, the directors should not and 
could not have regulated their expenditures according to the 
sums actually subscribed to the company. . . . The letters 
of M. de Tracy, filled with complaints that not half of what 
was necessary was being sent to the islands, justified haste, and 
when he wrote that it would take at least eighty vessels and 
3,000,000 livres worth of merchandise to satisfy the needs 
of the islands and drive out the Dutch (which is much exagger- 
ated), the said directors were forced to make large expendi- 
tures for vessels and merchandise."^^ 

These large expenditures alarmed the stockholders and 
made them fear that they would be held responsible for the 
debts of the company to an amount larger than that of 
their subscriptions. To allay this fear, an arret of Decem- 
ber 16, 1664, was published which guaranteed shareholders 
in the company against any such responsibility.^^ In spite 
of this assurance, subscriptions came in very slowly. Thus, 

31 Arch. Col., F2, 15, Memoire des Directeurs de la Cie. des Ind. Oc. 
pour- rendre raison a Mgr. Colbert de leur conduite, 1665. 

32 Arch. Nat., E, 1717, fol. 259. 

97 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

for the first month of the new year, 1665, only five were 
received for a total of 53,000 livres. The king had not as 
yet contributed a cent. Colbert seemed too absorbed in the 
promotion of the East India Company to devote much 
attention to the affairs of the West India Company. 

Colbert did open a small source of revenue for the com- 
pany by granting it, on February 12, the farm for the 
collection of a special import duty of 6d. the pound, 
levied at Rouen on sugar and wax. The farm was granted 
on the condition that the company pay yearly 24,000 
livres to the city of Rouen and 20,000 Hvres to the king, 
or a total of 44,000 livres. The surplus was to go to the 
profit of the company. With the exception of the year 
1666, when the revenue was 1601 liv. 8s. 6d. less than 
the aforesaid 44,000 livres, the farm proved a source of 
profit, varying from 11,669 liv. 15s. in 1665, to 77,981 
livres in 1672, and representing, for the years 1665 to 
1672, a total profit of 372,478 liv. 8s. 3d. The com- 
pany also profited from the fact that it was not forced to 
pay this tax on the sugar which it imported from the 
islands to Rouen. It is to be remarked, however, that 
although the farm later proved profitable, it offered no 
immediate relief to the company, for it yielded a gain of 
only 11,669 liv. Is. in 1665, a loss of 1501 liv. 18s. in 
1666, and a gain of 18,151 liv. 16s. in 1667, or a total 
gain for the first three years of less than 30,000 livres. ^^ 

The directors were forced to seek money elsewhere. 
They decided, in their meeting of February 11, to 
borrow 600,000 livres. An arret of February 14 author- 
ized the company to borrow the said sum "for one year 
and at whatever rate of interest it chooses, for the pay- 

33 Arch. Nat., Gj, 1312, Extrait du grand livre de la Cie. des Ind. 
Oc. "Comptes des droits de 6d. pour livre sur les sucres et cires 
entrants en la ville et banlieu de Rouen." Chemin-Dupontes, pp. 
37-38. 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

ment of which sum the directors may pledge all the effects 
of the company." It was from the fermiers generaux des 
aides that the sum was borrowed.^ With these funds at its 
disposal the company was enabled to continue its ship- 
ments, which had been interrupted during the last two 
weeks in January and throughout the month of February. 
On March 3, three large vessels sailed from La Rochelle 
for the islands. Three others were being equipped in the 
same port and would be ready to sail within another week. 
On March 6, another sailed from Honfleur and according 
to the calculations of the directors at Rouen, two more 
would be ready to sail from Dieppe at the end of the 
month.^^ 

In spite of the very praiseworthy efforts made by the 
directors, the company had not proved itself equal to the 
task of satisfying the needs of the islands. Thus, near the 
beginning of April, 1665, de Chambre wrote from Guade- 
loupe to de Clodore: "We are in about the same state of 
affairs as you. The proof is that I should be obliged to 
drink water, if it were not for the fact that M. de Tracy 
is here. As for meat, five days from now there will not 
be a pound in our stores. It is for this reason that both 
you and we are in great need of the arrival of vessels. It 
must be that bad weather has prevailed, for according to 
the letters which I have received, eight or ten vessels should 
have arrived."^^ Du Lion, governor of Guadeloupe, wrote 
about the same date that the company was not sending 
more than half enough vessels to satisfy the needs of the 
planters.^^ Even the vessels which had been sent lately 
failed to contain in their cargoes one important article, 

34 Arch. Nat., E, 1717, fol. 259; Arch, Col., F2, Memoire sur la Cie. 
des Ind. Oc, 1667. Against 55,000 livres of this amount shares of the 
company's stock were issued. 

35 Gazette, 1665, p. 354, La Rochelle, March 6, 1665. 

36 Du Tertre, III, 195. 

37 Arch. Nat. Col., C7, I, April, 1665. 

99 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

a fact which, according to Du Tertre, aroused much dis- 
content against the company. This article was shoes for 
the women. "This omission," remarks the historian, "was 
all the more dangerous, because it aroused natures more 
sensitive and vindictive than those of men. When the 
women saw that there was nothing for them in the com- 
pany's ships and that some of them would have to go 
barefooted to mass, they lost patience. It is certain 
that the anger of the women who had thus been disap- 
pointed contributed much toward the rebellion of which 
we shall have occasion to speak presently, especially so, 
for in the islands women have much influence over their 
husbands."'' 

The company had also failed to provide enough small 
barks by which the transportation of crops from the plan- 
tations along the coast to centers of trade was made. The 
harvest in the islands gave promise in the spring of 1665 of 
being "so abundant that more than twenty vessels seemed 
necessary for its exportation."'^ Du Lion remarked that 
only about half enough vessels were in sight to take away 
the products of Guadeloupe. Letters from different ports 
of France to correspondents in the island brought the news 
that the West India Company refused to transport mer- 
chandise of individual traders in spite of the promises 
which had been made to the planters.*" All of these things, 
together with the fact that the company sold its merchan- 
dise much dearer than the Dutch had been accustomed to 
do, caused a widespread feeling of discontent and of rebel- 
lion in the islands, and especially in that of Martinique, 
where rebellion shortly afterwards broke out. 

First came word to de Clodore from one of the com- 
pany's agents that some rebels in Cabesterre had hoisted 

38 Du Tertre, III, 218-219. 

39 Ibid. 

40 Arch. Nat. Col., C7, I, April 8, 1665. 

100 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

the Dutch flag with the cry, "Vive les Hollandais et les 
Flamands !" The governor let the incident pass unnoticed 
for the moment in order to abide a more favourable season 
to reply. A few days later, the planters of Basseterre 
came in great numbers to present a petition to the gov- 
ernor, in which they complained that the company had 
failed to carry out the regulations estabhshed by de 
Tracy. The framers of the petition had been very care- 
ful to address de Clodore as governor for the king, and 
not as governor under the authority of the West India 
Company. De Clodore received the petition and read it. 
Thereupon, he harangued the crowd, urging patience and 
promising to send the petition to the company and to 
exert his own influence in obtaining satisfaction for them. 
He urged them to remain loyal in the meantime, and not 
to assemble again without his permission. Thanks to the 
spirit of moderation of some of the planters, the gov- 
ernor's words were heeded. Promises were made to be 
obedient to his requests, and the crowd dispersed, appar- 
ently in a spirit of submission.^ 

This was followed a short time afterwards by a similar 
demonstration on the part of the tobacco "stringers," who 
were the most turbulent class in the islands and who 
during about half the year were idle, spending their time 
roaming from plantation to plantation, from cabaret to 
cabaret, and who "under the shadow of bottles and mugs 
hatched out all the rebellions in the Antilles." They 
marched in great numbers to the governor. De Clodore 
was indignant at seeing such a crowd and refused to 
listen to their grievances unless they chose some repre- 
sentatives to present them to him. The governor's wishes 
were complied with. Their representatives made the com- 
plaint that the agents of the company were insolent and 
that only about half of their needs were being satisfied 

41 Du Tertre, III, 217. 

101 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

by the company. De Chambre urged patience, assuring 
them that in a short while the stores of the company 
would be adequately supplied to provide plenty for all. 
"To remove present disorders, they had only to place an 
honest planter in each store who could supervise the dis- 
tribution of merchandise, with the understanding that if 
the clerks did not heed the orders given them, he [de 
Chambre] would either dismiss them, or punish them 
according to their merits. This gave satisfaction, and 
for the second time a band of rebels disbanded, apparently 
contented."*' 

Both de Clodore and de Chambre were so alarmed over 
the spirit of the planters, however, that they decided to 
build a fort as a refuge in time of rebellion. Plans were 
accordingly drawn up, the foundations dug, the stones 
dressed, all the material collected and the construction 
actually begun, when orders arrived from the directors of 
the company to stop the work. It is to be remarked that 
the directors gave these orders on the recommendation of 
de La Barre, who had recently returned to France, and 
who made the recommendation apparently through hos- 
tility to de Clodore. The fact is worth noting, because the 
hostility between de Clodore and de La Barre became very 
pronounced in 1666 and was not without certain impor- 
tance in the history of the company. 

Bechameil seems to have recognized the importance of 
sending ships to the islands in order to quell the spirit of 
revolt, for he wrote to Colbert that it was necessary to 
send twenty vessels to the islands during the months of 
April and May.*^ It was undoubtedly to enable the com- 
pany to accomplish this that Colbert decided at last to aid 
it financially. On March 16, he made a personal sub- 
scription of 30,000 livres, but much more important was 

42 Ibid., pp. 220-221. 

43 Bib. Nat. MSS., M61. Colbert, 128, fol. 30. 

102 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

the fact that he opened the royal treasury. Thus there 
were subscribed, in the name of the king, 187,000 livres on 
March 26; 100,000 Kvres on April 22; 100,000 livres on 
May 16; and 100,000 livres on June 22, making a total 
of 487,000 hvres furnished by the royal treasury within 
the space of three months. 

The company was thus enabled to send out immediately 
two expeditions. About May 15, a fleet of seven vessels 
sailed from La Rochelle for the islands, and on May 17, 
four others sailed from St. Malo.^ None of these vessels 
arrived in time, however, to prevent a very serious rebel- 
lion at Martinique, which arose in the following way. In 
the regulations estabhshed by de Tracy at Martinique on 
March 17, 1665, it was provided that the ships of the 
company should transport into the ports of France sugar, 
tobacco, indigo, and other products for the planters at the 
rate of seven livres the hundredweight, all import duties 
to be paid by the company. The company refused to be 
bound by this agreement, for de Tracy, in establishing the 
rate, supposed that the exemption from the payment of 
one-half the import duties ordinarily levied in France on 
products of the islands was valid not only for goods 
belonging to the company but for all those imported in 
its ships, and therefore thought that the company would 
be obliged to pay only two Kvres as import duty and would 
have the remaining five livres the hundredweight as pay- 
ment for transportation. This, however, was not the case, 
for the revenue-farmers demanded four livres per hundred- 
weight on all products belonging to individuals and 
brought by the company's own ships. The company felt 
itself justified in interpreting the spirit of de Tracy's 
regulation by demanding five livres per hundredweight for 
freight and four livres instead of two for the import duty, 

44 Gazette, 1665, p. 510. 

103 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

thus making a total of nine livres instead of seven.*^ An 
arret of the conseil d'etat of June 6, 1665, sustained the 
company's decision and, when judgments were rendered in 
the admiralty courts of Dieppe and Rouen against the 
company in favour of individual merchants who refused 
to pay more than seven livres per hundredweight on goods 
consigned to them from the islands and transported in the 
company's vessels, another arret of November S6, 1665, 
annulled the decisions and ordered the arret of June 6 to 
be enforced/^ 

This refusal of the company to abide by the regulations 
of de Tracy was taken as an excuse by some planters at 
Martinique to stir up a rebellion. On June 1, in the dis- 
trict of Casepilote, one Guillaume Roy with ten or twelve 
companions attacked the agent of the company and forced 
him to flee for his life. They were joined by about a hun- 
dred other planters and sacked the company's store, with 
cries of "Aux armes !" They forced everyone to obey the 
cry and marched from plantation to plantation exciting 
all to rebellion. They attempted to win as their leader 
Sieur de Merville, a lieutenant, assuring him that they were 
in communication with all the other parts of the islands and 
that by the morrow all would be in their hands. At his 
refusal they attempted to win Sieur de Lisle, who in his 
turn refused the command by feigning a case of gout, 
and went straightway to inform the governor.*^ 

Again the courage and promptness of de Clodore saved 
the day for the company. "The diligence which the gov- 
ernor showed is almost inconceivable. It was one o'clock 
in the afternoon when he received news of the outbreak of 
the rebellion. Casepilote was a distance of ten long miles 
over a very difficult mountain road. Nevertheless, he 

45 Arch. Nat., E, 1717, No. 297. 

46 Arch. Col., F2, 17, Extrait de Reg. du conseil d'6tat. 

47 Du Tertre, III, 226-227. 

104 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

assembled his troops and arrived there before nightfall, 
which comes before six o'clock."*^ On the point of depar- 
ture, de Laubiere, the heutenant-governor, informed him 
that rebellion had also broken out in the district of Carbet 
at three miles distance from St. Pierre, and that there 
were signs of a general rebelHon. De Clodore commanded 
the ships in the harbour to draw as close as possible to the 
shore in order that their cannon might be utilized in case 
of emergency. He then set his troops in march to attack 
the rebels of Casepilote. 

On arriving in the district of Carbet, he found that the 
rebels had taken flight and returned to their homes. At 
Casepilote, a loyal lieutenant, de Valmeniere, had per- 
suaded many rebels to return to their allegiance. The 
rest fled to the woods at the appearance of the governor 
with his armed force. De Clodore was firmly resolved to 
punish the leaders of the revolt and yet was afraid that 
he would frighten them farther into the woods. Sharp 
practice was resorted to. He had an interview with the 
curate of the district in which he said that it was necessary 
for everyone to return to his post of duty and employed 
other ambiguous expressions, so that good curate inferred 
that the governor would pardon everyone, and so 
announced it in the church on the morrow. This an- 
nouncement gave assurance to all those whom fear had 
driven into hiding and even the most guilty, except two, 
returned to their homes. But the two were captured by 
a sergeant who was implicated in the rebelKon, and who 
thereby gained his pardon. All the leaders were then 
arrested and imprisoned.*^ 

No sooner had this rebellion been put down than the 
news came of the preparation of a more serious uprising 
in Cabesterre. It presented the most difficult task which 

48 Ibid., Ill, 326. 

« Du Tertre, III, 229. 

105 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

the governor had yet encountered, because it was the dis- 
trict the farthest distant from St. Pierre and the most 
inaccessible of the whole island. Promptness and shrewd- 
ness again proved effective. De Clodore at once sent to 
Cabesterre, du Chesne, a lieutenant, with twelve soldiers of 
his own troops. In order to disguise the real purpose of 
the act he commanded du Chesne to arrest Planson, the 
West India Company's agent in the district, against whom 
the planters were making violent complaints. At the same 
time he wrote a letter to de Vepre, one of the commanding 
officers in Cabesterre, to send him full information of the 
rebellion, and to conduct into his presence his father-in- 
law, Sieur de Masse, one of the chief planters and also one 
of the leaders of the rebellion. It was in this way that the 
rebellion was suppressed before it had a chance to break 
out. 

Fortune again played into the governor's hands. This 
time he received news in advance of a plot being formed at 
Canonville. A Jesuit priest appeared, conducting into his 
presence a woman who was the wife of one of the conspira- 
tors in a plot. On being assured that her husband would 
not suffer, she disclosed to the governor that the night 
before some fifty men had come to her house and had a 
prolonged conference with her husband and that it was 
there agreed that on the morrow at nightfall, two hun- 
dred armed men would assemble to march straight against 
the governor. Again the principal leaders were arrested 
and another revolt was nipped in the bud.^^ 

It is necessary to reflect only for a moment to recognize 
in these rebellions and plots of rebellions a spirit of unrest 
and discontent which was all but universal at Martinique, 
and which had not proved disastrous for the authority of 
the company, because an energetic and courageous gov- 
ernor held the reins of power. 

50 Du Tertre, III, 231. 

106 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

De La Barre, who was actually at Martinique en route 
from Cayenne to France, was requested by de Clodore to 
give his opinion as to the punishment which should be 
meted out to the leaders of the late rebellions. He replied 
in writing under date of June 20 : 

"... Before expressing my opinion on this matter, I deem 
it necessary to consider two things of importance. The first 
is the condition of the islands and the state of mind of the 
planters ; the second, the interests of the company. As to the 
first, one should recognize that the planters are composed of 
two classes, namely those who have property and hence inter- 
ests at stake, and those who have none nor the means of acquir- 
ing any. Both classes are sore from the fact that His Majesty 
has prohibited the commerce of the islands to foreigners. 
They are both convinced that they will be made to suffer losses 
in their commerce, in the value of their property and in their 
afi*airs in general. . . . 

"As to the interests of the company, it is undeniable that 
from its debut the company has not been able to furnish the 
islands with supplies in the same abundance as foreigners had 
been accustomed to do for more than twenty years. It is to 
the interest of the company to silence complaints, to appease 
the troubled spirits, and to break up the factions of do-noth- 
ings w^ho would be able in course of time to win the more in- 
fluential planters to their cause, who might join them either 
from a desire to protect their own interests or from fear of 
seditions. It is thus clear that it is to the company's interest 
to calm the spirit of rebellion and to make it possible for every 
one to return to work. . . . To accomplish this two things, 
I believe, are necessary, namely, a prompt settling of all cases 
now pending before the courts and an assurance of pardon for 
all those who have reason to fear. Let matters be conducted 
in such a way that . . . punishment may fall on a few and 
fear on all."^^ 

De Chambre expressed the opinion that the rebellions 
at Martinique were being caused by two classes of people, 
51 Du Tertre, III, 234-237. See also Relation de VAmMque, I. 

107 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

the riffraff, and the merchants, who as a consequence of 
the company's monopoly remained without employment 
and with their stores empty and their fortunes wrecked. 

"To tell the truth as I see it," remarked Du Tertre, 
"one must seek for the real cause of all these rebellions in 
the inveterate hatred of the people against the name of 
a company and its agents. This hatred has always been 
stimulated by the adroit employment of two bugbears 
which have been dangled before the eyes of the planters by 
those who have wished to be masters of the commerce. 
The first is the small amount of succour furnished by the 
first two companies and the tyrannical and capricious 
spirit of their agents, the second is the high price at which 
supplies are sold by companies."*'^ 

Whatever may be the principal causes of this spirit of 
rebellion, it is certain that affairs at Martinique were in 
a bad way in this summer of 1665, and that the Wfest 
India Company, more than a year after its creation, had 
not proved itself equal to the task of satisfying the needs 
of the planters, of stimulating the growth of industry and 
of building up a thrifty trade. It must not escape notice, 
however, that the spirit of rebellion seems to indicate that 
the monopoly of trade was being asserted by the com- 
pany and that Dutch vessels were no longer bringing mer- 
chandise from Holland. If this be true, it means that a 
part of Colbert's plan in creating the company had been, 
at least temporarily, realized. 

It may be recalled that according to the dispatches 
contained in the Gazette, the company sent out eleven ves- 
sels during the month of May. It apparently sent no 
more until the month of July. During the first week of 
that month, three of its vessels sailed from Havre for the 
islands. They were all three captured by the English 
frigates, searched for Dutch goods, but allowed to con- 

52 Du Tertre, III, 338. 

108 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

tinue their waj.^^ Bechameil wrote to Colbert on July 23, 
1665, that WO soldiers would be sent to Martinique 
"aboard vessels which will sail during the month of 
August."^* But no records have been found of the sailing 
of vessels either during the month of August or during the 
months following. One of the company's vessels arrived 
from the islands at Dieppe about July 1, and on the 6th 
another at Havre with a cargo valued at 150,000 livres. 
On July 15, there arrived at Dunkerque "one of the first 
vessels which the West India Company had sent out to the 
islands of America. It had a cargo of tobacco and 
sugar."^^ 

No evidence has been found, however, which makes it 
possible to say that the number either of vessels sent out 
to the islands, or of those received in France, was of 
importance. One of the directors asserted in a memoir 
that the company received but small returns from the large 
outlay of capital in the islands. This explains why the 
company was in its chronic state of lack of funds. Its 
books were still open for subscription, but no appreciable 
sums were subscribed. Colbert was forced to provide 
funds. On July 31, the king subscribed 100,000 livres, 
300,000 livres on September 4, and finally, 500,000 livres 
on December 4. This made a total of 1,387,000 livres 
subscribed by the king within ten months. The large sub- 
scription of December 4 was perhaps made in order to 

53 Gazette, 1665, p. 699. These three vessels were probably those 
referred to in the following extract from the Calendars: "Warrant to 
the commissioners for Prizes at suit of the French West India Com- 
pany, the three ships of Dieppe, the Jonas, the Hercules, and Floris- 
sant, laden with goods for Barbary and Martinique which will spoil if 
they wait the usual forms of the Admiralty Court." Cal. St. Pap., 
Dom., 1664-1665, p. 476, July 14, 1665. The Jonas was captured near 
Brest, on its return, by English corsairs. 

54 Bib. Nat. MSS., Mel. Colbert, 130 bis, fol. 905. 

55 Gazette, 1665, p. 699. 

109 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

aid the company in the crisis of an approaching war with 
England.^^ 

The company's commerce became considerably embar- 
rassed by Enghsh corsairs. During the summer and fall of 
1665, although France and England were yet nominally at 
peace, they captured five vessels belonging to the West 
India Company .^^ In order to offset these losses, an arret 
of February S4, 1666, authorized the West India Company 
to seize, either on land or on sea, English goods to the 
value of 620,000 livres, notwithstanding the three months 

56 Arch. Nat., G7, 1313. 

57 Arch. Nat., E, 1733, fols. 93-95. Arret portant represailles centre 
les Anglais pour la Cie. des Ind. Oc, February 34, 1666; Gazette, 1666, 
No. 897; Arch. Col., F2, 15, M^moire importante pour la Cie des Ind. 
Oc, 1667. La Fortune, '250 tons, captain J. Thomas, laden in July, 
1665, at the island of Martinique with a cargo of 8000 rolls of tobacco, 
of which 5800 belonged to the company and the rest, together with 
a certain quantity of sugar, ginger and other goods, to planters of the 
said island, en route for France, was captured by some English ves- 
sels under the pretext that the vessel was of Dutch construction and 
in spite of the protests of the captain, was taken to Nevis and after- 
wards to Jamaica. Loss, 130,000 livres to the company and 40,000 to 
individuals. 

The St. Jean d'Hamhourg, Nicolas Billiet, captain, laden at 
Hamburg with a cargo of masts, tar, clay, lumber and other merchan- 
dise for the company, was captured by English corsairs, in September, 
1665, taken to Dover, ordered released, recaptured and taken to Ply- 
mouth. After a delay of six weeks, the Admiralty Court ordered its 
release, but merchandise to the value of 60,000 livres was seized under 
the pretext that the king had need of it. No payment had yet been 
made for the said merchandise in February, 1666. 

The St. Pierre of La Rochelle, Pingault, captain, was captured in 
the English Channel in October, 1665. Ic had a cargo of sugar, 
tobacco and other products laden at Guadeloupe, and belonging to 
the company and planters of said island. It was taken to Plymouth 
and declared good prize. Loss to the company, 100,000 livres and 
"much more to individuals." . . . 

The St. Jean de Dieppe, 300 tons, Le Moyne, captain, which had 
sailed from Dieppe in May, 1665, for Cape Verde and Senegal, on its 
return voyage was forced by stress of weather to put into Waterford, 
Ireland. In spite of the assertion of the captain that his vessel and 
cargo were French, it was seized and searched. "Many letters were 

110 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

grace which had been granted Enghsh merchants at the 
declaration of war in January .^^ The British Admiralty 
Courts granted the West India Company £10,639 9d. ster- 
ling for its claims in regard to the St. Jean of Hamburg, 
the Jonas and the St. Jean of Dieppe. They declared the 
St. Pierre good prize and refused to pronounce judgment 
on the La Fortime before receiving news from Jamaica.^^ 
The directors of the company asserted that the total loss 
sustained from these captures amounted to 465,900 livres.^° 
Navigation became so dangerous that an embargo was 
laid which forbade French vessels, without special permis- 
sion, to go into the English Channel, or to carry on com- 
merce with England, Scotland, or Ireland.^^ Bechameil 
addressed a memoir to Colbert in November, 1665, to 
explain the very serious embarrassments which the com- 
pany faced in the present crisis. "The company," he said, 
"has at present twenty vessels in the ports of the Channel 
and in Holland, which already have their cargoes or are 
ready to take them."^^ In addition it had two vessels char- 
found in her directed to merchants in Amsterdam and to others of 
the United Province. Many Dutch were also found aboard." The 
vessel with her cargo was therefore ordered confiscated. Loss to the 
company, 50,000 livres. Cal. St. Papers, Ireland, 1663-1665, p. 669, 
contains a letter from the Earl of Orrey to Secretary Arlington, of 
November 15, 1665, in which the news is given of the capture of the 
St. Jean. Id. 1666-1669: "Copy of the note of the appraisement of 
the St. John of Dieppe, her apparatus and goods." 

Le Jonas was captured near Brest in the fall of 1665, and confis- 
cated at Tangier. Her cargo, according to the estimates of the 
British authorities, was about 60,000 livres. 

58 Arch. Nat., E, 1733, fols. 93-95. 

59 Arch. Aff. Etrang., Mem. et Doc, 'Amerique, V, fol. 368. 

60 Arch. Col., F2, 17, Memoire des pieces touch, les navires pris par 
les Anglais avant la declaration de la guerre. 

61 Bib. Nat. MSS., Mel. Colbert, 133, fol. 328. 

62 They were as follows : 
At Havre: 

Le Mercier, 400 tons, with a cargo for Cayenne. It will take 130 
young women together with a certain number of servants. 

Ill 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

tered. Of these twenty-two vessels, fourteen were actually 
taking, or prepared to take, cargoes for the West Indies ; 
one, the St. Pierre, had been captured on its return from 
Guadeloupe. There were thus fifteen out of a total of 
twenty-two occupied with the trade of the islands. To these 
must be added the three vessels indicated in the memoir as 
being ready to sail for the coast of Guinea, whence they 
were to carry cargoes of slaves to the islands, making thus 
a grand total of eighteen. Only one vessel was destined for 
Cayenne and one for Senegal, and none for Canada. This 
is quite a striking indication of how completely the affairs 
of the company were centered in the islands. Bechameil 

Le 8t. Michel with a cargo for the islands. It is to call at Madeira. 

Le Marsouin, 300 tons, with a cargo for the islands. It is to call at 
Madeira. 

La Marie, 350 tons, with a cargo for the islands. It is to call at 
Madeira. 
At Honfleur: 

St. Jean. Is taking cargo for the islands. 
At Dieppe: 

L'Esperance, 300 tons, with cargo for Cape Verde Islands and 
Senegal. 
• La Bergere, 250 tons, to take cargo for the islands. 
At Dunkerque: 

Les Armes de France, 350 tons, with cargo for the islands. 

St. Antoine, 130 tons, to take cargo for the islands. 
At St. Malo: 

Le Grand St. Jean, with cargo for the islands. 

La Pucelle, 260 tons, with cargo for the islands. 

Le Lion d'Or, 250 tons, to take cargo for the islands. 
In Holland: 

La Justice, 300 tons, ready to sail with cargo for Guinea. 

L'Angelique, 350 tons, ready to sail with cargo for Guinea. 

Le St. Guillaume, 350 tons, ready to sail with cargo for Guinea. 

L'Yrondelle, 160 tons, ready to sail with cargo for the islands. 

Le Comte Franqois, 300 tons, ready to sail with cargo for the 
islands. 

Le Dauphin, to take cargo in France for the islands. 
[These last two were chartered by the company.] 
In Zealand: 

La Lucorne, 250 tons, ready to sail with cargo for the islands. 

113 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

informed Colbert that the four vessels at Havre were 
waiting for the six from Holland in order to sail in com- 
pany with them, but added that "unless they were escorted 
by some armed vessels, it would be very dangerous to let 
them risk the voyage." He requested that a suitable escort 
be provided by the Idng.^^ 

How many of these vessels really sailed it is not possible 
to say. The Gazette fails to indicate any sailings for the 
West Indies between those of the month of July, 1665, 
which have been noted above, and the month of March, 
1666. An order was issued on December 14 to the Admir- 
alty officials of St. Malo to permit three vessels, Le St. 
Jean, La Pucelle and Le Lion d'Or, to sail from that port 
for the islands.^* Janon, French consul at Middleburg, 
wrote to Colbert, under the date of December 4, 1665, that 
two vessels had recently sailed for the islands from that 
port by way of the north of Scotland, but had been forced 
to return on account of bad weather.^^ Were these vessels 
two of those belonging to the West India Company men- 
tioned in the memoir of November, 1665? If so, it would 
seem to indicate that the plan of sending the vessels in 
Holland with those actually at Havre by way of the Chan- 
nel had been abandoned, either because suitable escort 

At Gothenburg: 

Le Chariot d'Or, with a cargo of masts for La Rochelle. 
In England: 

Le St. Pierre, 260 tons, with a cargo from the islands. 

The vessel referred to above as being captured by English 

corsairs. 
At Hamburg: 

A fiyboat with a cargo for France. Arch. Col., F2, 17, Mem. de la 
Cie. des Ind. Oc, Besoin des Isles et Terre ferme de I'Am. et la neces- 
site de pourvoir a la seurete des pais de ladite compagnie tant pour 
lesd. Isles que pour la Guinee dans la conjoncture de la rupture avec 
les Anglais. 

63 Ibid. 

64 Arch. AfF. Etrang., Mem. et Doc, Am6rique, V, 193. 

65 Bib. Nat. MSS., Mel. Colbert, 134, fol. 131. 

113 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

could not be furnished by the king, or because prudence 
dictated such a course. If this be true, it is more than 
probable that the vessels from Havre did not sail. There 
is a passage in a memoir presented by the directors to 
Colbert in May, 1666, which seems to indicate the same 
thing : 

"The company has at present^ in the ports of Holland, of 
Zealand, Dunkerque, Dieppe, Havre and St. Male, fifteen of 
its vessels freighted for Cape Verd, Senegal, Cayenne and the 
West Indies, which have been waiting for three months for the 
Channel to be free. There is more than 600,000 livres worth 
of merchandise in these vessels. . . . The company can very 
well stop making new purchases, as it has actually done, for 
it is well supplied with vessels, but it cannot afford to stop 
its expeditions to the islands for, besides the fact that the 
planters would suffer, it would be unable to market in France 
all the merchandise which it has on hand to the value of 1,000,- 
000 livres."^^ 

Of the twenty-two vessels enumerated by the memoir of 
November, 1665, the St. Pierre was being detained in Eng- 
land as a prize, Le Chariot d'Or was at Gothenburg, and 
a flyboat was at Hamburg. The other nineteen were in 
the ports of Holland and of northern France. Of these 
nineteen we have already indicated that the passports were 
issued on December 14 to three vessels, Le St. Jean, La 
Pucelle and Le Lion d'Or, to sail from St. Malo for the 
West Indies. La Pucelle and Le Lion d'Or, however, did 
not proceed at once to the islands, for both were at La 
Rochelle in April, and they formed part of de La Barre's 
fleet which sailed from that port in June.^^ Le St. Jean did 
continue its way to the islands, for its presence at St. 
Christopher on April 27, 1666, is noted by the Gazette. ^^ 

66 Arch. CoL, F2, 17, Estat pres. des affaires de la Cie. des Ind. 
Oc. de France, mai, 1666. 

67 Du Tertre, IV, 116. 
^^ Gazette, 1666, p. 975. 

114 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

Thus we know positively that three of these nineteen ves- 
sels sailed. This leaves sixteen vessels of which we have no 
information up to the beginning of May, 1666. The 
memoir of May, 1666, says that fifteen of the company's 
vessels had been waiting for three months to set sail. It 
is more than probable that the phrase "depuis trois mois" 
does not state, or did not attempt to state, with precision 
the time which the vessels had been kept waiting. We 
know, as a matter of fact, that this is true in regard to 
La Justice and Le St. Antoine, for the former is indicated 
in the memoir of 1665 as being in Holland ready to set 
sail, and the latter at Dunkerque also ready. These ves- 
sels, however, did not set sail from Holland before May 
25. They turned the north of Scotland and arrived at 
Martinique on July 28.^^ We have no less than four long 
dispatches written from the islands and published in the 
Gazette of 1666. They bear the dates of April, May and 
August, 1666. None of the other sixteen vessels in ques- 
tion is mentioned as being in the islands.^'' It seems highly 
probable, therefore, that the West India Company's com- 
merce, so far as the important northern ports were con- 
cerned, was almost completely blocked during a period of 
several months. We have no positive evidence of any im- 
portant aid at all being sent to the islands by the company 
between July, 1665, and June 7, 1666, the date of the 
departure of the expedition sent out from La Rochelle 
under de La Barre's command, of which an account will 
be given in the following chapter. 

The close of the year 1665 marks the end of the first 
period of the West India Company, for, shortly after the 
beginning of the following year, the war with England 
began, which, as we shall see, had an important influence 

69 Gazette, 1666, p. 752, and No. 138, p. 1166. Letter from Martin- 
ique to the directors of the West India Company. 

70 Ibid., 1666, Nos. 106, 115, 138, and 157. 

115 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

upon its history. One naturally pauses to ask what the 
company had been able to accomplish. We are fortunate 
in having had preserved for us, in the few papers of the 
company which have survived, a memoir presented by the 
directors to Colbert, very probably in the month of 
November, 1665, and containing a statement of the things 
which the company had done. The most interesting pas- 
sages are the following : 

"After a year or a little more^ the company has^ to the 
astonishment of all nations^ placed upon the sea sixty vessels 
of 200^ 300 and 400 tons^ of which it has bought^ or had built, 
forty representing an outlay of 1,200,000 livres. ... It has 
laden vessels for 1,500,000 livres worth of various sorts of 
merchandise for the islands, 150,000 livres for Canada, 200,- 
000 livres for Senegal, Cape Verde and the coast of Guinea. 
Returns are beginning to come in from the islands, but in 
such small measure that the company has not as yet received 
any revenue of importance, for it has received only tobacco, 
for which there is no sale on account of the Dutch war. The 
only profit gained is that from freight. It has been spent 
for the repairing of vessels in order that they might return 
promptly to the islands. . . . The pressing need to supply 
food-stufFs and furnishings in order to prevent a recurrence 
of the deplorable state of affairs of last year, has forced the 
directors to stock all of the warehouses, situated in the ports 
where the company has subdirectors and correspondents, with a 
supply of these articles ... so that the company has in 
these several warehouses goods to the value of more than 
600,000 livres, without counting the contracts which it has 
made for the delivery of salt meat. 

"Inasmuch as the number of vessels which the company has 
at present cannot satisfy the needs of commerce in all of the 
countries which His Majesty has conceded to it, the said 
directors have made contracts for the construction in France 
of several more, which are actually being built. Two of these 
vessels, large and beautiful, have already been launched and 
two more will take the water before the end of the year. 

116 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

"The company has also amassed a supply of lumber^ flax, 
cordage, tar, masts and other things necessary for the calking, 
equipment and armament of its vessels. Thus by its orders 
two large flutes have come from Hamburg with full cargoes 
of these articles, the value of which amounts to 20,000 or 
25,000 ecus. 

"Besides all of this ... it has taken possession of the dif- 
ferent lands of its concession, or rather restored them to the 
allegiance of His Majesty. For this it has had to make large 
expenditures, as in the case of Cayenne, of Cape Verde and 
of Senegal, and besides to buy the several islands from pro- 
prietors, for which it assumed large obligations, amounting 
to more than 1,000,000 livres, of which sum it has actually 
paid 154,000 livres and must pay the remainder on the dates 
exacted by the contracts. 

"This is but a short resume of the things which the com- 
pany has accomplished since its establishment."'^^ 

The West India Company had, in fact, as this memoir 
asserts, done much to deserve praise. It had occupied with 
varying success different parts of its concession. Thus, 
near the beginning of 1665, it sent Sieur Jacquet to Sene- 
gal as the director of its commerce.^^ By the end of the 
year, according to the claims of its directors, it has estab- 
lished there a post of sixty men and merchandise to the 
value of 250,000 livres. It has already been noted that it 
sent out one of its vessels, Le St. Jean, from Dieppe, in 
May, 1665, which on its return was captured with its 
cargo in November, 1665.^^ 

Efforts had been made to develop trade on the coast 
of Guinea in order to supply the islands with slaves. Thus, 
on February 8, 1665, a contract was made with Sieur 
Carolof, " heretofore commander for the West India Com- 

71 Arch. Col., F2, 17, Memoire de la Cie. des Ind. Oc. sur I'etat ou 
elle se trouve et les secours qu'elle attend du Roy, 1665. 
72Labat, Nouvelle Relation de VAfrique, I, 16. 
73 Arch Col., F2, 15, Memoir, 1665. 

117 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

pany and at present a naturalized French citizen, assisted 
by Jean Andre, Baron de Woltrogue, a German gentle- 
man and his brother-in-law." This contract gave Carolof 
command for six years of all posts which he might estab- 
lish in the kingdoms of Luango, Congo, Angola, and all 
others situated on the coast of Africa between the equator 
and the Cape of Good Hope. It bound him to carry to 
the French islands all negroes captured or gained by 
trade. He was given full freedom to sell these negroes 
freely in the islands, on condition that the company's 
agent be permitted to choose seven per cent of them before 
they were offered for sale. All products received in 
exchange were to be brought directly to La Rochelle, 
Dunkerque, or any other port of France. All sugar was 
to be delivered directly to the company at the rate of 
eighteen livres per hundredweight net. The company 
assumed the obligation to pay all import duties and the 
expense of unloading the cargo. Of all merchandise sent 
to France directly from the coast of Guinea, Carolof was 
to pay seven per cent to the company. Finally, Carolof 
was permitted to fly the company's ensign on all vessels 
which he employed in this commerce. In November of 
this same year, 1665, the company had three vessels in 
Holland ready with cargoes to sail for the coast of Guinea. 
Whether these vessels had been equipped by Carolof in 
fulfillment of the above contract, or by the company on 
its own account, the writer is unable to say. In a later 
chapter it will be shown that Carolof commanded an expe- 
dition equipped by the company in 1670 and sent to Mar- 
tinique with cargoes of slaves. He was also in Guade- 
loupe in 1672, engaged in the same trade. 

The company had also taken possession of Canada in 
1665. It sent three large vessels there during the course 
of that year.^* 

74 Arch. Col., F2, 15, Memoire sur le Canada par les directeurs de 

118 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

Most important of all, the company had taken posses- 
sion of the several West India islands and thereby had 
brought to an end the period of proprietary rule, and had 
restored these islands to the national domain. It gained 
for itself, thereby, a rich field for the development of its 
commerce, and it was in this field that it expended its most 
important efforts. 

What had the company done in equipping vessels and 
establishing commerce ? It is necessary to correct an error 
which has been repeated time after time in endeavoring to 
answer this question. The Dictionnaire du Commerce of 
the Enci/ elope die methodiquue, in its article on the West 
India Company, remarks : "The funds to maintain such an 
extensive commerce were proportional to the enterprise 
and were so considerable that in less than six months the 
company equipped more than forty-five vessels, by means 
of which it took possession of all the lands of its conces- 
sion and established trade with them."^^ This statement 
has been accepted by Bonnassieux and repeated from him 
by Chemin-Dupontes.^^ We have already seen that the 
first expedition of the company was not sent out before 
December 14. That is to say, the West India Company, 
far from being able to arm "more than forty-five vessels in 
less than six months," armed seven at the most before the 
end of the year 1664, which was nearly eight months after 
its letters-patent were granted. It has also been shown 
that the company was not able to take possession of the 
islands before February and the months following of the 
year 1665. Furthermore, the directors of the company 
claimed in the memoir, written probably in November, 
1665, and quoted above, that the company had at that 

la Cie. des Ind. Oc, 1666; Cal. St. Pap.,. Am. and W. I., 1661-1668, 
No. 1227. 

75 Tome I, p. 641. 

76 Bonnassieux, Les Grandes Compagnies de Commerce, p. 371 ; 
Chemin-Dupontes, pp. 36-37. 

119 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

time at its disposal some sixty vessels, of which forty were 
owned by it, and the remainder, it is to be presumed, char- 
tered. It is nowhere claimed in that memoir that the com- 
pany had actually equipped and sent out that number of 
vessels. On the contrary, as has been seen, at the end of 
1665 the company had some twenty vessels locked in the 
Channel ports and in the ports of Holland, unable to sail 
on account of the danger of being captured by English 
corsairs. It has also been shown that almost all these ves- 
sels were still at anchor in these ports in May, 1666. But 
May, 1666, is two years after the establishment of the 
company. So that it is more than probable that it had 
not, even at that date, actually equipped forty-five vessels 
for voyages to the islands, and that, therefore, the state- 
ment quoted from the Encyclopedie methodique is entirely 
inaccurate. 

According to the sailings reported in the Gazette in 
1664 and 1665, fifteen of the company's vessels sailed 
from La Rochelle, one from Nantes, one from Bordeaux, 
four from St. Malo, three from Havre, two from Dieppe, 
and one from Honfleur, and one from Texel (Holland), 
which makes a total of twenty-eight. One cannot be sure, 
of course, that the reports in the Gazette contain a com- 
plete list of all sailings for the two years, but it is prob- 
able that they indicate the approximate activity of the 
company. If so, it is a most creditable showing, especially 
when one considers that the company's capital was small, 
and that it did not succeed in sending its first expedition 
to the islands before December, 1664, and that conse- 
quently the above figures would represent the sailings for 
the year December, 1664, to December, 1665. Further- 
more, the list of vessels which the company had ready to 
send out in November, 1665, shows that it was well on the 
road to increase the trade which it had begun. As com- 
pared with what the French East India Company had 

120 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

accomplished within the same period, results were very 
encouraging. It is the most creditable showing that any 
commercial company had ever made in France. 

There can be but little doubt that the directors had 
worked conscientiously against great odds for the accom- 
plishment of the gigantic task of driving out the Dutch 
and of supplying the islands. There can also be but little 
doubt that they had fallen far short of attaining this 
goal. Even if it be supposed that the company had actu- 
ally sent out the sixty vessels said to be at its disposal in 
November, 1665 — the most favourable estimate which was 
made of its activity — it would still be far short of supply- 
ing the place of the hundred or hundred and twenty vessels 
which the Dutch had been accustomed to send to the islands 
annually according to the estimate of de Formont. The 
cries of "Vive les Hollandais !" which resounded through 
Martinique told their story of the company's failure to 
supply the needs of the planters. 

In spite of the 1,387,000 livres contributed by the king 
during the last ten months, the end of the year 1665 found 
the company deeply in debt. To the total of 2,587,000 
livres of subscription was opposed an indebtedness of more 
than 4,000,000 livres. Its deficit amounted, in January, 
1666, to more than 2,000,000 livres.^^ To aid the com- 
pany to escape from its financial embarrassments, the 
directors made a most interesting suggestion: 

"The directors^ in searching for every means to sustain the 
company^ cannot refrain from proposing to Monseigneur 
[Colbert] a suggestion which he entertained at one time him- 
self, of uniting the two companies [the East and West India 
Companies] and thus place the funds of the East India Com- 
pany at the disposal of the West India Company. ... Or 
one might consolidate a part of the capital of the former, say 
for 1,000,000 or 1,500,000 livres, with that of the latter and 

77 Arch. Col., F2, 17, Memoire de la Cie. des Ind. Oc, 1665. 

121 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

place two or three of its directors on the board of the West 
India Company. "^^ 

This suggestion was not adopted, but it is most interesting 
in disclosing to us the fact that Colbert had at one time 
thought of uniting the two companies and thus bringing 
into existence a company even more gigantic in its scope, 
and offering to it the world for its conquest. 

The West India Company faced the outbreak of a war, 
which was destined to occur in the following year, heavily 
burdened with debt and with its ships locked in the ports 
of northern France. It was highly regrettable that just 
at a moment when it seemed prepared to advance upon the 
road of commercial expansion, the affairs of state dictated 
a declaration of war with England which called into play 
all the company's capital and all of its resources for the 
military defense of the islands, and thus made it impossible 
to use them for the development of its commerce. 

78 Arch. Col., Fg, 15, Memoire des Directeurs de la Cie. des Ind. 
Oc, mai, 1666. 



122 



U 



CHAPTER V 

The West India Company, 1666-1667 

rW^ HE year 1666 dawned beneath the clouds of an 
-*- approaching war. It has already been seen that 
the company's commerce suffered from the captures oper- 
ated by English corsairs and that the English Channel 
was considered too dangerous to risk the cargoes of mer- 
chant vessels in its waters. The directors seem to have 
entertained at first some hopes of maintaining neutrality 
between the two nations in the islands. "The orders of 
the court and of the company to the governors to main- 
tain the principle of neutrality," says Du Tertre, "were 
so explicit that they considered it as a matter which had 
been agreed upon." One of the directors of the company, 
Pocquelin by name, seemed so convinced of the fact, that, 
so late as May 2, 1666, he sent out a vessel with a cargo 
of wine under instructions to call at Barbadoes to trade, 
before proceeding to Martinique.^ De Sales, the French 
governor at St. Christopher, seems to have renewed the 
treaty with the English governor that peace would be 
maintained between the two nations in that island, in case 
of a declaration of war in Europe.^ These hopes, however, 
proved vain. The war was destined to prove more violent 
in the islands than in Europe. 

No attempt will be made here to follow the events of the 
war. The reader will find a detailed account thereof in 
Du Tertre. It will be attempted to give an account only 
of those events in which the interests of the company were 

iDu Tertre, IV, 10. 
2 Ibid., p. 4. 

123 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

affected and in which it was called upon to expend its 
energy in the defense of the islands. 

The official declaration of war against the English was 
signed at St. Germain-en-Laye, on January 26, 1666. Du 
Tertre makes a very serious charge against the West 
India Company in regard to notifying the islands of this 
fact. "The English governors," he says, "received the 
news of the fact by the middle of April, whereas the West 
India Company displayed such small diligence in inform- 
ing our governors that Captain Forant, commanding the 
St. Nicolas, which bore the dispatches of the court, did 
not sail from France before the month of March, so that 
the commander, de Sales, was killed [in the first battle at 
St. Christopher] before learning from France the news 
of the declaration of war."^ 

We have, however, a letter from de Clodore to Colbert, 
dated at Martinique, May 23, 1666, in which he says : "I 
received on March 19, the letters which His Majesty and 
you did me the honour to write on February 2 and 6, and 
by which I was informed of the declaration of war against 
England."^ It seems very evident from this letter that 
either Du Tertre was misinformed or that there was some 
unexplained negligence on the part of de Clodore at Mar- 
tinique in sending news to St. Christopher. The latter is 
highly improbable. On the contrary, either the govern- 
ment or the company showed promptness in communicat- 
ing the news to the islands. The declaration of war 
signed on January 26, letters written on February 2 and 
6, received at Martinique on March 19, is a most respect- 
able schedule for the seventeenth century. 

De Clodore, before the arrival of the news, became con- 
vinced of the bad faith of the English and made prepara- 
tions for the conflict. Thus he sent a special warning to 

3Du Tertre, IV, 13. 

4 Bib. Nat. MSS., Mel. Colbert, 138 bis, fol. 684. 

124 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

de Sales, governor of St. Christopher, to be on his guard. 
Du Lion, the governor at Guadeloupe, was warned per- 
sonally by de Chambre, and the governors of the other 
islands by letters. De Clodore completed the forts and 
batteries which were under construction at Martinique, 
increased his forces and put everything in such good 
order that all approaches to the islands were well guarded 
against attacks by the enemy. Du Lion likewise placed 
Guadeloupe in a state of defense. The governors of St. 
Christopher, Marie Galante, Grenada and St. Domingo, 
in response to the warnings given by de Clodore, prepared 
their forces of varying strength for the conflict.^ 

The company, however, had not made adequate provi- 
sion for the protection of the islands. Ammunition was 
exceedingly scarce. There was not enough in all the 
islands to sustain a battle of two hours' duration. This 
was partly relieved by the fact that the Dutch brought 
800 pounds of powder to Guadeloupe. Furthermore, 
there was a scarcity of food supplies which made the plant- 
ers murmur against the company. It was not wholly 
responsible for this fact, however. The vessels which were 
ready with their cargoes to sail for the islands in Novem- 
ber, 1665, did not do so, because suitable escorts could 
not be furnished by the king to conduct them beyond the 
zone of danger. Bechameil had distinctly stated the 
necessity for such escort. Colbert seems to have made no 
response to this request and, in failing to do so, he must 
be held at least partially responsible for the lack of ammu- 
nition and food supplies which the company's vessels 
would have brought. 

Fortunately the islands did not suffer seriously from 
these facts, because the English were not prepared to take 
the offensive. They seemed to think that the French were 
in an excellent state of preparation. Thus Governor Wil- 

5 Du Tertre, IV, 4 flF. 

125 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

loughby wrote to the king on May 12, 1666 : "The French 
spare no cost to supply their plantations with shipping, 
men, arms, and ammunition, all from home, and keep gar- 
risons in every island, well paid and disciplined, all done 
by a company."^ 

The edition of the Gazette for September 3, 1666, was 
devoted entirely to the description of the first important 
event of the war in the islands. The headlines announced : 
"The details of the defeat of the English and of the cap- 
ture of their forts, arms and standards in the island of St. 
Christopher in America effected by the French under the 
command of M. de Sales, commander under the authority 
of the West India Company."^ It told the story of the 
victory gained by the French in April preceding. The 
English had been reinforced by some 600 or 700 men, prin- 
cipally buccaneers under the command of Captain Morgan 
from Jamaica, so that they greatly outnumbered the 
French, in the proportion of six to one, according to Du 
Tertre, of two, three and four to one, according to various 
English accounts as given in the Calendars.^ They fur- 
thermore had the advantage of position, for they occupied 
the center of the island and were united, whereas the 
French occupied the two extremities and were disunited. 
In spite of these advantages, the courageous and well- 
directed attacks of the French leaders, de Sales and St. 
Laurent, won a rapid and decisive victory. The English 
claimed that their defeat was due to cowardice shown by 
their leaders.^ The French account in the Gazette reported 

^Cal. St. Pap. Col, Am. ^ W. Ind., 1661-1668, No. 1304. 
'i Gazette, 1666. 

8 Cal. St. Pap., Am. ^ W. Ind., 1661-1668, No. 1179, Relation of 
the loss of St. Christopher. 

9 Thus a band of refugees, on arriving in a small vessel at Swan- 
sea in September, reported that St. Christopher had been lost by 
reason of the cowardice and indiscretion of the governor, Watts, 
and the other officers. Ibid., No. 1278. See also other accounts, 
Nos. 1204 and 1206. 

126 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

that Governor Watts was accused of treason by Morgan 
and forced at the point of a pistol to march to battle.^" 
Captain Morgan and his buccaneers, on the other hand, 
seemed to have shown much courage. Thus out of a total 
of 360, there remained only about seventeen of them who 
had not been killed or wounded. Captain Morgan him- 
self was among the killed. "This victory," says Du Ter- 
tre, "is beyond doubt one of the most remarkable and 
noteworthy of this century, for the French, with 800 or 
900 men, killed more than 1000, disarmed or made prison- 
ers more than 3000, captured five standards and con- 
quered with all of its forts one of the most beautiful 
islands of the Antilles."^^ 

By the articles of surrender the English ceded all forts, 
artillery and firearms. Vagabonds and persons not pos- 
sessing plantations were forced to leave the island at once. 
Owners of plantations could remain or retire, as they chose. 
If they chose to retire, they could dispose of their real 
estate, slaves and live stock to the French and embark 
with their families and movables. If they chose to remain, 
they would be forced to take the oath of allegiance to the 
French king and to the West India Company. They 
would be granted religious liberty, provided they did not 
exercise it in public assemblies.^ 

Most of the English refused to take the oath of alle- 
giance and their expulsion began. The task of super- 
intending their transportation was performed by St. Laur- 
ent and de Chambre, the general agent of the West India 
Company, who had come to St. Christopher with reinforce- 
ments from Guadeloupe on learning of the victory. From 
May 8 to June 8, no less than 8000 persons, according to 

^^ Gazette, 1666, p. 912. 
11 Du Tertre, IV, 45. 

i2CaZ. St. Pap., Am. ^ W. Ind., 1661-1668, No. 1180; and Du 
Tertre, IV, 47. 

127 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

Du Tertre, were transported to various places. Some were 
sent to Montserrat and Antigua, others to Jamaica, Ber- 
muda and St. Domingo, still others to Virginia. Some 
800 or 900 Irish were sent to St. Bartholomew to culti- 
vate the plantations which the French planters had left, 
in order to strengthen the colony at St. Christopher. 
Three or four hundred more were sent to Martinique and 
Guadeloupe. No less then 400 contracts of sale were 
registered for the transfer of plantations by the English 
to the French, which represented a total value of 3,000,000 
pounds of sugar or 450,000 livres of money .^^ 

The news of this victory was received with joy in France. 
The king, Colbert, and the directors of the company, 
wrote most eulogistic letters to St. Laurent. Colbert 
informed him that the king, as a mark of his apprecia- 
tion, granted him 1000 ecus. The directors informed him 
that they had chosen him to succeed the late de Sales as 
governor of St. Christopher. 

The first battle had ended decidedly in favour of the 
French and the whole of St. Christopher passed into the 
hands of the West India Company. The burden of defense 
thereby became greater. The victory meant an increase 
of responsibility and an additional drain upon its re- 
sources. 

The company had faced the crisis of a foreign war in 
a very embarrassing financial condition. The directors 
consequently hesitated to engage the company's credit by 
further expenditures. But conferences, held at the begin- 
ning of 1666 with de Laubiere, lieutenant-governor of 
Martinique, who had been sent to France by de Clodore to 
depict the deplorable condition of affairs at Martinique 
and to urge them to send relief, made the directors decide 
to equip another expedition. De La Barre, who was in 
Holland occupied with the affairs of the company, was 

13 Du Tertre, IV, 62-63. 

128 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

summoned to Paris to give his advice. The directors had 
not yet given up hope that a treaty of neutraHty could 
be made with England and thought that the expedition 
of two or three vessels would be sufficient. De La Barre, 
on arriving at Paris, quickly destroyed this illusion by 
assuring them that the English were waiting only for the 
outbreak of a war in order to attempt the conquest of all 
the French islands. In accordance with his advice it was 
decided to equip a strong fleet and send it to the islands 
under his command.^* 

Preparations were immediately begun at La Rochelle. 
The king, in response to a request by the directors, 
granted permission to levy four companies of 100 sol- 
diers each and to place in command Sieur de Leon, cap- 
tain of a company of the regiment of Navarre. Haste was 
made to put the fleet in readiness to sail. The vessels were 
laden with ammunition for the defense of the islands and 
with supplies for the relief of the planters. Troops, pas- 
sengers, and cargoes were all embarked and the fleet set 
sail from La Rochelle on May 26, 1666.^^ 

It was a mistake, as events proved, to place de La Barre 
in command. Even before the sailing of the fleet, Colbert 
de Terron warned Colbert of the danger: "M. de La 
Barre is impatient to sail. . . . It is very easy to see 
that his thoughts are not of warfare, for which he has no 
disposition. He has no thought than that of establishing 
at Cayenne a part of his family which is to accompany 
him. . . . Under the smallest pretext, he will change his 
route and proceed to Cayenne with the women and best 

14 Du Tertre, IV, 116-117. 

15 Ibid., pp. 118-119. It was composed of ten vessels, Le St. 
Georges, 25 cannon, flying the admiral's pennant, Le St. Christopher, 
26 cannon, Le Mercier, 24 cannon, L'Hirondelle, 14 cannon, Le Lion 
d'Or, 14 cannon. La Dorothee, 8 cannon, Le Cher Amy, 10 cannon, 
La Pucelle, 14 cannon, a galiot and a bark of 50 tons. 

129 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

men whom he has on board."^^ Most prophetic words, 
which should have served as a warning to Colbert and to 
the directors of the company ! 

The fleet sailed with favourable winds, but encountered 
such a rude southwester that it was forced to return 
almost immediately to La Rochelle. The flagship, Le St. 
Georges, was found so badly damaged that it was consid- 
ered unfit to make the voyage. Fortunately another of 
the company's vessels, Le Florissant, armed with twenty- 
eight cannon, was found near La Rochelle and substituted. 
The fleet sailed again on June 8. This time the St. Chris- 
topher was fouled by one of the other ships and so badly 
damaged that it was forced to return to La Rochelle. 
The rest of the fleet continued its way. It arrived at the 
Madeira Islands on June S7, where de La Barre learned 
that war had already broken out in the islands and that, 
furthermore, a squadron of twelve English vessels had 
sailed from the Madeiras on June 6 for the West Indies. 
Instead, however, of making haste to carry relief to 
the islands, as duty commanded him to do, he decided to 
direct his whole fleet to Cayenne.^^ 

De La Barre himself explains the reason for this deci- 
sion by saying that after his arrival at the Madeiras, he 
took counsel with the most experienced navigators in his 
fleet, who said that inasmuch "as it was not possible to 
sail from the Madeiras before July 10, by reason of the 
cargoes which they were compelled to take aboard, it 
would not be possible to arrive in the islands before the 
first days of August which is the season of the greatest 
danger on account of storms and during which only 
rash and imprudent sailors dare approach near the 
coasts of the islands ; . . . that thus the fleet in arriving 
in the islands at such a season would be obliged to take 

16 Bib. Nat. MSS., Mel. Colbert, 137 bis, fol. 649. 

17 Du Tertre, IV, 134. 

130 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

refuge in the cul-de-sac of Martinique, which was a very 
unhealthy anchorage and where the greater part of the 
crews might die from sickness ; that it could not render 
any service to the islands at such a season. . . . These 
considerations, after being discussed, influenced Sieur de 
La Barre to change the plan, which had been agreed upon 
with Sieur Colbert de Terron, to sail directly to the 
islands, and made him decide to go first to Cayenne in 
accordance with the first orders which had been given 
him."'' 

This explanation is not convincing. One naturally 
asks why it was necessary for de La Barre to go all the 
way to the Madeiras before learning that it would be dan- 
gerous to arrive in the Antilles toward the first of August. 
It is evident that de La Barre did not act in good faith 
and that he gave this explanation only as a pretext to hide 
the truth, which Colbert de Terron had already divined, 
namely that he had his heart set on building up the colony 
at Cayenne and was willing, at almost any cost to the 
Antilles, to sidetrack the expedition for the profit of that 
colony. 

In accordance with his decision, de La Barre reprovi- 
sioned his ships in the Madeiras, made a stop of another 
ten days at Santiago in the Cape Verde Islands to buy 
live stock, and finally sailed on July 25 for Cayenne. He 
was separated on July 27 and 30 from the rest of his 
vessels, all of which arrived at Cayenne between October 
6 and 12, except one, which did not arrive until the last 
of October.'^ They were thus nearly three months on the 
way from Santiago to Cayenne. Their cargoes were so 
badly damaged that they furnished small aid to the col- 
ony. Much surprise was felt at the failure to find de La 
Barre at their arrival. For forty-eight long days he had 

'i^ Relation de VAmerique, I, 72 ff. 
19 Ibid. 

131 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

struggled against head winds and unfavourable tides. At 
the end of that time, finding himself separated from his 
fleet and still far from his destination and without a 
supply of water to drink, he at last gave up hope of reach- 
ing Cayenne and turned his lone vessel toward Martinique. 

In the meantime, the colonies had been suffering and 
the spirit of rebellion had reappeared, which might have 
been prevented, had de La Barre obeyed orders and arrived 
in season with his fleet. After the defeat of the English 
at St. Christopher, the planters, who had shown them- 
selves courageous and loyal subjects in combating the 
enemy, grew impatient at the unfulfilled promises of the 
company's agents. Many found their plantations dam- 
aged by the war, and poverty seemed greater than ever, 
in spite of the brilliant victory. A sedition would have 
broken out, but for the prompt action of de St. Laurent 
in arresting two of the most rebellious leaders. In Mar- 
tinique, a revolt of some importance did break out against 
the company. 

On July 13, de Clodore received word that some plant- 
ers in Cabesterre had refused to obey his orders to aid 
in strengthening the fortifications of the islands, com- 
plaining that they did not have food to eat. A little 
later in the day, he received additional news that all the 
planters of the district were in open revolt and were mov- 
ing towards the district of Precheur which was to serve as 
a rendezvous with other rebels. De Clodore was thus 
forced to turn his attention from defense against the 
enemy to the quelling of a rebellion against the company. 
Only four days before, yielding to the urgent requests of 
de Chambre and de St. Laurent, he had sent his own picked 
troops to St. Christopher. He, however, gave orders 
promptly to the commanders of the diff^erent districts to 
hold their troops in readiness. He commanded de la 
Calle, chief agent of the West India Company in the 

132 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

island, to assemble his troop of sixty clerks and employees 
of the company and to use it as a guard for the fort. 

Father Forcade, a Dominican, was sent to Cabesterre 
in order to persuade the planters to desist from rebellion, 
or, persuasion failing, to attempt to frighten them by 
assuring them that God would not desert the governor and 
that the larger planters would march with him against 
them. The leaders refused either to be persuaded or to be 
frightened. The two leading rebels, La Riviere and Daniel 
Jousselin, assured the good father that they were deter- 
mined to perish rather than to submit to the company 
longer; that they were in intelligence with the planters of 
Basseterre, but that, nevertheless, they would send some 
one to confer with the governor. The rebels had already 
made the two commanding officers of the district prisoners. 
Father Forcade returned and reported to de Clodore that 
he was convinced that the rebels were determined to make 
good their threats. 

De Clodore found very little enthusiastic support among 
the commanding officers. When he assembled some of 
them to take counsel, he found many of the opinion that 
it would be wise to yield to the rebels or at least to satisfy 
them temporarily. He refused, however, to listen to the 
expression of such ideas, saying that such a course would 
mean the ruin of all and put the island in danger of being 
taken by the English. Delay in attack meant a rapid 
spread of the rebellion. Success of a rebellion meant 
savage treatment of the officials and of the rich planters. 
As for him, he was resolved to march directly against the 
insurgents. He summoned those who loved him and their 
duty to follow him. 

The plan of the rebels of Cabesterre was to traverse Mt. 
Pelee in order to join those of Precheur. De Valmeniere, 
one of the most trusted officers, was sent with a body of 
troops to capture the mountain and combat them at their 

133 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

passage. At dawn of July 15, he set his troops in march 
and arrived at the summit of Mt. Pelee about ten o'clock. 
The rebels had anticipated his movements and were firmly 
entrenched. They fell victims, however, to their own 
stupidity and lost their vantage. They had forced the 
two commanders, Periere and Bouillon, whom they had 
taken prisoners before leaving Cabesterre, to accompany 
them. As quickly as these two officers realized that the 
troops commanded by de Valmeniere were those sent by 
de Clodore, they very adroitly made use of their situation 
to defeat and rout the rebels. They persuaded them 
that the troops in sight were none other than their friends 
from Precheur, who had come to join them. Under 
this pretext, Periere and Bouillon, who had gained some 
fifteen or twenty wavering rebels to their plot, were able 
to join de Valmeniere and inform him of the situation. 
They returned straightway to the band of insurgents and 
informed them that de Clodore was not present and they 
could confer with de Valmeniere in all security. The 
rebels fell at once into the trap. They deserted their 
posts of vantage and went down to the point which de 
Valmeniere occupied. The two officers quickly rallied 
about them those whom they had won over and de- 
manded of the others whether they did not recognize them 
as their officers, and at the same time began to shout: 
"Vive le Roi et M. de Clodore !" The most of the insur- 
gents were so surprised by these cries that they began to 
cry the same thing. An energetic attack was made upon 
the others. A volley was fired and some fifteen or six- 
teen of the mutineers lay dead or wounded. Periere 
sprang upon Jousselin, smote him with his sword and 
captured him. This quick turn of affairs spread terror 
among the rebels. They took to their heels and escaped 
into the woods. Some, however, in their flight encountered 
the troops led by de Clodore himself, who had marched 

134 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

straight into Cabesterre, and were captured. The lead- 
ers were captured, thanks to rewards offered by the gov- 
ernor. Joussehn was hanged and Riviere severely pun- 
ished. Some of the rest were condemned to three years 
of service to the company, others to the payment of large 
fines.^'' 

"Such were the misfortunes caused by the dishonesty of 
the West India Company's agents and by the scarcity of 
supplies which prevailed. One must admit that the company 
was very fortunate on this occasion in having a governor, 
who was loved and respected enough by the planters to make 
them fight and destroy their brothers^ who were in revolt, 
as they themselves believed, only by reason of motives which 
they could not condemn. The design of the rebels was, after 
uniting themselves with those of Precheur, to march against 
St. Pierre, where they would force the governor to surrender 
his commission, to overthrow the company and to establish 
himself governor under the proprietorship of M. D'Esnambuc, 
provided that he permitted the Dutch to trade in the island. 
They were nevertheless divided as to the choice of a governor, 
some desiring de Valmeniere, others de Clodore. But God 
willed otherwise. "^^ 

It can easily be imagined with what impatience de Clo- 
dore awaited relief from France. But de La Barre failed 
to appear. Some aid arrived shortly afterwards from 
another quarter. Three of the company's vessels which 
had sailed from Holland on May 25 arrived at Martinique 
on July 28. They were he Lys, La Justice (300 tons) 
and Le St. Antoine (130 tons). They brought with them 
two small English prizes, one with a cargo of salt fish and 
the other with a cargo of tobacco from Virginia.^^ About 
the same time, there arrived three Dutch vessels with 

20 Du Tertre, IV, 82 flF. 

21 Ibid., IV, 12. 

22 Gazette, 1666, No. 138 and pp. 752 and 1166. 

135 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

cargoes of supplies.^^ Some two weeks later, on August 
9, arrived the St. Christopher, which, it may be recalled, 
formed a part of de La Barre's fleet, but was forced to 
put back into La Rochelle for repairs. It had aboard a 
hundred soldiers of the regiment of Poitou under the com- 
mand of Sieur de I'Alou and de Laubiere, the lieutenant- 
governor of Martinique. The latter raised high the hopes 
of all by telling them that their suffering would soon be at 
an end, for a strong, well-equipped fleet, under the com- 
mand of de La Bar re, well laden with provisions, was on its 
way, that it had already touched at the Madeiras and 
should arrive shortly.^* 

Every eye was turned toward the horizon to see some 
sign of the approaching fleet. If that horizon had not 
been so limited, they might have seen a sight to turn 
them mad, for, thanks to the obstinate selfishness of de La 
Barre, the precious cargoes of supplies which they awaited 
were wasting away in mid-ocean in a struggle against 
adverse winds and unfavourable tides. 

At the arrival of the news of the victory at St. Chris- 
topher, the king resolved to send, at his own expense, 
another expedition to the islands. Orders were issued for 
the levying of 400 soldiers in Normandy and Navarre. 
The following vessels were equipped by the king: Le St. 
Sehastien (28 cannon), UAigle Noir (26), UAurore 
(16), Le Cher Amy (8), UEglise (16). "Two or three 
other vessels belonging to the West India Company were 
joined to this squadron. "^^ This fleet sailed from La 
Rochelle on July 27 and arrived at Martinique on Septem- 
ber 15, two weeks before the arrival of de La Barre. The 
troops brought by this fleet remained only a very short 

23 Du Tertre, IV, 95. 

24 Ibid., pp. 100-101. 

25 Du Tertre, IV, 122-133. See also Bib. Nat. MSS., M61. Colbert, 
138 his, fols. 812 and 936, for letters from Colbert de Terron in re- 
gard to the expedition; also vol. 140, fols. 1084 and 161. The last 

136 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

while at Martinique as they were shortly transferred to St. 
Christopher. Finally de La Barre arrived, on October 1, 
not with his fleet, but with one lone vessel. The disappoint- 
ment of all must have been great, as they saw this poor 
remnant of the strong fleet which they had awaited so 
impatiently and on which they had placed so much hope.^^ 
De La Barre was forced, soon after his arrival, to deal 
with a problem which he had done much to create and which 
demanded an immediate solution. The principal officers 
and planters of Martinique assembled and drew up a peti- 
tion which they presented to him. Their principal demands 
were: that the articles of de Tracy's ordinance be 
respected; that foreigners be admitted to trade in the 
islands ; and that they be not discouraged from doing so 

reference contains a statement of the expenses of equipping the fleet 
which was as follows: 



For levying 400 men . 
400 swords . 
280 muskets 
150 guns 

4 standards 
300 shoulder straps 
600 lbs. fuses 
600 lbs. powder . 
A quantity of flints 
A quantity of lead 
400 belts 
800 shirts 
400 uniforms 
400 pairs stockings 
800 pairs shoes 
400 hats 
800 cravattes 
Salaries for soldiers 
For their board and lodging 



4,800 livres. 
4,800 livres. 
2,250 livres. 
1,800 livres. 

160 livres. 

375 livres. 

172 livres. 

300 livres. 
6 livres. 

100 livres. 

600 livres. 
1,400 livres. 
2,400 livres. 

240 livres. 
2,200 livres. 

900 livres. 

240 livres. 

3,720 livres. 

28,380 livres. 



Total 



50,568 livres. 



26 The other vessels of de La Barre's fleet, after having discharged 
most of their damaged cargoes at Cayenne, set sail for the islands 
on November 13. See Relation de VAmerique, I, 376. 



137 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

by excessive duties laid on their merchandise ; that the 
planters might bargain freely for the transportation to 
Europe of their sugar, indigo and tobacco without being 
forced to ask permission of the company's clerks, pro- 
vided they were not indebted to the company; and that 
the maximum rate of transportation be fixed at ten 
deniers (money of France) the pound. The other demands 
concerned minor details of regulating and distributing 
merchandise. Among others the following regulations 
were made by de La Barre, de Clodore and de Chambre: 

"All Frenchmen shall enjoy the right to trade freely in the 
island of Martinique. They may import into the island what- 
ever merchandise they wish and may export^, into whatever 
country in alliance with France which they choose, the pro- 
ducts received in exchange. For the said privilege they shall 
pay to the company an import duty of 2^ per cent and an 
export duty of 2^ per cent. 

"Likewise foreigners, at peace and in alliance with France, 
shall enjoy the same privilege on the condition of paying 
5 per cent on cargoes imported into the island and 5 per cent 
on cargoes exported therefrom."^^ 

The directors of the West India Company in France, 
some three or four weeks previously, had come to a similar 
decision. They agreed to admit the Dutch to trade in the 
West Indies on condition of paying ten per cent both on 
incoming and outgoing cargoes, and private French trad- 
ers on paying five per cent.^^ On learning of the terms of 
the regulations made at Martinique, the directors sent 
instructions that the regulations which they had made 
should have precedence over the latter.^^ This action by 
the directors in admitting private French and Dutch trad- 
ers was of course an abnegation of the company's monop- 

27 Du Tertre, IV, 135-139. 

28 Arch. Nat. CoL, Fg, 52, September 24, 1666. 

29 S. Daney, Hist, de la Martinique, II, 135. 

138 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

oly, but was regarded as a temporary expedient to relieve 
the crisis created by the war. 

After this, the attention of de La Bar re and of all was 
turned to the struggle with the English. It was decided 
to make an attack upon the enemy and first upon the 
island of Antigua. All ships, belonging to the West 
India Company actually in the islands, were commanded 
by de La Barre to report for duty at Martinique. Eight 
responded to his call. The fleet sailed from Martinique 
for Antigua on November 2, and on the 4th an attack 
was made under the command of de La Barre. The resist- 
ance offered by the English was slight, for a landing was 
effected, the forts taken and the governor and his princi- 
pal officers captured all on the same day. On the morrow 
de Clodore and du Lion were sent with troops to complete 
the conquest of the island, which they did after some sharp 
fighting. Articles of surrender, essentially the same as 
those at St. Christopher, were signed. The conquest of 
the island seems not to have been thorough, however, due 
perhaps to the failure of de La Barre to grant the full 
quota of troops demanded for the purpose by de Clodore. 
Three weeks later, at the refusal of the English to abide 
by the treaty, de Clodore was compelled to return to the 
attack.^" 

De La Barre attacked and took Montserrat in Febru- 
ary, 1667. Du Tertre states that he had no less than 
twenty-five vessels under his command when he quit Mar- 
tinique. The French for the moment "were masters of 
the sea."^^ This was changed, however, by the arrival in 
April, 1667, of a strong English fleet which chose Nevis 
as the base of operations and captured five Dutch mer- 
chant vessels trading at Guadeloupe and blockaded effec- 
tively the island of St. Christopher. 

30 Du Tertre, IV, 173. 

31 CaZ. St. Pap. Col, Am. ^ W. Ind., 1661-1668, No. 1273. 

139 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

De La Barre returned to Martinique and made prepara- 
tions to attack the fleet. He united under his command 
the following vessels: Le Lys Couronne (38 cannon), La 
Justice (32), La Concorde (32), Le Florissant (30), Les 
Armes d'Angleterre (24), Le St. Christopher (26), 
L' Harmony e (32), L'Hercules (26), Le St. Sehastien 
(34), UHirondelle (14), La Nostre Dame (10), Le Mer- 
cier (24), Le Marsouin (12), and two fireships. All these 
vessels belonged to the West India Company.^^ In addi- 
tion there were four Dutch vessels armed with 108 cannon. 
In spite, however, of most elaborate preparations in the 
details of the order of battle, the fight with the English 
fleet off^ Nevis on May 20 was indecisive. De Clodore 
attributed the lack of victory to the cowardice shown by 
de La Barre. De La Barre in turn attributed it to the 
failure of de Clodore to obey orders.^^ The Dutch seemed 
to have been disgusted with the poor seamanship of the 
French. De La Barre withdrew to St. Christopher and a 
few days later the whole fleet returned to Martinique to 
await the attack of the English. They did not have to 
wait long, for the English fleet, under the command of 
Sir John Harman, began a series of attacks upon the 
island, which lasted from June 29 until July 6, and which 
proved of much consequence to the West India Company. 

After three unsuccessful attacks the English fleet 
entered the road of St. Pierre on July 6. On that day, 
after five hours of cannonading, an English fireship suc- 
ceeded in attaching itself to Le Lys Couronne, the French 
admiral, and setting her afire. Le St. Jean, an unnamed 
vessel, and two large flutes, Le Mercier and Le Lion d*Or, 
the last two named laden for Holland with cargoes valued 

32 Du Tertre, IV, 343-243. 

33 See on this controversy a pamphlet, entitled Plaintes et griefs 
presentes a Mgr. de Colbert par M. de Clodore, and de La Barre, Re- 
lation de I'Amerique, and finally Du Tertre, IV, 243-260. 

140 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

at 1,200,000 livres, also took fire and were "reduced to 
ashes, nothing being saved aboard them." The crews 
leaped into the sea and many were drowned.^* Terror 
spread to the other vessels, soldiers and sailors jumped 
into the water, believing that all would be burned. Be- 
sides, they were no longer able to resist the cannonading 
of the enemy which was riddling their ships. But for a 
change of wind, all the other twenty-eight vessels might 
have been destroyed by fire, for they were all anchored 
close together. "The fire and the booming of cannon and 
the slaughter of our forces so frightened those who escaped 
from the vessels that it was almost impossible to stop them 
in their flight. "^^ Only by heroic eff^orts was de Clodore 
able to check their rout, restore their courage, rearm them 
and offer resistance to the enemy. Heroism saved the day 
from complete disaster.^^ The English, apparently dis- 
heartened by the stubborn resistance, or else satisfied with 
the damage which they had wrought, retired at the moment 
when they seemed to have a complete victory in their grasp. 
At their withdrawal, de La Bar re gave orders that all 
vessels which remained should be entirely unladen, and 
that portholes be made so that they could be easily sunk, 
if the enemy returned. 

The English fleet reappeared on the morrow for a final 
attack. Again the heroic eff'orts saved Martinique from 
capture, but the English did not retire without forcing 
the French to sink their vessels near the shore in order to 
save them from capture or destruction. "Sir John Har- 
man has burned nineteen or twenty great French ships in 

34 Du Tertre, IV, 286-287; Relation de VAmerique, II, 261. 

35 Du Tertre, IV, 287. 

36 "A woman, named Madeleine d'Orange, whose husband was 
gunner at the battery of St. Sebastien, remained unflinching by his 
side during the combat, bringing courageously ammunition to aid in 
the conflict." See du Motey, Guillaume d'Orange et les Origines des 
Antilles Frangaises, Chap. XXXI. 

141 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

Martinico road,"^^ was a rather exaggerated English 
account of what happened, but it told the story of the 
great disaster which had been inflicted upon the French. 
The significance of the victory was that it gave the Eng- 
lish control of the sea and made commerce almost impos- 
sible for the French, and that it inflicted a most serious 
financial loss upon the West India Company, for the 
directors estimated that the vessels destroyed by fire alone 
represented a loss of 400,000 livres.^ 

St. Christopher remained effectively blockaded, but the 
English seemed unable to capture it. Cayenne was cap- 
tured easily. The French settlement was pillaged, farm- 
houses were burned and sugar-mills destroyed.^^ Thus 
much of the work for which the company had expended 
such large sums was undone and the losses were heavy. 

The proclamation of peace alone seems to have saved 
the French from greater disaster. The treaty of Breda 
was signed on July 31, 1667. The status ante helium was 
restored so far as the islands were concerned.*" 

The war had proved disastrous to the West India Com- 
pany. Before the outbreak of the war, as we have seen, 
the company lost no less than five vessels from capture by 
English corsairs. This represented a loss of some 272,000 
livres, deduction being made for the sums awarded by the 
English admiralty courts. It lost during the course of 
the war: by shipwreck in the islands, Le St. Sebastien, a 
vessel of 250 tons, and UAngelique of 350 tons ; by cap- 
ture. La Suzanne (350 tons) and an unnamed vessel; by 
destruction at the hands of the enemy in "Martinico road," 
Le Lys Couronne, Le St. Jean, an unnamed vessel, Le Lion 

37 Ca?. St. Pap. Col, Am. ^ W. Ind., 1661-1668, No. 1520. Wil- 
loughby to Williamson, July 19, 1667. Id., 1531 and others. See index. 

38 Arch. Col., F2, 15, Mem. sur I'etat des affaires de la Cie. des 
Ind. Oc, November, 1667. 

39 Du Tertre, IV, 313. 

40 Du Tertre, IV, 318-325, prints the text of the treaty. 

143 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

d'Or (250 tons) and Le Mercier (400 tons), the two last 
named containing cargoes of sugar for France. Further- 
more, the company had been forced to expend its funds, 
or rather to sink itself deeper in debt, not for the advance- 
ment of its commerce, but for the defense of the islands 
against the enemy. What this meant is clearly under- 
stood, when one recalls such an attack as that of de La 
Barre against Antigua in November, 1666, where all the 
vessels of the company in the islands were put in battle 
array and thus called from the peaceful pursuits of com- 
merce into the exacting duties of warfare, or when one 
remembers that many of the cargoes sent out to the islands 
were composed entirely of ammunition and of provisions 
for soldiers. The loss to the company from the fact that 
production was virtually arrested during the war is incal- 
culable. The planter had been forced to turn his face to 
the battlefield and his back upon his plantation, with the 
result that there was not enough tobacco or sugar or 
indigo at the close of the war to lade the company's ves- 
sels. To the devastation and privation of war had been 
added, in the case of St. Christopher, the ravages of a 
violent storm. There on the first of September, store- 
houses and sugar-mills had been overturned, trees up- 
rooted, sugar-cane blown down and the plantations all 
ruined.^ 

It is interesting to note the estimate made by the direct- 
ors of how much the war had cost the company. In a mem- 
oir,^ addressed by them to Colbert in November, 1667, they 
remarked: "It is evident from the company's books that 
without the expense of the war and the losses incurred 
therein, which together amount to more than 2,000,000 
livres, it would have gained during the first four years of 

41 Du Tertre, IV, 298-299. 

42 Arch. Col., F2, Memoire sur I'etat des affaires de la Cie. des Ind. 
Oc, November, 1667. 

143 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

its existence 500,000 livres. . . . Thus without the burden 
of a war which the company has sustained for two years 
and in which it has employed all of its vessels and during 
which its agents and even all the planters of the islands 
have had time to think of nothing except their defense, the 
company would not have been forced to appeal constantly 
to His Majesty for aid." The directors estimated the 
losses as follows: 

Expenses of the war . . . 1^000^000 livres. 

Captures by the English before the 

war . . . . . 272,000 livres. 

Sundry losses caused by the war . 250,000 livres. 

Destruction by fire of five vessels and 

their cargoes at Martinique . 400,000 livres. 

Depreciation of value of vessels which 

served in the war . . . 300,000 livres. 



Total 2,222,000 livres.*^ 

The actual deficit of the company in November, 1667, 
was 1,639,860 livres. If, said the directors, one compared 
these two sums, it would be seen that the losses caused by 
the war were greater by 581,140 livres than the deficit. 

The company very naturally found itself, at the close of 
the war, in serious financial embarrassments, for Colbert 
had responded very feebly to the appeals for aid during 
the course of the war. Thus in May, 1666, the directors 
had informed him that the company was forced to meet 
pressing obligations amounting to 650,000 livres (300,- 
000 livres at Lyons, 150,000 livres at Rouen, and 200,000 
livres at Paris), and that it would be forced to go into 
bankruptcy, if some funds were not placed at its disposal. 
They estimated that the sum of 2,000,000 livres was neces- 

43 The directors remarked that to this should be added the losses 
sustained by the company by reason of cessation of commerce, which 
were incalculable. 

144 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

sary to enable the company to meet those obligations 
and to continue its commerce. But the royal treasury 
remained closed. Colbert attempted to satisfy temporarily 
these needs, however, by commanding the farmers of the 
taxes imposed for non-pursuit by the Chambre de Justice, 
to pay to the company sums amounting to 1,084,000 
livres.*^ The total sum realized from this source for the 
year 1666 amounted to only 245,400 livres and this seems 
to be the entire amount placed at the disposal of the com- 
pany during the year.^^ The income from the farm at 
Rouen was in deficit to the sum of 1601 liv. 8s. 6d. Col- 
bert did not aid the company directly until 1667. On 
April 27, 230,000 livres, and again on September 4, 192,- 
000 livres from the royal treasury were placed at its dis- 
posal. But it was another case of "a drop of water on the 
tongue of a man with a fever." 

In November, 1667, the financial state of the company 
was as follows: 

Debit. 

Funds furnished by the king 
at different times August 
17^ 1664^ to September 4, 
1667 . . . . 1,922,000 liv. 

The Fermiers gen. des Aides 

paid in 1665 . . . 600,000 liv. 

For which stock in the com- 
pany was issued for . 55,000 liv. 



545,000 liv. 545,000 liv. 

44 Thus Sieur Coquille was ordered to pay for the generalite of 
Paris, 45,000 livres in ten equal payments at intervals of three months, 
the first payment to be made on March 1, 1666. Arch. Col., F2, 17, 
Mem. de ce qui doibt estre paye par les soubstraitans des taxes faicts 
pour la descharge des recherches de la Chambre de Justice dans les 
generalites de ce royaume. 

45 Arch. Nat, G7, 1312. 

145 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

Stock subscribed . . 1,784,000 liv. 

Farmers of taxes of Chambre 

de Justice, paid, 1666-67 607,000 liv. 

For which stock in the com- 
pany was issued for . 72,940 liv. 



The Company owes 534,060 liv. 534,060 liv. 

To Correspondent at Am- 
sterdam . . . 84,000 liv. 

To different individuals . 930,000 liv. 
Deficit in cash account . 70,000 liv. 



1,084,000 liv. 1,084,000 liv. 



Total .... 5,883,860 liv. 

Credit. 
32 vessels, estimated value . 600,000 liv. 

Small boats in the islands . 20,000 liv. 

Goods sent to islands on which 

agents have not made re- 
port — for 2,262,000 livres. 

Adding estimated profit of 

50 per cent, this should 

yield .... 3,393,000 liv. 
Returns already received, 

393,000 liv., plus probable 

expenses during the war, 

1,000,000 liv., equals . 1,393,000 liv. 



2,000,000 liv. 2,000,000 liv. 
The Company has paid on the 

sums due for the islands . 179,000 liv. 
It has effects: 

At Tortuga for . . 30,000 liv. 

At Cape Verde and Senegal 200,000 liv. 

In Canada . . . 260,000 liv. 

In warehouses in France . 285,000 liv. 

In Madeira . . . 20,000 liv. 

146 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

Its establishments at Cayenne 

have cost . . . 600,000 liv. 



Total .... 4,194,000 liv. 

The Company, therefore, was in arrears for 1,639^860 
livres.*^ 

An examination of the credit sheet will show that the 
company's assets were of doubtful value. It is hard to 
accept, for instance, the calculation that from 2,262,000 
livres of merchandise sent to the islands, the company 
would realize 2,000,000 Hvres after the expenses of the 
war had been deducted. It is much more probable that a 
very large part of this sum would be and was lost in debts, 
especially when one takes into account the reckless way in 
which the company's agents granted credit to the planters. 
Again, among the company's assets one finds the value of 
the colony at Cayenne estimated at 600,000 livres. It is 
very evident that news had not yet been received of the 
pillage wrought by the English in that island. Much of 
the amount expended by the company for the establish- 
ment of that colony had been undoubtedly lost. 

At the end of November, Colbert opened the royal treas- 
ury and placed 713,000 Hvres at the disposal of the com- 
pany. On December 26, the fermiers generaux des aides 
paid 200,000 livres and the fermiers generaux des gahelles 
paid 150,000 livres. The total sum received by the com- 
pany for the year 1667 was 1,601,040 livres, of which His 
Majesty alone had contributed 1,134,000 livres. It was 
proposed to employ these new funds, half for the pay- 
ment of pressing debts and half for the maintenance of 
commerce.*^ 

The directors informed Colbert that the company had 
thirty-two vessels with an aggregate tonnage of 7610 

46 Arch. Col., 

47 Ibid. 

147 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

tons.^^ It is to be noticed that in comparison with the num- 
ber of vessels owned by the company at the close of 1665, 
which was estimated at forty, the company's fleet had 
decreased; that instead of having a large number of ves- 
sels well equipped and laden ready to sail for the islands, 
as in November, 1665, nearly half of its fleet, namely four- 
teen, were in the islands awaiting cargoes — many of them 
perhaps in much worse condition than the directors of the 
company realized. Of the vessels actually in Europe, 
two were being prepared to be sent to Cayenne, one to 
Santiago (Cape Verde Islands) to take a cargo of live 
stock, one to the coast of Guinea for a cargo of slaves, 
and ten to the islands. It is to be remarked in passing how 
completely the commerce of the islands was still absorbing 
the company's attention. It is also to be noticed that out 
of fifteen vessels in France eleven were at La Rochelle, for 
in 1665, it will be remembered, the great majority of the 
company's vessels were in the ports of northern France. 
Attention is called to this fact here, because the continual 
wars of Louis XIV's reign almost destroyed commerce 
between the Antilles and the northern ports and left it 

48 They were distributed as follows: 

In the islands: Le 8t. Antoine (130 tons). La Marye (350), L'Har- 
monye (350), La Concorde (380), Les Armes de France (350), 
L'Hercules (300), L'Angelique (350), La Justice (300), La Nostre 
Dame (150), Le St. Nicolas (250), L'Hirondelle (160), Le St. Paul 
(250), La Licorne (250), Le St. Georges (400). 

In Holland: La Bergere (250 tons), ready to sail for the islands. 

At Havre: Le Marsouin (300 tons), Le Florissant (350), Le St. 
Guillaume (50), Le Marchand (an English prize, 30). 

At La Rochelle: Les Armes de L'Angleterre (prize, 180 tons), La 
Vierge (120), Le Postilion (120), La Pucelle (260), La Ste. Dorothee 
(250), L' Granger (250), L'As (250), to take cargo at Bordeaux, Le 
Soucy (50), Le Chasseur (200), La Catherine (180), Le St. Christo- 
pher (300). 

On the sea: L'Esperance (300 tons), en route for Cayenne, Le St. 
Louis de Bayonne (300), coming from Senegal. 

148 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

almost entirely in the hands of the traders of Bordeaux, 
La Rochelle and Nantes. 

Thus ended the second period of the company's history. 
Its finances were in a deplorable state, its commerce was in 
a state of decadence, its monopoly of trade was broken, 
for foreigners had been re-admitted to the privileges of 
commerce, and private French traders were permitted to 
trade freely. Between the two the company had been 
cheated out of the few crumbs which had fallen from the 
table of the planters during the war. It had a most diffi- 
cult task to gain its feet after such an enfeebling struggle. 
"It passed from a period of embarrassment into the period 
of its downfall."*' 

49 Chemin-Dupont^s, oy. cit., 64. 



149 



CHAPTER VI 

The West India Company, 1668-1670 

T T was the general opinion in the islands at the close of 
-*• the war, according to Du Tertre, that the West India 
Company was totally ruined and that its restoration could 
be effected only at the expense of much suffering to the 
planters. Houel would soon be back at Guadeloupe and 
du Parquet at Martinique. The Dutch ships would soon be 
coming freely, well laden as before with all sorts of mer- 
chandise to satisfy their needs.^ There was much to justify 
such an opinion. The company was heavily in debt; a 
large number of its ships lay idle in different ports of the 
islands, some of them being much the worse for the ser- 
vice which they had been called upon to perform during 
the war. It was but an easy step backwards for the com- 
pany to retire and yield the place to the former proprie- 
tors, because it had as yet paid only a small part of the 
sums due them for the islands. The Dutch, re-admitted 
to the privileges of commerce during the war, were already 
trading with increased freedom, even without permits from 
the company. Thus the cry of the rebels, ^'Vive les Hol- 
landais/' and the dream of all the planters to see the return 
of the old days of comparative prosperity seemed well on 
the road to realization. 

There was, however, the indomitable will of a great 
minister, which had not been fully reckoned with or fully 
understood. Colbert never debated for a moment the plan 
of taking a backward step by restoring proprietary rule. 
Least of all did he think of permitting the Dutch trader 
to reconquer the commerce of the French islands. A spe- 

iDu Tertre, IV, 335-336. 

150 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

cial chapter will be devoted to the study of the persistent 
and uncompromising fight which he pursued against him 
and no further attention need be paid to the subject here. 
As to the belief that the company was ruined and would 
be dissolved, some modern writers have misunderstood Col- 
bert's attitude toward the company at this time. M. 
Pigeonneau, for instance, remarks : "Erom the commence- 
ment of 1668, Colbert retained very few illusions as to the 
future of the West India Company. He regarded it hence- 
forth as a pis oiler and awaited a propitious day to dis- 
solve it."^ This opinion has been accepted by M. Chemin- 
Dupontes.^ There are several facts, however, which show 
that this opinion is erroneous. Colbert placed almost a 
milhon livres at the disposal of the company near the end 
of the year 1667. No less than 713,000 livres of this sum 
were granted as late as November 30. This fact was 
regarded by the planters of the islands as ample evidence 
that the company was to be continued and would receive 
the support of Colbert.* Again in the autumn of 1667, His 
Majesty ordered a squadron of his vessels to be sent for a 
year's cruise in the West Indies and in the Gulf of Mexico. 
It was placed under the command of Sieur de La Rabes- 
nieres de Treillebois. He was commanded to remain three 
months in the islands, and was ordered to direct his atten- 
tion principally to the maintenance of order and to the 
exclusion of foreigners from trade and to the protection of 
the interests of the West India Company. In regard to 
the last point, his instructions were very definite : 

"His Majesty wills that Sieur de Treillebois make it clearly 
known to the planters that he intends to maintain the West 

2 Pigeonneau, La Politique coloniale de Colbert, in Annales de 
VEcole des Sciences Politiques, 1886, p. 800. 

3 Chemin-Dupontes, Les Compagnies de Colonisation en Afrique 
Occid. sous Colbert, pp. 66-67. 

4Du Tertre, IV, 335. 

151 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

India Company in possession not only of the islands which he 
has granted them^ but also of all the commerce thereof; that 
he will see to it that the said company treat them well and 
that he will always be disposed to listen to their complaints."^ 

In the instructions to de Baas, on the eve of his departure 
for the islands in 1668 to succeed de Clodore as governor 
at Martinique, there is another very clear expression of 
the same policy: 

"M. de Baas should know that the interests of the king and 
those of the West India Company are one and the same. He 
should be thoroughly persuaded that everything which he can 
do to advance these interests will be very agreeable to His 
Majesty." 

De Baas was further instructed to act in concert with 
the directors of the company in order to promote their 
trade.^ 

When Bechameil suggested in a memoir that subscrip- 
tions to the company be closed on January 1, 1669, Col- 
bert remarked: "I do not believe that it is necessary to 
close the books of the company."^ In fact, during the 
course of 1669, Colbert subscribed from the royal treasury 
half a million livres to aid the company. 

At the beginning of 1668, Colbert himself made out a 
plan of reform for the administration of the company.^ 
He continued to keep in very close touch with the admin- 
istrators of the company's affairs, especially by corre- 
spondence with Pelissier, one of the directors, who was sent 
out to the islands in 1670 to look after the company's 
affairs. Even as late at February 26, 1670, he seems to 
have had in mind a possible restoration of the company's 

5 Clement, III, 2, p. 400. 

6 Ibid., p. 410. 

7 Arch. Col., F2, IT, Memoire, 1668. 

8 Arch. Col., F2, IT, Projet de reglement propose par M. Colbert 
le T dec. 166T, et adopte par la Cie. 

152 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

monopoly. In a memoir which he addressed to the direct- 
ors at that date, the following passage is to be found : 

"So long as the company grants permission to trade to 
French private traders,, it will suffice merely to grant the free- 
dom to those who trade in the islands to sell their goods to 
whatever persons and in whatever way they wish, on the con- 
dition that they complete their sales before the lapse of one 
month after their arrival, under penalty of having them seized 
and sold at public auction. When, however, the company 
ceases to grant such permission and rvill hold all of this com- 
merce in its own hands, the only policy to be adopted is 
that the company act in good faith in its relation with the 
planters."^ 

It is very clear from these facts that Colbert had not 
reached the point at the beginning of 1668 or even much 
later, where he planned to abolish the West India Com- 
pany. On the contrary, the maintenance of that company 
was still an essential part of his policy. 

There was one point, nevertheless, where one might say 
that Colbert's attitude toward the company had changed. 
He was unwilling that its monopoly of trade be restored 
to the exclusion of the French private trader. Bechameil 
remarked that a large number of private traders were 
going to the islands at the beginning of 1668, and that, 
if it continued, the Dutch could soon be driven out. In 
the margin of the memoir containing this remark, Col- 
bert made the following comment: "There is nothing so 
important as to influence the French to send ships to the 
islands and to exclude all the Dutch from this trade. "^'^ 
By an arret of the conseil d'etat of September 10, 1668, 
the directors of the company were forbidden to grant any 
passports whatever to the Dutch, but were specifically 

9 Clement, III, 2, pp. 472-476. 

10 Arch. Col., F2, 15, Memoire, January, 1668. 

153 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

ordered to grant them freely to all Frenchmen.^^ Meas- 
ures were passed, and instructions constantly given to the 
governors of the islands and to the directors and agents 
of the company to insure the largest possible freedom to 
the French private trader. 

This did not mean necessarily any hostility on Colbert's 
part toward the company. It meant rather that he 
beheved that the company needed help in its conquest of 
the islands. In this he was in accord with Bechameil, 
the most active director of the company, who remarked: 
"If that continues [the trade by individual Frenchmen], 
there is every reason to believe that we shall be able to 
take this trade out of the hands of the Dutch. "^^ The 
essential point in Colbert's mind was that the traders in 
the islands be French. This, let it be recalled, was the 
real reason of the creation of the company itself, and the 
directors were heartily in sympathy with this view. Thus 
in the memoir to Colbert under date of November, 1667, 
they said: 

"If individual French traders, by sending vessels to the 
islands after the manner of the Dutch, could carry on all of 
this trade, the company would willingly consent to yield it 
to them in order that the kingdom might profit from it, but 
it cannot think of yielding it to the Dutch, who were driven 
from the islands during the first year of the company's exist- 
ence."^^ 

It is therefore much more accurate to say that the West 
India Company began the year 1668 with the sincere sup- 
port of Colbert and that the limitation of its monopoly 
was not intended as a step towards its dissolution, but 
rather to give it an ally in building up its trade. 

iiMoreau de Saint-Mery, I, 174-175. | 

12 Arch. Col., F2, 15, M6moire, 1668. | 

13 Arch. Col., F2, M6moire important, November, 1667. | 

154 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

The company had just passed through two very trying 
periods ; the first was a period of organization, during 
which it had insufficient capital to solve a tremendous 
problem whose solution was imperative, with the result 
that it was forced to plunge itself into the embarrass- 
ment of heavy debts ; the second period was more embar- 
rassing still, for the company had to defend its posses- 
sions against the attacks of a foreign foe by the expendi- 
ture of large sums and had to suffer a cessation of its 
commerce. It is not surprising that during these two 
periods, as Bechameil asserted, the directors had not been 
able to pursue a well-defined policy, and that they had 
often lost heart, when they saw so many interruptions 
to the carrying out of their plans. But the war was now 
over and peace had come. Prospects seemed much more 
favourable for success. 

Some reforms were made. One was in the organization 
of the board of directors, adopted in accordance with the 
plan drawn up by Colbert himself, whereby each director 
was given definite work to do. All were required to report 
for duty at the company's office "every Tuesday, Wednes- 
day, Friday and Saturday at four o'clock and remain 
until seven." It was hoped that in this way the indiffer- 
ence of many directors to the interests of the company 
would disappear."^* A governor-general was placed in 
command of all the islands. They had been governed for 
the first four years of the company's rule separately by 
individual governors. The choice for the first governor- 
general fell upon Jean Charles de Baas, a lieutenant-gen- 
eral in the army of the king. After instructing the new 
governor in the duties which he had to perform — the 
maintenance of law and order, encouragement to early 
marriages, promotion of clearing new lands and increased 

14 Arch. Col., F2, 17, Projet de reglement propose par Colbert; 
ibid., Memoire, January 1, 1668. 

155 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

production — Colbert specifically commanded him to act 
conj ointly with the directors to re-establish the trade of the 
company. De Chambre, who had served as general intend- 
ant since 1664, was replaced by Sieur Cartier, who had 
been serving the company as its agent at Bordeaux. It 
was decided to dismiss the great body of agents and clerks 
in the islands and to limit the company's activity to whole- 
sale trade. It was planned to maintain henceforward two 
large warehouses in each island, from which individual 
traders and merchants might supply themselves with 
goods at a price that would assure a profit of ten, twelve 
and fifteen per cent by retailing them to the planters. 
Bechameil expressed his belief that after these reforms 
were inaugurated, success was assured. 

With perhaps the double purpose of encouraging old 
stockholders and attracting new investors, Colbert de- 
cided to have the company declare a dividend — the first 
in its history. All those who had voluntarily subscribed 
as much as 3000 livres before December 1, 1665, and those 
who had supplemented such subscriptions by a sum of 
1500 livres or more were to receive a dividend amounting 
respectively to four per cent and five per cent annual 
interest on sums subscribed, the time to be reckoned from 
December 1, 1665, to December 1, 1668.^^ To make the 
payment of such a dividend possible, 300,000 livres were 
furnished from the royal treasury on January 9, 1669, 
and later an additional sum of 104,545 liv. 8s. 6d. Toward 
the close of the year some fifteen new subscriptions were 
made, which yielded a total of 540,000 livres. 

In spite, however, of efforts to bolster up the company 
by reforms and by the subscription of new funds, its 
affairs seem to have drifted from bad to worse. No mate- 
rial has been found which enables one to estimate even 
approximately the amount of commerce carried on by the 

15 Arch. Nat., E, 1753, Arret, January 9, 1669. 

156 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

company during the years 1668 and 1669. A letter 
written by de la Cale, the company's agent at Martinique, 
to Sieur Cartier, the general agent for the islands, 
reported the sailing of the St. Pierre for Dunkerque in 
June, 1669, with a cargo of 3078 rolls of tobacco, valued 
at 190,280 livres, for the West India Company, and 729 
rolls of tobacco and 58% hogsheads of sugar for private 
traders. Likewise in a letter of July 8, he noted the sail- 
ing of the St. Joseph for St. Malo.^^ But these cases do 
not indicate anything more than that the company was 
still carrying on some trade. Du Lion, in a letter of 
December, 1669, remarked that the number of vessels 
which the company was sending to the islands at that 
date was small.^^ Later events show that the company's 
commerce was declining at this time and that it was far 
from being in a prosperous condition. It is very clear 
that its affairs were being managed very poorly. Its 
general agent, Sieur Cartier, proved to be both a thief 
and a smuggler. He not only appropriated some of the 
company's property for his own personal use, but accepted 
bribes freely from the Dutch for the permission to intro- 
duce slaves, live stock and merchandise in the islands. He 
also kept up a smuggling trade with the English at 
Antigua. He kept the vessels of the West India Company 
"wasting away in the roads while those of the Dutch 
received payments for their smuggled goods and sailed 
away promptly with full cargoes." The Dutch were also 
given preference in the collection of debts.^^ Du Lion 
made similar charges of corruption against other agents 

16 Arch. Nat. Col., Cj, I. 

17 Ibid. 

18 Arch. Nat. Col., Cj, I, a long and interesting letter by du Lion 
of December 1, 1669. The charges against Cartier were substantiated 
by de la Cale, who was charged by the company with the investigation 
of Cartier's conduct. Arch. Nat. Col., Cg, 2nd series, I, letter from 
de la Cale to directors, November 18, 1669. 

157 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

of the company, notably against Sieur Royer, the agent 
at St. Christopher, and even against de Baas, the gov- 
ernor-general. 

It was perhaps to remedy this situation that the direct- 
ors decided to choose a new general agent and in addi- 
tion, perhaps at Colbert's suggestion, to send out to the 
islands one of their own number to protect the company's 
interests and to introduce some necessary reforms. For 
the former position it chose Bertrand Pallu, Sieur du 
Ruau, a former officer of justice at Tours. He remained 
in the islands until January, 1674, the eve of the com- 
pany's dissolution, and it is to be supposed that he gave 
satisfaction in his service. The director selected to repre- 
sent the company in the islands was Pehssier, a titular 
secretary of the king. 

Colbert de Terron demanded at the time of Pelissier's 
selection that the powers of intendant be conferred upon 
him during his sojourn in the islands. To this demand 
Colbert made the following response: 

"The demand which you have made in regard to M. Pelis- 
sier is very difficult to grant, and in any case I can do nothing 
before the return of the king. I do not believe, however, that 
His Majesty will be willing to confer upon him the power 
which you ask, all the more so, because it is hardly practicable 
to confer upon a member of a commercial company the same 
power as that conferred upon intendants in the provinces of 
the realm. In addition I am not at all informed as to the 
way in which justice is administered in the islands and I do 
not know Sieur Pelissier well enough to confer upon him such 
extensive power. But if, after having informed himself of 
the general practices in the islands, he sends me an excellent 
account thereof, more extensive powers can be conferred upon 
him with more certainty of success. "^^ 

19 Clement, III, 2, p. 482, May 5, 1670. 

158 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

Although no record has been found which shows that the 
powers of an intendant were formally conferred upon 
Pelissier, yet Colbert certainly charged him in his letters 
with the duties of an intendant. In one letter, for instance, 
he instructed him to study the means "of establishing order 
in matters of religion, justice, and police. "^° Further- 
more, he regarded Pelissier as directly subject to his 
orders. Thus on December 20, 1670, he wrote him: 

"I am very much surprised that you have not replied 
article by article to the instructions which I gave you and 
that you have not answered my letters. Do not fail to do so 
as soon as you receive this letter. Inasmuch as the company 
is in accord with the orders which I have given it in the name 
of the king and with all the suggestions which I make for its 
advancement and welfare, you must conform your conduct to 
what I write. You may rest assured that the company will 
give you orders to do the same thing."^^ 

The original instructions to Pelissier present very 
clearly Colbert's views as to the particular duties of a 
director and as to the principles which should guide the 
West India Company in its efforts to build up trade. He 
was instructed to inform himself thoroughly before his 
departure of the complete history of the company's 
activities and policy. After his arrival in the islands, he 
was to examine carefully the accounts of agents, to listen 
to the complaints of the planters against them, and, in 
general, to examine thoroughly their conduct. In case 
they were found guilty, they were to be dismissed and 
punished. The most interesting passages of these instruc- 
tions are the following: 

"As the interests of the company are purely commercial, the 
conduct of the directors should be governed by three unvary- 
ing maxims, namely, freedom in trade, honesty, and content- 

20 Ibid., pp. 486-496. 

21 Ibid., p. 503. 

159 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

ment with a small profit. As to freedom in trade^ although it 
may prove difficulty, if the company monopolizes commerce, it 
is nevertheless certain that some expedient can be found which 
will give satisfaction to the planters on this point. It is very 
important to maintain this principle, as it is the only thing 
which will promote the cultivation and the development of 
the islands . . . for liberty is the soul of commerce and 
alone can work its increase. As everything which is contrary 
to it will retard the development of the colonies some means 
of establishing it must be found. So long as the company 
grants permission to French private traders, it will be sufficient 
merely to grant the liberty to those who send merchandise 
to the islands of selling to whomever they wish and for 
whatever price they wish. . . . When, however, the company 
ceases to grant such permission and assumes a monopoly of 
this commerce, one will be compelled to trust to the good 
faith of the company in establishing storehouses in each of 
the islands, where an abundance of all sorts of merchandise 
will be on sale, and in selling its merchandise at auction to 
the highest bidder, in order in this way to make it possible 
for a large number of people to carry on a retail trade. 

"In regard to sugar and the other products of the islands, 
their price will be regulated by the sale of merchandise at 
public auction. But if it is found that the introduction of 
specie, recently made, interferes with the system of exchange, 
and that merchandise is being bought for cash, it will be 
necessary to find some means of limiting liberty of sale or 
at least of regulating the price in such a way that both the 
company and the planters will find an honest gain. The profit 
and development of the company depend on the consider- 
able increase in the number of inhabitants in all the islands, 
because such an increase brings with it an increase both in 
the demand for the merchandise and in the quantity of pro- 
ducts in the islands. These two sources of increase should 
prove instrumental in enriching the company. The company, 
therefore, must work for the comfort of the planters, so that 
their friends in France may be attracted to the islands. 
Thus it should sell its goods at low prices and leave as much 

160 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

liberty as possible in trade. It should choose two seaports, 
such as La Rochelle and Havre, with some others such as 
Honfleur or Dieppe, where it can load and unload its vessels. 
In these ports it should maintain its depots well filled with 
all merchandise for which there is a demand in the islands. 
. . . Vessels on arriving in France should be unloaded, re- 
paired and reloaded and sent back to the islands with all 
diligence. The same rule should be observed by the com- 
pany's agents in the islands. The company should strive to 
pay all debts and begin a new record. 

"The king desires that Sieur Pelissier remain an entire 
year in the islands. He is not to return to France without 
an express order from the king, or before another director 
will have arrived to replace him."^^ 

Pelissier arrived in the islands at the beginning of July. 
His credentials were formally registered at Martinique 
on the 14th.^^ He spent about two years in inspecting and 
supervising the affairs of the company. During this time 
Colbert was in constant correspondence with him. He 
instructed him to work at the larger task of promoting 
the interests of the islands. "Remember that I count 
upon it," he wrote in one letter, "that during your sojourn 
in the islands you will pay much attention to the enforce- 
ment of the king's orders that foreigners be entirely 
excluded from trading and that French private traders 
enjoy complete liberty to trade. Inasmuch as upon 
these two points depend the advancement of the com- 
pany's interests, the prosperity of the islands and the 
increase of the colonies, bend your energy to their enforce- 
ment."^ 

In other letters he urged Pelissier to reduce the amount 
of sugar produced in the islands by persuading the plant- 
ers to undertake the culture of other products; to see to 

22 Clement, III, 2, pp. 472-476. 

23Daney, Histoire de la Martinique, II, 195. 

24 Arch. Nat. Col., B, 2, fol. 121 verso, October 12, 1670. 

161 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

it that wise regulations were made for the preservation 
and increase of live stock in the several islands ; to urge 
the inhabitants to build ships and to engage in commerce ; 
to make a census of the island ; to try to settle the dispute 
between the governors of Guadeloupe and St, Christopher ; 
and in general, to consider what would be "the most 
advantageous and wisest thing to do for the police of the 
islands and particularly to establish an entire freedom of 
commerce to all French traders, to drive out foreigners, 
to establish public fairs and markets, to insure full lib- 
erty to creditors, to compel their debtors to pay them, 
and finally, to perfect the manufacture of tobacco and 
sugar."^^ 

Pelissier does not seem to have carried out the spirit 
of Colbert's instructions that the company work for the 
comfort of the planters and sell goods at small profit. 
Thus du Lion complained to Colbert, "that M. Pelissier, 
a short time after his arrival at Martinique, ordered the 
company's agents to sell at prices as high as 9000 and 
10,000 pounds of sugar each, horses and mares of Poitou 
for which the company had paid forty of fifty ecus."^^ 
Likewise de Baas complained that Pelissier had given 
instructions to the company's chief agent at Martinique 
to sell at 4000 pounds of sugar slaves for which the 
Dutch used to demand only 2000 pounds. "That is 
certainly hard," remarked de Baas, "and it is not a 
means to make the planters love the company."^^ Col- 
bert was forced to interfere by ordering that this ex- 
orbitant price be lowered.^^ Pelissier does seem to have 
made some efforts in accordance with Colbert's suggestion 
to study the needs of the islands with a view of increasing 

25 Clement, III, 3, pp. 526 ff. 

26 Arch. Nat. Col., C7, II, March 15, 1672. 

27 Arch. Nat. Col., Cg, I, de Baas to Colbert, March 29, 1671. 

28 Ibid., February 28, 1672. 

162 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

commerce, for, in a letter of July 8, 1671, he enclosed a 
memoir regarding "the trade which can be carried on 
with the French Antilles by the merchants of Marseilles 
and of other French ports of Provence and the Mediter- 
ranean coast." Detailed information was given as to the 
articles which the islands needed and the current prices 
there.'' 

Material is entirely too scanty to permit any estimate of 
what Pelissier really accomplished in the islands. Col- 
bert's letters to him would seem to indicate that he had 
much confidence in him and was more or less satisfied with 
what Pelissier was doing. His mission, however, certainly 
failed to restore the West India Company to a prosperous 
condition, or to check it on the downward road to bank- 
ruptcy. 

The more Colbert laboured to build up the commerce 
of the French West Indies, the more he realized that all 
efforts to make the company prosperous were proving 
fruitless, and that much more hope was to be placed in 
the employment of the private trader as an agent in the 
realization of his plans. He seems, however, to have enter- 
tained one last hope that the West India Company could 
be utilized in the solution of his important problem. He 
endeavoured to make it useful by forcing it to concentrate 
its forces upon the importation of special articles which 
the private trader was not supplying satisfactorily and 
which were very essential to the welfare of the planters. 
"The king orders me to inform you," he wrote to the 
directors on November 10, 1671, "that it is his will that 
the West India Company engage in no other commerce 

29 Thus the common wine of Provence was sold in the islands for 
700 or 800 pounds of sugar the cask, brandy for 600 to 650 pounds 
the barrel, salt fish at 550 to 600 the barrel, salt beef at 200 to 250 
the barrel. Colbert in his letter of December 8, 1670, acknowledged 
the receipt of Pelissier's memoir on "the price of sugar, the trade in 
slaves and live stock," but no trace of the memoir has been found. 

163 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

in the countries of its concession than that of importing 
into the islands slaves from the coast of Guinea and live 
stock and salt meat from France."^" 

This short letter, which has been quoted entire, is an 
important document in the history of the company, and 
marks a milestone in the history of the commercial policy 
of Colbert, for it is proof positive that the great minister 
had realized that the instrument which he had chosen in 
1664 to carry out his plans for establishing commerce with 
the West Indies was no longer suited to that end in 1671. 
It remains to see in the succeeding chapter how far the 
company succeeded in accomplishing the smaller task 
which Colbert had assigned to it and to trace briefly the 
events which led to its dissolution. 

30 Arch. Nat. Col., B, 3, fol. 97, letter to the directors of the W. Ind. 
Company, November 3, 1671; fol. 99, circular letter to the officials in 
the ports, November 10, 1671. 



164 



CHAPTER VII 

The West India Company^ 1670-1674 

Its Trade in Slaves^ Salt Beef, Live Stock. 
Its Downfall 

rr^ HE West India Company apparently made its first 
-■- attempt to establish, on its own account, trade on 
the coast of Guinea at the end of the year 1669. It is 
particularly fortunate to have an account of this attempt 
written by Sieur Delbee, the captain of one of the vessels 
sent out by the company.^ The expedition was composed 
of two vessels, La Justice, a frigate of 250 tons, under the 
command of Sieur Delbee, and La Concorde, under the 
command of Captain Jasmin. They were both laden with 
everything necessary for the establishment of trading 
posts and for the commencement of trade. On board La 
Justice were Sieur du Bourg, who was to become com- 
mander for the company at the coast, and Sieur Carolof, 
with several clerks and passengers. We have already had 
occasion to make the acquaintance of Carolof, for it was 
to him, it may be remembered, that the company granted 
in 1665 the privilege of trading on the western coast of 
Africa.' 

They set sail from Havre on November 1, 1669, doubled 
Cape Verde on the 26th, and, having passed before the 
English settlement at Gambia, were becalmed nearly two 

1 Delbee (le Sieur), Journal du Voyage du Sieur Delb4e, com- 
missaire general de la Marine aux Isles, dans la coste de Guinee pour 
Vestahlissement du commerce en ces pays en Vannee 1669, Paris, 1671. 

2 He had apparently been engaged in the slave trade during the 
intervening years, for Delbee speaks of him as "one who had traded 
at this coast and who had great knowledge of the practices of trade 
there." Journal, p. 387. 

165 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

weeks at the mouth of the Sierra Leone. On December 
21, the Cape of Palms was rounded and on the S6th anchor 
was cast before Assenay,^ where an Enghsh ship was trad- 
ing with the natives, but set sail immediately on perceiving 
that the incoming vessels were French. "A short time 
afterwards a number of negroes came in a canoe to our 
vessels. The moment that they saw we were French, they 
plunged into the sea, daring not to come near us, for the 
English had told them, as we learned afterwards, that we 
were not to be trusted and that we kidnapped all the 
negroes who came to trade with us along the coast."^ 
Seeing that it was impossible to trade with these negroes, 
the vessels set sail on the 27th, and after encountering 
light winds, rounded the Cape of Three Points on the 30th, 
and anchored before Chateau de la Mine, "where resides 
the Dutch general who is in command of all those of his 
nation who frequent the coast. "^ As the French possessed 
no fort there and realized that it would be difficult to estab- 
lish one, they sailed farther to the eastward. Carolof 
learned from the directors of the Danish post that the 
Dutch had long since known of the West India Company's 
plans and were making preparations to prevent their 
realization. Acting under instructions from Holland, 
they "were resolved to spare no pains to keep us from 
trading or at least to render our trade so unprofitable 
that our voyage would prove unfruitful." 

3 On the coast between Cape of Palms and Cape of Three Points. 

^Journal, p. 369. 

5 "It is a place well fortified with a good garrison, where all the 
Dutch ships take water and wood and receive their orders. The 
Dutch pay a water tax to the king of the country who has never per- 
mitted them to dig a cistern in their chateau, employing this means 
to hold them in subjection. Cape Corse is about twelve miles from 
this chateau, where the fort of the English general is located. Five 
miles farther to the east is the chateau of the Danes, which is called 
Fredericksburg. Still farther on are three forts, two of which belong 
to the Dutch and one to the English." Ibid. 

166 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

La Justice anchored at the gold coast in the kingdom 
of Ardres on January 4, 1670. Four Dutch vessels were 
already anchored there and were joined by a fifth a few 
days later. On January 5, Carolof debarked and went to 
Offra, "a burg about five miles from the seashore where 
were situated the trading posts of all foreigners who 
traded with the king of Ardres." He had an interview 
with the fidalque, who was charged with the commercial 
affairs of the kingdom. Carolof at once perceived that 
the Dutch were using shrewd and underhanded means to 
thwart his mission, but succeeded, nevertheless, in obtain- 
ing a promise from the fidalque to demand an audience of 
the king for him. He also sent a messenger to the king on 
his own responsibility. Four days passed without a word 
of reply, which was very surprising, "because Carolof had 
hoped that the news which he had sent the king of his 
arrival, in recalling to his memory the confidence which he 
had honoured him with in former years, and the fact that 
they had drunk ^hocca a hocca' together would produce 
some extraordinary eifect in his favour and shorten the 
delay which newly arrived foreigners are forced ordinarily 
to endure."^ 

On the 9th, a coach all gilded and a set of harness, 
with gilded trimmings and gilded bridles, were brought 
from the ship and set ashore. It was the present of the 
West India Company to the king of Ardres. All was put 
in preparation for the reception by the king, but the 
French were kept waiting until the 16th, when an officer 
came to Oifra with a message from his master to Sieur 
Carolof, The king, said the message, had not forgotten 
his ancient friendship for Sieur Carolof, and as a proof 
of his esteem for him he would not require presents in 
advance, as he had the habit of doing with others ; he 
was favourably disposed to grant to the French the same 

^Journal, p. 388. 

167 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

privileges as he had already granted to those who were 
actually engaged in trade in his kingdom. On the 18th, 
the prince and the grand captain of commerce arrived at 
OiFra to conduct Carolof into the presence of the king. 
The 19th and 20th were passed in exchanging compli- 
ments. On the latter day the prince had a great tent 
pitched on the seashore, whither he came with his invited 
guests, du Bourg, Carolof, the chief agent of the English, 
and a sub-agent of the Dutch, and there a feast was 
spread.^ 

On the 26th, du Bourg was invited to lodge in the royal 
palace in an apartment to be henceforth reserved for the 
French. He was received by the king on the morrow. He 
paid his compliments to the monarch in the name of the 
West India Company and begged him to accept the char- 
iot as a present from it. He then asked permission to 
build a trading post at Offra, promising to send four 
ships yearly to trade. The reply was made that the 
Dutch were in the habit of sending more vessels than 
could be supplied and that during the last year some 
were compelled to sail without cargoes ; that there were at 
present six Dutch vessels at the coast and four more were 
at Chateau de la Mine near by, which awaited word from 
their agents to come and take cargoes ; that thus there 
was no scarcity either of vessels or of merchandise; fur- 
thermore that the Dutch had made very attractive offers 
to establish a close alhance with the king and to have a 
monopoly of trade which the king would perhaps find 
advantageous to accept, inasmuch as the English seemed 
to have neglected his coast last year, and as the French, 
who used to come in former years, did not keep their word 
or fulfill their promises, of which no one could with justice 

^Delbee has recorded his impressions of the feast which may be 
consulted with interest by all those who love the curious. Journal, 
p. 394. 

168 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

accuse the Dutch; but that notwithstanding all of these 
reasons, "the great things which he had heard of the king 
of France and of the love which one of his principal min- 
isters had for commerce . . . made him desire to gain the 
friendship of such a great monarch by treating his sub- 
jects with favour; that accordingly he had given orders 
to his great captain of commerce to construct a post for 
the French at OfFra and to protect them in all things, and 
to favour their commerce." Thereupon were brought 
before the king the chests which contained the most pre- 
cious merchandise which had been brought. The king 
chose "all the pearls and the large red and blue beads, the 
carnavacques, crystals and the fine cottons of India, be- 
cause the Dutch did not bring such merchandise."^ 

Carolof made an agreement that slaves should be deliv- 
ered to the West India Company's agent at the rate of 
eighteen bars of iron each, although the former price had 
been only twelve.^ He then went to Assem, where he traded 
with the prince and some important officials for 260 slaves. 
He returned to OfFra on January 30, and spent the month 
of February trading. By March 1, La Justice had aboard 
a cargo of 434 negroes and was ready to sail for the West 
Indies. When she was on the point of sailing. La Con- 
corde arrived. Carolof was unwilling to sail before pro- 
vision had been made for its cargo. Much to the detri- 
ment of the cargo of slaves aboard La Justice, many days 
were spent in new interviews with the king and the prince. 
Delbee reports a very interesting conversation which he 
pretends to have had with the king during the course of 
these new interviews: 

"The king remarked that he was somewhat surprised that 

^Journal, p. 409. 

9 "He had reason for that which I do not know and as he had been 
given direction of all that which concerned trade, du Bourg permitted 
him to do this without interfering." Ibid. 

169 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

we brought only merchandise similar to that which the Dutch 
for a long time had been in the habit of bringing. To this 
I replied that the Dutch being our neighbours carried on an 
important commerce with France and were in the habit of 
choosing those articles which were the best suited and would 
prove the most agreeable to the king; and that inasmuch as 
we had no knowledge ourselves of what would prove most 
useful to the king, we brought those articles which the Dutch 
were in the habit of bringing; but that if ■ we had known that 
had he desired other things, we would not have failed to 
bring them. Whereupon the king asked me to bring him, on 
my next voyage, a sword of silver a la francaise, a large knife, 
two large mirrors, some fine cloth, lace suitable for making 
two vests, two pairs of slippers, which I promised to do."^*^ 

La Justice set sail on March 13 for the islands and 
arrived at St. Pierre (Martinique) on June 7. De Baas 
wrote to Colbert on June 25, 1670, as follows : 

"I found on arriving here [Martinique] the vessel, named 
La Justice, commanded by Sieur Delbee, with a cargo of 
310 negroes or thereabouts. More than a hundred died dur- 
ing the voyage and certain others after they were landed. I 
gave orders for an equal distribution to be made between 
the three islands, Martinique, Guadeloupe and St. Christo- 
pher. Two-thirds were set aside for the last named islands, 
but as Captain Delbee assured the general clerk [of the com- 
pany] that there would be a cargo of slaves for each island, 
and that his own was meant for Martinique, the whole cargo 
was sold here."^^ 

The vessel had taken two months and three days to 
make the voyage from Havre to the coast of Guinea and 

"^^ Journal, p. 424. 

11 Arch. Nat. Col., Cg, I, de Baas to Colbert, June 25, 1670. Du 
Lion in his letter of July 18 likewise notes the arrival of the vessel. 
As to its cargo, he simply says that the vessel "had a cargo of 
slaves." Du Lion notes in this same letter, however, the arrival of 
another vessel belonging to M. de Formont "with a considerably less 
cargo of negroes." Ibid., C7, I. 

170 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

from there to Martinique, two months and twenty-three 
days. After having spent a little more than three months 
in trade at St. Pierre, La Justice set sail for France on 
July 21 with a cargo of sugar and tobacco. Cape Lizard 
was sighted on September 16, and on the 20th the vessel 
anchored at Havre. The voyage from the islands was 
made in two months, less a day. The whole voyage, there- 
fore, had taken ten months and twenty days.^^ 

La Concorde, which we left at the coast of Ardres, 
traded successfully and sailed for the islands with a cargo 
of 5Q^ slaves. It arrived at Martinique on September 
22, 1670, with 44S, having lost 120 en route.^^ Aboard 
her was Matheo Lopez, sent by the king of Ardres as his 
ambassador to the French king. He was received with 
great pomp at Martinique by de Baas and Pelissier. He 
was sent to France aboard La Bergere, one of the com- 
pany's vessels, which sailed from Martinique about Octo- 
ber 1. The arrival of this ambassador with three of his 
wives, three children and several slaves created a sensa- 
tion at Versailles."^* 

This initial expedition of the company to the coast of 
Africa seemed auspicious, for it had yielded good profit. 
Colbert seems to have had a large vision of what might 
be accomplished. Thus we find him instructing Pelissier 
to "consider carefully what advantage there will be for 
the company if, after having furnished some 2000 negroes 
to meet the demand in the islands, it can obtain 2000 more 
to sell to the Spaniards of Terre Ferme, for these Span- 
iards never refuse to buy slaves and pay very dear for 
them to the Dutch of Cura9ao."^^ Encouragements were 
offered to continue the trade. An arret of the conseil 
d'etat removed all duties from merchandise exported from 

^^ Journal, p. 473. 

13 Ibid., p. 474. 

i^jLe Commerce de I'AmSrique par Marseille, II, 159. 

15 Clement, III, 2, p. 485, June 21, 1670. 

171 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

the kingdom to the coast of Guinea,^^ and a bounty was 
oifered of thirteen livres per head for all slaves imported 
into the islands .^'^ 

The company seems to have continued to send vessels to 
Guinea. Carolof arrived at Guadeloupe near the begin- 
ning of 1672 with a cargo of 350 slaves. One of the com- 
pany's vessels, the St. Francois (captain, Mallet) of 
Dieppe, brought a cargo of over 200 slaves to the same 
island at the close of the year. At the same time. La Jus- 
tice was being expected with another cargo from the coast 
of Guinea.^^ The energetic measures which Colbert took 
to keep the Dutch out of the islands, especially during the 
years 1670-71, by maintaining patrol about the Wind- 
ward Islands, probably gave the West India Company 
and private French traders licensed by it a monopoly 
of this trade. Pelissier tried to take advantage of this 
fact by putting the price of slaves at 4000 pounds of 
sugar, which was 100 per cent dearer than the price for- 
merly demanded by the Dutch."^^ 

16 To prevent frauds captains of vessels vi^ere forced to deposit at 
their return a certificate of discharge of cargo signed by the agents 
of the company at the coast. Arch. Nat., AD,vii, 3; Le Commerce de 
VAmerique par Marseille, II, 303, arrSt of September 18, 1671. 

i^Moreau de Saint-Mery, I, 259-360, January 13, 1672; ten livres 
of this sum were to be paid by His Majesty to merchants who sent 
the ships with cargoes of slaves and three livres by the West India 
Company to the captains of ships. 

18 Arch. Nat. Col., C7, II, du Lion to Colbert, December 5, 1672. 

19 Colbert attempted to encourage the individual French trader to 
share the slave trade wdth the company. Thus an arrH of August 26, 
1670, removed the tax of 5 per cent laid by the company on them for 
the privilege of trading at the coast of Guinea. Moreau de Saint- 
Mery, I, 197. They were also admitted to the benefits of the arrH 
which granted exemption from duties on cargoes exported to Guinea 
and of that vi^hich granted a bounty of thirteen livres per head of 
slaves imported into the islands. No large results, however, were 
obtained from this policy. Very few individuals seemed to have been 
attracted to the trade. Colbert himself expressed his disappoint- 
ment. Arch. Nat. Col., B, 3, fol. 137, Colbert to the directors. 

172 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

But no important results seem to have been realized from 
the efforts of the company. It was approaching too near 
to its debacle to be able to accomplish the task set for it. 
Du Lion wrote in 1672 that the company was no longer 
making efforts to satisfy the needs of the islands, for the 
vessels it sent brought only cargoes "of planks, coal and 
barrels in order to carry away the sugar received in pay- 
ment of debts which the company was demanding with 
utmost vigour.^" 

It is to be recalled that Colbert commanded the com- 
pany to direct its attention also to the importation of 
salt beef and live stock. He was not satisfied with the 
fact that the large amount of salt beef consumed in the 
French islands came almost entirely from Ireland and was 
often imported by foreign traders. He was particularly 
anxious that France be made to produce the supply neces- 
sary and most of all that it be carried to the islands by 
French traders. This was why he wished the West India 
Company to devote special attention to the matter. 

His correspondence with Brunet, one of the directors of 
the company, is very instructive in showing the persistence 
with which Colbert attempted to realize his wishes. On 
October 27, 1670, he wrote: 

"I note by your letter the application which you are giving 
at present to carry out the principal points of the instruc- 
tions which I gave you^ and especially in regard to the pur- 
chase of French beef to send to the islands in place of that 
of Ireland. As you know how very much I cherish the suc- 
cess of the plan, you will understand how happy I am to 
learn of the hopes which you have of success. . . . Bend 
your energy in that direction and be very sure that you can 
do nothing which could prove more agreeable to me."^^ 

20 Arch. Nat. Col., C7, II, du Lion to Colbert, July 22, 1672. 
2iDepping, Correspondance, III, 533. 

173 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

On November 13, he wrote: 

"In regard to the matter of beef^ do not let yourself be 
discouraged by difficulties which you encounter at first and 
continue without exception to buy French beef. In order 
to let you know how very much I have the matter at heart, 
I shall tell you that I have informed the directors who are 
at Paris that if the company will ship during the year 4000 
barrels of French beef to the islands, I shall have the king 
pay to it 4000 ecus.^^ During your sojourn at La Rochelle 
take measures which will be necessary for the shipment of the 
said amount to the islands during the year 1671. Take care, 
however, that this be done in good faith, and that only beef of 
France be furnished. . . . Let me know every two weeks how 
much beef you have bought and the number of barrels which 
you have in condition to send to the islands. "^^ 

To the objection that French beef was too dear, Col- 
bert wrote Brunet that is was necessary to convince 
traders that it was of superior quality. When Brunet 
found that merchants resorted to smuggling, Colbert 
wrote : 

"Continue always to buy French beef. ... In order to 
force merchants who trade in the islands to buy French beef, 
you can forbid them to use He de Re as an entrepot for the 
purchase of Irish beef. In case that you have need of an arret 
of the conseil d'etat to aid you in the matter, let me know and 
I shall send it to you promptly."^* 

Such an arret was published on August 17, 1671, which 
formally annulled the right of entrepot for "beef and other 

22 Bonnassieux, Les Grandes Comp. de Commerce, p. 374, states 
that the sum of 3012 livres was accorded to the West India Company 
as a bounty on salt beef which it had shipped to the islands. 

23Depping, Correspondance, III, 523; see also other letters in 
regard to the same subjects, pp. 534, 525, 526. 

24 Ibid., p. 527, February 26, 1671. 

174 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

meats from Ireland. "^^ This was followed by a royal ordi- 
nance which forbade the importation into the islands of 
all beef and bacon from foreign countries under penalty 
of confiscation and 500 livres fine for the first offense, and 
of bodily punishment in case of repetition. 

Brunet seems to have made some purchases of beef for 
the company in upper Guyenne.^^ Colbert encouraged 
him to continue: "I see already from news which reaches 
me from the provinces around La Rochelle that the fact 
that you are buying cattle has aroused interest. I am 
counting on you to arrange matters in such a way that in 
the future it will not be necessary to buy Irish beef."^^ 

In spite, however, of Colbert's determination "to suc- 
ceed in the project at any cost," he was doomed to dis- 
appointment. De Baas wrote to him in February, 1672, 
that French ships were bringing no beef and that, as a 
consequence, sufi'ering was great.^ The West India Com- 
pany thus met with even less success in supplying the 
islands with salt beef than in furnishing them with slaves. 

It met apparently with another failure in trying to 
supply live stock. Brunet received instructions to pur- 
chase live stock during his sojourn at La Rochelle and to 
ship it to the West Indies. He seems to have made some 
shipments, for we find Pelissier arousing protests, because 
he demanded the exorbitant price "of 9000 to 10,000 
pounds of sugar for horses of Poitou," which the West 
India Company was shipping to the islands. No evidence 
has been found, however, which shows that these shipments 
were of any considerable importance. 

It was the failure to perform these tasks, together with 
the fact of an increasing number of private French trad- 

25Moreau de Saint-Mery, I, 330. 

26 Depping, Correspondance, III, 528. 

27 E. Jourdan, Ephemerides de la Rochelle, II, 32, 33. 

28 Arch. Nat. Col., Cg, I, de Baas to Colbert, February 28, 1672. 

175 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

ers, that brought Colbert to the resolution to abolish the 
West India Company. On October 11 he wrote to the 
directors : 

"Inasmuch as the commerce of the West India Company 
is diminishing every day by reason of the number of vessels 
which private traders are sending to the islands and to the 
coast of Guinea, and consequently as some of the company's 
vessels may remain idle_, the directors may charter such vessels 
to the Company of the North, which will pay them five livres 
per ton more than they pay to foreign vessels. "^^ 

On December 20, Colbert informed the directors that it 
would not be necessary to maintain any longer the special 
boards of directors at La Rochelle and at Rouen, but only 
correspondents, such as the company maintained at Bor- 
deaux, Nantes and other ports.^** 

Although the revocation of its charter did not occur 
until December, 1674, for all practical purposes, as 
Chemin-Dupontes remarks, the West India Company 
ceased to exist after 1672.^^ On April 9, of that year, 
Menjot, conseiller, and Guillaume Mesnager, a stockholder 
and former director, were instructed to prepare the liqui- 
dation of the company's effects,^^ and on January 21, a 
commission was named to make a thorough examination 
of the company's books and further prepare its liquida- 
tion. This commission was composed of Mess. Hotman, 
le Vayer, Menjot, de Senteuil, de Manse, de Formont and 
Denison.^^ 

29 Arch. Nat. Col., B, 3, fol. 135. 

30 Ibid., fol. 137, December 20, 1671. 

31 Chemin-Dupontes, op. cit., p. 82. 

32 Arch. Col., F2, 17, arret du cons, d'etat qui commet les srs. 
Menjot et Mesnager interesses en la Cie. des Ind. Oc. pour pourvoir 
a I'utilite employ, des effets de ladite Cie. April 9, 1672. 

33 Ibid., Extrait des Reg. du conseil d'etat, January 31, 1673. 

176 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

On February 21, 1674, a report was made on the state 
of affairs of the company, of which the following is a 
summary : 

Credit. 



In good debts 

In bad debts . 

Vessels 

Effects in the islands 

Effects at Cayenne . 

Effects at Tortuga^ St. Domingo 

Furnishings and other effects in stores 
at Paris . . . . . 

Value of taxes levied at the entry of 
the port of Rouen on sugar^ wax^ 
etc. ..... 

Estimated value of land^ seigneurial 
rights and taxes levied in the 
countries of its concession . 

Total 



liv. 


s. 


d 


155,464 


6 


8 


26,475 


1 


8 


3,000 








695,717 


15 


1 


96,309 


12 


9 


16,407 


4 


3 


2,423 





1 



800,000 



1,473,000 



3,268,797 16 5 



(Estimated value of the above, according to the opinion of 
Mess. Bellinzani and Dalier, 3,074,000 livres.) 



Debit. 

Sums owed to various persons . 
To Fran9ois Le Gendre or to notes 
held by him .... 
To His Majesty .... 

Total 

Indebtedness of the company . 



514,730 8 

700,000 
5,382,628 8 6 



6,597,350 
3,328,553 



16 




34 Arch. Col., F2, 15, Proces verbal sur les aflPaires de la Cie. des 
Ind. Oc. — Etat ofl&ciel des comptes de lad. Cie. fait suivant les ordres 
de Sa. Majeste; also Arch. Nat., G7, 1316. 



177 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

From its origin the company had received from: 

Voluntary subscribers . . . 1^297,000 livres. 
Sums yielded from taxes of Chambre 

de Justice .... 2,000,000 livres. 

Total paid by the king . . . 3,337,000 livres. 

Sums paid by revenue farmers . . 700,000 livres. 



Total 7,374,000 livres.^^ 

In addition the revenue farm at Rouen had yielded for 
the years 1665-72 a total profit of 372,478 liv. 8s. 5d. 
That is to say, the West India Company had made use all 
told of a capital of nearly 8,000,000 livres.^^ 

The liquidation of the company went forward rapidly. 
Its effects yielded the sum of 1,047,195 livres which served 
for a partial reimbursement of voluntary subscriptions. 
The king supplied 250,000 livres necessary to make this 
reimbursement complete and assumed responsibility for 
all the debts of the company.^^ The right to collect, taxes 
and duties in the islands was farmed out. This revenue- 
farm became known henceforth as Domaine d' Occident. 
Of the 350,000 livres, the annual rent paid by the farmer, 
250,000 livres were set aside for the payment of the com- 
pany's debts. In the following year the company's pos- 
sessions in Senegal were sold to the first Company of Sene- 
gal. All of its other possessions were reunited to the 
royal domain and opened freely to all Frenchmen. 

35 Arch. Col., F2, 15, Mem. sur les avantages procurez par la Cie. 
des Ind. Oc. 

36 Chemin-Dupontes, op. cit., 68, somewhat exaggerates matters 
when he asserts that the company had absorbed a capital of 10,000,- 
000 livres. 

37 Arch. Nat., G7, 1312, Memoire touchant la Cie. des Ind. Oc. par 
MM. Mesnager and Dalier — "les HoUandais ayant fait offre de 34,- 
000,000 livres pour ce que de Roy a eu par le moyen de ladite com- 
pagnie quoyque le tout n'en couste pas 6,000,000 a Sa. Majeste." 

178 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

The edict of revocation was issued in the month of 
December, 1674,^^ and thus came to an end the famous 
West India Company. It had been founded by Colbert in 
1664, apparently with high hopes, certainly with gigantic 
plans for it to realize, and here it was ten years later in a 
state of hopeless bankruptcy. 

It is precisely this fact about the company which has 
received most attention, and which is the reason why it 
is considered one of the failures of Colbert's ministry. It 
is perfectly true that the company did not realize the 
hopes which both its mission and its opportunities justly 
raised. Its funds were not always wisely expended, for 
they were sometimes foohshly wasted, as we have seen. 
It was often the victim of the dishonesty and ignorance of 
its agents and clerks. It failed to satisfy more than half 
the needs of the islands. It sometimes abused its monopoly 
by imposing unreasonable prices and impossible conditions 
upon the planters. It was constantly in debt and was 
forced to appeal frequently to the royal treasury for sup- 
port. Many of these points of failure can be explained 
by adverse conditions, some of which, as we have had 
occasion to see, were quite beyond the power of the com- 
pany to control. There is one phase of its history, how- 
ever, which presents the West India Company in a totally 
different light and which must not escape attention. It 
is presented in the preamble of the edict of revocation: 

"The situation of our kingdom between the Mediterranean 
on one side and the Atlantic on the other facilitates the lad- 
ing and discharging of merchandise and has made possible 
many commercial enterprises. Success has not always crowned 
such enterprises^, because most of the armaments have been 
made by individuals and have not been supported by sufficient 
force to insure their success. . . . We were prompted by the 
affection which we had for our subjects to undertake to estab- 

38 Arch. Col., F2, 17; Moreau de Saint-Mery, I, 383-289. 

179 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

lish trade with the islands and mainland of America, which 
foreigners had usurped for sixty years, in order to preserve 
for our people the advantages which their courage and their 
industry had given them the right to enjoy from the discovery 
of a great expanse of land in this part of the world. For 
this end we formed the West India Company. . . . Our plan, 
both useful and glorious, has attained the success which we 
could expect, and this company has happily taken possession 
of the lands of its concession, . . . which are inhabited at 
present by more than 45,000 persons, . . . which furnish 
trade to more than 100 French ships of 50 to 300 tons, giving 
employment to a great number of pilots, sailors, gunners, 
carpenters and other artisans, and which furnishes a market 
for many articles produced in this realm." 

One might be inclined to dismiss this language as offi- 
cial jargon, common to nearly all public documents of the 
period, but it may be asked if this bit of official jargon 
does not contain many grains of truth. There is a great 
difference between 1664 and 1674 in the number of French 
vessels going to the West Indies. We have seen that in the 
former year there were practically none, whereas in the 
latter year there were 131 of private traders alone. The 
difference is notable. It means that during the ten years 
a comparatively large commerce had been built up. We 
can not, of course, credit the West India Company with 
a very large per cent of the vessels sent to the islands 
during the last five years of its existence. After October, 
1666, private traders became more and more important. 
But how is one to explain the somewhat rapid rise of the 
private trader.? Was it not from the fact that the organi- 
zation of the West India Company made possible a con- 
centrated attack upon Dutch traders ? Its capital and its 
resources, together with its centralized administration, 
made possible a kind of tour de force both in closing the 
doors to foreigners and in re-opening the way for French 
merchants and French merchandise. The comparatively 

180 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

large number of vessels which it collected during the years 
1665 and 1666, created in a sense the nucleus of a mer- 
chant marine with which to carry on this trade. The 
monopoly of the company existed in reality only for two 
years, and after that time private traders could and did 
profit from the work of preparation which the company 
had done. 

Thus the West India Company was the means of transi- 
tion from the period of Dutch commercial supremacy to 
that of the growth and development of French commerce. 
It was constantly stated by Colbert and by the directors 
themselves that the mission of the company was to substi- 
tute French trade for Dutch trade. As early as 1667 the 
directors affirmed in a memoir to Colbert that the moment 
private French traders grew strong and numerous enough 
to carry on the entire trade of the islands, the company 
would willingly cede the whole field to them. This moment 
had come in 1672 and the company's fall should not be 
regarded as a failure or as a check in Colbert's commer- 
cial policy, but rather as an indication that enough pro- 
gress had been made to render the employment of such a 
company no longer necessary. In short, the West India 
Company rendered a definite service and its fall marks a 
post of progress in the history of Colbert's policy. 



181 



CHAPTER VIII 

The Exclusion of Foreign Traders 

TT has already been remarked that de Tracy, at his 
^ departure from France in February, 1664, was 
charged with the enforcement of an arret which forbade 
the Dutch to trade in the islands during the period of six 
months. Although the fact that a pest was raging at 
Amsterdam was given as the reason for this action, there 
can be but httle doubt that this was only a pretext and that 
the measure indicates that Colbert had already reached 
the decision to exclude Dutch traders and that he thereby 
laid the first stone in the construction of the solid wall 
which he intended to build around the French islands. We 
have just seen that one of the chief tasks imposed upon the 
West India Company at its creation was to maintain its 
monopoly of trade to the exclusion of all foreigners. The 
outbreak of the war with the English, however, forced the 
company to expend so much of its energy in the defense 
of the islands and in carrying on war against the enemy, 
that it was forced to forego its monopoly by admitting 
both private French traders and the Dutch to the com- 
merce of the islands. The necessity for this is proved by 
the fact that the directors of the company in France and 
the administrators in the islands, acting independently of 
one another, took the step almost simultaneously. 

But in spite of the fact that the admission of foreign 
traders during the war was made necessary by the inability 
of the West India Company to supply the islands with 
food, the practice of admitting them did not cease at the 
close of the war in July, 1667. For over a year after that 
date the Dutch continued their efforts to draw the com- 
merce of the French islands back into their control and 

182 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

they were so successful that Colbert was forced to begin 
a long and difficult campaign to drive them from the 
French possessions. An arret of the conseil d'etat of 
September 10, 1668/ formally forbade the West India 
Company "to grant permission to foreigners to trade 
within its concession, under penalty of being deprived of 
the privileges which the king had granted it." The 
reasons for taking this action were very clearly set forth 
in the preamble : 

"Whereas the king has been informed that contrary to the 
intentions which he had in organizing and establishing the 
West India Company^ the chief of which was to draw into the 
kingdom all the commerce of the French islands of America, 
then in the hands of foreigners, the said company during the 
late war with England has granted permission to a number of 
foreigners to trade in these islands in consideration of a cer- 
tain tax levied on their cargoes ; and that since the war the 
said company has continued the same practice; that the said 
foreigners, incited by the desire to regain entire possession of 
this trade, have not remained satisfied with sending vessels 
for which they had obtained permission from the said com- 
pany, but have sent vessels without any such authorization; 
furthermore, that the governors of the said islands, in spite 
of orders which have been given them to permit no vessels to 
trade without the company's permission, have received all ves- 
sels indiscriminately and have permitted them to barter their 
cargoes freely; that foreigners take away all the sugar and 
tobacco and other products of the said islands to the detri- 
ment of the sums due by the planters to the West India 
Company, so that its directors have been forced to appeal to 
His Majesty; His Majesty, therefore, taking into considera- 
tion how important it is for the welfare of the state and for 
the commerce of the realm that the trade of the islands of 
America, which gives employment to a large number of ves- 
sels and furnishes a market for a large quantity of articles 

lArch. Nat. AD,xi, 48; Arch. Nat. Col., A, 24, fol. 93; Moreau de 
Saint-Mery, I, 174. 

183 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

produced in the provinces^ remain in the entire possession of 
the French and that foreign traders be excluded in accordance 
with the practice which other nations follow in regard to 
their colonies^ and His Majesty having for this very purpose 
placed such large funds at the disposal of the company and 
lately accorded extraordinary sums in order to repair the great 
losses which it sustained during the late war with England, 
and being resolved to grant to the said company additional 
sums to enable it to regain the greater part of its com- 
merce . . . wills that the commerce of the islands of Amer- 
ica and of the other lands granted to the West India Company 
be carried on by the said company alone and by French trad- 
ers authorized by it." 

This is a most clear statement of the motives which Col- 
bert had had in establishing the West India Company and 
it gives expression to his large unchanging purpose to 
permit no compromises with foreign traders and to march 
with determination straight to the commercial conquest of 
the French West Indies. 

Colbert was still willing, however, to leave in the hands 
of the company the power of granting passports. He was 
satisfied for the present with a formal prohibition to the 
company to issue passports in favour of foreigners. In 
spite of this, the company continued to allow the Dutch 
some liberty of trade, for the directors instructed de Baas, 
at his departure from France in the fall of 1668 to become 
governor-general of the French West Indies, to admit 
foreign vessels which brought cargoes of slaves and live 
stock.^ In addition the report reached Colbert's ears that 
the Dutch were obtaining passports in the name of French- 
men and were continuing to trade in the islands. He 
thereupon established, on June 12, 1669, the following 
regulations: (1) that all passports bearing permission 
to trade in the islands should be granted by His Majesty 

2 Arch. Nat. Col., Cg, I, de Baas to Colbert, December 26, 1669. 

184 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

on certificates of recommendation issued by the West India 
Company; (2) that the said passports be granted only to 
Frenchmen; (3) that the passports should be valid only 
for eight months; (4) that all to whom passports were 
granted should give bond, either to the directors of the 
West India Company or to the officers of the Admiralty, 
that they should take their cargoes to the port specified in 
the passport and make their returns either to the port 
from which they had sailed or to some other port of the 
realm; and (5) that certificates of discharge and of lad- 
ing of cargoes, properly signed by Admiralty officers, 
should be deposited at the Admiralty bureau where the 
passport was issued, otherwise obligations imposed by the 
bond should still be considered binding.^ On December 
30, 1670, the arret of June 12, 1669, was restated with 
the following additions : ( 1 ) it was prohibited to trade in 
the islands without passports; (2) all captains of vessels 
on arriving in the islands should present to the Admiralty 
officers their passports and bills-of-lading, properly signed 
by the Admiralty officers of the port from which they had 
set sail; and (3) failure to comply with these regulations 
subjected one to the penalty of confiscation of vessel and 
cargo and of 1500 livres fine for the first off^ense, and to 
corporal punishment in the case of repetition.* 

Colbert did not content himself with controlling the 
issue of passports and with making regulations. On Sep- 
tember 12, he addressed a circular letter to the governors 
of Martinique, Guadeloupe, St. Domingo, St. Christopher, 
Grenada and Cayenne on the subject of foreign commerce: 

"Having resolved that all the commerce of the islands of 
America under my obedience shall be carried on by the French 

3 Moreau de Saint-Mery, I, 178-1T9. The last clause of the regu- 
lation seems not to have been promptly complied with, for an arrH 
of July 1, 1670, commanded obedience to this regulation. Arch. Aff. 
Etrang., Mem. et Doc, France, 3007, fol. 137 verso. 

4 Arch. Nat. Col., B, 3, fol. 117; Moreau de Saint-Mery, I, 206-307. 

185 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

West India Company, and by my other subjects with permis- 
sion of the directors of the said company, who have been com- 
manded by me to grant no permission to foreigners, ... I 
forbid you very expressly to admit into the island under your 
command or into the ports which depend upon it any foreign 
vessels to trade there."^ 

Special instructions were sent to de Baas on June 13, 
1669: 

"Of all things which you have been commanded to do, there 
is absolutely nothing to which I desire that you devote your 
attention so much as to drive out foreign vessels from the 
islands and in every way possible to prevent them from trad- 
ing there, without suffering a single exception under whatever 
pretext that may arise. I desire that you enforce this order 
with all the precision and with all the severity which are 
merited by an affair of such importance to the well-being of 
my subjects."^ 

Colbert wrote to de Baas again on July 31 : "In regard 
to commerce, His Majesty wills that above everything 
else you devote all of your attention and employ all of your 
industry and every means at your command to exclude 
foreigners from trade in the islands, either by punishing 
inhabitants who aid them or by destroying all their ships 
and barks which frequent our islands. Keep special watch 
on the Dutch established at St. Eustatius, who will miss no 
opportunity to employ every means to sell their merchan- 
dise in the French islands and to carry away the products 
thereof."'^ These instructions were repeated with the same 

5 Arch. Nat. Mar., B2, 7, fol. 128; ibid., Col., F3, 67. 

6 Arch. Nat. Col., B, 1, fol. 153, the king to de Baas, June 13, 1669. 
On the same day instructions were addressed to Comte d'Estrees, 
who was in command of a squadron of vessels on a cruise in Ameri- 
can waters, to remain in the islands six months longer and "to prevent 
in every way possible foreign vessels from trading in the islands 
under any pretext or for any cause whatever." Ibid., fol. 154. 

7 Ibid., fol. 159. 

186 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

emphasis in letters to de Baas on August 8, September 15, 
and October 4.^ 

In order to give greater publicity to the orders which 
had been issued to exclude the foreign trader from the 
islands, a royal ordinance was issued on June 10, 1670, 
which was as follows : 

"His Majesty^ having already ordered Sieur de Baas, 
lieutenant-general in his armies^ in command of the islands of 
America inhabited by his subjects, as well as the particular 
governors of the several islands, not to suffer any foreign 
vessel to anchor or to traffic there, and having sent a squadron 
of three ships of war to seize and capture all foreign vessels 
found in the ports and roads of the said islands, or in their 
neighbourhood, and being informed that the said prohibitions 
have not been executed as rigidly as the welfare of the state 
and the interests of his subjects demand and that even ves- 
sels after confiscation have been repurchased by proprietors 
for trifling sums; in order to put an end to these abuses. His 
Majesty expressly forbids any foreign ship or vessel to enter 
the ports, or anchor in the roads of the said islands, or sail 
near their shores, on pain of confiscation, and at the same time 
he expressly forbids his subjects who are inhabitants of the 
said islands, or who go to trade there, to receive any foreign 
merchandise or any foreign vessel, or to have any relations 
with them, on pain of confiscation of said merchandise, 500 
livres fine for the first offense and corporal punishment in 
case of repetition. His Majesty wills that the proceeds from 
the confiscation of ships and merchandise taken at sea shall 
be divided, one-tenth to the commander of His Majesty's 
squadron, another tenth to the captain of the ship that has 
made the prize, a third tenth to the lieutenant-general in com- 
mand of the islands, and the rest, half for the crew of the 
vessel, and half to the West India Company, to be employed 
by it for the establishment and maintenance of hospitals in 
the said islands ; and that of the proceeds from prizes made on 
land, one-third shall go to the informer, another third shall 

8 Ibid., fols. 164 and 170; ibid., March 27, October 4, 1669. 

187 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

be equally divided between the lieutenant-general and the 
particular governor of the island^ and a third shall be given 
to the aforesaid company for the establishment and mainte- 
nance of hospitals. His Majesty hereby commands and orders 
Sieur de Baas, lieutenant-general in his armies and in com- 
mand of the said islands, the several governors, the officers of 
the conseils souverains and all of his officers and subjects 
whom these presents concern, to obey and to enforce the pres- 
ent ordinance."^ 

A copy of this ordinance was sent with special letters to 
the various governors and officers in the islands .^° Other 
letters and instructions, sent by Colbert and the king dur- 
ing the year 1670, show the immense importance which was 
attached to its enforcement. Out of nineteen letters writ- 
ten to de Baas in that year, no less than twelve were 
devoted largely to the exposition of the two principles of 
freedom of trade to all Frenchmen and of rigid exclusion 
of all foreign ers.^^ 

Both the ordinance and the instructions were so clear 
that they should have left no doubt in the minds of gov- 
ernors as to the intentions of the minister. The habit, 
however, of relying upon the Dutch for a supply of cer- 
tain articles, such as slaves and live stock, was of such long 
standing that de Baas seems not to have understood at 
first that the Dutch should be prevented from bringing 
these articles. His confusion was quite natural, for, in 
the first place, although on leaving France to begin his 
administration in the islands he was ordered to maintain 
the principles of exclusion of foreigners, he was specifically 
instructed by the directors of the West India Company 

9 Arch. Nat. Col., B, 2, fols. 85-86; Arch. Nat., AD,vii, 2A; Moreau 
de Saint-Mery, I, 195-196; Dessalles, I, 516 (Note 2). See also Cal. 
St. Pap. Col, Am. ^ W. Ind., 1669-1674, No. 104, for a translation, 
which has served as a base of the present translation. 

10 Arch. Nat. Col., B, 2, fols. 86, 86 verso, 95, 95 verso, 98, 100, etc. 

11 Arch. Nat. Col., B, 2, fols. 88-89, 94, 114 and 115-119. 

188 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

to admit Dutch ships which brought cargoes of negroes 
and Hve stock; and, in the second place, he failed to see 
that any special provisions were being made by French- 
men to supply these two articles of such prime importance 
in the cultivation of the islands. He could not understand 
that such vital interests could be sacrificed for the main- 
tenance of the principle of exclusion of foreigners : 

"In regard to commerce with foreigners, Monseigneur, I 
must say to you that inasmuch as the efficiency of the planters 
depends upon the number of slaves and of horses which they 
have^ the directors of the West India Company instructed me, 
when I sailed from France, to receive foreign vessels which 
brought these two articles. I have acted in accordance with 
these instructions up to the present. But since receiving the 
orders of His Majesty, I have forbidden all foreigners to 
trade and shall continue to do so until I receive instructions 
from you as to the king's will in the matter. It may be well, 
nevertheless, to inform you that the planters will suffer very 
much from the maintenance of such a policy, for the Dutch 
have been accustomed to bring every year horses from Cura- 
9ao and Ireland — a thing which French merchants will not 
do — and if the planters cannot replace the negroes and horses 
which die, they will suffer seriously."^^ 

Colbert's reply to this letter left no doubt as to the 
policy which he meant to pursue: "The West India Com- 
pany has taken such excellent measures to furnish the 
number of slaves and horses necessary for clearing and 
cultivating lands in the islands that any brought by for- 
eign vessels would prove superfluous. I desire, therefore, 
that you receive no foreign vessel under any pretext what- 
soever."^^ A formal order was addressed to Pelissier to 
forbid the clerks of the West India Company to continue 

12 Arch. Nat. Col., Cg, I, de Baas to Colbert, December 26, 1669. 

13 Arch. Nat. Col., B, 2, fol. 19 verso, the king to de Baas, March 
25, 1670. 

189 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

the practice of receiving slaves and horses brought by 
Dutch ships. A similar order was addressed to the general 
directors of the West India Company.^* It was at this 
time that Colbert commanded the company to limit its 
commerce to the importation of live stock and slaves. We 
have dealt elsewhere with the measures which it took in 
obedience to his orders. In addition, Colbert attempted 
to make a partial provision for the supply of live stock 
by requiring every vessel going to the islands, to take two 
mares, or two cows, or two she-asses.^^ Although the 
results of these measures were not encouraging, a strict 
exclusion of all foreign vessels was constantly urged. Thus 
a letter was written to de Baas on October 12, 1670 : 

"I shall say to you, in short, that nothing which you can 
do in the discharge of the duties which I have imposed upon 
you could prove more agreeable to me than a rigourous en- 
forcement of my orders to exclude foreigners from the trade 
of the islands. You are not to admit them under pretext that 
there is need of slaves, or of live stocky or of furnishings of 
sugar-mills, or of any other sort of merchandise, however 
pressing such a need may be. I repeat that you are not to 
admit any foreign vessel or permit any commerce with for- 
eigners. I shall take pains to insure a supply of things neces- 
sary for the islands and especially of slaves and live stock."^^ 

Again, de Baas did not seem to be sure that French 
ships should be prevented from trading with foreign 
islands : 

"M. de Gabaret has sent here [Martinique] the bark of a 
French merchant, named Dartiagne, which he ordered seized 
when he arrived at Guadeloupe. The merchant, who hails 
from St. Jean de Luz^ confessed that the merchandise which 

14 Ibid., fols. 31, 23. 

15 Arch. Nat. Col., B, 2, fol. 145, December 20, 1670. 

16 Arch. Nat. Col., B, 2, fol. Ill, the king to de Baas, October 12, 
1670. 

190 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

he had on board had been bought from the English at Nevis. 
That's why I condemned him to a fine of 4000 pounds of 
sugar. . . . To tell the truth^ I imposed this fine against my 
own feelings^ for I do not know whether or not the king intends 
that a French merchant who goes to trade in New England and 
comes back to barter his goods in Barbadoes and in Martinique, 
for instance, be punished. The arret of the conseil d'etat pro- 
hibits foreigners to trade in the islands. I understand never- 
theless that if a French merchant enjoyed the liberty of going 
to the English islands, he could, with permission of their 
governor, transport our sugar to St. Eustatius and load it on 
Dutch ships. As I thought that Dartiagne had done this, I 
imposed a fine upon him. Otherwise I should have had 
scruples in punishing him at all."^^ 

Colbert's response could not have left any doubt as to 
his intentions. He commanded de Baas to prohibit with 
the utmost rigour "absolutely all foreign commerce in the 
islands, whether carried on by foreigners themselves or by 
French subjects. That is to say, that every foreigner 
importing merchandise into the islands from whatever 
source it may be, unless he has a passport from the king, 

17 Arch. Nat. Col., Cg, I, de Baas to Colbert, March 22, 1670. Du 
Lion, governor of Guadeloupe, in a letter to Colbert on March 29, 
mentions the capture of this vessel. He says that Dartiagne had 
permission from St. Laurent to pass from St. Christopher to Mar- 
tinique and that en route he was becalmed oflF Guadeloupe where he 
was captured by de Gabaret. Du Lion adds that Dartiagne had 
traded with an English vessel which he had met on his way probably 
by appointment. Ibid., C7, I, du Lion to Colbert. In another letter 
de Baas shows that he did not understand at first the earnestness 
and thoroughness with which Colbert intended to make his fight 
against the foreign trader. "Two inhabitants of this island who 
own a bark have applied for permission to trade at Barbadoes two 
or three times a year in order to buy provisions of which the plant- 
ers are in such need at present and thus to bring some welcomed 
relief. I refused to grant the permission and shall continue to do 
so unless you should see fit to make an exception of an affair of 
such small consequence, as it assuredly is." Ibid,, Cg, I, de Baas to 
Colbert, January 16, 1670. 

191 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

should suffer the penalty of confiscation, and that every 
Frenchman, importing merchandise from foreign countries 
and even from the nearest foreign islands, should likewise 
suffer the same penalty, and besides that, all foreign ves- 
sels, and particularly those belonging to the Dutch, which 
are found sailing near the coasts of the French islands are 
to be seized."^^ 

Colbert made only two small exceptions in his rigid 
system of excluding foreigners. One was in regard to 
trade between the English and French inhabitants of St. 
Christopher, and the other, in regard to trade with the 
Spanish Main. As to the former, he defined his position 
very clearly in a letter to de Blenac, governor-general of 
islands, under date of June 2, 1680: 

"I note what you write me of the difficulties encounter e.d at 
St. Christopher to prevent commerce between the English and 
French. In regard to the commerce of that island, you should 
distinguish between trade by sea, carried on between the two 
nations, which should be prohibited just as it is in the other 
islands, and trade by land, which cannot and should not be 
prevented in this island. "^^ 

As to commerce with the Spanish Main, Colbert, true to 
the ideas of his age and to his own, naturally welcomed any 
trade which brought returns in gold and silver. He seems 
to have thought at one time of establishing an entrepot 
at Grenada for contraband trade with the Spaniards, 
and at another, he instructed Pelissier to consider the 
advisability of having the West India Company send 2000 
slaves to the Spanish Main, "for these Spaniards never 
refuse to buy slaves and always pay the Dutch of Cura9ao 

18 Arch. Nat, Col., ,B, 2, fols. 87-89, Colbert to de Baas, June 33, 
1670. 

19 Arch. Nat. Col., B, 10, fol. 2, letter to de Blenac, June 2, 1680; 
also fol. 18, letter to Patoulet; also B, 9, fol. 34, letter to Blenac, 
April 19, 1679. 

192 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

very dear for them."^'' When, however, Colbert saw that 
no commerce sprang up with the Spanish Main, he forbade 
the islands to trade with the Spaniards : 

"The exclusion of all commerce with foreigners should be 
maintained in all the islands. Trade even with Spaniards is 
to be prohibited^ for His Majesty is of the opinion that no 
Spanish vessels are likely to come from the Spanish Main and 
he is unwilling that any commerce be carried on with the 
Spaniards of Porto Rico and the other islands belonging to 
Spain."2i 

These two small exceptions in the system of excluding 
foreigners are very readily understood and need not make 
one stop to qualify the statement that Colbert's exclusion 
of foreign traders was in theory complete. 

If the planters were hungry, barefooted and in rags, 
they must count these things as a bit of temporary suffer- 
ing to be endured for the upbuilding of French commerce. 
They must wait for the law of supply and demand to 
operate and bring them, sooner or later, an abundance 
from France. If these same planters were in need of 
slaves and of live stock to cultivate their cane and turn 
their sugar-mills, they must await the ''hons ordres'' which 
the West India Company had given to supply their needs. 
Such was the system of exclusivism which Colbert wished 
to impose upon the islands. Such were his demands upon 
the planters. Their realization would mean the growth of 
a valuable commerce for the kingdom and thus the realiza- 
tion of one of his fondest dreams. But he was demanding 
too much. What meant the noble idea of restoring French 
commerce and the upbuilding of a mighty colonial empire 
to the planters in the West Indies, whose empty bellies 
were crying for food, whose nakedness demanded to be 
clothed, whose sugar-cane, like time and tide, tarried for 

20 Clement, III, 2, p. 485, June 10, 1670. 

21 Arch. Nat. Col., B, 9, fols. 1-8, letter to de Blenac, July 6, 1682. 

193 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

no man, but ripened for the harvest in its season? Under 
the shelter of the night in the little inlets and creeks, or in 
the open day, thanks to the corruption of the officials, for- 
eign traders came and bartered wine, salt beef, slaves and 
live stock for tobacco, sugar, ginger and dye-woods. The 
great Louis and his determined minister might thunder 
commands from Versailles with a voice of Sinai, and the 
governors might be obedient, or they might not, but one 
thing was certain, such a rigid system could be enforced 
only at the cannon's mouth and only by a long and deter- 
mined struggle could the subjects of the far-away West 
Indies be brought into subjection to it. 



194 



CHAPTER IX 

The Fight Against the Dutch 

A SQUADRON of His Majesty's vessels under the com- 
•^^^ mand of Sieur de Treillebois was sent for a cruise in 
the West Indies and the Gulf of Mexico at the end of 1667. 
De Treillebois was commanded to remain in the islands for 
three months, during which time he was to prevent all for- 
eign vessels from trading.^ At the close of the following 
year, the Count d'Estrees, vice-admiral, was sent in com- 
mand of a squadron on a similar mission. He arrived at 
Martinique about February 1, 1669,^ and was commanded 
by an order dated June 13 to remain six months longer in 
the islands in order to prevent "in every manner foreigners 
from coming into the roads of the islands and from carry- 
ing on trade there under any pretext, or for any motives 
whatever."^ No evidence has been found which shows that 
either de Treillebois or d'Estrees maintained any system- 
atic patrol or succeeded in any large measure in preventing 
foreign traders from violating the strict orders which had 
been given for their exclusion. It may have been for this 
reason that Colbert decided in July, 1669,* to send to the 
West Indies three vessels charged with the special duty of 
enforcing regulations by maintaining a strict patrol. 

In accordance with this decision, Le Normand, Le Gal- 
ant and UAurore were equipped and sent to the West 
Indies under the command of de Gabaret. De Gabaret was 
given special orders, in the name of the king himself, "to 

1 Clement, III, 2, p. 398, October 1, 1667. 

2 Dessalles, Histoire generate des Antilles, I, 506. 

3 Arch. Nat. Col., B, 1, fol. 154, June 13, 1669. 

4 Clement, III, 2, pp. 456-459, Colbert to de Baas, July 31, 1669. 

195 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

sink or take or capture all foreign vessels, sailing in the 
waters about the islands, or attempting to anchor in the 
roads or harbours of said islands, for whatever cause and 
under whatever pretext which may be given, under penalty 
of disobedience to the king."^ He was commanded to keep 
his vessels "constantly cruising around the islands," and 
to keep his plans secret, so that "he could surprise foreign 
traders in' every inlet and harbour where they might 
attempt to trade."^ He was ordered to make special 
efforts to interrupt contraband trade between the Dutch 
at St. Eustatius and the colony at St. Christopher.^ De 
Gabaret received during the year no less than fourteen 
letters either from the king or from Colbert.^ Both the 
frequency and the contents of these letters bear testimony 
to the importance which was attached to his mission. 

De Gabaret arrived with his three vessels at Martinique 
on January 19, 1670.^ He straightway sent one of his 
ships, UAurore, to Grenada to capture a Dutch vessel 
which he had heard was trading there. The vessel in ques- 
tion was the Queen Esther, of 300 tons, Drik Jansen, cap- 
tain. In spite of the fact that the captain had a pass- 
port, issued by the French West India Company on Novem- 
ber 9, 1668, which gave him permission to trade in the 
islands, and in spite of the fact that the governor of 
Grenada had given him permission to sell slaves in that 

5 Arch. Nat. Col., B, 2, fol. 47, the king to Capt. de Gabaret, April 
9, 1670. The seriousness with which de Gabaret regarded the last 
phrase of these orders was shown, when he refused near the close of 
the year to obey the orders of de Baas to go to St. Domingo to 
quell a rebellion, on the grounds that he had been commanded by 
the king to perform the task of patrolling the islands and was 
responsible to the king for the thoroughness of his work. Ibid., de 
Baas to Colbert, October 19, 1670. 

6 Arch. Nat. Col., B, 1, fols. 89, 98 verso. 

7 Ibid., fol. 47. 

8 Ibid., passim. 

9 Arch. Nat. Col., Cg, I, de Baas to Colbert, February 24, 1670. 

196 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

island, his vessel was seized and taken to Martinique/" De 
Baas wrote the facts to Colbert and awaited instructions. 
They came under date of June 22, and were very brief: 
"I believe that I have already said enough for you to 
know that in all cases where there is any doubt, the king 
wishes that they be decided against the foreigner. "^^ The 
case must have been considered, for de Baas informed 
Colbert, in a letter of March 29, 1671, that the vessel had 
been restored to its captain, but that the sums due him 
for his negroes were yet to be collected at Grenada.^ 
About the same time another small Dutch vessel with a 
cargo of wine was captured. From November 5 to No- 
vember 9, five Dutch vessels were seized near St. Christo- 
pher.i^ 

De Baas complained that de Gabaret was showing too 
much zeal in his efforts to capture Dutch vessels. Thus 
he reported his capture of a Dutch bark with a cargo of 
wood which it was taking from Dominica to Cura9ao : "I 
am sending you, Monseigneur, an inventory of its cargo 

10 Arch. Nat. Col., Cg, I, de Baas to Colbert, March 22, 1670. 
The passport granted to the Queen Esther is to be found ibid., C^q* 
La Grenade, 1654-1729. The said passport was granted on condi- 
tion of paying to the company 5 per cent on negroes and live stock 
imported into the islands and 10 per cent on products exported. 
The incident was recounted by the English governor of Antigua 
as follows: "I cannot omit one ignoble passage of the governor of 
Grenadoes. A Dutchman from Guinea falling in with the islands 
with 200 negroes was invited by the governor to trade and security 
assured him, but no sooner were the negroes landed than the gov- 
ernor dispatched a shallop to La Barret [Gabaret] who sent up his 
vice-admiral and immediately seized poor Hans suspecting no danger, 
being of twenty-four guns, carried him to St. Kitts and keeps him as a 
prize till the business be decided in France." Cal. St. Pap., Am. ^ 
W. Ind., 1669-1674, No. 508, W. Byam, governor of Antigua, to 
Willoughby. 

11 Arch. Nat. Col., B, 2, fol. 94. 

12 Ibid., Cg, I. 

13 Arch. Nat. Col., Cg, I, Mem. des prises faites a St. Christopher 
par M. Gabaret, commandant I'escadre des vais. du Roy. 

197 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

and a copy of the captain's commission in order that you 
may see for yourself that excessive zeal is causing M. de 
Gabaret to seize all vessels which he can lay his hands 
upon. He says that he is doing so in accordance with 
orders to handle the Dutch brutally."^* To this com- 
plaint Colbert made the following reply: 

"In regard to the Dutch or the Flemish^ as they are called 
in the islands, His Majesty commands me to say to you that 
we have the right to capture and confiscate their vessels, when 
they are found trading or even cruising in the waters of our 
islands, and that he orders you to enforce with the utmost 
vigour this right against them. You cannot render a service 
which would prove more pleasing to him than to trouble them 
in their commerce and even to chase them from the West Indies 
entirely, if it can be done without openly violating our trea- 
ties, as could be done, for instance, by secretly aiding the 
Caribs against them in case of a war, or by secretly inciting 
them to attack the Dutch by furnishing them firearms and 
ammunition. It will be necessary, however, to be very cau- 
tious, so that the Dutch can not make any complaints which 
could be justified by proof of an unfriendly act."^^ 

Colbert stated in another letter that he wished to make 
the Dutch "lose the habit" of coming to the French islands, 
and that they would never lose it until the news of confis- 
cation and of destruction of vessels and cargoes produced 
its effect in Holland.^^ 

De Baas' reply has something of the sarcastic in it and 
shows a disapproval of treating the Dutch with such 
severity : 

"Inasmuch as the first instructions to me to exclude the for- 
eign trader did not specify or explain the policy which the 
court wished to be followed, I supposed that in case the Dutch 

14 Arch. Nat. Col., Cg, I, same to same, March 22, 1670. 

15 Clement, III, 2, p. 487, Colbert to de Baas, July 3, 1670. 

16 Arch. Nat. Col., B, 2, fol. 115, October 12, 1670. 

198 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

came into our roads to trade^ they should simply be sent away 
without listening to their offers and not be treated as enemies. 
M. de Gabaret, however^ who was better informed than I, 
as he had been enlightened by some rays from the sanctuary, 
began to treat the Dutch in a fashion which he knew would 
prove more agreeable to you. I made objections to his brutal 
treatment, and was so shrouded in darkness as to your inten- 
tions, that I myself was groping toward the abyss of error 
into which I thought he was already falling. It is thus that 
the ignorant err and are lost. Nevertheless since receiving 
the orders of His Majesty and your own, Monseigneur, I see 
the error of my way. . . . You may rest assured that I shall 
henceforth treat the Dutch with the utmost severity/'^^ 

The strict exclusion of foreigners from the French 
islands brought a protest from the English government. 
Colbert replied to it in a very interesting letter to the 
French ambassador at London: 

"In reply to your letter of the 20th of the last month, I 
shall say that the ambassador of England at this court has 
filed the same complaint as the English government has with 
you in regard to the ordinance of June 10 last, which forbids 
foreigners to trade or cruise in the waters of the French 
islands of America under penalty of confiscation. His Maj- 
esty orders me to say that he was forced to issue this ordi- 
nance in order to drive out the Dutch, who have become so 
accustomed to carry on all of this trade (in which they are 
especially favoured by all the planters) that it was impossible 
to get rid of them without the employment of extraordinary 
measures; that for this purpose His Majesty is forced to 
maintain a squadron of armed vessels in the islands. As the 
same causes of complaint did not exist against the English, 
who are contented, as we are informed, to carry on trade with 
their own islands. His Majesty would have been glad to make 
any exception in their favour in the enforcement of the afore- 
said ordinance, but he was obliged to make the terms of the 
regulation general in regard to all nations on account of the 

17 Arch. Nat. Col., Cg, I, March 29, 16T1. 

199 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

treaties which he had with Holland. He has given orders to 
Sieur de Baas^ who is in command of the islands, to enforce 
the regulation with the utmost rigour against the Dutch, 
but at the same time to treat the English differently by reason 
of the fact which I have already noted, that they have never 
engaged in this trade nor at present are attempting to do so. 
You can, therefore, assure the king of England and his min- 
isters that nothing will be done in the enforcement of the pres- 
ent regulation contrary to the good relations which the king 
wishes to be maintained between the two crowns and between 
their subjects; and that English vessels will receive in all of 
the waters and lands of His Majesty good treatment and all 
the aid which his own vessels and those of his subjects receive 
from the English^ on condition, however, that they attempt to 
carry on no trade in our islands, as they pretend that they do 
not do and in accordance with the regulations which the king 
of England orders to be enforced in the islands under his own 
obedience."^^ 

It is to be noticed that although it was promised here 
that the English would not be treated with severity as 
were the Dutch, Colbert made no exception in their favour 
as to the privileges of trading in the islands. De Gabaret, 
in fact, captured a French vessel which attempted trade 
with the English islands.^^ 

The effect of de Gabaret's activity seems to have been 
felt at once, for de Baas wrote on November 10, 1670: 
"The Dutch have stopped coming to our coasts. As long 
as there are vessels of the king here they will flee from them 
as from dangerous reefs. M. de Gabaret is continually 
trying to surprise them by laying traps. I believe that in 
the future he will be able to see them only from afar oif . 
They are greatly frightened."^" The work of patrolling, 

18 Clement, III, 2, pp. 491-493, Colbert to Colbert de Croissy, 
August 5, 1670. 

19 Arch. Nat. Col., Cg, I, de Baas to Colbert, March 22, 1670. 

20 Arch. Nat. Col., C^q, St. Christophe, I, de Baas to Colbert, 
November 10, 1670. 

200 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

however, had to be interrupted in order to quell a rebellion 
which had broken out in St. Domingo. 

When Ogeron took command at St. Domingo as gov- 
ernor for the West India Company, the inhabitants said 
frankly that they would never submit to the company and 
that they would obey him only as governor for the king, 
and that although they intended to be obedient to the 
king, there was one point in which they would never yield, 
namely, in regard to trade with the Dutch, "who had 
never let them lack for anything at a period when the 
presence of French at Tortuga and St. Domingo was 
unknown in France. "^^ There was a spirit of too much 
independence and too great a habit of not being subjected 
to any other law than that of force for these inhabitants to 
submit peaceably to any such system as that which Colbert 
was attempting to impose upon them. 

About the first of May (1670), Ogeron, on returning 
to Tortuga from the coast of St. Domingo, sighted two 
large vessels, which, on seeing him, pretended to be going 
to Coridon, where the English were accustomed to go to 
get salt. Consequently he believed them to be English ves- 
sels from Jamaica and did not give chase. On arriving 
at Tortuga, however, he learned that the two vessels 
were Dutch, armed with twenty-eight and thirty-two 
guns, and commanded by Peter Constant and Peter 
Marcq; that during his absence these vessels had traded 
with filibusters at Bayaha and then had anchored on the 
northern coast of St. Domingo at Port de Paix, where 
they had remained trading during eight days. They had 
not only traded with all comers, but had sent a boat to 
Tortuga, and although the West India Company's agents 
forbade them to trade, Peter Constant replied that some 
one stronger than he would have to keep him from doing 
so. 

21 Charlevoix, Histoire de VIsle Espagnole, II, 61. 

301 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

Two days later, having learned that all the inhabitants 
of Leogane were in rebellion, Ogeron embarked on the 
vessel, Les Armes de la Compagnie, and sailed thither. 
On arriving at Nippes four days later, he found the same 
two Dutch vessels anchored there, and learned that the 
rebellion had spread to the whole western coast. The 
rebels had sent messengers to the northern coast in order 
to win the co-operation of the filibusters and buccaneers 
there. An attempt was made to prevent the two Dutch 
ships from continuing their trade and when they sent two 
boats ashore they were ordered seized. The Dutch forth- 
with attacked the governor, retook the boats by force, 
and sent Renou and another commander, de Ville Neufve, 
on board their vessels as prisoners. Ogeron himself was 
forced to leave Nippes before the attack of a hundred 
armed men. He sailed and arrived two days later at 
Petit Goave. There the inhabitants pretended to welcome 
him. As a bit of caution, however, he first sent a messenger 
with letters addressed to some of the principal inhabitants. 
The messenger had hardly set foot ashore before he was 
arrested. No less than two thousand shots were fired at 
the governor's vessel and he was forced to retire to Tor- 
tuga. He learned on arriving there that the rebels of the 
west coast were marching to unite themselves with those 
of the north and that they were planning to attack him at 
Tortuga. 

He straightway dispatched Renou, a lieutenant, to the 
Windward Islands in order to inform de Baas of the revolt 
and to demand aid. Renou fell sick en route and did not 
reach Martinique before September 25.^^ De Baas gave 
orders to de Gabaret to proceed at once to St. Domingo 
in order to quell the rebellion. De Gabaret, however, 
refused to obey the order, on the grounds that he was 
under special orders from the king to patrol the Windward 

22 Arch. Nat. Col., C7, I, du Lion to Colbert, September 30, 1670. 

202 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

Islands. Consequently a special order from France had 
to be waited for before aid was sent to Ogeron. 

In the mean time the revolt continued. Ogeron was 
attacked by three hundred rebels, but succeeded in hold- 
ing his ground at Tortuga.^^ St. Domingo, however, was 
entirely in control of the rebels and foreigners were trad- 
ing there with the greatest freedom. The hatred against 
the company was so great that the planters asserted, 
according to Ogeron, that they would rather have their 
goods perish than see them loaded upon one of its vessels. 
The governor was powerless to assert his authority, be- 
cause he found no support among the planters. He was 
so discouraged, in fact, that he proposed to Colbert the 
establishment of a colony on the coast of Florida with the 
few who remained faithful to him.^* 

On receiving news of the revolt, Colbert acted promptly. 
He first filed complaint with the Dutch government against 
the conduct of the two vessels at St. Domingo, and at the 
same time gave warning that all Dutch vessels found 
cruising near Tortuga and the coast of St. Domingo, 
would be sunk or confiscated.^^ He then sent orders to de 
Gabaret to go to St. Domingo, to restore Ogeron, and 
to capture or sink all Dutch vessels found near the coast. 

In obedience to orders, de Gabaret arrived in Tortuga 
on February 7, and tried, in co-operation with Ogeron, to 
quell the rebellion. The planters of Tortuga were per- 
suaded without difficulty to take a new oath of allegiance 
to the king. De Gabaret and Ogeron then sailed, on 
February 9, for the western coast of St. Domingo. They 
arrived at Leogane on the 14th. De Sourdis, captain of 
L^Aurore, was sent ashore with a summons to the rebels 

23 Bib. Nat. MSS., Franc. Nouv. Acq., 9325, fols. 176-178, Ogeron 
to de Baas, October 9, 1670. 

24 Charlevoix, II, 89. 

25 Arch. Nat. Col., B, 2, fol. 127, Colbert to Ogeron, November 6, 
1670. 

203 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

to lay down their arms and to acknowledge Ogeron as 
their governor. In reply to his appeals they said that 
although they were good subjects to the king, they would 
not submit to the West India Company or acknowledge 
Ogeron as their governor. De Gabaret then came ashore 
himself to endeavour to persuade the rebels to change 
their mind. He found before him 600 of them armed. 
He received the same reply. When he tried to frighten 
them by threats, he was greeted with cries of derision. 
He then tried to deal directly with one of the leaders, 
but he no sooner began to talk with him than the 
rebels crowded about in great numbers and shouted that 
this leader had no more power to treat than anyone else. 
De Gabaret returned to his vessel to confer with Ogeron 
as to the best measures to be taken. An immediate attack 
seemed imprudent, because the landing of troops would 
prove exceedingly difficult on account of the marshes. 
Accordingly they sailed on the 16th and arrived at Petit 
Goave the following day. Here they found also all the 
inhabitants armed and drawn up in battle array. Ogeron 
addressed a letter to them, but they refused to listen 
to its contents, and began to cry, ^'Vive le Roy, point 
d'Ogeron!"'^^ They announced their intentions to do as 
the inhabitants of Leogane had done, and asserted that 
they would be re-inforced by the rebels from there on the 
morrow. In spite of these threats an attack was made upon 
them and they fled into the woods. The royal troops, after 
burning a few houses, were re-embarked and sailed away. 
The same thing was repeated at Nippes. No thorough 

26 An explanation of the hostility of the inhabitants of St. Do- 
mingo towards Ogeron is perhaps to be explained by a letter written 
by du Lion to Colbert on September 30, 1670: "The people of St. 
Domingo say that since Ogeron has participated in commerce with 
the West India Company, he no longer governs them as a father, 
but as a man who is promoting his personal interests. I don't 
know whether these reports are true or not.' 

204 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

campaign seems to have been attempted. De Gabaret and 
Ogeron both decided that it was best to return to Tortuga, 
where they arrived on the 25th. From February 27 to 
March 4, the inhabitants of Port de Paix and Port Fran- 
9ais were visited and finally persuaded to take the oath of 
allegiance. With this de Gabaret seems to have been con- 
tented and straightway sailed for France. 

After de Gabaret's departure, Ogeron, on returning to 
the west coast of St. Domingo, found that the spirit of 
rebellion had lost much of its zest. He agreed that no 
prosecutions would be made on account of the recent rebel- 
lion, but said that all French vessels would be permitted 
to trade at Tortuga and the coast of St. Domingo, but 
that foreigners would be excluded. The inhabitants there- 
upon returned to their obedience to the governor. Renou 
was sent on a special mission to France with a letter to 
Colbert to demand pardon for the rebels. The letter bore 
the date of May 7, 1671. Colbert replied under date of 
October 21, expressing entire satisfaction with the con- 
duct of Ogeron, and informing him that the king had 
granted general pardon to all. The terms of the pardon 
stated that it had been granted because Ogeron had 
affirmed that all acts of hostility had ceased; that arms 
had been laid down, and that there was sincere regret for 
the acts of rebellion.^'^ 

De Gabaret and Ogeron were both in agreement as to 
the cause of this rebellion. "This rebellion occurred," 
said Ogeron, "only by reason of the regulation which for- 
bade trade with foreigners. Thus it is certain that if the 
two Dutch vessels had not come to trade and made strong 
appeals to the inhabitants to do so, the rebellion would 
not have occurred."^^ De Gabaret affirmed that the rebel- 

27 Arch. Nat. Col., B, 3, fols. 75-78, 79. 

28 Arch. Nat. Col., C9, I, Proces verbal de la Revolte arrivee a la 
Coste de St. Dom., August 12, 1670. 

205 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

lious and insolent spirit of the inhabitants came from the 
fact that they were too sure of trade with foreigners. 
Suzanne, a former agent of the West India Company at St. 
Domingo, had estabhshed himself at Jamaica and offered 
good prices to the inhabitants of St. Domingo for all their 
products. He had, in fact, made a contract with them by 
which he agreed to take all they produced and transport 
it to Holland, for which purpose he would furnish a vessel 
of 300 tons armed with twenty-two guns, and in return to 
bring every year a quantity of negroes and all sorts of mer- 
chandise for a reasonable price. This agreement had made 
the planters believe that they could be quite independent 
of France and resist all attacks against them.^^ 

In the following year, Ogeron demanded a vessel of 
twenty or thirty guns to serve as a patrol,^'' but his de- 
mand seems not to have met with a favourable response, 
for he wrote in the following year, on the eve of the out- 
break of the war with Holland, that he had neither vessels 
nor armed soldiers nor ammunition, and that it would be 
impossible for him to defend himself in case of a foreign 
attack or to prevent foreign commerce.^^ 

The revolt at St. Domingo seems to have awakened some 
echo in the other islands, but beyond a bit of murmuring 
there was no overt act of rebellion.^^ 

De Gabaret's sojourn in the islands had meant much 
toward the enforcement of the regulations against foreign 
traders. The presence of three armed vessels which cap- 
tured at the cannon's mouth Dutch vessels and confiscated 
them before the eyes of the planters must have made, as 
Colbert hoped it would do, a big impression both upon the 
Dutch and upon the planters. The show of such force 

29 Charlevoix, II, 94; Arch. Nat. Col., C9, I, Ogeron to Colbert, 
March 4, 1671. 

30 Arch. Nat. Col., C9, I, September, 1671. 

31 Charlevoix, II, 97. 

32 Arch. Nat. Col., C7, I, du Lion to Colbert, September 30, 1670. 

206 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

proved much more effective in a frontier community like the 
West Indies than ordinances and commands. The spirit of 
revolt was hushed and the planters were held in subjection. 
The governor of a neighbouring English island remarked 
that, although the French were "thus huffing it at sea," 
the poor planter was suffering within the islands.^^ The 
Dutch fled before such force and seem to have suffered. 
Thus du Lion wrote to Colbert on March 29, 1670: 

"The quantity of merchandise is so great at St. Eustatius 
that the Dutch do not know what to do with it and are forced 
to sell it at very low prices to the English at Nevis, Montserrat 
and Antigua. . . . The Dutch will certainly be ruined so far 
as the islands are concerned, if the policy of excluding them is 
strongly enforced, for they will be obliged to see their mer- 
chandise perish or to send it back to Europe, and in addition 
they will be forced to send away their vessels without any 
cargo whatever."^ 

The results upon French shipping seem to have proved 
rather satisfactory to Colbert. He wrote to de Baas on 
October 10, 1670, as follows: 

"I'll tell you for your own satisfaction that since you have 
turned your attention to the enforcement of the laws against 
foreigners, we notice that a much larger number of French 
vessels demand permission to go to the islands and we see also 
that the number of refineries is increasing constantly in 
the realm. Foreigners no longer bring us sugar. We have 
begun since six weeks or two months to export it to them."^^ 

It would be a mistake to suppose, however, that the 
problem of excluding the foreign trader had been definitely 
solved, for the presence of armed vessels was still neces- 
sary. De Gabaret was commanded to leave at his depart- 

33 CaZ. St. Pap., Am. ^ W. hid., 1669-1674. 

34 Arch. Nat. Col., C7, I, March 29, 1670. 

35 Arch. Nat. Col., B, 2, fol. 115. 

207 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

ure one of his vessels, UAurore, a frigate, to continue the 
work which he had begun.^^ Another squadron under the 
command of d'Aplemont was sent to Martinique at the 
beginning of 1672. De Baas was ordered to use it for the 
protection of French commerce and "in order to prevent 
any foreign vessel from trading in the French islands. "^^ 
In 1673 three vessels, Le Belliqueux, La Fee and La Sibille, 
were on patrol duty, and at the close of the year three 
others were sent out, L^Alcion, Les Jeux and La Friponne, 
"which were to be employed for no other purpose than to 
give chase to all foreign vessels which attempted to come 
into the roads of the islands."^ Throughout the course 
of the Dutch war, ships were constantly sent to the West 
Indies, both to defend them and to keep out foreign 
trader s.^^ 

But Colbert was not contented with the ground which 
he had gained from de Gabaret's work in 1670. Reports 
reached his ears that some vessels, purported to have been 
built in Canada and in the West Indies, were taking car- 
goes to foreign ports under the claim that they were not 
subject to the regulations which governed vessels built and 
owned by merchants of France. To meet this situation, 
a royal ordinance was proclaimed on July 18, 1671, which 
forbade such practice.**^ In this same year he advanced to 
another point in his fight by attempting to exclude Irish 
salt beef. 

Salt beef was indispensable at this time for feeding 
slaves, and a large quantity was necessary to West India 
planters. The supply had almost from the beginning been 

36 Arch. Nat. Col., B, 2, fol. 149, order to de Gabaret, December 
28, 1670. 

37 Arch. Nat. Col., B, 4, fol. 29, Colbert to de Baas, March 34, 
1672. 

38 Ibid., 5, fol. 47, Colbert to de Baas, September 5, 1673. 

39 Ibid., 6, fols. 15 verso, 16. 

40 Arch. Nat. Col., B, 3, fols. 62-64; Moreau de Saint-Mery, I, 227. 

208 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

brought either from Ireland directly, or indirectly through 
Holland or the ports of France.*^ But one of the cardinal 
points in Colbert's economic policy was independence so 
far as possible of foreign markets. He saw no reason 
why the French should seek a supply of salt beef in Ire- 
land, when it might be produced in France. The privilege 
of entrepot in France was annulled for Irish salt beef by 
an arret of August 17, 1671.*^ Another ordinance of 
November 4, 1671, forbade the importation of salt meat, 
purchased in foreign countries, under penalty of confis- 
cation of vessel and 500 livres fine for the first offense 
and corporal punishment for the second.*^ Bounties were 
also offered for the exportation to the islands of French 
salt beef. Salt beef, however, became so scarce that gov- 
ernors were forced to permit trade with foreigners to save 
slaves and planters from suffering. "I saw people at 
Guadeloupe," wrote one official, "come to thank their com- 
mander for the permission which he had given to the Eng- 
lish to sell 200 barrels of beef, swearing to him with tears 
in their eyes that it had been more than a year since they 
or their families had had a morsel of meat to eat."^* Two 
Jewish merchants of Martinique were permitted to import 
from Barbadoes, a cargo of codfish, cheese, butter, bacon, 
beef, candles, cloth and shoes. *^ Permission was likewise 
granted to four English vessels to trade, one, a ketch with 
a cargo of provisions for Guadeloupe, the other three with 

41 Du Lion states, in a letter of July 25, 1670, that de Formont, a 
French merchant, was preparing a quantity of salt beef and live stock 
in Ireland for shipment to the islands. Arch. Nat. Col., C7, I. A 
further discussion of trade in salt beef will be found in a succeeding 
chapter. 

*2 Moreau de Saint-Mery, I, 130. Its enforcement was postponed 
until February 1, in order to enable those merchants who had a stock 
of Irish beef on hand to dispose of it. 

43 Ibid., p. 253. 

44 Arch. Nat. Col., Cg, I, du Clerc to Colbert, January 20, 1675. 

45 Ibid., de Baas to de Bleor, February 6, 1674. 

209 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

similar cargoes for Martinique. Among the latter was a 
"ketch coming from the city of Boston."*^ De Baas per- 
mitted another foreign vessel to bring some salt beef to 
St. Pierre, to enable the labourers to continue the work on 
the fortifications which they had been compelled to quit 
because they had nothing to eat.^^ 

Colbert sternly rebuked this conduct and forbade any 
exceptions being made to the regulations regarding trade 
with foreigners.^^ He was forced, however, by conditions 
in the islands in 1673, to restore the right to import Irish 
beef and never renewed the fight .^^ 

De Baas wrote on February 8, 1674, in most emphatic 
terms that all foreign commerce had ceased: 

"I do not know, Monseigneur, what can be your thoughts 
on the subject of foreign commerce after the repeated assur- 
ances which I have given you that there is none at all. If 
anyone has written you differently and can convince me that 
what he writes is so, I shall submit to punishment without 
asking for mercy. It is true that on the eve of my departure 
for Cura9ao a small English vessel which asked permission to 
take water in this harbour [St. Pierre] aided me by bartering 
a small quantity of codfish, herring and biscuits for French 
wine. Lately a bark brought seven or eight barrels of beef, 
which were bartered for French brandy. The beef was needed 
to feed the workmen who are engaged in fortifying the har- 
bour and who had been forced to abandon their work on 
account of a lack of food. It is perhaps of these facts that you 
have been told. If beyond these two cases any foreign com- 
merce has been carried on in the French islands with my 
knowledge, I wish very much that the king punish me with 
the utmost rigour. Thus, Monseigneur, your mind can be at 

46 Arch. Nat. GoL, Cg, I, du Clerc to Colbert, January 30, 1675. 

47 Ibid., de Baas to Colbert, February 8, 1674. 

48 Arch. Nat. Col., B, 6, fols. 32, 34-39, Colbert to de Baas, May 15, 
1674. 

49 Arch. Nat. Col., B, 5, f ol. 45, September 5, 1673. 

310 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

rest on the subject of foreign trade^ for the truth is as I have 
represented it."^*^ 

And yet in the same letter de Baas wrote near its close 
that as the price of sugar was exceedingly low, the plant- 
ers had begun to cultivate indigo and ginger, and that 
they had devised "other means for their subsistence by 
raising stock and poultry of every description, which they 
sell at good profit, especially to foreigner s."^^ 

The letter raises a question of some importance. What 
did de Baas mean by affirming most categorically that 
commerce with foreigners had ceased, and yet adding that 
stock and poultry were being sold to them? He could not 
have been ignorant of the fact that the regulations pro- 
hibited all trade with foreign islands, even when carried on 
by Frenchmen, for he had raised the question himself in a 
letter to Colbert in 1670 and had received most definite 
and clear-cut instructions on the point.^^ The same diffi- 
culty occurs elsewhere in the correspondence of de Baas. 
Thus only a few months later he wrote Colbert that com- 
merce with the Dutch had ceased and that regulations were 
being strictly enforced,^^ and yet he was at that time, 
according to one of his own letters, trying to establish 
trade with the Dutch: 

"I should tell you^ Monseigneur, that during my stay at St. 
Christopher^ I wrote to a Dutch merchant, named Doukre, 
who lives at Cura9ao and whom I knew here at Martinique 
some three years ago, to send me information in regard to the 
price of sugar, ginger and indigo at Cura9ao in order that I 
might have some idea of their value. I shall send him a large 
enough quantity of these articles to yield to both of us an 
honest profit. I had been thinking of this scheme for some 

50 Arch. Nat. Col., Cg, I, de Baas to Colbert, February 8, 1674. 

51 Ibid. 

52 See preceding chapter. 

53 Arch. Nat. Col., Cg, I, March 29, 1671 ; Ciq, St. Christophe, I, de 
Baas to Colbert, November 10, 1670. 

211 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

time, but I did not wish to take the risk of sending a vessel 
to Cura9ao without receiving in advance some assurance that 
it would be permitted to return. Some six days ago I received 
a reply not only from the merchant to whom I had written, 
but also from the governor, Otterinck, who informed me very 
civilly that M. Doukre had informed him of my intentions and 
assured me that foreigners received the same treatment at 
Curasao as the Dutch. His letter is dated at Fort Amsterdam, 
Cura9ao, December 10, 1671. I believe, Monseigneur, that 
after this assurance that you will not raise any objections, if 
I send a small bark, belonging to the king, which is still here, 
and carry on a little trade with Cura9ao. ... I shall do so 
in about fifteen days."^* 

Furthermore, de Baas informed Colbert from time to time, 
as has been noted above, that he had admitted in some 
cases trade with foreigners and justified his conduct by 
saying that it was necessary in order to prevent suffering. 
The motive given for sending a vessel to Cura9ao, however, 
was not the relief of suffering, but personal gain. 

Did de Baas tell Colbert of these few instances in order 
to hide from him a larger number where he was permitting 
foreigners to trade.? Did he profit from his situation by 
sharing in the profit with foreign traders .^^ Du Lion, the 
governor of Guadeloupe, asserted in many letters that de 
Baas was doing so. In one very long letter he gave an 
account of the corrupt practices of Cartier, the West 
India Company's general agent, in admitting the Dutch, 
and cited specific instances where de Baas had aided him 
and profited personally from trade with the Dutch.^^ In 
another letter, du Lion said that de Baas was embarrassed 
by the presence of the king's vessels : 

"MM. de Gabaret and de Sourdis, captains of the king's 
vessels, have stated to me that M. de Baas is not pleased with 

54 Arch. Nat. CoL, Cg, I, de Baas to Colbert, January 20, 1673. 

55 Arch. Nat. Col., C7, I, du Lion to Colbert, December 1, 1669, a 
long and extremely interesting letter. 

212 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

the way in which they have been capturing foreign vessels in 
the roads of Martinique and Grenada, where they were wont 
to trade. They turned over their prizes to him and had diffi- 
culty enough in obtaining receipts from him. They are of the 
opinion that this arises from the fact that M. de Baas wishes to 
have more leeway in granting favours to foreigners, to whom he 
must have made promises, for, since he is unable to grant them 
freedom to trade on account of the presence of the king's ships, 
they have complained that he has not kept his promise to 
them. . . . These captains are determined, however, to cap- 
ture as many Dutch vessels as possible. Notwithstanding this, 
M. de Baas has granted three permissions to land cargoes 
brought from Holland, I notified him that I would not permit 
the cargoes to be landed in Guadeloupe, unless he gave a 
written order forcing me to do so. I urged him to remember 
that you had given me orders to destroy a Dutch vessel rather 
than let it trade in this island. M. de Baas has another way 
of regarding the matter."^^ 

Du Lion, the author of these charges, seems to have 
been a jealous, meddlesome busybody and gossiper. His 
letters leave the impression that their author was one of 
those unfortunate self-righteous individuals who are quick 
to see the faults in others and gloat upon them. Colbert 
saw fit more than once to rebuke him, as for instance: 

"I am writing you only a few lines, in response to all the 
letters which I have been receiving from you for a long time, 
to tell you that I find them too long, too tedious and of too 
small importance to spend my time reading them. . . . M. de 
Baas is your enemy, the West India Company is trying to 
destroy you, Pelissier is also your declared enemy, as is also 
du Ruau Pallu and the rest. Their enmity toward you is a 
creation of your own imagination, for as a matter of fact, none 
of them has ever tried to play you a bad turn. Your own 
letters prove to me that you would like to be omnipotent in 
the government which the king has confided to you, as well 

56 Arch. Nat. Col., C7, du Lion to Colbert, March 8, 1670. 

213 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

as in all of the other islands. Judges fail to do their duty^ if 
their decisions are not in accord with your views. The West 
India Company does nothing worth while if it does not meet 
with your approval."^^ 

In another letter he rebuked du Lion for insubordination,^ 
and in still others he told him that it was needless for him 
to keep watch on what de Baas did, as for the most part 
he was commanded to do many things against which he 
was making complaint.^^ It must be stated also that du 
Lion was decidedly hostile to de Baas, because he had been 
forced by de Baas to leave Guadeloupe and sail for France 
in 1669.'' 

But one cannot read carefully the charges made by du 
Lion without being on the whole convinced that they were 
based partially at least on facts. Colbert stated himself 
that he "continually found de Baas conniving with foreign 
traders and pardoning them too easily."®^ Furthermore, 
Colbert did not accept the statement which de Baas made 
in the letter quoted above that all commerce with for- 
eigners had ceased, for he wrote under the king's name in 
reply as follows : 

"I receive complaints from merchants every day to the effect 
that when they send their vessels laden with merchandise for 
the use and consumption of the inhabitants of my islands, 
they find vessels of the English and of other foreigners 
admitted under various pretexts — a fact which is utterly ruin- 
ing the commerce of the French. It is this which forces me to 

57 Arch. Nat. Col., B, 5, fols. 51 verso, 52. 

58 Clement, III, 2, p. 538, May 1, 1673. 

59 Arch. Nat. Col., B, 3, fols. 49 verso, 50, April 9, 1670; and fol. 
100, July 3, 1670. 

60 Arch. Nat. Col., C7, I, June 27, 1670, and C16ment, III, 2, p. 457, 
July 31, 1669. 

61 Arch. Nat. Mar., B2, 14, Colbert to Colbert de Terron, January 
% 1671. 

214 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

write you that it is my will that my ordinances which forbid 
foreigners to trade in the islands be promptly enforced."^^ 

It seems on the whole probable that de Baas was guilty 
of admitting foreign traders and perhaps that he even 
did so with corrupt purposes. De Baas' actions, how- 
ever, are to be explained in part by the fact that he 
yielded in some cases to necessity and admitted foreign 
ships to relieve suifering, and it must be added that on the 
whole de Baas made an excellent governor, and was 
retained in his position until his death on January 24, 
1677. 

How far French governors of the West Indies were 
guilty of bribery in the matter of foreign trade it is 
impossible to state. There is one case of conviction of an 
official at St. Christopher in 1670,^^ and about the same 
time, St. Marthe, governor of Martinique, was convicted 
of carrying on illicit trade with the English.*"^ 

The year 1677 was marked by two formal renewals of 
the regulations against foreign commerce, one on Septem- 
ber 11, 1677, by the proclamation of a royal ordinance,^^ 
and the other by an arret of the conseil d^etat of October 
16, 1677.^^ The latter was necessitated by the fact that 
the conseil sowverain of St. Christopher had interposed 
its authority to prevent the penalty of confiscation from 
being enforced in two cases of conviction for trade with 
foreigners. The circumstances were as follows. At the 
liquidation of the West India Company, the right of col- 
lecting duties and taxes in the islands had been trans- 

62 Arch. Nat. Col., B, 6, fol. 17 his, May 10, 1675. 

63 It is spoken of in the correspondence between de Baas and Col- 
bert as the "affair Royer." See Clement, III, 2, pp. 490, 500 and 673. 

64 See a full exposition of the case in Dessalles, Hist. g4n. des 
Antilles, III, 194-197. 

65 Arch. Nat. Col., B, 7, fol. 41 verso, 49; Moreau de Saint-M6ry, I, 
304-305. 

66 Arch. Nat., G7, 1313. 

215 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

ferred into a farm called the Domaine d'Occident. The 
farmer in taking possession of the farm was commanded 
to instruct his agents to prevent foreign commerce. The 
agents, sent to St. Christopher, found on their arrival 
the inhabitants trading freely with foreigners. Several 
attempts at arrest proved fruitless, but two seizures were 
made, one of twenty-six barrels of sugar and another of 
six barrels of beef. Sieur Dupas, the judge of the island 
of St. Christopher, declared the seizures justified and 
ordered their confiscation according to law. The conseil 
souverain, however, annulled the decision and ordered the 
restitution of the goods in question. Oudiette, the farmer 
of the Domaine d'Occident, considered the case of enough 
importance to make appeal to the conseil d'etat in France. 
It was in answer to this appeal that the arret of October 
16 was rendered, sustaining the decision of the judge, and 
at the same time ordering the enforcement of the laws 
against foreign trade. In spite, however, of this arret, 
trade between the English and the French at St. Christo- 
pher continued. The task of preventing it was exceed- 
ingly difficult. A double frontier existed between the two 
peoples from the fact that the French occupied the two 
ends of the island and the English the middle. It was 
consequently only a matter of "one kick of the foot to 
roll a barrel of beef or a bale of cotton to the French, and 
another to roll a barrel of sugar in payment to the Eng- 
lish."^'^ Soldiers were posted along the frontier, but they 
proved entirely untrustworthy, for they profited from 
their situation by permitting foreign trade. Commercial 
agents also proved unfaithful. They stocked their stores 
with foreign goods and wrote to their employers in 
France that there was no sale for French goods in the 
islands, because the governors and intendants and agents 

67 Arch. Nat. Col., Ciq, St. Christophe, I, Memoire sur St. Chris- 
tophe par Sr. Cloche, commis. du Dom. d'Oc, April 10, 1679. 

216 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

of the revenue farmers permitted free commerce with for- 
eigners. Only about one-fourth of the vessels which went 
to St. Christopher between July, 1678, and April, 1679, 
were officially reported.^ Consequently the English im- 
ported much merchandise from Nevis and the Dutch from 
St. Eustatius. One effect of this was that beef at Martin- 
ique and Guadeloupe was twenty to forty per cent dearer 
that at St. Christopher.^^ St. Laurent, the governor of 
St. Christopher, wrote on July 2, 1679, that two com- 
panies of marines and twenty soldiers from the garrison 
had been posted along the frontiers at places indicated by 
Sieur Cloche, and that he had given all orders necessary 
to prevent foreign trade. Englishmen were forbidden to 
pass with merchandise through French territory without 
special permission."^ The English governor objected, 
however, to such a regulation, maintaining that all har- 
bours and roads were free to them for the transportation 
of all of their goods according to treaty between the two 
nations. This constituted a very serious difficulty. 

"It is not at all easy^" St. Laurent wrote^ "to prevent foreign 
commerce at St. Christopher^ so long as the roads and har- 
bours remain common to both nations for the transportation of 
merchandise. . . . If we forbid the English to anchor in our 
harbours of Basseterre and Cabesterre, whence they trans- 
port provision to their quarters of Cabesterre and Cayenne^ 
and to which they bring their goods to be embarked, they will 
have the right to forbid us to pass across their territory and 

68 Ibid. 

69 Ibid., Cloche proposed among other things the following reme- 
dies: (1) A strict enforcement of the orders of His Majesty in con- 
fiscating all foreign vessels found in French waters; (2) a visitation 
of stores and of vessels and the confiscation of foreign goods found 
in them; (3) a reward of three ecus to soldiers for every barrel of 
sugar which they intercepted in passing into English territory; (4) 
a prohibition for soldiers to board foreign vessels. 

70 Arch. Nat. Col., C^qj St. Christophe, I, Memoire sur le commerce 
etranger a St. Christophe par St. Laurent, July 2, 1679. 

217 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

thus interrupt commerce between our two settlements. In case 
of war with the English or another power^ the French gov- 
ernor would not be able to unite the inhabitants of the two 
colonies or to send aid from one to the other in case of 
danger."'^ 

Another very serious objection was that there was no ade- 
quate supply of water in the French territory for the 
supply of ships and that the French had always been 
forced to go into English territory where there was a 
small river. Matters remained in this state until the 
arrival of de Blenac, the governor-general of the islands, 
and of Patoulet, intendant, in 1679. They proposed a 
treaty with the English containing the following clauses: 
(1) a delimitation of the harbours with a prohibition for 
one nation to frequent the waters of the other; (2) free 
passage across the territories of each nation for persons 
without merchandise; (3) formal permission to be made 
obligatory for the transportation of colonial products or 
of merchandise from Europe across the territories of the 
other nation, and a bond to be given in order to insure 
good faith; (4) free access for the French to the sulphur 
mines on British territory; (5) free access for the English 
to the salt fields on French territory. The treaty, how- 
ever, was refused by the English.^^ Colbert seemed to real- 
ize the impossibility of preventing trade between the Eng- 
lish and French in the island, for he instructed de Blenac 
to remain satisfied with the prevention of commerce be- 
tween the two nations by sea and not to attempt to pro- 
hibit it within the island.^^ 

The Dutch attempted to send some vessels to the islands 
in 1678, on the pretext that the passports in blank which 

71 Ibid. 

72 Arch. Nat. Col., C^qj St. Christophe, I, Un proj ect de traitte qui 
a est6 envoye aux Anglais, December 15, 1679. 

73 Arch. Nat. Col., B, 9, fol. 34, Colbert to de B16nac, April 19, 1679. 

218 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

were given them by the treaty of Nymwegen authorized 
them to do so. Colbert, however, wrote letters to all the 
governors of the islands to respect no such passports and 
to enforce rigourously the regulations against all foreign- 
ers without exception/* De Blenac, who was sent out to 
the islands in 1678 to succeed de Baas, deceased, and 
Patoulet, who was sent out to become the first intendant 
of the islands in 1679, were both ordered to keep up the 
fight against foreign traders. In the instructions of the 
latter the following passage occurs : 

"Inasmuch as His Majesty has forbidden all foreigners to 
trade in the said islands and has reserved the trade thereof 
for his own subjects, there is nothing to which Sieur Patou- 
let should devote more attention and on which he should 
concentrate more effort than to prevent all foreign vessels 
from entering into the harbours, bays and inlets of his islands 
and trading there under any pretext whatsoever. He is not 
to admit them even when the inhabitants are in need of some 
article of merchandise for their subsistence."'^^ 

When Patoulet wrote Colbert that he had permitted 
three French vessels to trade at Martinique, although they 
had no passports, and another one from Nantes which had 
called at Cadiz and taken part of its cargo there, Colbert 
rebuked him for his conduct and commanded him to act 
in concert with de Blenac in order to insure strict enforce- 
ment of regulations.^^ 

On October 11, 1680, de Blenac and Patoulet issued an 
ordinance which forbade French vessels to bring cargoes of 

74 Arch. Nat. Mar., B2, 38, fol. 498 verso, June 10, 1678; ibid.. Col., 
B, 7, December 8, 1678. 

75 Arch. Nat. Col., B, 9, April 1, 1679. 

76 Bib. Nat. MSS., fonds frangais, 11315, fol. 54 verso. He in- 
structed the same official a few months later that in case the officers 
of the Domaine d'Occident disobeyed the regulations regarding for- 
eign trade, they be punished as all other subjects. Ibid., fols. 150- 
151, 125-134. 

219 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

salt beef, bacon, cloth, and other merchandise from foreign 
countries/'^ About the same time a squadron of His Maj- 
esty's vessels was sent to the West Indies under the com- 
mand of Count d'Estrees "to protect the commerce which 
my subjects carry on in the islands and prevent the for- 
eigners from participating therein. "'^^ The following year 
order was given for two small vessels of 120 and 150 tons 
to be equipped at Rochefort and sent to the islands to serve 
as a patrol/^ 

Colbert made provision, in theory at least, for the im- 
portation of all goods from Europe of which the planters 
had need, for he asserted that the law of supply and 
demand would force French merchants to bring them. He 
did not, however, make provision for the marketing of the 
by-products of the sugar industry, namely molasses and 
rum. In proportion as the sugar industry developed, 
these by-products became more important. Their impor- 
tance became especially great after the establishment of 
refineries in the islands. By 1681, Patoulet estimated 
their value at 100,000 ecus. But neither molasses nor 
rum could be marketed in France, the former apparently 
because there was no demand for it, the latter because law 
forbade its importation, in order to prevent it from enter- 
ing into competition with various distilled liquors manu- 
factured by the vine-growers of the realm. This fact gave 
rise to a very interesting proposal made by the refiners in 
Guadeloupe and Martinique: 

"Whereas his honour the intendant has urged the chief 
planters of the islands to undertake trade with the inhabitants 
of Canada and the coast of Acadia, the proprietors of the 
aforesaid refineries under the direction of Sieurs Bouteiller 
and Jamain^ . . . offer conjointly to open commerce with the 

77 Moreau de Saint-Mery, I, 343. 

78 Arch. Nat. Col., B, 9, April 8, 1680. 

79 Ibid., second part, fol. 10. 

230 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

inhabitants of Canada and of the coast of Acadia, which should 
be promoted in order to facilitate the sale of all syrups and 
rum made from cane, and to stop the mixture which is now 
being made of syrup with sugar, under the following condi- 
tions: (1) A monopoly of trade for ten years to be granted 
them with exemption from all import and export duties; (2) 
as Quebec and Acadia cannot consume all the syrup and the 
rum which are being made in the French islands and two- 
thirds of which is at present a pure loss, permission to be 
granted to barter these syrups with the English colonies, 
especially those in the neighbourhood of Boston, for salt meat 
and live stock for which there is such great need in the French 
islands." 

In regard to the latter, the petitioners asserted that 
they would be able in this way not only to satisfy a need 
in the islands, but also find a market for a product which 
remained a pure loss upon their hands, that they would 
thus be able to obtain an adequate supply of salt meat by 
barter, for which they had been accustomed to pay money 
to the Irish. In order to insure their good faith in limiting 
their trade with the English colonies strictly to the arti- 
cles enumerated, the petitioners offered to submit to a 
strict inspection by the customs officers and that in case 
any other merchandise were found they agreed to submit 
to whatever penalty His Majesty wished to impose. 

"This trade would occasion no diminution in the revenue of 
the king as there is no duty on syrups and rum. It would 
increase considerably the earnings of the planter, would per- 
fect the manufacture of sugar, and would encourage the estab- 
lishment of refineries, for they are now forced to throw away 
their syrups, whereas the refiners of France sell theirs to the 
Dutch for seven livres a hundred, a thing which the refiners 
of the islands cannot do by reason of the great leakage and 
cost of transportation." 

This petition received the approval of Patoulet, who 

231 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

wrote to Colbert that he regarded the project as very 
commendable : 

"I am convinced that if trade with the English colonies, 
close to Boston, can be established, as is proposed, the king 
and the colonies would derive great profit therefrom. I can 
hardly persuade myself, however, that the king of England 
will suffer his subjects to receive all of our syrup and rum, 
as they have an annual value of more than 100,000 ecus. The 
proprietors of the refineries here believe the contrary, and 
have confidence in their project, because they have learned 
that the English islands cannot furnish a sufficient quantity of 
these articles to satisfy the demands of those colonies. The 
English who dwell near Boston will not worry themselves 
about the prohibitions which the king of England may issue, 
because they hardly recognize his authority."^° 

Three things are to be remarked about this document: 
First, it presents a very interesting and reasonable pro- 
posal on the part of the refiners, which throws light upon 
the need of the colonies to find a market for some impor- 
tant commodities outside of the French empire ; second, 
it shows clearly that the profit in exchanging these pro- 
ducts with the English North American colonies for com- 
modities which these colonies were in turn forced to market 
outside of the British empire was great; third, that the 
New Englanders had already won a reputation among the 
French for a spirit of independence. 

The petition was refused by Colbert, partly because he 
did not approve of the establishment of a monopoly of 
trade between Canada, Acadia and the islands, but chiefly 
because he did not wish to authorize a modification of 
his policy to exclude all foreign trade.^^ He thus main- 

80 Arch. Nat. Col., Cg, III, March 8, 1681. The text of this peti- 
tion is to be found accompanying the letter of Patoulet. What 
appears to be the original, however, is found in the correspondence 
of Canada, Arch. Nat. Col., C^, V. 

81 Arch. Nat. Col., B, 9, fols. 38-39, Colbert to Patoulet, July 13, 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

tained his fight to the end and refused to yield a jot or 
a tittle in the principles which he had striven so long to 
maintain. 

As we draw to the close of the ministry of Colbert, we 
naturally ask how far his indefatigable efforts, his strict 
orders had borne fruit. Patoulet stated in a memoir of 
December 26, 1680, that he was "convinced that no for- 
eign commerce is being carried on in the island."^^ De 
Blenac assured Colbert in 1681 that no foreign commerce 
existed in the islands, and, finally, in 1683, St. Laurent 
and Begon in a joint memoir gave him assurance of the 
same fact.^^ Some three weeks after Colbert's death, the 
king wrote to these two officials that he was satisfied by 
the assurance which they had given him that foreign com- 
merce hac^ been effectively interrupted in the islands.^ It 
is not necessary to conclude from these statements that 
absolutely all commerce with foreigners had been stopped, 
for later events proved that there was still some contra- 
band trade, but the rapid increase in the number of French 
vessels trading in the islands indicates that Colbert's long 
and determined fight against foreign traders had borne 
fruit and that, on the whole, the great minister had won 
a signal triumph. 

The enemy of 1669, the ubiquitous Dutch trader, had 
been defeated and the French islands were comparatively 
free of foreign traders. The eyes of a prophet might have 
seen, however, that the rapid development of the French 
sugar colonies with a constantly increasing supply of 
molasses and rum, for which there was no market in the 
mother country, and with their increasing demand for 

1681; fol. 24, instructions to Sieur Begon, May 1, 1683; Arch. Aff. 
Etrang., Amerique, V, 507. 

82 Arch. Nat. Col., Cg, III. 

83 Ibid., November 13, 1681. 

84 Arch. Nat. Col., B, 10, fol. 20, the king to St. Laurent and Begon, 
September 24, 1683. 

223 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

food stuffs, live stock, slaves and lumber, which France 
could not satisfy, and the growth of the thrifty New Eng- 
land trader who could find neither a satisfactory supply 
of the former articles, nor a sufficient market for his 
increasing quantity of the latter in the British West 
Indies, meant an inevitable trade between the two groups 
of colonies. It proved an economic fact of prime impor- 
tance in the eighteenth century and was destined to have 
momentous consequences, both in overthrowing the "sys- 
tem" of exclusivism which Colbert had established, and in 
forming one of the chief economic causes of the American 
Revolution. 



224 



CHAPTER X 

Freedom of Trade and the Rise of the 
Private Trader 

WITH the dissolution of the West India Company in 
1674 came to an end the administration of the 
islands by a commercial company. With the exception of 
the slave trade, which was committed into the hands of 
contractors or of companies after 1673, the entire com- 
merce of the French West Indies was henceforth entrusted 
by Colbert to private enterprise. Attention has already 
been called to the fact that the private trader was admitted 
to the trade of the islands during the English war (Octo- 
ber, 1666) and that Colbert refused to close the door to 
him at its termination (July, 1667). That fact must be 
reconsidered here and the policy of the great minister 
stated with more precision. 

By an arret of the conseil d'etat of September 10, 1668, 
the privilege of trading in the islands was guaranteed to 
private traders. Heretofore it had depended upon the 
willingness of the company to grant them passports. By 
this arret they were accorded an equal right with the 
company to trade in the islands and to re-export from 
France, free of duty, colonial products which they wished 
to market in foreign countries.^ For a while their vessels 
were subjected to a tax, imposed by the company, of six 
livres per ton on their registered tonnage, when they 
sailed for the islands, and of five per cent on their cargoes 
at their return to France. But Colbert forced succes- 
sively the abolition of the tax of six livres (December 9, 
1669) and the reduction of the five per cent to three per 

iMoreau de Saint-Mery, I, 174-175. 

225 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

cent (June 4, 1671). He also abolished the special tax 
imposed by the company on cargoes of slaves imported by 
private traders into the islands (August 26, 1670).^ Even 
after the West India Company was forced to concentrate 
all of its efforts upon the importation of salt beef, live 
stock and slaves, the private trader was encouraged to 
enter into competition with it by being made a beneficiary 
of the same premium of four livres on every barrel of 
French salted beef, and of thirteen livres per head for 
slaves imported into the islands. 

By an arret of June 12, 1669, Colbert took into his own 
hands the power of granting passports to private traders.^ 
He gave an explanation of this action in a letter to Col- 
bert de Terron a few days later : "I am resolved to grant 
henceforth all passports myself in order to prevent the 
company from diminishing this commerce by preferential 
treatment to its own ships and in order to encourage indi- 
viduals to apply themselves to it."* 

These measures, which favoured in such an unmistakable 
way the growth of the private trader, were accompanied 
by reiterated commands of their enforcement and repeated 
statements of the principle of freedom of trade. The 
correspondence between Colbert and de Baas, governor- 
general of the islands, is very instructive on this point. 

De Baas seems to have had very little sympathy for 
the private trader. "I must tell you," he wrote to Colbert 
at the beginning of 1670, "that since private traders, 
coming from France, have begun to receive their passports 
directly from the king, they hold their heads too high and 
have become impertinent. They wish to sell their mer- 
chandise according to their own sweet wills without so 
much as paying the taxes usually levied on such cargoes 

2 Ibid., I, 187, 197. 

3 Ibid., I, 178. 

4 Clement, II, 2, p. 473. 

336 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

in the islands."^ He complained in another letter that 
French merchants were taking advantage of the fact that 
the king was assuring them a monopoly of trade, by de- 
manding too high prices for goods, and that they were 
coming to the islands with no other idea than that of per- 
sonal gain and without thinking of the real needs of the 
planters. Thus, in order to have cargoes of sugar, they 
were bringing fancy articles instead of the supphes which 
were really needed.^ Furthermore, de Baas showed par- 
tiality toward the ships of the company, and recommended 
that its monopoly be restored.^ 

To these reflections and recommendations, Colbert re- 
plied by a restatement of his policy and a command of 
obedience in the name of the king in regard to it : 

"It is really not necessary that you bother yourself with 
the consideration of the question as to whether it would be 
more advantageous or not for the company to carry on com- 
merce with the islands to the exclusion of all others. You 
have nothing to do, in fact, except to attract French vessels 
which have my passports by the good and just treatment which 
you accord to them. ... In regard to the company, when it 
becomes strong enough^ and has a sufficient number of vessels 
to satisfy the needs of the islands, I shall then listen to the 
arguments which it has to advance why permission should be 
refused to other Frenchmen who wish to go to the West Indies 
to trade. ... Be assured that it is only through liberty to all 
of my subjects to trade with these colonies that an abundant 
supply of everything can be obtained. This is especially true 
now, because my subjects are applying themselves much more 
than formerly to the pursuits of navigation and trade. They 
will surely go to trade where they receive good treatment and 
gain profit."^ 

5 Arch. Nat. Col., Cg, I, February 24, 1670. 

6 Ibid., January 15, 1670. 

7 Ibid. 

8 Clement, III, 3, p. 477, note 1. 

227 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

In regard to the refusal of private traders to pay taxes 
on their cargoes, Colbert wrote: "The custom which has 
been followed up to the present of levying duties on incom- 
ing and outgoing cargoes was a very good practice for 
the time, when foreigners and only a few Frenchmen car- 
ried on this trade, but at present, when foreigners have 
been entirely eliminated and only French traders remain, 
the custom must be abolished."^ A royal ordinance was 
proclaimed on June 9, 1670, whereby it was forbidden to 
lay any tax upon merchandise brought in French bottoms 
from France, or upon sugar exported in the same manner 
to France.^" 

As to de Baas' complaint that French merchants were 
demanding too high prices for their goods, Colbert 
replied again in favour of the private trader by affirming 
that it was only an entire freedom to sell goods at what- 
ever price one chose which could produce an abundant 
supply, and only an abundant supply which could produce 
cheapness. A royal ordinance was straightway pro- 
claimed which ordered "that all merchandise brought in 
French bottoms into the French islands of America shall 
be sold, either wholesale or retail, at whatever prices and 
under whatever terms that are agreed upon between buyer 
and seller. "^^ He rebuked de Baas for preferential treat- 
ment to the vessels of the West India Company and spe- 
cifically commanded him "to leave entire freedom to 
all Frenchmen to ply their trade in accordance with their 
passports. "^^ He appealed to de Baas' patriotism to guide 
him in the matter: 

"I should say to you in regard to freedom of trade that we 
should not be surprised to find that the directors of the West 

9 Ibid., p. 478. 

lOMoreau de Saint-M^ry, I, 194. 

11 Moreau de Saint-Mery, I, 194, June 14, 1670. 

12 Arch. Nat. Col., B, 1, fol. 156 verso, July 10, 1669. 

328 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

India Company wish to keep for themselves a monopoly of 
trade^ because they very naturally think only of their own 
interest and not of the general welfare or of that of the state. 
But as for you and me, we should raise ourselves above the 
plane of personal interests to that of public welfare, and plant 
ourselves squarely upon the principle of freedom of trade."^^ 
In order that there might be no mistake as to what he 
meant by freedom of trade, Colbert took occasion to define 
it himself in most specific terms: 

"The maxim of freedom of trade means that every French 
trader, holding a passport from the king, shall be received in 
all of the French islands and shall have an entire liberty to 
trade, to sell and to exchange goods at whatever price he 
chooses, and that the planter shall have the same liberty to 
dispose of his sugar in the same way. Any doubts which may 
arise in the application of this principle should be decided in 
favour of the trader, except where suspicions are entertained 
that the cargo contains articles purchased in foreign coun- 
tries."^* 

Colbert is thus very clearly presented as the champion 
of freedom of trade, that is to say, of the principle of 
assuring to all Frenchmen the right of trading in the 
islands. He appears in this role only after 1668, and 
especially in his correspondence of 1669, 1670 and the 
years following. Only about five years previously he had 
apparently appeared in quite a different role. In 1664 
he was active in the organization of the West and East 
India Companies. Although all Frenchmen and even for- 
eigners were invited to become stockholders and thus the 
whole nation was free to share in the two enterprises, yet 
both companies were endowed with monopolies. The 
inference is natural that in 1664 Colbert preferred the 
employment of large companies, founded on the principle 

13 Clement, III, 2, p. 479. 

14 Clement, III, 2, p. 487, Colbert to Pelissier, June 21, 1670. 

229 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

of monopoly of trade, to private enterprise, founded on 
the principle of freedom of trade, and that after five years 
of experience, he was converted from the error of his way 
and henceforth espoused the cause of the private trader 
and became a champion of the principle of freedom of 
trade. Some recent French historians have adopted the 
view that this inference is correct, and that a sharp line 
separates the commercial-colonial policy of Colbert into 
two periods, namely, that before 1669 and that from 1669 
to 1683.'' 

But had a great change really gone on in Colbert's 
mind between 1664 and 1669.? Had experience really 
proved to him that the principle of monopoly was really 
wrong and converted him to that of freedom of trade? 
Is one forced to conclude that the minister made a radical 
change in his commercial policy after 1669.'^ 

It must be said at the outset, that there is really no 
material for the period anterior to 1669 which enables 
one to say that Colbert estabhshed the two companies of 
1664, because he beheved in the principle of monopoly 
in preference to that of freedom of trade. Material 
throwing light upon Colbert's relations to the colonial 
problem previous to 1669 is exceedingly meagre. It is 
only for the period after that date, when Colbert was 
officially charged with the administration of the colonies 
and when correspondence became regular and was method- 
ically preserved, that one has any very satisfactory 
material on which to base any assertions as to the motives 
or the principles on which any given action of the minister 
was based. One can, at best, only adopt some working 
hypothesis to explain his commercial policy previous to 
1669. 

15 See especially E. Benoit du Rey, Becherches sur la politique 
coloniale de Colbert; Chemin-Dupontes, Les Compagnies de Com- 
merce en Afrique Occidentale sous Colbert. 

230 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

But the adoption of the view that Colbert accepted 
freedom of trade as the principle governing his commer- 
cial policy after 1669 leads at once to difficulties. The 
East India Company continued to enjoy a monopoly of 
trade until Colbert's death in 1683. A monopoly of the 
slave trade in the islands was granted to individual con- 
tractors or to companies in 1675, 1679 and 1681. No 
less than five commercial companies — the Company of 
the North, the Company of the Levant, the Company of 
the Pyrenees, the first Company of Senegal and the second 
Company of Senegal — were organized after 1669, and to 
all of them either a partial or a total monopoly was 
granted. These facts do not tend to make one accept the 
view that Colbert had discarded the principle of monop- 
oly. Furthermore, a strange confusion at once appears 
in his correspondence, if this view is accepted. Thus he 
wrote to de Baas on July 31, 1669: 

"In regard to trade by the French, His Majesty desires that 
you accord an equal protection to the ships belonging to the 
West India Company and to those belonging to individuals 
who have passports^ and he desires that you execute with 
promptness the terms of the said passports. . . . His 
Majesty is of the opinion that it is immaterial whether the 
company carry on this trade or not [trade between France and 
the islands]. This is all the more true because if it is freed 
from the necessity of carrying on this trade^ it can undertake 
that of Guinea^ or some other which will prove more profit- 
able. ... If the trade of the islands can be carried on in full 
liberty by all Frenchmen^ it is certain that both the kingdom 
and the islands will be better ofF."^^ 

Only seven months later, however, he addressed a mem- 
oir to the directors of the West India Company on Feb- 
ruary 26, 1670, which said: 

16 Clement, III, 2, pp. 456-457. 

231 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

"As long as the company grants permission to private trad- 
ers, it will suffice to permit all those who send cargoes to the 
islands to sell their goods to such persons and in such 
quantities as they wish. . . . But when the company ceases 
to grant such permission and asserts its monopoly, in order 
to avoid oppression the company must act in good faith toward 
the planters. "^^ 

But on April 9, 1670, only a little over a month later, 
he wrote to de Baas that "inasmuch as commerce was an 
act of the free will of man, it should be necessarily left 
free."^« 

Thus Colbert seems to be shifting from the thought of 
delivering the trade of the islands entirely into the hands of 
private traders to that of placing it again under the 
monopoly of the West India Company. De Baas com- 
plained of this fact as a cause of much unrest among the 
planters : 

"The common complaint of the planters at present is that 
changes are continually being made in the manner of gov- 
erning them and in the policy which controls their com- 
merce. Yesterday^ so they say, they were under the rule of 
individual proprietors, and today they are subjected to the 
rule of a company which they can not tolerate, for besides the 
bad treatment which they receive at its hands, it is responsible 
for the fact that the conditions of trade are ever changing so 
that they are at sea as to what to do. Sometimes the com- 
pany endeavours to monopolize trade and drive out foreign- 
ers, sometimes foreigners are readmitted only to be driven 
out again a short time afterwards. Then private French trad- 
ers are admitted. Such frequent changes confuse and dis- 
gust them so much that they would be glad to see the com- 
pany decide something definite, either to carry on the trade 
all alone, or to admit foreigners. "^^ 

17 Ibid., p. 472. 

18 Ibid., p. 477. 

13 Arch. Nat. Col., Cg, I, February 24, 1670. 

232 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

The fact is, that if one studies the acts and corre- 
spondence of Colbert with the hope of making some dog- 
matic assertion as to whether he became after 1669 a 
convert to the principle of freedom of trade, he will find 
himself in about as much confusion as the planters of 
Martinique. One thing is certain, Colbert was a practical 
man, not a doctrinaire who stopped to study the advan- 
tages or disadvantages of monopoly or of freedom of 
trade as theories. He regarded a commercial company 
and a private trader in exactly the same light. They 
were both instruments to be used in the realization of a 
plan which meant the building up of French industry and 
French commerce. He never organized a commercial com- 
pany or permitted the organization of one to which he 
did not commit some mission of national service. It was 
for this end that he subsidized and often entirely supported 
them, that he often charged some special officer or public 
official with their administration, and for this purpose 
that he gave so much of his own busy hfe to their direction. 
The dominating note of Colbert's industrial and commer- 
cial policy was patriotism. He worked so indefatigably 
for its realization, because he saw in it national prosperity 
and national greatness. It has already been shown what 
importance he attached to the establishment of commerce. 
For that end he was willing to seize any means at his com- 
mand, were it a commercial company or a private trader, 
which gave promise of being an effective agent in accom- 
plishing his work. If that is taken as a working hypothe- 
sis to study Colbert's commercial policy, it gives to it a 
unity from the commencement to the end of his ministry. 
He knew perfectly well that a regime of monopoly was 
oppressive and that one of freedom of trade was more 
natural and productive. "Commerce must be left free," 
he said, '^unless there is an indispensable necessity to com- 
mit it into the hands of a company or of a few contract- 

233 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

ors."^'^ Colbert said this in 1670, but there is nothing to 
show that he did not hold the same view in 1664, when he 
created the East and West India Companies. At that 
date he saw the Dutch in control of practically all of the 
commerce of the French West Indies, which had been 
established by French settlers and bought by French blood. 
He set his hand to the task of driving them out and of 
laying fast hold upon their riches for the profit of France 
and of her people. But Colbert never did things by half 
measures. He saw that such or such a thing should be 
done and he ordered it done immediately. So in this case 
the Dutch must be driven out at once. De Tracy left 
France in February with orders to exclude the Dutch 
trader during the space of six months, and consequently 
the problem of sending a large number of ships with car- 
goes of supplies was very pressing. Some agent must 
be found which could supply without delay the place which 
the Dutch had been occupying in the islands. There were 
too few private traders in the ports of France to make 
it at all possible to leave to them the task of satisfying 
the needs of the planters. Obviously the formation of a 
company which would have enough capital to send enough 
cargoes of supplies to the islands at once was about the 
only means at hand. One is justified in saying that the 
"indispensable necessity of committing commerce into the 
hands of a company" had arisen, and perhaps it is not 
too much to add that Colbert was of that opinion when he 
created the company. It does not follow at all that as Col- 
bert created the West India Company in 1664, and en- 
dowed it with a monopoly, he did so because he did not 
believe then, as he believed in 1670, that "commerce must 
be left free" wherever possible. 

When he found at the close of the English war that a 
number of private French traders were going to the 

20 Clement, III, 2, p. 477, Colbert to de Baas, April 9, 1670. 

334 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

islands, he protected them and encouraged them to con- 
tinue. From 1669 to 1674, he insisted that the ships of 
the company and those of private traders should be treated 
alike. He offered to both the same premiums, the same 
freedom from import and export duties, and subjected 
them to the same laws. He knew that every French ship 
which went to the islands, whether it belonged to the com- 
pany or to a private trader, was a gain for French com- 
merce and was a step forward in the realization of his 
plans. He wished to see a large number of vessels carry- 
ing an abundance of French manufactures and merchan- 
dise to the West Indies and bringing back with them rich 
cargoes of colonial products. 

"When the company becomes strong enough and has enough 
ships to carry on all of this trade alone, I shall then listen 
to arguments which it has to advance why passports should 
be no longer granted to private traders who wish to go to the 
islands. "^^ 

His only concern was that enough ships be sent to the 
islands and that they be French. The West India Com- 
pany was discarded in 1674, simply because it had ceased 
to be an effective instrument in building up that trade. 
Private traders had become numerous and into their hands 
was committed the commerce of the islands. When in turn 
private traders showed themselves incapable of satisfying 
the needs of the planters for slaves, Colbert called back 
into play commercial companies and endowed them with 
a monopoly of the slave trade. 

It seems much more accurate to say, therefore, that 
the so-called radical change in Colbert's policy in 1669, 
dividing his ministry into two halves, was not an impor- 
tant change at all. The only difference to be noted be- 
tween the two periods, 1664-1668 and 1669-1674, is that 

21 Clement, III, 2, p. 427, note 1. 

235 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

in the latter period he employed two instruments instead 
of one to realize his policy. In 1674 he discarded one of 
these instruments, because it had become too old and too 
weak to be of further service. Later he employed both 
commercial companies and private traders in the com- 
merce of the islands. 

The rapid growth of the number of private traders in 
the West India trade is one of the achievements of Col- 
bert's ministry, and, it might be added, one of the most 
permanent achievements, if it be measured in the light of 
its influence on the development of French commerce in 
the eighteenth century. The number of private ships 
going to the West Indies rose from three or four in 1662^^ 
to 60 in 1670, 89 in 1672, 131 in 1674'' and to 205 in 
1683.2' 

This growth took place principally in the three south- 
ern ports of Bordeaux, La Rochelle and Nantes. The 
Norman and Breton ports of Havre, Honfleur, Dieppe, 
Rouen and St. Malo became considerably handicapped by 
the frequent European wars and profited much less from 
the increase of trade with the islands. Thus, out of a total 
of eighty-nine passports demanded by private traders in 
1672, only eighteen were demanded by the ports of the 
north, and only twenty-four in 1674 out of a total of 131. 
Complete statistics are lacking for the later years, but 
it is certain that the trade of the northern ports with 
the West Indies continued to be of much less importance 
than that of the three southern ports mentioned. 

The admiralty records of Bordeaux, although incom- 
plete, enable one to follow with reasonable accuracy the 
growth in that port of trade with the West Indies. The 

22 Lavisse, VII, 2, p. 235, note 1. 

23 Arch. Nat. Col., B, 4, fols. 148-149; 4, fols. 107-114; 6, fols. 54-60. 

24 Arch. Col., F2, 15, Memoir marked "Indes Occidentales," and 
endorsed "M. Morel." 

236 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

registers for 1640 and 1651 indicate no sailings for or 
arrivals from the islands.^^ La Justice, 68 tons, of Amster- 
dam arrived on January 1, 1661, with a cargo of sugar 
from St. Christopher, and the St. Joseph, 70 tons, of 
La Rochelle, brought a similar cargo from the West 
Indies on February 28, 1667.^^ These two cases are the 
only sailings or arrivals indicated for the two years. In 
1671, twelve ships, with an aggregate tonnage of 1115 
tons, sailed from Bordeaux for the West Indies and six 
entered, all coming from Martinique except one, which 
came from St. Christopher.^'^ Fifteen sailed in 1672, and 
twelve more (1087 tons) in 1673.^^ In 1674 passports were 
granted to twenty-four private vessels to trade in the 
islands,^^ and in 1676 nineteen vessels were recorded as 
sailing for the West Indies. ^° This number rose to twenty- 
six in 1682 and 1683.^^ Twenty vessels arrived at Bor- 
deaux from the West Indies in 1684.^^ Of these twenty, 
six came from Martinique, of which one had touched at 
St. Domingo, six from St. Christopher, one from Guade- 
loupe, one from Cayenne, two from St. Domingo, and 
three indicated simply as coming from "the islands of 
America." The average tonnage of these twenty vessels 
was only fifty tons, and one Le Pierre of Royan, gauged 
only thirty tons. It made the voyage from Martinique 
with a cargo of sugar. The log of La Marie, fifty tons, 

25 Arch. Dept., Gironde, B, 1640, and Malvezin, Histoire du Com- 
merce de Bordeaux, II, 369. Malvezin consulted the admiralty rec- 
ords for 1651, 1671, 1672 (sailings only), 1676 and 1682 (arrivals 
only). His researches have been supplemented and the results offered 
in part here. 

26 Arch. Dept., Gironde, B, 153, fol. 3, and 154, fol. 27 verso. 

27 Malvezin, op. cit., II, 369. 

28 Arch. Dept., Gironde, B, 186; Malvezin, II, 369. 

29 Arch. Nat. Col., B, 6, fols. 54-60. 

30 Malvezin, II, 369. 

31 Arch. Dept., Gironde, B, 187, 188. 

32 Ibid., 159. 

237 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OE COLBERT 

may be taken as typical. It sailed from Bordeaux on Jan- 
uary 17, and arrived at Martinique on March 14. After 
trading there until May 7, it sailed for St. Domingo, 
arriving at Port de Paix on May 13. No mention is made 
of any cargo being taken at Martinique, but at Port de 
Paix, La Marie took 718 rolls of tobacco and two bales of 
cotton and sailed on August 9 for Bordeaux, where it 
arrived on November 13.^^ 

The principal articles of export from Bordeaux to the 
West Indies were wine, brandy, staves, headings and hoops, 
flour and salt beef.^* The majority of vessels went to the 
Windward Islands, Martinique, Guadeloupe, St. Christo- 
pher, and a few to St. Domingo. The cargoes from the 
former were composed almost entirely of sugar, with small 
quantities of indigo, ginger, roucou, and cotton, those 
from the latter, of tobacco, with small quantities of cotton, 
indigo and hides.^^ 

This trade proved very beneficial to Bordeaux. Profit 
derived from it laid the basis for the fortunes of many 
successful traders. One, Darriet by name, equipped no 

33 Arch. Dept., Gironde, B, 159. 

34 The details of cargoes are not often indicated in the registers 
for the period. Very frequently it is simply noted at the registration 
of a passport that the cargo of the vessels was composed of "wine 
and other merchandise," or "wine and victuals." The cargo of Les 
deux Maries, vthich sailed from Bordeaux for the West Indies on 
September 16, 1698, was as follows: 6Q tuns of wine, Q5 barrels of 
beef, 88 quintals of salt pork, 30 barrels of flour, 22 quintals fish oil, 
staves and hoops and headings for 100 barrels. La Vierge, J.60 tons, 
which sailed on October 6 of the same year, had a cargo composed of 
64 tuns wine, 100 gallons brandy, 53 barrels flour, 100 bundles hoops, 
staves, 200 pounds copper, 200 refining forms and pots, 6 guns, 300 
tables, 10 dozen pair shoes, 2 dozen hats, 100 dozen drinking glasses, 
400 yards cloth, 150 pounds olive oil. Arch. Dept., Gironde, B, 197, 
fols. 72 verso and 75 verso. 

35 Le Charles, 60 tons, coming from St. Christopher in 1671, brought 
a cargo of 13 pipes, 95 hogsheads, 138 barrels sugar, 2 barrels indigo. 
Malvezin, II, 369. 

238 



i 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

less than five vessels for the West Indies in 1683, seven in 
1682, and received five in 1684.^^ The registers of 1661 
and 1667 show that Bordeaux had been receiving its 
sugar from Portugal and La Rochelle,^^ but henceforward 
its supply was obtained directly from the West Indies. 
A new refinery was established in 1670.^^ Thanks to the 
high tariff against foreign refined sugar, established in 
1665,^^ and to the increase of trade with the French West 
Indies, the refining industry became prosperous. Trade 
with the West Indies became, in the eighteenth century, 
the most important factor in the economic life of Bor- 
deaux. It is only in the light of that development that 
one can fully appreciate the importance to Bordeaux of 
the work which Colbert accomplished in the seventeenth 
century. 

It is particularly unfortunate that the admiralty rec- 
ords, which would render it possible to state accurately 
the facts concerning the development of trade with the 
West Indies at La Rochelle, have not been preserved, for 
it is clear that La Rochelle was the most important port 
for that trade throughout the ministry of Colbert. The 
inquest of 1664 showed that there were only three vessels 
in this port engaged in trade with the West In dies. ^° In 
the list of passports granted to private traders in 1672 
in all France, no less than twenty-seven out of a total of 
eighty-nine were demanded by its traders. In 1674, the 
proportion was thirty-five out of a total of 131.^^ In 
both cases La Rochelle heads the list in number of pass- 
ports demanded. For 1682 we have found scattered rec- 

36 Arch. Dept., Gironde, B, 187, 188, 159. 

37 Ibid., 153, fol. 19; 154, fols. 91, 94, 98, etc. 

38 Malvezin, II, 373. 

39 See below, the discussion of legislation regarding sugar. 

40 Bib. Nat. MSS., 500 Colbert, 199, fols. 37 ff. 

41 Arch. Nat. Col., B, 4, fols. 107-114; 6, fols. 54-60. 

239 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

ords of thirty-four vessels sailing for the West Indies,*^ 
and forty-nine in 1685.*^ 

Colbert seems to have especially favoured the Rochellais. 
Thus he wrote on January 23, 1671, to Brunet, one of the 
directors of the West India Company: 

"Let me know exactly how many private traders are making 
preparations at La Rochelle to go to the islands of America. 
Inform the merchants that the moment I see that the number 
of their vessels is sufficient to satisfy the needs of the islands, 
the king will exclude those of Nantes and St. Malo, because 
I notice that the traders of those ports gain their profit from 
sugar which they sell to the Dutch, who take it away to refine 
in their own country."** 

The average tonnage of twenty-five ships sailing from 
La Rochelle for the West Indies in 1674 was 144 tons, 
almost three times greater than that of the ships from 
Bordeaux in 1684, recorded above.*^ The cargo of La 
Fortune, 150 tons, which sailed in 1674, may be taken as 
typical. It was composed of 248 one-quarter barrels wine, 
122 ditto brandy, 116 ditto flour, and 139 ditto salt pork.*^ 

Since the establishment of the port of La Pallice, the 
picturesque harbour of La Rochelle is being neglected. 
Mud banks and sand-bars keep out all but small fisher 
boats and shallow-draft steamers which glide over them at 
high tide. But no one can roam about the ancient strong- 
hold of the Protestants without seeing traces and hearing 
echoes of the great wealth brought by the sail vessels which, 
after their long voyage from the distant West Indies, 

42 Arch. Dept., Char. Inf., B, 235, Roles d'equip., 1682-1696. 

43 Ibid. 

44Jourdan, Ephemerides de la Rochelle, II, 32-33. 

45 Arch, Dept., Char. Inf., B (unclassified), Rap. et Proc. Verbal, 
1674. 

46 Only two cases have been noted for the year where cargoes con- 
tained any salt beef. One was three one-quarter barrels and the other 
sixty barrels. Ibid. 

340 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

glided between the two watch-towered gateways to unload 
their rich cargoes of sugar. Colbert had pointed the way 
and the enterprising Rochellais were quick to follow it. 

Results were also very encouraging at Nantes. Accord- 
ing to the inquest of 1664, only two vessels were engaged 
in trade with the West Indies.*^ But after the admission 
of private traders to the privileges of trading, the mer- 
chants at Nantes seized the opportunity and established 
a regular commerce with the West Indies. Colbert became 
convinced, however, as we have seen, that some merchants 
of this port were lending their names to Dutch traders and 
that practically all of the raw sugar, imported from the 
French colonies, was being re-exported to Holland. He, 
therefore, in 1670, refused to grant any more passports 
to the traders at Nantes. He restored the privilege by an 
arret of the conseil d'etat of December 14, 1671, on con- 
dition that the merchants of Nantes give up their former 
practices.*^ After this interruption, trade with the West 
Indies increased steadily and Nantes became a close rival 
to La Rochelle. In 1672 traders of Nantes demanded 
twenty-four passports,*^ and twenty-four again in 1683.^° 
During the year, August 18, 1685, to August 18, 1686, 
no less than fifty-eight vessels, 5830 tons, sailed from 
Nantes for the West Indies.^^ 

The principal exports were wine, brandy, salt pork, 
Irish and domestic salt beef, Irish butter, olive oil, fuel 

47 Bib. Nat. MSS., 500 Colbert, 199, fols. 225 ff. See also L. 
Maitre, Situation de la Marine du comt6 de Nantes d'aprfes I'enquete 
de 1664 in Ann. de Bretagne, xviii, 326-343, and E. Gabory, La Marine 
et le Commerce de Nantes au xviie siecle et au commencement du 
xviiie, ibid., 1-44. 

48 Arch. Nat., G^, 1313. 

49 Arch. Nat. Col., B, 4, fols. 107-117. 

50 Arch. Dept., Loire Inf., B, 6, Reg. de sorties, 1679-1685. The 
aggregate tonnage of these 34 vessels was 3410 tons, the aver- 
age being a fraction over 100 tons. 

51 Ibid., B, 7, Reg. de sorties. 

241 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

oil, flour, peas, biscuits, staves, headings and hoops, 
cloths and clothes, etc., etc.^^ Imports were raw and re- 
fined sugar, cotton, indigo, ginger, syrup, etc.^^ 

The admiralty records for the ports of northern France 
which carried on trade with the West Indies are almost 
wholly lacking and it is impossible to state more than 
superficial facts regarding their trade. The inquest of 
1664 showed that there were no vessels at Honfleur en- 
gaged in trade with the islands,^ or at Rouen.^^ There 
were at Havre one, at St. Malo three and at Dieppe six.^^ 
Up to the outbreak of the English war in 1666, the W'est 
India Company carried on a large part of its trade with 
the islands from these ports. In November, 1665, it may 
be recalled, it had about thirty vessels either ready or 
preparing to sail from them. But the war seriously inter- 
fered with commerce. During the years after its close, 
ships again sailed for the West Indies, for traders of 
Dieppe demanded nine passports in 1672 ; those of Hon- 
fleur, six; those of St. Malo, three; and in 1674, Dieppe 
demanded ten; Honfleur, nine; Havre, seven; St. Malo, 
six.^^ De Vanvre, general commissioner at Havre, stated 
in a letter of February 5, 1675, that there were fifteen 
vessels at Havre, Dieppe and Honfleur ready to sail for 

52 The cargo of L'Africaine, 250 tons, equipped by Rene Montau- 
douin, which sailed on January 18, 1675, was as follows: 41 tuns 
wine of Nantes, 30 barrels domestic beef, 200 barrels Irish beef, 900 
sets of staves, hoops and headings, 6 hogsheads prunes, 5 casks of 
brandy, 4 hogsheads peas, 3 cases shoes, 8 one-quarter barrels flour, 
8 cases hats, 15 bales cloth Bilbao style, 4 hogsheads and 6 cases cloth, 
10 barrels glass. Arch. Dept., Loire Inf., B, 3. 

53 The St. Frangois Xavier, 100 tons, which arrived at Nantes on 
October 12, 1688, brought a cargo of 94 hogsheads raw sugar, 1 hogs- 
head refined sugar, 20 bales cotton, 22 small barrels syrup. Ibid., 
B, 1, Long Cours, Rapports, 1686-1689. 

54 Bib. Nat. MSS., 500 Colbert, 199, fols. 113-116. 

55 Ibid., fols. 47-66. 

56 Ibid., fols. 101-108, 237-260, 69-83. 

57 Arch. Nat. Col., B, 4, fols. 107-117; 6, fols. 54-60. 

242 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

the West Indies, and on March 3, that ten had actually 
sailed from Dieppe, five from Honfleur and four from 
Havre. ^^ The northern ports suffered both from the exist- 
ence of the Dutch war, 1672-1676, and from the superior 
advantages of the southern ports for trade with the islands. 
A memorialist of 1698, in noting the decline of trade of 
these ports, offered the following explanation: 

"The Norman traders and those of La Rochelle^ particu- 
larly, rendered possible the first establishment of the French 
in the West Indies. Those of Brittany also had relations 
with the islands up to 1664. . . . After the West India Com- 
pany granted the privilege of trade to private traders, Nor- 
mandy continued her commerce principally through the effort 
of Sieur Pierre Formont, who sent a considerable number of 
ships to the islands. It was through this trade that the refin- 
eries of Rouen were able to obtain a supply of sugar and 
supply Paris and other parts of the kingdom. But this com- 
merce diminished and the Normans were in the habit of 
sending only a small number of vessels or none at all to the 
West Indies even before the outbreak of the last war [war of 
the Austrian Succession] and during that war. This change 
was due in part to wars during which danger of capture in 
the English Channel was great, and also, in part, to the growth 
of trade at Nantes, which had at hand a supply of all sorts 
of food-stuffs, products and merchandise necessary for the 
West India trade, whereas Normandy had neither wine nor 
brandy which were most important in making up cargoes for 
the islands. "^^ 

It would be a mistake to suppose, however, that trade 
with the West Indies ceased in the northern ports, for 
the second Company of Senegal equipped a number of its 

58 Arch. Nat. Mar., B3, 19, fols. 183, 190. It seems certain that 
some of the vessels to which passports were granted in 1674 were 
the same as spoken of in these letters. See ibid., 17, fols. 215, 218, for 
letters from the same person in regard to these vessels. 

59 Arch. Nat. Col., Cg, 2nd series, II, Mem, sur le commerce et 
navigation des Isles de L'Amerique. 

243 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

vessels at Dieppe in 1682/" and in 1683 five vessels be- 
longing to Protestants, or belonging to Protestant cap- 
tains, sailed from Dieppe to trade with the islands.^^ 

The war with the Dutch, declared in April, 1672, inter- 
fered seriously with the West India trade in 1672, 1674 
and 1676. At the opening of the war, Bellinzani stated 
in a memoir that inasmuch as the "commerce of the islands 
is of considerable importance to France, there being at 
present in the islands more than 100 French vessels, which 
should bring back very large quantities of merchandise," 
measures should be taken to protect it.®^ In accordance 
with this advice, vessels were forbidden to sail from the 
ports of France for the islands without an armed escort, 
and those in the islands were expressly prohibited from sail- 
ing for France "except after having assembled at the time 
and place indicated by the lieutenant-general" in order to 
be escorted by the king's vessels beyond the zone of dan- 
ger.^^ Escorts were furnished in some cases, for mention is 
made in one letter from the islands of the arrival "of the 
king's vessels and the merchants ships which they es- 
corted. "^^ Royal vessels sometimes carried cargoes back to 
France. Thus du Lion noted in one of his letters the sail- 
ing for La Rochelle of "one of the king's flutes with a good 
cargo of sugar, much to the contentment of the merchants 
and planters who transacted affairs with the captain."^^ 
In spite, however, of these precautions, Dutch corsairs 
at times wrought havoc with trade. Most of the fifteen 
vessels which sailed from Bordeaux for the islands in 1672 

60 Arch. Col., Cq, Cie. du Senegal, I, Estat des vais. ap. aux bour- 
geois marchands de Dieppe. 

61 Ibid. 

62 Arch. Nat. Col., Cg, 2nd series, I, Mem. du Sr. Bellinzani sur 
le commerce des Isles, March 13, 1673. 

63 Moreau de Saint-M6ry, I, 362, Ordon. du Roy, March 14, 1673. 

64 Arch. Nat. Col., Cg, I, letter from Jolinet, September 11, 1676. 

65 Arch. Nat. Col., Cy, I, March 33, 1673. 

244 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

were captured by them so that "the chamber of insurance 
was bankrupt and many failures followed. "^^ Ogeron, 
governor of St. Domingo, wrote to Colbert that he had 
neither vessels nor troops nor ammunition nor any means 
of defending the colony against their attacks or of keep- 
ing foreigners from trading there.^^ 

An embargo was laid in all the ports of France by an 
ordinance of February 23, 1674, but special permission 
was given to sixteen vessels assembled at Belle Isle, three 
at La Rochelle, four at Bayonne, and three at Nantes, to 
sail for the islands.^ The attack of Reuyter on St. Pierre 
(Martinique) in July, 1674, although unsuccessful by 
reason of the heroic defense maintained by the French, 
seemed to scatter terror among French shippers, for not 
a single vessel from France arrived at Martinique from 
the month of August until December 17.^^ The price of 
sugar, consequently, fell so low in 1674, that some plant- 
ers in Martinique began to cultivate ginger and indigo, 
and "to raise stock and poultry which they sold very dear 
to foreigners, much to their relief and satisfaction. "^° In 
the following year, however, French traders "came in such 
large numbers that the planters lacked nothing and all 
supplies of which they had need were furnished them at 
very reasonable prices. This was an unexpected joy to 
them, for the previous year had been very hard because 
only a small number of vessels came from France and 
such high prices were demanded by merchants that they 
became intolerable."^ 

66Malvezm, op. cit., II, 369. 

67 Charlevoix, II, 97. 

68 Arch. Nat. Col., B, 6, fols. 5, 6, 6 verso, and 11. 

69 Arch. Nat. Col., Cg, I, du Clerc to Colbert, January 20, 1675. 
On Reuyter's attack see ibid., 2nd series, I, de Baas to Colbert 
August 28, 1674; also Dessalles, Hist. Gen., I, chap., 21. 

70 Arch. Nat. Col., Cg, I, de Baas to Colbert, February 8, 1674. 

71 Arch. Nat. Col., Cg, I, de Baas to Colbert, May 4, 1675. 

245 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

Another Dutch squadron appeared in the islands in 1676 
and interrupted trade again. In May it was at Marie 
Galante. Jacob Beinchk, its commander, demanded the 
surrender of the island. He contented himself, however, 
with sending a small band of his men ashore to sack a 
plantation. In July, Beinchk appeared at the coast of 
St. Domingo, and on the 7th addressed a letter to the 
French inhabitants, offering them generous treatment, if 
they would declare themselves subjects of the Prince of 
Orange.'^^ On the 15th he attacked Petit Goave, where 

72 Arch. Nat. Mar., B4, 7, fol. 179; Dessalles, Hist. G4n., I, 544; 
Arch. Nat. Col., F3, 164, contains a copy of the letter addressed by 
Beinchk to the inhabitants of St. Domingo. It is as follows: 

"His Royal Highness, the Prince of Orange, has been informed 
several times of the strong desire which the French of the coast of 
St. Domingo have to trade with the Dutch. He knows also that His 
Majesty, the King of France, out of regard for the King of Spain, 
has never wished to recognize them as his subjects, with the excep- 
tion of those who dwell at Tortuga. Besides, His Majesty does not 
permit in any way the inhabitants of St. Domingo to trade with any 
others than French merchants. He refuses to them the same freedom 
in this respect which he grants to his subjects in the Antilles to 
whom negroes are brought by foreigners and who trade freely with 
all Frenchmen. His Majesty, for special reasons, prevents negroes 
to be brought to St. Domingo. It is needless to describe the suffering 
imposed upon the inhabitants of St. Domingo by such narrow restric- 
tions and by a host of burdens which are imposed upon them, such 
as excessive taxes and duties laid by His Majesty. It is useless to 
describe these things, because the inhabitants themselves have been 
made to feel the burden thereof. His Royal Highness, the Prince of 
Orange, believing that these hardships are unendurable and that the 
French of St. Domingo will take advantage of the existence of the 
war to throw off such a heavy yoke and to enter under the protection 
of our lords, the estates of Holland and His Royal Highness, and 
into the enjoyment of trade with all nations without any distinc- 
tions, and into that of other privileges which we will not specify in 
this letter, but which will undoubtedly prove advantageous to the 
said inhabitants. This generous offer of His Royal Highness is very 
favourable to the inhabitants of St. Domingo and of great conse- 
quence to them. Thus every one would be freed from the burden of 
work by the quantity of negroes imported into the island. . . . The 
majority of the planters would become in time very prosperous. We 

246 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

he defeated and destroyed the few French vessels there. 
Moreau de Saint-Mery has preserved for us a hst of no 
less than thirteen vessels captured by the Dutch between 
June 10 and July 17, 1676.^^ Beinchk next captured 
Cayenne. 

Trade became more secure in the following year, for 
Comte d'Estrees was sent to the islands with a squadron 
of twenty vessels. He recaptured Cayenne on December 
21, 1676, and took Tobago on December 25, 1677.'* He 
was at St. Domingo in May, 1678. In the summer he 
attempted an expedition against Cura9ao, but his squad- 
ron was shipwrecked on August 5. The Dutch took ad- 
vantage of the catastrophe and captured several vessels 
with cargoes of tobacco at the coast of St. Domingo.'^ 

are sure that the inhabitants will not refuse proposals which are 
so vital to their prosperity and well being, and that they will come 
aboard our vessels to confer with us more at length. We hereby give 
assurance to all in general, and to each in particular, that those who 
wish to come aboard, either to confer with us or for other things, 
will be freely returned ashore, whenever they wish. If the inhabi- 
tants, collectively, desire to delegate some representative who will go 
'with us to Cul de Sac, empowered to act conjointly with the inhabi- 
tants of that quarter in treating with us, we shall be very glad to 
receive such representatives and will guarantee their safe return. To 
accomplish this His Royal Highness has sent this squadron of ves- 
sels hither and has commanded us to treat with the inhabitants of 
St. Domingo in the most friendly spirit. Awaiting a response, we are 
your humble servant, 

"Jacob Beinchk. 
"Aboard La Defense, July 7, 1676." 

73 Arch. Nat. Col., F3, 164, liste des Navires qui sont pris des 
Hollandais a la Cote de St. Domingue. The thirteen vessels had an 
aggregate tonnage of 1900 tons and had cargoes of 18,900 rolls of 
tobacco. Of the thirteen vessels four were from La Rochelle, three 
from Honfleur, two from Dieppe, one from Havre and one from 
Nantes. 

74 Arch. Nat. Mar., B4, 7, contains much material on d'Estrees' 
voyage. 

75 Charlevoix, Hist, de L'Isle Esp., II, 118-119. 

247 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

Again the disturbance in trade was only temporary, for 
the French quickly regained control of the West India 
waters by the appearance at Martinique on May 8 of 
d'Estrees with another squadron, and they remained in 
control until the close of the war/^ Treaties of peace 
were signed at Nymwegen on August 10, 1678. 

With the exception of such interruptions occurring dur- 
ing the war, private traders steadily increased in numbers 
and carried on a constantly growing trade with the West 
Indies. An experienced merchant of La Rochelle remarked 
in 1679 that "so many vessels had never been seen at 
Nantes, La Rochelle and Bordeaux in preparation for the 
islands. "^^ By 1683, the number of French ships trading 
with the West Indies had increased to S05.^^ 

Freedom of trade seems to have worked miracles, but in 
reality it was the indomitable will and the wisdom of 
a great minister which had called the dormant forces of 
the nation to life, and endowed them with new prosperity. 

76 Arch. Nat. Mar., B4, 8. 

77 Bib. Nat. MSS., fonds fran?., 11315, fols. 19-23, letter from 
Anthoine Allaire to Patoulet, 1679. 

78 Arch. Col., F2, 15, Memoir marked "Indes Occidentales" and 
endorsed "M. Morel." 



248 



CHAPTER XI 

Colonial Exports — Tobacco 

WE have had occasion in the preceding chapters to 
see the situation which confronted Colbert at the 
beginning of his ministry, to study the history of the West 
India Company from its origin in 1664 to its downfall ten 
years later, to follow the unrelenting campaign against 
the Dutch, and finally to trace the rise and development of 
the private trader. An important task still remains, for 
we have touched only superficially upon the legislation 
which Colbert framed, on the one hand, to control the 
production of colonial commodities and to regulate their 
exportation to the mother country, and, on the other, to 
stimulate French industry to furnish the articles de- 
manded by the planters and to open the way for their 
importation into the islands. The royal edicts, ordinances, 
arrets and letters, concerning these several problems, con- 
tain some of the least known and, at the same time, some 
of the most interesting phases of Colbert's commercial 
policy. But their number is so great that it would prove 
quite impracticable to present them in detail. We shall 
limit our study, therefore, to the most important. There 
were really only two commodities of importance produced 
in the French West Indies during the entire ministry of 
Colbert, namely, tobacco and sugar. Neither cotton, nor 
roucou, nor indigo, nor any other product, except the 
two staples mentioned, ever became important enough to 
be made the subject of special legislation. The study has 
been limited therefore to a discussion of the legislation 
relating to tobacco and sugar. As for articles imported 
into the islands, slaves, food-stuffs, live stock, lumber and 

249 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

manufactured goods were the most important, and it will 
be only with them that we shall concern ourselves. 

It will be recalled that d'Esnambuc, at his first visit to 
St. Christopher, was enthusiastic over the quality of 
tobacco which grew there and took back with him to 
France a cargo of "excellent tobacco." The Dutch, too, 
were so attracted by its excellent quality that they estab- 
lished a regular trade with the island. It became the 
staple product at Guadeloupe, Martinique, St. Domingo, 
and the other islands, at their settlement by the French. 
Jacques Bouton stated in 1640 that tobacco was the only 
product carried to Europe from the French West Indies.^ 
Its production became so extensive that de Poincy, gov- 
ernor-general of the French islands, resident at St. Chris- 
topher, made an agreement with the governor of the Eng- 
lish that no more tobacco would be planted for seventeen 
months "in order to restore that merchandise to its former 
price." In accordance with that agreement, de Poincy 
issued an ordinance on May 6, 1639, ordering "everyone 
to pull up root and branch the tobacco already planted, 
without saving a single plant. "^ 

Tobacco remained the staple product throughout the 
period of the first two companies and served, as in Vir- 
ginia, as currency in the islands. It was not until near 
the middle of the century that the cultivation of sugar- 
cane became important enough to create a rival for it.^ 
By the beginning of Colbert's ministry, the cultivation 
of tobacco had become secondary and during the course 
of his ministry the cultivation of sugar-cane became the 
all absorbing occupation of the planters. This was true 
only so far as the Windward and small Leeward Islands 
were concerned, for at French St. Domingo tobacco 

IJ. Bouton, Relation de I'Estab. des Frang., pp. 80-81. 
2Du Tertre, I, 143, prints text. 
3 Pelleprat, op. cit., 8-9. 

250 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

remained practically the only product of importance 
throughout the entire period/ 

It was apparently Ogeron who first tamed the wild 
spirit of the freebooters of St. Domingo and led some of 
them to undertake the more gentle pursuit of cultivating 
the soil. He was so successful that by 1669 the produc- 
tion of the colony reached 1,200,000 pounds of tobacco,^ 
and by 1674, 3,000,000 pounds.^ 

Previous to the ministry of Colbert, French colonial 
tobacco seems to have been admitted free of duty. Thus 
a royal proclamation of November 17, 1629, laid a duty 
of thirty sous the pound on tobacco imported from foreign 
countries, but specifically exempted that brought from 
the islands within the concession of the Company of the 
Isles of America.^ By the tariff of 1664, framed by Col- 
bert, an import duty of thirteen livres the hundredweight 
was laid on foreign tobacco and one of four livres the 
hundredweight on colonial tobacco.^ The latter was re- 

4 A contemporary description of the coast of St. Domingo passes 
in review the different settlements thereof. On the section of the 
north aromid the Cape it is noted that "all the lands are planted in 
tobacco," and that a few of the inhabitants were buccaneers; on that 
of Port-de-Paix that the inhabitants were occupied with the produc- 
tion of tobacco and food-stuffs; on that of the west coast around 
Petit Goave it is remarked that "the occupation of all the inhabitants 
of this gulf is the cultivation of their lands in tobacco and the hunting 
of the wild boar." Arch. Nat. Col., C9, 2nd series, I, M6moire en- 
voye par Bellinzani sur les Boucaniers et sur I'^tat des establ. faits 
a St. Dom., 1677. 

5 Arch Nat. Col., C9, I, Ogeron to Colbert, September 23, 1669. 

6 Arch. Aff. Etr., Mem. et Doc, Esp. 79, fols. 46 verso, Memoire 
sur le commerce des isles fran9., 1692. Arch. Nat. Col,, F3, 164, 
contains a list of vessels captured by the Dutch at the coast of St. 
Domingo between June 10 and July 17, 1676. There were thirteen 
captured, of which nine were laden with 18,900 rolls of tobacco (945,- 
000 pounds). In a supplementary list are given the names of nine 
vessels which had sailed from St. Domingo for France with 13,900 
rolls (695,000 pounds). 

7 Arch. Nat,, AD,xi, 48; Sabatier, La ferme du tabac. 
SDessalles, Hist. Gen., II, 31. 

251 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

duced to two livres by an arret of December 10, 1670, but 
restored to four livres on May 24, 1675.^ In addition, 
an import duty of three per cent was paid by private 
traders to the West India Company up to the date of its 
dissolution (1674), and then to the Domaine d'Occident 
throughout the remainder of the period. The right of 
re-exportation with drawback of import duties was pro- 
vided by law throughout the period.^° 

Other legislation favoured the West India planter. 
Thus the cultivation of tobacco was forbidden in Canada 
on the ground that it would prove less profitable to the 
inhabitants than other occupations and that "the culti- 
vation of this weed in Canada would be injurious to the 
interests of the islands of America. "^^ Its cultivation in 
France was restricted to the generalites of Bordeaux and 
of Montauban and to certain districts around Montdragon, 
St. Maixant, Levy and Metz.^^ 

But the most important act concerning tobacco taken 
during Colbert's entire ministry came in 1674. In that 
year the sale of all tobacco in France was transformed into 
a monopoly, controlled by the state. The monopoly was 
farmed out to Jean-le-Breton, whose bail bears the date 
of November 30, 1674. By the terms of the bail a monop- 
oly was granted of the sale, wholesale and retail, of all 
tobacco, whether grown in France or imported from the 
French West Indies, from Brazil or from other foreign 
colonies or countries ; consequently, all those who grew 
tobacco in France or imported it into the realm were 
forced to treat with the farmer or his agents ; if, however, 
no agreement could be reached between the two contract- 
ing parties, the liberty of exporting or of re-exporting 

SMoreau de Saint-Mery, I, 204, 292. 

10 Moreau de Saint-Mery, I, 208-209. 

11 Arch. Nat. Col., B, 4, Colbert to Talon, June 4, 1672. 

12 Arch. Nat., AD,xi, 48, ArrH du conseil d'Uat, March 14, 1676. 

252 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

tobacco to foreign countries was to be enjoyed by the 
seller, on condition that, in case of delay, his tobacco be 
placed in the warehouses of the farmer at the owner's 
expense until the time of shipment; the wholesale price 
of tobacco, grown within the realm and in the French 
islands of America, was fixed at twenty sous per pound, 
and of foreign tobaccos at forty sous and upwards ; the 
retail price at twenty-five sous and fifty sous and upwards, 
respectively; and it was forbidden to import tobacco into 
the kingdom by land and by any other ports than by 
those of Rouen, Bordeaux, La Rochelle, for the ocean, and 
of Marseilles for the Mediterranean; although special 
permission was granted to import tobacco for Normandy 
by Dieppe and for Brittany by Morlaix, St. Malo and 
Nantes.^^ By an arret of January 25, 1676, exportation 
of tobacco was limited to the ports of Bordeaux, Sables 
d'Olonne, La Rochelle, Nantes, Morlaix, St. Malo, Rouen, 
Dieppe, St. Valery, Narbonne, Cette, Agde, Marseilles 
and Toulon.^* ' 

The marketing of colonial tobacco in France was thus 
made highly unprofitable by reason of the relatively high 
import duty laid upon it and by reason of the fact that its 
sale was placed in the hands of a monopoly. The fact 
that it was liberally protected against foreign competition 
was offset by the fact that in actual practice the privilege 
of its re-exportation to foreign countries was rarely 
enjoyed. Thus a well-known merchant of Nantes re- 
marked that when tobacco arrived from St. Domingo, it 
was necessary to place it under the lock and key of the 
farmer. If the farmer wished to buy the tobacco, he 
nought all sorts of means to intimidate the trader. He 
objected to the quantity or to the quality, and offered 

13 Arch. Nat., AD,xi, 48, contains a copy of the bail which bears 
date of November 30, 1674. 

14 Ibid. 

253 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

low prices. He tried to prevent re-exportation to foreign 
markets, for which provision was made by the law, by 
demanding a bond of twenty sous the pound as a guar- 
antee that the tobacco would be carried to the port desig- 
nated.^^ 

The effect of this policy was felt at once in the colonies. 
Patoulet stated in 1680 that, whereas the cultivation of 
tobacco used to occupy in the Windward Islands 4000 or 
5000 men, none was being cultivated then "by reason of 
its depreciation."^^ De Pouan9ay wrote about the same 
time from St. Domingo that he was compelled to employ 
all of his efforts in order to hold the planters within their 
allegiance, because "they are reduced to the last extremity 
on account of the great losses which they have suffered 
since the time that tobacco was placed in the hands of a 
monopoly. I have seen them in despair, and ready to with- 
draw among the English of Jamaica and among the Dutch 
of Cura9ao." He added that he had persuaded them from 
doing so only by communicating to them a letter which he 
had received from Bellinzani and which held out the hope 
that the monopoly would be suppressed at the expiration 
of the bail, that is to say, in 1680, and that colonial 
tobacco would be subjected to a simple import duty as 
in former times.^'^ De Pouan9ay gave warning that if 
conditions continued as they were, he would not remain 
responsible for what might happen in the colony.^^ He 
wrote again at the beginning of the following year that 
the cultivation of tobacco had become so unprofitable by 
reason of the quantity produced and of the low price of- 
fered by the monopoly in France that several plantations 

15 Boislisle, of. cit., II, appendix, 497, Memoire du depute de 
Nantes. 

16 Arch. Nat. Col., Cg, 2nd series, I, Memoir by Patoulet, 1680. 

17 Arch. Nat. CoL, Cg, I, de Pouangay to Colbert, March 20, 1680. 

18 Charlevoix, Hist, de VIsle Esp., II, 131. 

254 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

had been abandoned.^^ In still another letter, a few months 
later, he remarked that the planters could no longer gain 
a li"sdng by cultivating tobacco.^^ Accompanying this last 
letter was a memoir addressed to Colbert by "the officers 
and principal planters of St. Domingo who had assembled 
in obedience to the orders of M. de Blenac, governor and 
lieutenant-general of the islands and terre ferme of 
America" : 

"The planters of the coast of St. Domingo find themselves 
reduced to the last extremity^, being unable to derive any fruit 
from their labour, because the monopoly places such a low 
price upon the tobacco which they send to France, notwith- 
standing the fact that the same tobacco is sold at a very high 
price in the realm. The result is that they can no longer 
support themselves or maintain their plantations so that most 
of them have been forced to abandon their fields and become 
freebooters. It is therefore humbly begged of Monseigneur 
that he take some measure, agreWble to His Highness, which 
will prevent the destruction of the colony, either by abolishing 
the monopoly or by prohibiting, within the kingdom, the use 
of foreign tobacco with which the farmers of the monopoly 
are supplying themselves in abundance. . . . Monseigneur is 
also humbly begged to accord the privilege of re-exporting 
to foreign countries the tobacco imported from St. Domingo. 
The said officers and planters agree to furnish only a limited 
quantity of tobacco, properly weighed and of good quality, 
on condition that the monopoly be forced to purchase it at a 
price proportionate to the cost of production. "^^ 

This memoir had hardly reached France before the monop- 
oly for the sale of tobacco was renewed in favour of Claude 
Boutet.'' 

19 Arch. Nat. Col., C9, I, de Pouan^ay to Colbert, January 30, 
1681. 

20 Ibid., May, 1681. 

21 Arch. Nat. Col., C9, I, Memoir of May 5, 1681. 

22 The bail was renewed on July 22, 1681. It is printed in full by 
Chambon, Le Commerce de I'Amerique, I, 482 ff. A printed copy is 

255 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

But one measure was taken which theoretically freed 
the planters from the tyranny of the monopoly. This was 
the arret of April 8, 1681, which confirmed the right of 
re-exportation of colonial tobacco to foreign countries. 
Consequently all French subjects, importing tobacco from 
the "French islands of America and the coast of St. 
Domingo," were to enjoy this right on condition that a 
formal declaration be made of their intentions to do so. 

The farmers of the monopoly apparently continued, 
however, to prevent the re-exportation of colonial tobacco, 
for a merchant guild of St. Malo made protest against 
their conduct, asserting that they were doing everything 
to control absolutely the price of colonial tobacco and 
that they were so successful that there was no longer any 
profit in the trade. ^^ Complaints came also from the 
merchants of La Rochelle of the bad faith of the farmers 
in using every means to prevent the re-exportation of 
colonial tobacco and to force traders to sell them tobacco 
at prices which they offered.^* 

Whatever may have been Colbert's hope in the passage 
of the arret of April 8, 1681, or to whomever must be 
attributed the fault that the privileges accorded by it 

to be found also in Arch. Nat., AD,xi, 48. Dareste, Histoire de 
France, V, 513, asserts that Colbert had the intention to abolish this 
monopoly. On what authority he makes the assertion, he fails to 
state. 

23 Arch. Nat., G7, 1685, Sindic de la communaute des March. n6goc. 
de St. Malo, November 28, 1685. Villebague Eon, one of the prin- 
cipal merchants of St. Malo, wrote to de Lagny, at that time director- 
general of commerce, asking permission to ship tobacco directly from 
St. Domingo to Holland. De Lagny replied that the request could 
not be granted, but that orders had been given to the farmer of the 
monopoly to grant without delay permission to re-export colonial 
tobacco. Arch. Nat. Mar., B7, 58, II, fol. 98 verso, de Lagny to 
Villebague Eon, September 23, 1686. 

24 Boislisle, op. cit., I, 358. The controller-general wrote to Arnoul, 
the intendant at La Rochelle, to inquire into the matter and report 
to him. Ibid. 

256 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

were not enjoyed, one thing is certain, poverty continued 
at St. Domingo. Thus, de Pouan9ay wrote on September 
25, 1682: 

"They [the planters] live very well so far as food is con- 
cerned, but they are entirely destitute of cloth and garments 
for themselves, for their servants and their slaves, and are in 
need of other things necessary for their plantations. This is 
due to the fact that merchants are unwilling to barter merchan- 
dise for tobacco which is pure loss to them."^^ 

De Cussy found on assuming the duties of governor as 
successor to de Pouan9ay in 1684, that his most difficult 
task was "to calm the planters on the subject of the 
tobacco monopoly which continued to ruin them, because 
the existence of this monopoly had so cheapened the price 
of tobacco, which had so long been the staple product of 
the colony and served as its currency, that those who had 
no other means of support than its cultivation were in 
danger of dying of starvation. "^^ A priest wrote from 
St. Domingo somewhat later : 

"I believe that you would like to know that the cause of 
discontent among the planters of the island is none other than 
the question of tobacco. It is only the well-to-do planters 
who can earn their living, as they have the means to cultivate 
indigo ; the small planters who can cultivate nothing but 
tobacco are objects of pity, as they have no market for their 
tobacco. They are in extreme poverty. One can see whole 
families naked. I saw a poor young miss who was obliged to 
borrow a chemise from a negress to put on while she washed 
her own. I have seen women about to be delivered come and 
upon bended knee implore the governor to give them a small 
quantity of wool wherein to wrap their babes. "^^ 

25 Arch. Nat. Col,, Cg, I, de Pouan9ay to Colbert, September 25, 
1682. 

26 Charlevoix, o'p. cit., II, 150. 

27 Arch. Aff. Etrang., Doc. et Mem., Amerique, V, 6Q5, Le Pere 
Plumier to de Bonrepos, October 6, 1690. 

257 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

If a contemporary estimate of 50,000 or 60,000 rolls 
(2,500,000 or 3,000,000 pounds) of tobacco as the pro- 
duction of the colonies in 1674 be accurate, the decrease 
in production in ten years was nearly fifty per cent, for 
the average production of St. Domingo for the six years, 
1683-1688, was only 30,674 rolls (1,533,700 pounds).'^ 
A few years later the planters became so incensed at the 
low price of tobacco that they pulled up what they had 
planted and ceased to plant it altogether.^^ 

This policy of sacrificing the interests of the planters 
to those of the monopoly in France forced the adoption 
of another means to gain a livelihood. De Pouan9ay tells 
us, in one of the last letters which he wrote before his 
death, that "the planters are devoting themselves to the 
cultivation of indigo and cotton, and a few to the cultiva- 
tion of sugar-cane, some others to that of cacao and to 
the raising of cattle."^" This was true, as Pere Plumier 
remarked, only of the larger planters who had the capital 
necessary to begin the cultivation of new products. The 

28 Arch. Nat. Col., C9, IV, Estat des quantites de roUes de tabac 
de St. Domingue entrez dans le Royaume pendant le bail de Fau- 
conne, de celle qui en a este acheptez, pour la ferme et le prix qu'ils 
ont este payez le cent pesant. S9avoir: 



A.nnee 


Nombre 

des Rolles 

entrees 


Ditto 

acheptees pout 

la ferine 


Prix courant 
du centpesant 


1683 


47,823 


8,913 


600 rolles a 20 livres 
5,513 rolles a 25 livres 
7,800 rolles a 30 livres 


1684 


17,213 


11,211 


6,825 rolles a 25 livres 
d'autres rolles a 21 to 36 livres 


1685 


25,153 


6,300 


de 20 a 45 livres 


1686 


35,590 


14,126 


Moyenne h 30 livres 


1687 


45,500 


6,381 


Moyenne a 32 livres 


1688 


12,763 


7,955 


Moyenne k 22 livres 



The "roll" usually contained 50 pounds. 

29 Boislisle, II, 497, Memoire du deput6 de Nantes, 1701. 

30 Arch. Nat. Col., C9, I, de Pouan^ay to Colbert, September 25, 
1682. 

258 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

small planter was idling away liis time in the sunshine with 
his hungry, naked children about him. Before him was 
his small tobacco field. As he gazed upon it, he doubt- 
lessly thought of the days when the large green leaf, turn- 
ing to a rich yellow for the harvest time, brought its 
reward for the days of sweat and toil. The bitterness of 
defeat and disappointment and rebellious anger must 
have been in his soul. The curse was writ upon his brow. 
Colbert's ministry closed leaving poverty broadcast 
among the tobacco planters of St. Domingo, and the 
policy which had been pursued during the last ten years 
was directly responsible therefor. But one might have 
seen the first rays of a new dawn which was to transform 
the struggling colony of tobacco planters into the richest 
and most productive sugar colony of the world. 



259 



CHAPTER XII 

Colonial Exports — Sugae 

■pELLEPRAT, who was in the islands in 1650 and 
-■- again in 1654, and pubHshed an account of his voy- 
age in 1655, remarked that the ordinary money of the 
islands . was tobacco and sugar and that traders were 
exporting sugar. "I say that traders take away sugar 
with them, because of late sugar of excellent quality is 
being produced in the islands and particularly at St. 
Christopher."^ De Rochefort, in 1658, in describing the 
plantation of de Poincy, the governor of St. Christo- 
pher, remarked that in the lot adjoining the dwelling- 
house, there were "three machines or mills suitable for 
crushing sugar-cane." Besides these, the same governor 
maintained three similar mills on another plantation in 
Cayonne. Following the example set by the governor, 
the chief officers and planters of St. Christopher also set 
up sugar-mills. De Rochefort gives a list of no less than 
fifteen planters who had done so.^ Shortly afterwards 
Biet noted that the sugar industry at Guadeloupe was 
flourishing, thanks to the fact that the Dutch who had 
been driven from Brazil had settled in that island: 

"After one of the principal Dutchmen had examined the soil 
of Guadeloupe^ he found it so excellent that he assured the 
governor that even the soil of Brazil was not better adapted 
to the cultivation of sugar-cane. Immediately the governor 
granted him a plantation in Cabesterre where he employed 
his slaves in clearing the land, preparing the soil and planting 
sugar-cane. . . . The governor and all the planters followed 
his example with the result that according to report of those 



1 Pelleprat, pp. 8-9. 

2 De Rochefort, p. 312. 



260 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

who come from the island, Guadeloupe is no longer what it 
used to be. . . . There are planters who manufacture 10,000 
pounds of sugar a week. . . . All the planters are very well 
established and are little lords, whereas in former times they 
were very poor."^ 

In a memoir written in 1660, it was stated that the first 
trade of the planters of Martinique was in tobacco, which 
was still produced, and that indigo, cotton, ginger and 
roucou were also cultivated, but that in proportion as the 
planters become rich they began to plant sugar-cane and 
establish sugar-mills, of which, the author adds, there 
were many then in the islands.^ De Tracy wrote to Col- 
bert on October 24, 1664, that there was a scarcity of 
food-stuffs, not only for the soldiers, but also for the plant- 
ers of all the islands, and especially of Martinique, because 
the planting of cassava had been abandoned for the culti- 
vation of sugar-cane.^ In another letter the same year 
he wrote to the same minister that it was useless to urge 
the planters to cultivate cotton and indigo, because much 
more profit was to be gained by the production of sugar.^ 
It is clear from these citations that by 1664 the pro- 
duction of sugar had become the chief industry of the 
French Antilles, except St. Domingo, where tobacco re- 
mained for more than two decades longer the chief produc- 

3Biet, pp. 314-315. 

4 Arch. Nat. Col., Cg, 2nd series, I, Relation des Isles de I'Amer- 
ique. 

5Du Tertre, III, 98. 

6 Arch. Nat. Col., Cg, 2nd series, I, Minute of a letter addressed by 
Colbert to the governor-general of the Antilles. In the margin is 
written in the hand of Colbert the following comment: "Quoyque le 
peuple trouvent (sic) plus d'advantage au sucre qu'au coton et a 
Findigo comme il y a lieu d'esperer que les isles en se peuplant se 
defricheront et que cette augmentation de terre en culture pourroit 
rendre les sucres trop communs, il faut toujours s'appliquer et main- 
teuir la culture dudit coton et de I'indigo parceque la diversite des 
denrees et marchandises causera assurement I'abondance dans les 
Isles." 

261 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

tion. But practically all of the sugar produced in the 
French islands was carried either directly or indirectly 
to Holland to be refined, for the refining industry in 
France was as yet in its infancy^ Colbert, therefore, 
had two problems : ( 1 ) the creation of the refining indus- 
try in France, and (2) the encouragement of production 
in the islands by legislation which would facilitate the sale 
of sugar in France. 

Colbert formed the plan as early as 1664 of building 
up the refining industry in the realm, for he made provi- 
sion in that year for exportation to foreign countries of 
sugar refined in France.^ Shortly afterwards he encour- 
aged Guy Terre, a merchant at Rouen, in the establish- 
ment of two refineries in that city. He even furnished 
part of the capital himself, "because he regarded the 
enterprise as very useful to the state, to the increase of 
navigation and to the development of the colonies of 
America."^ On September 15, 1674, he ordered Gaspard 
Maurellet to establish a refinery at Marseilles "with the 
view of increasing and extending the commerce of the 
French islands of America to the ports of the Mediterra- 

7 As early as 1613 permission was granted to Jeremie Vualens to 
establish a refinery at Rouen and in 1620 he was authorized "to con- 
tinue with his associates the refining of sugar." Gosselin, Doc. authent. 
et inMits pour servir a I'histoire de la Marine Normande et du com- 
merce rouennais pendant les 16^ et 17^ sUcles, Rouen, 1876, p. 131. 
Trezel, to whom was granted the privilege of establishing sugar mills 
in the islands, was also probably interested in the same industry at 
Rouen. But it is not probable that these refineries were of much 
importance. 

8 Article XVlII of the letters-patent of the West India Company 
of May, 1664, reads as follows : "The merchandise which will have been 
declared to be consumed in the kingdom and on which import duty 
will have been paid and which the company decides later to export to 
foreign countries will be subject to no export duty, nor shall the 
sugar, refined in France in the refineries which the said company 
will have established, be subjected to export duties with the condi- 
tion, however, that the said sugar be exported in French bottoms." 

9 Chambre de Commerce of Nantes, C, 733. 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

nean and those of Provence, where it was not known, and 
to destroy in Provence and in the provinces, trade in 
Dutch sugar and the cassonades of Brazil."^" Others 
were urged to make similar estabhshments at Dunkerque, 
Dieppe, Nantes, Saumur, Angers, Tours, Orleans, La 
Rochelle, Bordeaux and Toulouse. By 1683 no less than 
twenty-nine refineries existed in France, which consumed 
annually 17,700,000 pounds of raw sugar.^^ 

Colbert protected refineries in France by putting, in 
1664, a very high duty on foreign refined sugar of fifteen 
livres the hundredweight. This was increased by an arret 
of September 15, 1665, to twenty-two livres ten sous the 
hundredweight.^ 

The amount of sugar refined in the realm was important 

10 O. Teissier, Inventaire des Archives Historiques de la Cha/mbre 
de Commerce de Marseille, p. 144. 

11 The document from which this information has been taken is of 
enough interest to be reproduced here : Estats des rafineries de France, 
1683: 







Consommation de 




Rafineries 


Sucre brut 


Dunkerque 


• .2 


1,500,000 livres. 


Dieppe 


1 


500,000 livres. 


Rouen 


8 


4,500,000 livres. 


Nantes 


3 


3,000,000 livres. 


Saumur . 


1 


800,000 livres. 


Angers 


1 


800,000 livres. 


Tours 


1 


500,000 livres. 


Orleans . 


2 


800,000 livres. 


La Rochelle 


4, 


2,400,000 livres. 


Bordeaux 


3 


2,000,000 livres. 


Toulouse . 


1 


400,000 livres. 


Marseille . 


2 
. 29 


1,200,000 livres. 


Totals 


17,700,000 livres. 


Aux Colonies . 


& 

34 


3,000,000 livres. 




20,700,000 livres. 


Arch. Nat. Col., F3, 14 


\>2. 




12 Arch. Nat., AD,xi, 48. 







263 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

enough by 1670 to raise a discussion between the revenue 
farmers, on the one side, and the West India Company 
and private traders on the other, to make it necessary for 
the king to settle the dispute. The dispute arose in the 
following way. By a royal declaration of September, 
1664, a general provision was made whereby both French 
and foreign merchants were permitted to place in entrepot 
foreign merchandise which they wished to export later 
into foreign countries. No export duties were to be laid 
upon such goods and even import duties paid upon mer- 
chandise which was at first declared to be for consumption 
in France were to be returned if the said goods were re- 
exported to foreign ports. This was confirmed by a royal 
edict of February, 1670.^^ It is to be inferred that colonial 
products brought by the West India Company and pri- 
vate French traders could thus be exported to Holland and 
other European countries. At any rate, the claim was 
made by the West India Company and private traders that 
raw sugar, brought from the French islands and refined 
in the kingdom and re-exported into foreign countries, fell 
within the law, and that therefore, duties paid on the 
raw sugar when imported, should be restored at its expor- 
tation after it had been refined. As it took two and one- 
half pounds of raw sugar to yield one pound of refined 
sugar, the duties paid on the two and one-half pounds 
should be restored for every pound of refined exported. 
The revenue farmers objected, however: (1) that the 
sugar brought from the islands came from a territory 
under the domination of His Majesty and did not fall 
within the law, which had to do only with merchandise 
imported from foreign countries; (2) that, besides, sugar 
after being refined changed its character; and (3) that 
it would be impossible to avoid confusion in attempting 
to restore duties collected on raw sugar, because raw 

13 Chambre de Commerce of Nantes, C, 730. 

364 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

sugar imported by the West India Company paid only 
two livres the hundredweight, and that imported by pri- 
vate ships paid four hvres, and that it would be obviously 
impossible to distinguish between the two after refining. 
An arret of September 29, 1670, settled this dispute by 
ordering the farmers to restore duties collected on raw 
sugar imported into the kingdom from the French islands 
at the rate of six livres the hundredweight on its exporta- 
tion in the form of refined sugar. No distinction was to 
be made between sugar belonging to the company and 
private merchants. An interesting clause was added to 
this arret which said that no restoration of duty whatso- 
ever was to be made on raw sugar re-exported to foreign 
countries. ^^ 

To the refiners of Rouen was granted, on every hun- 
dredweight of refined sugar exported, a special drawback 
of 100 sous, which represented a partial restitution of the 
special import duty of fifty sous per hundredweight laid 
at Rouen on raw sugar.^^ 

This was a most distinct encouragement to the refining 
of sugar within the realm, both by the relatively high tariff 
imposed on foreign refined sugar, and by the encourage- 
ment given to exportation of refined sugar by granting a 
drawback. There was after this no additional legislation 
to affect the refiners in France before 1682, "when they 
complained of the competition of the refiners in the 
islands." Before, however, considering that legislation, 
it will be well to see what measures were taken to promote 
the interests of the planters in order to understand how 
the dispute arose. 

14 Chambre de Commerce of Nantes, C, 730. 

15 Chambre de Commerce of Nantes, C, 730, arrH of March 25, 1670. 
This duty had been imposed originally by the city itself in 1638 as a 
temporary source of revenue, but it became permanent and the right 
to collect it was farmed out. The West India Company possessed the 
farm and it was by it that the drawback was to be paid. 

265 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

By the tariff of 1664, all refined sugars which entered 
France by the ports of the Cinq Grosses Fermes were to 
pay fifteen livres the hundredweight, all other sugars four 
livres the hundredweight. Included in the last named was 
all sugar imported from St. Christopher. It is thus seen 
that French colonial sugar, that is to say, raw sugar, for 
as yet there were no refineries in the islands, received no 
preferential treatment. Colbert, however, quickly reme- 
died this by an arret of September 15, 1665, by which all 
refined sugars imported from foreign countries were forced 
to pay twenty-two livres ten sous the hundredweight ; cas- 
sonades and muscovado from Brazil, fifteen livres and 
seven livres ten sous, respectively ; paneles and sugar from 
St. Thomas, six livres ; and all sugar from the French 
colonies, four livres.^^ 

This schedule remained in force for all foreign sugars 
throughout the entire period and for French colonial sugar 
until an arret of December 10, 1670, by which the import 
duty was reduced fifty per cent, that is to say, to forty 
sous the hundredweight. The motive for this reduction 
was stated in the preamble to be the fact that the import 
duty was so large in proportion to the price of sugar in 
France that the planters could no longer gain any profit in 
its production. Colbert remarked in a letter to Colbert de 
Terron, inclosing a copy of this arret, that "there is justi- 
fication for the hope that, with such a great concession, 
the French will carry on all the commerce of the islands 
to the exclusion of the foreigner."^^ This new schedule on 
raw sugar from the islands was maintained, however, only 
until May S4, 1675, when the old schedule of four livres the 
hundredweight was restored. It remained thus fixed until 
the close of Colbert's ministry. 

These duties were applicable only to the ports within 

16 Arch. Nat., AD,vii, 3. 

17 Arch. Nat. Mar., Bg, 14, January 2, 1671. 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

the Cinq Grosses Fermes, that is to say, so far as commerce 
with the islands was concerned, in the ports of Normandy. 
They were later extended to Bayonne and Bordeaux but 
did not apply to the Breton ports of St. Malo and Nantes. 
Sugar imported into Rouen was subject to a special local 
import duty of six deniers the pound or fifty sous the 
hundredweight. That imported into other ports likewise 
was subjected to local duties, but they were of small 
importance. 

The increased production in the islands, stimulated no 
doubt by the new activity of French traders after the 
English war, seems to have been accompanied by a corre- 
sponding decrease in the price of sugar. De Baas repeat- 
edly expressed the opinion in his letters of 1670 that the 
increasing production of sugar would shortly result in 
such low prices that the planter would no longer find profit 
in cultivating the soil.^^ Du Lion asserted in a letter of 
September 30, 1670, that the price of sugar in France was 
so low and the cost of freight so high that the planters 
were losing hope of gaining any profit from its sale.^^ The 
duty of four livres the hundredweight on colonial sugar 
was reduced to two livres by the arret of December 10, 
1670, as we have just seen, because its low price made it 
impossible "for the planter to export it to France or 
to continue the cultivation of his plantation. "^° The same 
conditions continued at the close of the Dutch war, when 
the price of sugar in the islands fell to two livres ten sous 
and three livres the hundredweight.^^ 

18 Arch. Nat. Col., B, 2, fol. 135, the king to de Baas, December 
21, 1670. 

19 Arch. Nat. Col., C7, I, du Lion to Colbert, September 30, 1670. 
Du Lion stated that the price of sugar at Dunkerque was fifteen 
francs the hundredweight and that the planters were forced to pay 
sixteen deniers a pound for freight. 

20Moreau de Saint-Mery, I, 204. 

21 Arch. Nat. Col., C3, III, Memoire de I'intendant Patoulet pour 
M. Begon, December 20, 1682. 

367 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

Three very obvious means could be employed to bring 
relief to the planter: (1) To limit the production of sugar 
in the islands so that the supply would more nearly corre- 
spond to the demands of the refineries in France ;^^ (2) to 
permit a free exportation of raw sugar to foreign ports, 
either directly from the islands or indirectly by way of 
France; and (3) to permit the establishment of refineries 
in the islands. 

Colbert seems to have favoured the principle of limiting 
production. To the remark made by de Tracy, in a letter 
from Martinique in 1664, that the planters found much 
more profit in the cultivation of sugar-cane than in that 
of cotton or of indigo, Colbert made the following reply: 
"Although the planters find more profit in the production 
of sugar than in that of cotton or indigo, it is necessary to 
maintain the cultivation of the latter, inasmuch as there 
is reason to expect that the islands, in proportion as their 
lands are cleared and put in cultivation, will produce too 
large a quantity of sugar. Variety in cultivation is more 
conducive to their welfare."^^ But to the letters of de 
Baas expressing fears that an over-production of sugar 
was imminent and might prove disastrous to the islands, 
the following reply was made: 

"You can assuredly relieve your mind of the uneasiness 
which is expressed in all of your letters that the islands will 
produce so much sugar that it will be difficult to find a market 
for it and that consequently its price will be so cheapened 

22 P. Leroy-Beaulieu, De la Colonisation chez les peuples modernes, 
5th edition, Paris, 1903, I, 166, states that the production of sugar in 
the islands was 37,000,000 pounds. He cites, however, no authority 
for this statement. Patoulet estimated the production at 18,000,000 
pounds. Arch. Nat. Col., Cg, III, Mem. pour M. Begon, December 20, 
1683, and Moreau de Saint-Mery made from some source the estimate 
that the seventeen refineries in France consumed 17,700,000 pounds 
of raw sugar. Arch. Nat. Col., F3, 143. 

23 Arch. Nat. Col., Cg, 3nd series, I, Minutes de lettre ad. par Col- 
bert au gouv. gen. des Antilles. 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

that the planters will suffer a loss in its production and will 
no longer be able to cultivate their plantations. . . . Trust to 
me that I shall guarantee to my subjects who are engaged in 
this trade every means and facility to transport sugar to for- 
eign markets."^* 

In spite, however, of this very clear evidence that Col- 
bert did not wish at that time to limit the production of 
sugar, because he believed that there was a better solu- 
tion to the problem, we find him writing in less than a 
year to Pelissier, a director of the West India Company in 
the islands : 

"As the abundance of sugar seems to be exceedingly great 
in the kingdom, it would be wise for you to take into considera- 
tion whether or not you could influence the planters to decrease 
the amount of land devoted to the cultivation of sugar-cane, 
and to cultivate some cotton, indigo, and ginger. Try some 
experiments in the planting of spices such as pepper, nutmegs, 
etc."25 

But no measures were taken to enforce such a plan upon 
the planters. Colbert regarded it as unwise because he 
believed that "a decrease in the production of sugar meant 
a decrease in the development of the islands. "^^ 

The expediency of permitting the exportation of raw 
sugar directly from the islands was never seriously con- 
sidered, because "he [Colbert] knew that it would foster 
the growth of the Dutch refineries, which he wished to 
destroy."^^ The question arises as to whether the raw 
sugar of the islands could be exported from France to 
foreign countries. It seems that according to clause 

24 Arch. Nat. Col., B, 3, fol. 135, the king to de Baas, December 21, 
1670. 

25 Clement, III, 2, pp. 526-527, Colbert to Pehssier, November 4, 
1671. 

26 Arch. Nat. Col., Cg, III, Memoire by Patoulet, December 20, 
1682. 

27 Arch. Nat. Col., Cg, III, Mem. by Patoulet, 1682. 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

XVIII of its letters-patent, the West India Company 
had the right to re-export any sugar imported from the 
islands. The act of September 10, 1668, which forbade 
the company to grant passports to foreigners, said explic- 
itly: 

"The said company and the said private traders shall arm 
their vessels, and make their returns in the ports of France, 
where they shall have the privilege of discharging their car- 
goes of sugar, tobacco, and other merchandise coming from 
the company's colonies, and may re-export them into foreign 
countries without being obliged to pay duties thereon, on con- 
dition, however, of making a declaration of the fact before the 
proper officers. "^^ 

Colbert wrote on November 28, 1670, to Brunet, one of 
the directors of the West India Company: "In regard to 
muscovado, I shall not change my policy of requiring 
duties to be paid upon it when it is re-exported from the 
realm"; and again on January 23, that "His Majesty 
desires that all sugar imported from the islands of Amer- 
ica be refined in the realm. "^^ It was also about this time 
that the privilege of trading in the islands was taken from 
traders at Nantes and not restored until a formal promise 
had been given by them that no raw sugar would be re- 
exported to foreign countries, under penalty of confisca- 
tion of vessel and cargo, and that they would refine their 
sugar.^" 

Scherer^^ states that an ordinance of 1682 prohibited the 
re-exportation of raw sugar imported from the islands. 
Boizard and Tardieu^^ refer vaguely to a law of 1681 which 
forbade the same thing. The latter add that the same 

28Moreau de Saint-Mery, I, 175. 

29 Depping, Correspondance, III, 524, 527. 

30 Arch. Nat., G7, 1313; AD,xi, 48, arrit du conseil d'Stat, Decem- 
ber 14, 1671. 

^^Histoire du Commerce, II, 493. 

32 Histoire de la Legislation des Sucres, 1664-1891, p. 3. 

270 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

law imposed a duty of eight francs the hundredweight on 
refined sugar in the islands and imported into the realm. 
But this last action was taken apparently for the first 
time by the enactment of the arret of April 18, 1682, which 
will be discussed below, and it seems probable that it is to 
this arret that reference is made. It contains, however, 
no prohibition to re-export colonial raw sugar. Although 
two very excellent collections of acts relating to sugar 
have been examined, no legislation of 1681 or 1682 con- 
taining such a prohibition has been found.^^ Apparently it 
was not until September 28, 1684, that the re-exportation 
of colonial raw sugar to foreign countries was formally 
forbidden.^ It is to be remarked, however, that this date 
is posterior to that of the death of Colbert. All that can 
be said, so far as the records which we have consulted are 
concerned, is that Colbert expressed the wish that all raw 
sugar be refined within the realm before re-exportation, 
but that he never formally required it except in the case 
of traders of Nantes. The importance of this consists in 
the fact that colonial raw sugar was never placed by Col- 
bert entirely in the control of the French refiner. The law 
permitted its sale in foreign markets. In actual practice, 
however, the refiner in France enj oyed a monopoly of colo- 
nial raw sugar, for it was found to be so unprofitable to 
sell it in foreign markets, after import duties had been 
paid in France and the expense of unloading and reloading 
had been met, that it was not done. Thus Patoulet ex- 
plained the excessively low price of sugar in the islands in 
1679, which was two livres ten sous or three livres per hun- 
dredweight, by saying that the refiners of France agreed 
among themselves to fix the price to be paid for raw 
sugar. 

33 Arch. Nat., AD,xi, 48, Chamb. de Commerce of Nantes, C. 730. 

34Moreau de Saint-Mery, I, 402. 

35 Arch. Nat. Col., Cg, III, Memoire, December 20, 1682. 

271 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

Obviously the only means left to save the planters from 
the tyranny of the French refiner was to encourage the 
establishment of refineries in the islands. The refining of 
sugar had already been begun in the islands in fact. Thus 
Claude Gueston, a director of the East India Company, 
and residing at Caen, established in 1667, at great expense 
to himself, a refinery in the island of Guadeloupe in order 
"to do something agreeable to His Majesty."^^ We learn 
from a letter by de Baas to Colbert of March 4, 1670, that 
the superior-general of the Jesuits, R. Pere Brion, had 
begun the refining of sugar at Martinique and that he 
hoped to refine 10,000 pounds. De Baas added that it 
would be wise for the West India Company to encourage 
him in every way possible in order to stimulate others to 
follow his example in establishing refineries, for it was a 
matter of great importance to the welfare of the islands.^^ 
At the beginning of 1672, de Baas wrote that the planters 
were convinced of the advantage of refining their own 
sugar, but that there were several things which prevented 
them from doing so. In the first place, the planters were 
heavily indebted to private merchants and to the West 
India Company and wished to pay their debts, but their 
creditors wished to receive refined sugar on the same basis 
as raw sugar ; in the second place, a considerable capital 
was necessary for the establishment of refineries ; and in 
the third place, there were not enough refiners in the 
islands to teach the process of refining to the planters. In 
regard to the last point, de Baas suggested that the West 

seChamb. de Commerce of Nantes, C, 730, Extrait des Reg., July 
4, 1682. The purpose of the act was to grant exemption from import 
duties for 200,000 pounds of sugar refined at this refinery and im- 
ported into France, as an import duty of eight livres per hundredweight 
had been laid by an arrH of April 18, 1683, on sugar refined in the 
islands. 

37 Arch. Nat. Col., Cg, 2nd series, I, de Baas to Colbert, March 4, 
1670. De Baas wrote again some few days later (March 22) that 
Father Brion was still persisting in carrying out his plans. Ibid. 

272 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

India Company send out six refiners, two for each of the 
islands of Martinique, Guadeloupe and St. Christopher.^ 
Du Lion wrote on November 16, 1671, that he was plan- 
ning to establish a refinery at Guadeloupe and that he was 
trying to induce others to follow his example.^^ 

Colbert pursued the policy of encouraging such estab- 
lishments. He wrote to de Baas on November 29, 1672: 

"You know how important it is for the commerce of the 
islands of America to persuade the planters to refine their sugar 
themselves and thus to gain a more ready and more assured 
market for their sugar. The West India Company has given 
orders and instructions to Sieur de Loover^ planter of Guade- 
loupe, and supplied him with all implements necessary for the 
instruction of planters in the method of refining sugar and of 
making cassonades. You should not only aid him in every 
way that you can^ but acquaint all with the undertaking and 
especially convince the planters of the advantage to be gained 
in refining their sugar. "*^ 

He wrote similar letters to du Ruau Pallu, agent-general 
of the West India Company, and to du Lion, governor 
of Guadeloupe.*^ In 1674, Colbert wrote again to de 
Baas instructing him "to urge the planters to purify and 
refine their sugar. "*^ 

Furthermore, Colbert protected colonial refiners by for- 
bidding the revenue farmers to collect more than four 
livres the hundredweight on sugar refined in the islands 

38 Arch. Nat. Col., Cg, I, de Baas to Colbert, February 28, 1672. 

39 Arch. Nat. Col., C7, II, du Lion to Colbert, November 16, 1671. 

40 Arch. Nat. Col., B, 4, Colbert to de Baas, November 29, 1672. 

41 Ibid., fols. 102, 102 verso. 

42 Ibid., 6, fol. 32, May 15, 1674. We have a bit of evidence in the 
admiralty records of La Rochelle which rather implies that a refinery 
was established in one of the islands a few months later. L'Angelique, 
whose passport was registered on December 22, 1674, had in her cargo 
"320 barriques de charbon, 1800 pots et formes a rafiner sucres." She 
was bound for Guadeloupe. Arch. Dept. Charente Inf., B, unclassi- 
fied. Rap. et Proc. Verb., 1674. 

273 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

and imported into the realm. He thus placed the same 
import duty on it as that levied on raw sugar.*^ 

By 1679, two refineries had been established at Martin- 
ique and three at Guadeloupe, but they seem to have been 
small and rather unimportant.^* Thus Colbert's efforts 
had as yet borne small fruit. This was possibly due in 
part to the Dutch war. At any rate, the very low price 
of sugar in 1679 necessitated renewed activity. 

Patoulet's arrival in the islands in the summer of 1679, 
to become the first intendant-general, marks an epoch in 
the growth of refineries. A memorialist of 1692 re- 
ferred to him as the one who had proposed their estab- 
lishment and fostered their growth.''^ It was inaccurate 
to affirm that Patoulet had originally proposed their estab- 
lishment, as is evident from what has been said above, but 
it is strong proof of his activity during his intendancy in 
contributing to its success. Shortly after his arrival he 
wrote to Colbert that plans had been made for the estab- 
lishment in Martinique of two large refineries which would 
be able to refine annually 800,000 or 900,000 pounds of 
raw sugar. These two refineries were to be ready by the 
beginning of 1680. Permission had been asked to con- 
struct others. Patoulet wrote to Colbert in regard to the 
matter as follows : 

"As I do not know exactly what are your intentions toward 
such enterprises and as they might be unfavourable, I have 
postponed my reply to the very pressing demands of certain 
other planters who wish to construct two new refineries and 
asked my permission to do so. This delay which I imposed, 
together with the report which comes from the refiners at 
Bordeaux to the effect that a supplementary import duty of 
four livres had been laid on sugar refined in the islands, has 

43 Moreau de Saint-Mery, I, 294. 

44 Arch. Nat. Col., Cg, II, Patoulet to Colbert, September 22, 1679. 

45 Arch. Aff. Etrang., Mem. et Doc, Esp., 79, fol. 61, Memoire sur 
le commerce des Antilles. 

274 



M 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

so alarmed every one that those who asked permission to estab- 
lish the two refineries no longer talk of carrying out their 
plan."*6 

The reply which Colbert wrote to this letter, although 
brief, can leave no doubt as to the policy which he intended 
to pursue. "You should work to increase by every means 
the number of refineries."*'^ Shortly afterwards he wrote 
again: "You should persuade the planters to establish 
refineries, for it is certain that it can contribute much to 
the increase of commerce."*^ 

In accordance with these instructions, Patoulet became 
very active in promoting the refining industry. He wrote 
in 1680 enthusiastically, that the two large refineries of 
which he had written in a previous letter had brought forty 
good workmen from France and that the advantage of 
such establishments was already evident, for the price of 
sugar had already risen thirty-three and one-third per 
cent. "I shall exert all my efforts to persuade others to 
construct new refineries." He added that he had almost 
completed a company which would erect a new refinery 
and that he had written to the Company of Senegal to 
urge it to establish another. If these plans materialized 
he was sure that enough sugar could be refined in the 
islands to supply the entire kingdom.*^ Patoulet became 
personally interested in one refinery for a three-eighths 
interest,^" and he seems to have carried on a regular trade 
in sugar with Anthoine Allaire, a merchant of La Ro- 
chelle.'^ 

46 Arch. Nat. Col., Cg, II, Patoulet to Colbert, September 22, 1679. 

47 Arch. Nat. Col., B, 9, fol. 24, June 2, 1680. 

48 Bib. Nat. MSS., fonds fran9., 11315, fol. 133, May 4, 1681. 

49 Arch. Nat. Col., Cg, 2nd series, I, Mem. de Patoulet, December 
20, 1680. 

50 Arch. Nat. Mar., B3, 45, fols. 31-33, Patoulet to Seignelay, March 
7, 1684. 

51 Bib. Nat. MSS., fonds fran?., 11315, fol. 19 verso, contains a 

375 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

The growth of these refineries produced immediate re- 
sults, for the price of raw sugar rose in 1682 to five francs 
and later to six francs ten sous per hundredweight.^^ The 
refineries of the realm felt the competition and appealed 
to the government against this new force which had arisen 
to dispute their monopoly and to threaten their destruc- 
tion. Colbert had been responsible, as has been shown, 
for the growth of the refining industry in France and 
those interested in it had a right to claim his protection. 
He was equally responsible for its growth in the islands, 
as has just been seen. There is, however, a difference to 
be observed in his attitude toward the two enterprises. 
There can be no doubt that his original plan was for the 
islands to produce raw sugar and to have it refined in the 
realm. When, however, the establishment of refineries in 
France was not sufficiently rapid to make it possible for 
all of the raw sugar of the islands to find a ready market 
in France and to prevent a serious depreciation thereof, 
he was forced to find some expedient to save the planter 
from ruin. He refused to permit the exportation of raw 
sugar direct from the islands to foreign markets and dis- 
tinctly discouraged its re-exportation from France, and 
he was not willing to limit the production of sugar by 
forcing the planters to plant a certain per cent of their 
lands with other crops. He was thus forced in a sense to 
encourage the establishment of refineries in the islands. 
He thus seems to have favoured their establishment more 
as a temporary expedient than as a permanent policy. 

The experiment had proved highly successful and ad- 
vantageous to the planters. There were many sound rea- 
sons why the policy of encouraging colonial refineries 

letter of October 29, 1679, from this merchant to Patoulet, contracting 
for 50,000 pounds of raw sugar at four livres the hundredweight. 
52 Arch. Nat. Col., Cg, III, M6moire pour M. Begon par Patoulet, 



276 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

should be continued. Raw sugar lost in transportation 
from the islands to France about one-fourth, whereas 
refined sugar lost nothing. ^^ By refining their own sugar 
in the islands the planters would gain, according to an 
estimate by Patoulet, 600,000 francs annually, for, he 
argued, 18,000,000 pounds of raw sugar at an average 
of five francs the hundredweight would yield only 900,000 
francs, whereas the same, when refined, would yield 1,500,- 
000 francs (price twenty-five francs the hundredweight). 
This incidentally would mean a net gain for French trad- 
ers, as the planters would have this additional sum with 
which to purchase French merchandise. An increase in 
commerce meant an increase in navigation, hence an 
increase in the number of vessels and sailors, which would 
be a source of strength to the kingdom. Vessels would not 
be obliged to wait such a long time for their cargoes. 
"At present," said Patoulet, "vessels are forced to wait 
a whole year for a cargo of raw sugar, whereas a cargo of 
refined sugar could be had in three or four days." It 
would produce another advantage for traders. A vessel 
of 150 tons, bringing a cargo of merchandise valued in 
France at 15,000 francs and yielding in the islands 22,500 
francs, could receive payment in 90,000 pounds of refined 
sugar which could be obtained from a refinery in three 
or four days. If, however, the cargo were bartered for 
raw sugar, it would yield 450,000 pounds. As the vessel 
could not carry more than 300,000 pounds, one-third of 
the amount would have to be left in the islands. Fur- 
thermore, the establishment of refineries created a liveli- 
hood for the petits habitants. Thus Patoulet stated that 
the three refineries at Martinique consumed 12,000 francs 
worth of eggs. The effect of this was already seen in the 
fact that the petits habitants who had lately been seeking 

53 Arch. Nat. CoL, Cg, IX, Memoir by Robert, intendant of the 
islands, April 21, 1696. 

277 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

some way to return to France were planning to remain. 
Patoulet admitted frankly that the growth of the refining 
industry in the islands meant a destruction of that in 
France. "But," said he, "I am of the opinion that that 
would not be a bad thing \^un grand mal~\. It is true that 
one would thus destroy the profit made by thirty or forty 
individuals who are either foreigners or protestants, but 
the benefit thereof would be enjoyed by a large number 
of people.'"* 

In spite of such sound arguments Colbert sided with the 
refiners of France by imposing a special import duty of 
eight francs the hundredweight on sugar refined in the 
islands. This was done by an arret of April 18, 1682. 
After having recalled the arret of May 31, 1675, by which 
the import duty on sugar refined in the islands was main- 
tained at four livres the hundredweight, the same as that 
on raw sugar, the preamble says: 

"Whereas His Majesty has been informed that when the 
said arret was rendered^ there existed only a very small num- 
ber of refineries in the islands and the planters were accus- 
tomed to send their sugar to France to be refined, but that at 
present a large number of refineries have been established in 
the islands by different individuals; that this fact is proving 
very prejudicial to His Majesty's customs, after having heard 
the recommendation of Sieur Colbert, councilor in his royal 
council, controller-general of his finances, and being in his 
council, he has ordered and hereby orders that sugar refined in 
the French islands and colonies of America shall pay, com- 
mencing with the first day of May next, the sum of eight livres 
the hundredweight."^^ 

It is to be noticed that the reason given for laying duty 
is one of revenue. It is very clear, however, that the real 

54 Arch. Nat. Col., Cg, III, Patoulet to Colbert, December 20, 1683. 

55 Arch. Nat., AD,xi, 48 ; Moreau de Saint-Mery, I, 368-369. White 
sugar imported from Cayenne was exempted from this by an arrit of 
September 19 following. Chamb. de Commerce of Nantes, C, 730. 

278 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

reason Avas one of favouritism for the refiners of France, 
for the estabhshment of new refineries in the islands was 
definite!}' prohibited by an arret of January 21, 1684.^^ 
There the reason given for the action is stated very 
frankly and clearly : 

"Whereas the king has been informed that the planters of the 
French islands and colonies of America . . . having devoted 
themselves almost entirely to the plantation and cultivation of 
sugar-cane, have established a large number of refineries in the 
said islands; that almost all of the sugar produced is being 
refined there; and that consequently the refiners established in 
France have almost ceased work and that men and refiners 
employed in them who have no other means of gaining a live- 
lihood are leaving the kingdom, he, being in his council, has 
forbidden and forbids by these presents all of his subjects of 
the aforesaid French islands and colonies of America, planters, 
as well as merchants and traders, to establish any new refin- 
eries in the said islands and colonies under penalty of 3000 
livres fine." 

Patoulet, who in the meantime had been made intendant 
at Dunkerque, protested energetically against this meas- 
ure.^'^ But his protest was in vain. The mind of the gov- 
ernment was clearly made up to sacrifice the general inter- 
ests of the planters to the special interests of the refiners 
in France. 

Such was the policy which Colbert pursued in promoting 

the production of sugar in the islands and the establish- 

The duty was made permanent by an arrU of September 28, 1674. 
Moreau de Saint-Mery, I, 402. 

56 Moreau de Saint-Mery, I, 395. Curiously enough a copy of this 
important act is not to be found in Arch. Nat., AD,xi, 48. A copy is 
found, however, in Chambre de Commerce of Nantes, C, 730. 

57 Arch. Nat. Mar., B3, 45, fol. 30. Patoulet to Seignelay, letter and 
memoir of March 7, 1684. Patoulet there related the history of the 
refining industry in the islands and of the encouragement which had 
been given by Colbert to it. He demanded at least exemption from 
import duty for sugar refined in the refinery at Martinique in which 
he owned a three-eighths interest. 

279 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

ment of refineries both in the islands and in France. There 
were three very important results : ( 1 ) an increase in the 
production of sugar, (2) the growth of the refining indus- 
try, and (3) France began exporting instead of importing 
refined sugar. 

If we accept the estimate made by a memorialist of 
1691, that the amount of sugar produced in the islands in 
1674 was 12,000,000 pounds,^^ and that of Patoulet that 
it was 18,000,000 pounds in 1682,^^ an increase of fifty per 
cent is to be noted for the last eight years of Colbert's 
ministry. 

The rise and growth of the sugar-refining industry was 
even more noticeable. Colbert stated in 1664 in his mem- 
oir on commerce that the Dutch were furnishing almost all 
of the refined sugar consumed in the realm. By 1683, no 
less than twenty-nine refineries existed in France and five 
in the islands, making a total of thirty-four, which refined 
annually 20,700,000 pounds,^'' 

At the beginning of Colbert's ministry, as has just been 
stated, refined sugar was imported into France from Hol- 
land. But in 1670, Colbert wrote to de Baas : "Foreign- 
ers no longer bring us sugar. We have begun in the last 
six weeks or two months to export it to them."^^ No mate- 
rial has been found which makes it possible to state what 
amount of sugar France exported to foreign countries by 
the end of Colbert's ministry, but it is certain that the 
French had begun by that time to march forward in that 
road which led in the eighteenth century to their suprem- 
acy over the English as furnishers of sugar in the markets 
of Europe. 

58 Arch. Nat. Col., Cg, III, Memoire pour M. B6gon, 1683. 

59 Arch. Nat. Col., Cg, 2nd series, II, Memoire touchant le com- 
merce des Isles, 1691. 

60 See above. 

61 Arch. Nat. Col., B, 2, fol. 115, Colbert to de Baas, October 10, 
1670. 

380 



CHAPTER XIII 

Colonial Imports — Indentured Servants 
AND Slaves 

IN the early history of the French West Indies the inden- 
tured servant played an important part. Large num- 
bers of them were drafted in the Norman ports and sent 
out to the islands. During the years of 1637, 1638 and 
the first six months of 1639, more than 500 were sent from 
the single port of Honfleur.^ Considerable numbers were 
also sent from Havre and Dieppe.^ 

The usual form of contract was three years of service 
on the part of the servant to the one who paid his passage 
and fed, clothed and housed him during his term of ser- 
vice.^ The master had the right of selling to another any 
portion of the unexpired term of service. It was not 
unusual for a servant to have seven or eight masters during 
the three years.* 

This form of contract proved so profitable to planters 
that they were willing to pay to ship captains 1000 
to 1200 pounds of tobacco for servants. Even higher 
prices were paid for artisans.^ Captains of La Ro- 
chelle, St. Malo, Dieppe and Havre engaged regularly in 
the trade. In order to obtain servants "they take ad- 
vantage of the naivete of many people whom they persuade 
that life in the islands is a bed of roses, that the land flows 
with milk and honey and that one works little and gains 

1 C. Breard, Les documents relatifs a la marine normande, p. 187. 

2Du Motey, Guillaume d'Orange et Vorigine des Antilles fran- 
gaises, chap. XIII. 

3 Both Breard and du Motey publish the texts of several con- 
tracts made at Honfleur and Havre. 

4Du Tertre, II, 454. 

5 Ibid., p. 464. 

281 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

much. They not only deceive the ignorant, . . . but also 
debauch young children in order to kidnap them. Some 
have been mean and knavish enough to entice children 
aboard their vessels under various pretexts and force them 
to go to the islands where they were sold to masters who fed 
them poorly and made them work so excessively and treated 
them so inhumanely that many of them died in a short 
time."^ Abuses of this nature grew so flagrant that de 
Poincy complained to the home government of one case 
where 200 young Frenchmen, some of whom were of good 
family, had been kidnapped, concealed at St. Servan for 
three months and then taken to be sold at Barbadoes.'^ 

But after the establishment of the sugar industry and 
of the regular trade in slaves, the trade in indentured 
servants decreased. Colbert was forced to take measures 
to encourage and to compel the importation of servants 
into the islands. He first attempted to encourage it by 
making the terms of the contract more attractive to the 
servant. Thus by an arret of February 28, 1670, the term 
of service was reduced from three years to eighteen 
months.^ This arret was re-enacted on October 31, 1672.^ 
Colbert made efforts to force their importation by an arret 
of January 22, 1671, which required all vessels of 100 tons 
or more, going to the West Indies, to carry two cows or 
two mares, and those of less than 100 tons to carry two 
indentured servants in place of each cow or mare.^° To 
prevent too large a growth of slave population in propor- 
tion to the white, a regulation was made which required 
all planters of St. Domingo to have a number of servants 

ePelleprat, p. 21. 
7Du Tertre, II, 465. 

8 Moreau de Saint-Mery, I, 190 ; Arch. Nat. Col., B, 2, f ol. 54, letter 
to conseils souverains of Martinique and St. Christopher to register 
the said arret. 

9 Ibid., p. 264. 

10 Ibid., p. 20T. 

282 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

equal to that of their slaves/^ After the close of Col- 
bert's ministry, regulations required that vessels of sixty 
tons or less should take three servants, those of sixty to 100 
tons four, and those of more than 100 tons six.^^ 

There were two facts, however, which militated against 
the success of any plan to supply labour in the islands by 
the importation of indentured servants from France. The 
one was that the supply was not large enough to keep 
pace with the demand for labour after the introduction 
of the cultivation of sugar/^ The other was that slave 
labour was more reliable and much cheaper.^* The slave 
became the planter's property and his labour was avail- 
able throughout his lifetime, whereas the indentured ser- 
vant offered only a temporary service and became his own 
master at the end of three years. This explains why the 
slave trade developed in the French West Indies, and it 
seems idle to argue, as does M. Peytraud,^^ that these 
islands might have been cultivated entirely by white labour. 

There seems to be some evidence that d'Esnambuc found 
some slaves in the small French colony at St. Christopher 
in 1625.'^ Du Tertre informs us that in 1635 a Dutch 
trader, Pitre Cotte, brought to St. Christopher a "quan- 
tity of slaves" which he had captured from the Spaniards.^'^ 
In 1643 the Company of the Isles of America made a 

11 Arch. Nat. Col., Cg, I, Ord. du Roy, September 30, 1686 ; Moreau 
de Saint-Mery, I, 434. The proportion was later changed to one 
servant to twenty slaves. Peytraud, L'esclavage aux Antilles fran- 
gaises, p. 15. 

12 Moreau de Saint-Mery, I, 581, Ordre du Roy, February 19, 1698. 

13 This assertion seems warranted by the practices to which the 
traders were forced to resort in order to have a number of servants. 
See passages cited above from Pelleprat and Du Tertre. 

14 Arch. Nat. Col., Cg, I, Memoir by de Pouan^ay, governor of St. 
Domingo, 1681, speaks of indentured servants as "costing much more 
than slaves." 

'^^ L'Esclavage aux Antilles franqaises. 

16 Peytraud, p. 5. 

17 Du Tertre, I, 59. 

283 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

contract with a Captain Drouault to deliver sixty slaves 
at Guadeloupe for 12,000 livres.'^ 

The supply of slaves did not as yet become very abun- 
dant, however, for Maurile de St. Michel remarked that 
slaves were being imported to the islands in 1646, but that 
they were very dear, the price at St. Christopher being 
4000 pounds of tobacco for a male and 3000 pounds for 
a female. But the next ten years saw a considerable 
increase in the trade. In 1655, Pelleprat remarked that 
the planters "employed in tilling their land neither oxen 
nor horses, but only slaves which were brought from 
Africa or the coasts of America," and that well-to-do 
planters possessed twenty-five or thirty slaves. ^^ De 
Poincy, the governor-general, had between six and seven 
hundred on his several plantations.^'^ Pelleprat said that 
several ships came yearly to the islands with cargoes of 
slaves and that in 1654, between six and seven hundred 
had been brought to Martinique alone, the price having 
dropped to 2000 pounds of tobacco or 100 ecus. By 
1655 the slave population of the islands had reached 12,- 
000 or 13,000.2' 

The French trader had apparently played a very small 
part in supplying these slaves. Du Tertre records that 
during the sojourn of de Tracy in the West Indies, from 
June 1, 1664, to April, 1665, the Dutch imported into 
Guadeloupe and Martinique no less than twelve or thir- 
teen hundred negroes. ^^ De Tracy wrote to Colbert from 

18 The contract was carried out by Drouault. We find him in 
October of the same year demanding payment for the sixty slaves 
and for two others which he had delivered to the company's agent at 
St. Christopher. Arch. Col., Fg, 19, fols. 444, 462, Records of the 
meetings of the directors for February 4, and October 7, 1643. 

19 Pelleprat, p. 54. 

20 Ibid. 

21 Ibid. 

22 Du Tertre, III, 201. The same historian records the arrival at 
Martinique in October, 1664, of a Dutch vessel bringing a cargo of 

284 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

the islands in 1664 that the slave trade would prove profit- 
able to the French, as it yielded a profit of ^66 per cent.^^ 
It will be recalled that the West India Company had 
all the west coast of Africa included in its grant and that 
it attempted to make provision for a supply of slaves to 
the planters by ceding to Carolof, in 1665, the right of 
trading on the coast of Guinea and importing slaves into 
the islands.^* In 1667 a treaty was made by Villaut de 
Bellefond in behalf of the West India Company, with cer- 
tain tribes on the coast of Guinea for trading privileges, 
which implies that the company was not satisfied with the 
results attained by Carolof and that it was taking other 
measures to supply slaves to its West India colonies.^^ 
Material is lacking to show what the company did to take 
advantage of this treaty, but it is very probable that it did 
nothing and that the Dutch still supplied slaves to the 
planters, for de Baas was instructed by the directors at 
the beginning of 1668, to admit Dutch ships which brought 
slaves from Cura9ao,^^ and on November 7, 1668, permis- 
sion was accorded by the company to a Dutch trader to 
import slaves into the islands.^^ In 1669, Cartier, the 
general agent of the company, was freely admitting into 

300 slaves. He states that the price demanded was 3000 pounds of 
sugar per slave, which was reduced by de Tracy to 2000 pounds. 
Ibid., p. 101. 

23 Arch. Nat, Col., Cg, I, Abreg6 de la corresp. de M. de Tracy. 
Letter de juillet, 1664. 

24 See Chapter IV. 

25 Arch. Col., Cg, I, Trait6 fait avec le Roy de Comendo en la 
coste de Guinee. The treaty was made on March 15, 1667, aboard 
L' Eur ope, a vessel belonging to a Dutchman, Van Teitz by name. 

26 Arch. Nat. Col., Cg, I, de Baas to Colbert, December 26, 1669. 

27 Arch. Nat. Col., Cg, I, de Baas to Colbert, March 22, 1670; Cio, 
La Grenade, 1654-1729, contains a copy of the passport. The trader, 
Drik Jansen by name, agreed to pay to the company five per cent on 
aU slaves and horses imported into the islands and ten per cent on 
commodities exported therefrom. Jansen was captured by one of de 
Cabaret's ships. See a discussion of the case in Chapter IX. 

285 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

Guadeloupe and Martinique Dutch vessels which brought 
slaves. For the slaves he was demanding as high as 4000 
pounds of sugar per head.^^ Slaves were being imported 
also into Marie Galante from Cura9ao in this same jear.^^ 

It will be noticed that we have reached the date when 
Colbert began his determined fight to exclude all foreign 
traders from the islands and attempted to supply abso- 
lutely all the needs of the planters by French commerce. 
He assigned to the West India Company, as one of its spe- 
cial duties, the task of furnishing a supply of slaves to 
the planters. It was most probably in accordance with 
Colbert's instructions that the company equipped and sent 
out, at the close of 1669, two vessels to the coast of 
Guinea.^^ Carolof, who was in charge of the company's 
interests, succeeded in establishing trade relations with 
the king of Ardres and the two vessels sailed for the West 
Indies with 997 slaves on board. Of this number there 
was landed at Martinique a total of 753, the remainder 
having died during the voyage. The results seemed so 
auspicious that Colbert at once had large visions of the 
company being able not only to furnish 2000 slaves 
annually to the French, but also to send SOOO more to the 
Spanish colonies.^^ 

In order to encourage private traders, the special tax 
of five per cent levied by the company on slaves imported 
by them was removed in 1670.^^ In the following year 
(1671) all duties were removed from goods exported from 
France to the coast of Guinea,^^ and in 1672 a bounty of 

28 Ibid., Cy, I, du Lion to Colbert, December 1, 1669. 

29 Ibid., Temericourt to Colbert, December 14, 1669. 

30 A full account of this expedition will be found above in Chap- 
ter VII. 

31 Clement, III, 3, p. 485, Colbert to Pelissier, June 31, 1670. 

32 Arch. Nat., AD,vii, 3; Moreau de Saint-Mery, I, 97, arrH of 
August 26, 1670. 

33 Arch. Nat., AD,vii, 3; Le Commerce de VAmerique par Mar- 
seille, II, 303, arrH of September 18, 1671. 

286 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

thirteen livres per head was granted on all slaves imported 
into the islands.^ 

From the beginning de Baas expressed doubts as to the 
ability of the French traders to furnish the number of 
slaves necessary to the development of the islands and 
added the warning that "if enough were not furnished to 
take the place of those that died, the planters would suffer 
seriously. "^^ Colbert, however, remained deaf to de Baas' 
doubts and warnings, and ordered a strict enforcement of 
the regulations against the foreign trader. The slave 
trade was thus left in the hands of the West India Com- 
pany and of private French traders. 

The activity of neither seems to have been great. We 
find mention of the arrival in 1672 at Guadeloupe of two 
vessels belonging to the company with about 550 slaves, 
and another of its ships, coming from Guinea, was ex- 
pected to arrive in December.^^ But the company's com- 
merce practically ceased after 1672. Its dissolution in 
1674 formally removed it from the field. Private traders 
seem to have shown but small interest in the slave trade and 
it is very probable that their activity was even less than 
that of the company. The result was that the supply of 
slaves was very inadequate. Du Lion stated in 1672 that 
the clearing of new lands was being retarded for this rea- 
son.^^ Du Clerc, secretary to de Baas, informed Colbert 
in a letter of January 20, 1675, that it was impossible to 

34 Moreau de Saint-Mery, I, 259-260, arret of January 13, 1672. Of 
this sum, ten livres were to be paid by His Majesty to the armateurs 
and three livres by the West India Company to the captains com- 
manding the vessels. After the dissolution of the company, the three 
livres were paid by the Domaine d' Occident. 

35 Arch. Nat. Col., Cg, I, de Baas to Colbert, December 26, 1669. 

36 Arch. Nat. Col., C^, II, du Lion to Colbert, Deceraber 5, 1672. 
Du Lion states in a letter, eod. loco, of November 16, 1671, that he had 
become associated with Carolof in an enterprise to clear land at 
Guadeloupe for which Carolof was to furnish slaves. 

37 Ibid., du Lion to Colbert, March 15, 1672. 

287 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

replace the slaves who were dying, because "no one is 
bringing slaves to the islands."^ 

Colbert, doubtless disappointed at the failure of the 
private trader to respond to his liberal policy, shortly 
afterwards committed the slave trade into the hands of a 
monopoly and continued to do so until his death. 

By a contract of November 8, 1673, the West India 
Company ceded to a private company, composed of Mau- 
rice Egrot, Fran9ois Fran9ois and Fran9ois Raguenet, all 
the western coast of Africa, lying between the rivers Sene- 
gal and Gambia, with all the privileges of trade which had 
been granted to it in its letters-patent and with all furnish- 
ings, utensils, arms, munitions and everything belonging to 
it at the said coast except the slaves in its possession, which 
were sold to Thouret, a merchant of La Rochelle.^^ This 
contract was approved by an arret of November 11, by 
which was granted to the new company a monopoly of 
trade for thirty years, the unexpired term of the W'est 
India Company, and all others were forbidden to encroach 
upon its monopoly under penalty of confiscation of vessels 
and cargoes and of a fine of 3000 livres. 

Only a small part of this coast had ever been actually in 
control of the West India Company. The Dutch were in 
possession of a good strategic base in the island of Goree,*° 
and would have to be reckoned mth before the Company 
of Senegal could enter with advantage into the exploita- 
tion of its grant. The war with Holland furnished the 
occasion to dispute with them the control of Senegal. In 
1677, Jean d'Estrees attacked the Dutch at Goree, de- 
stroyed their forts, and took possession of the island, thus 
preparing the way for the conquest of the coast south of 

38 Arch. Nat. Col., Cg, I, du Clerc to Colbert, January 30, 1675. 

39 Arch. Col., Cq, I, contrat de vente du Senegal et dependences aux 
Sieurs Egrot, Francois et Raguenet, November 8, 1673. 

40D'Elbee, Journal, p. 351, states that the Dutch used the island 
as an entrepot for trade with the tribes of the mainland. 

288 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

Cape Verde.^^ Du Casse, who was later to win fame as 
governor of St. Domingo, and still later as admiral of 
France, had recently been appointed governor of the coast 
by the Company of Senegal. He at once took advantage 
of d'Estrees' victory. In command of UEntendu, a royal 
vessel mounted by forty guns and with a crew of 250 men, 
he occupied Goree and placed some agents in command for 
the company. He then made treaties with the princes of 
Rufisque, Portudal and Joal. In the following year, 1678, 
he continued the work of conquest. The Dutch, driven 
from Goree, had concentrated their forces at Arguin, a 
well-fortified island off the coast near Cape Blanco. Du 
Casse first captured, without difficulty, their trading posts 
on the mainland opposite the island. The defense of the 
island itself proved so stubborn, however, that he was 
forced to return to Saint Louis for more ammunition and 
reinforcements. After sustaining seven days of bombard- 
ment, the Dutch were finally forced to surrender and 
evacuate the island. The French entered into possession on 
September 2, 1678.*^ Shortly after this a Dutch vessel 
appeared and succeeded in stirring up a rebellion among 
the natives on the coast between Cape Verde and Gambia, 
so that du Casse was forced to land troops and march 
against them. He met with small resistance and forced 
the natives to sign treaties, by which full trade privileges 
were accorded to the French. 

These conquests made by d'Estrees and du Casse were 
sanctioned by the treaty of Nymwegen.*^ The Company 

*l P. Chemin-Dupontes, Les Compagnies de colonisation en Afrique 
occidentale sous Colbert, pp. 93 ff.; P. Cultru, Histoire du Senegal du 
XVe si^cle a 1870, Paris, 1910, pp. 58-59. 

42 Robert du Casse, L'Amiral du Casse, Paris, 1876, pp. 9 fF. 

43 The conquest of Arguin was in reality posterior to the signing 
of the treaty, but it remained effective by reason of the fact that the 
treaty provided that all conquests, made south of Cape St. Vincent 
within ten weeks after date, would be recognized. 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

of Senegal was thus placed in actual possession of the 
coast from Cape Blanco to the Gambia. It established 
several trading posts^* which apparently became prosper- 
ous.^^ But no record has been found that the company 
even attempted to carry slaves to the West Indies. It 
is to be remarked that the company's concessions extended 
only to the Gambia and did not include the coast of Guinea, 
which furnished the supply of choice slaves and where the 
West India Company had carried on some trade. 

No immediate disposition was made of the coast of 
Guinea, and the planters had to depend for a while longer 
upon private traders to supply them with slaves. The 
report came from the islands in 1675, that none were 
being brought.*^ It was perhaps for this reason that an 
attempt was made in this same year to make definite pro- 
vision for a supply. 

On October 16, 1675, the liquidators of the West India 
Company signed a contract with Jean Oudiette, the 
farmer-general of the Domaine d'Occident, whereby the 
latter agreed to import into the French West Indies 800 
slaves a year for four consecutive years. Oudiette was 
probably granted a monopoly of trade.*^ He was certainly 
to enjoy the bounty of thirteen livres per head on all 
slaves imported into the islands.*^ De Baas was informed 

44 Cultru, op. cit., 60. 

45 Arch. Col., Cq, I, Traite fait entre les Sieurs directeurs gen^raux 
du Dom. Roy. d'Occid. et la Comp. du Senegal, March 21, 1679. 

46 Arch. Nat. Col., Cg, I, du Clerc to Colbert, January 30, 1675. 

47 No copy of the contract has been found. The fact of the con- 
tract and a part of its provisions are to be found in the avant-propos 
of the letters-patent creating the Company of Senegal of 1679. Moreau 
de Saint-M6ry, I, 314. 

48 This had been originally provided, it will be recalled, by an arrH 
of January 13, 1673. This meant probably only ten livres to Oudiette, 
because three livres were to be paid by the Dom. d'Occident, of which 
he was the farmer. 

390 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

of the contract and instructed to aid Oudiette in every way 
possible. The king wrote him in part as follows : 

"As there is nothing which can contribute so much to the 
increase of my islands of America as the importation of a 
quantity of negroes^ I am very glad to inform you that a con- 
tract has been made with the Sieur Oudiette, farmer of my 
Domaine d'Occident, to carry on this trade. As it is impor- 
tant for him to enjoy freely the privilege which I have granted 
him by the arret of which I am enclosing a copy, do not fail 
to aid him in every way you can."*^ 

Oudiette for some reason did not carry out the contract 
and it was annulled on March 25, 1679.^" Four days 
previously, on March 21, Bellinzani and Mesnager, in 
quality of liquidators of the defunct West India Company, 
had made another more important contract with the Com- 
pany of Senegal. 

The preamble of this contract stated that the Company 
of Senegal, "which had established large trading posts on 
the coast of Africa, was on the point of making contracts 
to furnish slaves to the Dutch and Spanish," and had 
offered to transport to the French West Indies 2000 
slaves annually for the space of eight years.^^ It was 
apparently in excellent shape to make a contract to do so. 
Of its three original directors, Fran9ois, Raguenet and 
Egrot, the first alone remained. Raguenet was dead. His 
widow and Egrot had ceded their interests to Bains and 

49 Arch. Nat. Col., B, 7, fol. 30, the king to de Baas, May 27, 1676, 
cited by Dessalles, Hist. gen. des Antilles, I, 546, and Peytraud, op. 
cit., p. 43. 

50 Arch. Nat., AD,vii, 3; Moreau de Saint-Mery, I, 314. 

51 The company had apparently already begun to send some slaves 
to the islands, for in a letter written from Martinique on August 16, 
1677, the arrival "of a vessel belonging to the Company of Senegal 
with eighty slaves" is noted. Arch. Nat. Col., Cg, II, Jolinet to Col- 
bert, August 16, 1677. 

291 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

le Brun.^^ Under the new directors the company had made 
considerable progress in its commerce and in 1679 was in 
a prosperous condition.^^ Within six years, thanks to the 
conquest of d'Estrees and du Casse and the wise direc- 
tion of the latter, it had occupied a large territory and 
established a rich trade.^* 

It is to be remarked, however, that the company's pros- 
perity had been gained most largely by trade in rubber, 
ivory, wax, and other articles from Senegal, and very 
little in the slave trade. Success in trade north of Gambia 
did not necessarily augur success in the slave trade on the 
coast which stretched to the southward. However, the 
oiFer of the company was accepted and a contract was 
signed on March 21.^^ 

The number of directors was straightway increased by 
the addition of six new associates, namely, Duvivier of Paris, 
Thouret and Duport of La Rochelle, Petit Saint-Louis of 
Bordeaux, Sieur de Richemond, who had aided du Casse 
in his conquests, and Ballade at St. Domingo.^^ Chemin- 
Dupontes' remark that the company was thus composed 
of the '* principaux armateurs frangais de Vepoqiie" is 
perhaps a conjecture, but one is impressed with the dis- 
tinctly national character of the company and with the 
fact that most of them were probably merchants. The 
new company was capitalized at approximately 1,000,000 
francs, about one-fourth of what it really needed to carry 
out the plans which it had undertaken.^^ 

The contract was officially approved by an arret of 

52 Arch. CoL, Cq, II, Memoire concernant le commerce du Senegal, 
1695. 

53 Ibid. 

54 Chemin-Dupontes, p. 99. 

55 A copy of the contract is to be found in Arch. Col., Cg, I. 

56 Chemin-Dupontes, p. 104. 

57 Chemin-Dupontes, p. 105, makes this estimate, based on an inter- 
esting calculation. 

292 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

March 25, 1679, and letters-patent were issued in June, 
whereby the company was granted a monopoly of trade 
for twenty-five years (the unexpired time of the West 
India Company's grant) on the whole coast of Africa 
from Cape Verde to the Cape of Good Hope, and was also 
given a full monopoly of the slave trade in the West India 
colonies for the same period. All other French subjects 
were excluded from both these branches of commerce, under 
penalty of confiscation of vessel and cargo to the profit of 
the company, and of a fine of 3000 Hvres, to be divided 
between the company and His Majesty. Full freedom was 
accorded to sell slaves at any price agreed upon between 
the company's agents and the planters. The bounty of 
thirteen livres was granted on all slaves imported by the 
company into the islands. Exemption from all duties on 
goods exported to the coast of Guinea or to the islands, 
and from half the duties on goods imported into France 
from Africa or from the West Indies was to be enjoyed. 
The company assumed the obligation to import into the 
French Wfest Indies 2000 slaves annually for eight years 
and in addition to furnish to "His Majesty at Marseilles 
such a number as he shall need for his galleys," on terms to 
be agreed upon later.^^ 

Efforts seem to have been made at once to carry out 
the contract, for by May 20, 1679, the company had upon 
the sea, twenty-one vessels of an aggregate tonnage of 
5580 tons. Of these, sixteen were occupied in the slave 
trade, four of which were to carry cargoes of slaves to 
Marseilles for His Majesty's galleys; four, cargoes to 
Spain to trade at the arrival of the galleons from Amer- 
ica, and eight to carry slaves to the West Indies. Of the 
remaining five, three were to bring cargoes of hides, rub- 

58 Arch. Nat. Col., B, 9, fol. I, contains the arret of March 25, 
1679; Arch. Col., Cq, I, contains the letters-patent. They have both 
been printed by Moreau de Saint-Mery, I, 314-317, and 325-336. 

293 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

ber and ivory to France from Senegal, and two were to 
bring cargoes of sugar and tobacco from the islands. ^^ 

But misfortunes were encountered from the beginning. 
During the course of the first year no less than four of 
the company's vessels suffered shipwreck.^" By April, 
1680, the company had lost no less than 2000 slaves who 
died on board its ships during the voyage from Guinea to 
the West Indies.^^ Its total losses were estimated at 400,- 
000 livres. Furthermore, the company experienced the 
same difficulty which the West India Company had met 
with, in being unable to receive from the planters prompt 
payment for its slaves. It was thus unable to meet the 
heavy obligations which it had assumed in order to equip 
its vessels and carry out its contract. Even before the 
first fiscal year had closed, the debt of the company 
amounted to no less than 1,200,000 livres.^^ Large sums 
had to be borrowed, but they only added to the burden 
without creating any additional income. 

A crisis came in the spring of 1680, with the failure of 
de Kervert and Simonnet, bankers. In the credits of the 
bankers, which amounted to 2,000,000 livres, the Company 
of Senegal figured for an indebtedness of 1,500,000 hvres. 
Immediate bankruptcy of the company seemed inevitable. 
An appeal was made to the king by its directors "to grant 

59 Arch. Col., Cq, I, Estat des Navires appart. a la Cie. du Senegal, 
May 20, 1679. Seventeen of these vessels belonged to the company, 
the other four were chartered. All were equipped with from six to 
forty guns. It is to be noticed that the company was sending as 
many vessels to Marseilles and Spain with slaves as to the West 
Indies. 

60 The St. Franqois, 400 tons, was wrecked on the coast of Brittany 
and its cargo of tobacco and sugar from the islands lost. La Paix, 
400 tons, was wrecked in the West Indies with a cargo of tobacco. 
La Fortune was lost in the Canaries, and Le Soleil on the coast of 
England with a cargo from the coast of Senegal. 

61 Arch. Col., Cq, I, arrH of April 9, 1680, preamble. 

62 Chemin-Dupont^s, p. 107. 

294 



ii 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

them his protection in order that they might be able to 
continue their commerce, for which they have more than 
twenty vessels upon the sea." They promised that in a 
short while they would be able to pay all of their debts. 
After the approval of Colbert, a favourable reply was 
made to the petition. An arret of April 9 forbade the 
creditors to make any seizures against the company under 
penalty of invalidation of their claims and 3000 livres 
fine.^^ The persistence of the creditors was so great, how- 
ever, that the arret had to be re-enacted on April 16. 
Finally, on May 14, an agreement was reached by which 
the creditors accepted the following settlement. De Ker- 
vert and Simonnet were to pay one-fourth of their debts 
within the space of three months. The remaining three- 
fourths were to be paid by the Company of Senegal, one- 
twelfth in eleven months, one-fourth in one year, one- 
twelfth in sixteen months, one-twelfth in two years, and for 
the remaining one-fourth, shares in the company were to 
be issued. This agreement was sanctioned by the king on 
May 26.'* 

But misfortunes continued to pursue the company. 
Shortly afterwards two vessels were lost by shipwreck and 
one was captured by pirates.'^ Storms in the West Indies 
destroyed much of the sugar and tobacco harvests and 
delayed payments upon which the company had counted. 
It was consequently unable to make the settlements which 
it had agreed to make with its creditors. By June 30, 
1681, its liabilities exceeded its assets by 1,184,569 liv. 
13s. 7d.'' The Company of Senegal was bankrupt. It 
formally came to an end on July 2, 1681. 

63 Arch. Col., Ce, I, arrH of April 9, 1680, cited by Chemin-Du- 
pontes, p. 109. 

64 Chemin-Dupontes, p. 110. 

65 Ibid., p. 114. 

66 Arch. Col., Cq, I, Estat general des effets de la Compagnie du 
Senegal, June 30, 1681. Among its chief assets were eight vessels in 

295 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 



The question naturally arises as to what success the 
company had met with in furnishing slaves to the West 
India colonies. We seem to have some evidence in the 
accounts of the Domaine d'Occident. Under the sixth 
title of the credit sheet of its accounts for 1680, 1681, 
1682, 1683, the entry is made of thirteen payments made 
to "Fran9ois for the thirteen livres per head of slaves 
imported into the islands of America." The total of these 
payments amounts to 49,424 liv. lOs.^'^ 

"This sum at thirteen livres per head, represents," says 
Chemin-Dupontes, "the bounty for 3810 slaves imported 
by the Company of Senegal from March 25, 1679, to July 
1, 1682, in reality during the space of two years, . . . 
showing that the Company of Senegal, bankrupt as it 
was, was the company which did the most for the develop- 

France valued at 73,000 livres and eleven upon the sea valued with 
their cargoes at 375,345 liv. lis. 7d. and sums due in the West Indies 
amounting to 174,164 liv. 18s. 6d. 

67 Arch. Nat., G7, 1312, Extrait de la R6cepte et d^pense du compte 
du Sr. La Live cy-devant caissier du dom. d'occident par luy faitte 
pendant les annees 1680-1683. The portion in question is as follows: 

Sixiesme Chap, de depense 
A Francois pour les 13 livres par 
teste de negres port6s aux Isles de 
I'Am. ord. du 11 fev. 1680 
luy ord. du 2 dud. mois 
15 avril 1681 a luy ord. du 12 dud. mois 
15 juin 1681 a luy ord. du 31 mai 
27 fev. 1683 a luy ord. du 36 dud. mois 
21 nov. 1682 a luy ord. du 29 juin 1682 
31 nov. 1682 a luy ord. du 21 dudit 
Signature en blanc: 

Servant de quitt luy ord. du 29 desdit, mois et an 

3 fev. 1683 a luy ord. du 3 Jan. 1683 

5 avril 1683 a luy ord. du . 

14 dec. 1680 a luy ord. du 2 dec. 1680 

13 juin 1681 a luy ord. du 2 dudit . 

7 oct. 1682 a luy ord. du dudit jour . 



Dates 
14 sept. 1680. 

14 dec. 1680 





7,059 liv. 






2,907 liv. 






963 liv. 






4,515 liv. 






1,212 liv. 






3,051 liv. 






5,981 liv. 


10 s. 


t an 


864 Hv. 

1,971 liv. 

2,268 Uv. 

5,733 liv. 
10,000 liv. 
30,000 liv. 






49,524 liv. 


10 s. 



296 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

ment of the slave trade Avith the West Indies. "^^ This 
would be most interesting, if our data could be interpreted 
in such a way. Unfortunately a close analysis of the docu- 
ment, together with other evidence which apparently es- 
caped the notice of M. Chemin-Dupontes, will not permit 
it. In the first place, the list of payments shows that of 
the thirteen payments made, only six, representing an 
aggregate of 31,177 livres, were made between June, 1679, 
the date when the privilege of the slave trade was accorded 
to the Company of Senegal, and July 2, 1681, when it 
was replaced by a reorganized company. Fran9ois, to 
whom all payments were said to be made, was also a 
director of the reorganized company .^^ Now, payments 
after the date of July 2, 1681, would certainly represent 
bounties paid to the second company. Even upon M. 
Chemin-Dupontes's supposition that the sums represent 
bounties paid on slaves, we should be compelled to reduce 
the number of slaves imported by the Company of Senegal 
during the two years of its existence from 3810 to S398. 
This would still represent a respectable activity by the 
company, as the average would be 1199 slaves a year. 
Our suspicion is aroused, however, by the fact that onl}^ 
two of the thirteen sums paid are divisible by thirteen. 
The total is also indivisible by that number. A possible 
explanation might be offered by saying that the thirteen 
livres ''par tete'' really meant thirteen livres "par piece 
d*Inde."^^ This would immediately introduce an element in 

68 Chemin-Dupontes, p. 111. 

69 Bib. Nat. MSS., fonds fran?., 11315, fol. 152, letter of the direct- 
ors to Patoulet, October 22, 1682. Fran9ois' name occurs among the 
seven signatures of the directors. 

70 This suggestion has been made to me by Prof. P. Cultru of the 
University of Paris. The practice grew up of making contracts for 
the delivery of so many "pieces d'Inde," which served as a standard 
by which to measure the value of a slave. In the Spanish trade the 
"piece d'Inde" was a slave seven "quartas" high (about 182 
centimeters), between thirty and thirty-five years old and without any 

297 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

the reckoning which we could not control from the data 
given in the document. It would obviously, however, 
increase the actual number of slaves sent to the islands, 
which would mean that the Company of Senegal sent more 
than 2398 slaves to the islands during the two years of its 
existence. It is not necessary to search farther for some 
key to unlock the mystery, for it is more than probable 
that the sums do not represent at all hona fide bounties 
paid on slaves imported into the islands. Just at the 
close of the document is to be found a most interesting note 
which reads, ''Nota, le Sieur Bellinzani a profits de la 
moitie des susdites sommes,'' and this is corroborated in 
another document, contained in the same carton, which 
states that Bellinzani himself had confessed the fact.^^ 

With the name of Bellinzani enters upon the scene a 
person of more than passing interest. Taken into service 
by Colbert in 1654, he was named in 1669 to the important 
post of general inspector of manufactures. On February 
19, 1670, he was made one of the directors of the West 

physical defect. "On measurait les adultes qui n'avaient point cette 
hauteur, les enfants et I'on obtenait ainsi, en divisant le total obtenu 
un certain nombre de pieces d'Inde dans une cargaison." G. Scelle, La 
traite negridre aux Indes de Castille, Paris, 1906, 2 vols., I, 506. In 
a contract made at Nantes by the French Assiento Company in 1702, 
for the delivery of 4000 slaves, the following definition was given: 

"La piece d'Inde sera homme et femme depuis quatorze jusqu'a 
quarante ans au plus, ainsy qu'il paraistra par la veue, reglee par gens 
indifferens, choisis de part et d'autre, filles et gar9ons seront regies a 
prorata de leur grandeur huit pour sept, six pour cinq et enfin quatre 
pour trois. On ne pourra rebuter ancun negre que ceux qui passeront 
quarante ans qui n'auront qu'un oeil ou qui seront rompus a leurs parties 
ou qui seront malades. On sera oblige de recevoir ceux a qu'il man- 
quera un ou deux doigts a la main ou au pied, ou ceux qui seront 
maigres, pourveu qu'ils se portent bien, car maigre n'est pas un d6- 
faut." Chamb. de Commerce, Nantes, C, 739. 

71 Arch. Nat., Gj, 1312, Extrait de la depence du compte du Sr. de 
La Live des 150,000 livres qu'il a receu par chacun an de M. Jean 
Oudiette, fermier du Dom. d'Occident, etc. 

298 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

India Company at Colbert's recommendation/^ It was in 
this way that he became actively associated with West 
India affairs. He became personally interested in the 
commerce of the West Indies. In 1671 we find a record of 
a cargo of slaves being sold at Guadeloupe "for the 
account of M. Bellinzani."'^^ He wrote to de Baas in 1675 
instructing him to permit four English vessels to trade in 
the islands, stating that permission had been granted by 
His Majesty.^* Yet the letter which Colbert wrote to de 
Baas on receiving the news that these vessels had traded 
in the islands implies that no such permission had been 
granted.'^^ At the dissolution of the West India Com- 
pany, Bellinzani was named by Colbert as one of the three 
charged with the liquidation of its affairs.'^^ A very long 
and detailed indictment was made against Bellinzani, by 
no less a personage than Jacques Savary, in which he was 
accused of dishonesty in the discharge of his duties in the 
direction and liquidation of the West India Company, 
specific cases being given where he had embezzled funds.^^ 
After Colbert's death he was thrown into the Bastille on 
charges of embezzlement and died there. 

It is very possible that the sums entered in the accounts 
of the Domaine d'Occident as payments to the Company 
of Senegal for bounties on slaves imported into the islands 
represent, in part at least, sums embezzled by Bellinzani. 
In that case they give no clue to the number of slaves 
imported into the West Indies. Besides, we have some 
very positive evidence to show that the number of slaves, 

72 Arch. Nat. Col., B, 2, fol. 5. 

73 Arch. Nat. Col., C7, II, du Lion to Colbert, November 16, 1671. 

74 Arch. Nat. CoL, Cg, I, du Clerc to Colbert, January 20, 16T5. 

75 Ibid., B, 6, fols. 34-39, Colbert to de Baas, May 17, 1675. 

76 Moreau de Saint-Mery, I, 290, arrH of December 4, 1674. 

77 Arch. Nat., Gy, 1312. The exact title of the document has not 
been recorded in my notes, but it is easily found by its size, being the 
longest document in the carton. 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

corresponding to the bounties represented as having been 
paid, is much too large for the number actually imported. 
Thus de Blenac, the governor-general of the islands, wrote 
on July 13, 1680, that within the last sixteen months no 
more than 600 or 700 slaves had been imported into all the 
islands, including St. Domingo.^^ The "sixteen months" 
covered exactly the period of the obligation of the Com- 
pany of Senegal to carry slaves to the islands. The com- 
pany was probably less active during the last year of its 
existence, which followed these sixteen months, for de 
Pouan9ay stated in a memoir of 1681 that the company 
was not bringing a large number of slaves to St. Do- 
mingo,^^ and Patoulet wrote that an adequate supply was 
not being sent to Martinique.^*^ A letter was written to the 
latter in May, 1681, explaining that the small number of 
slaves being sent was due to the embarrassments of the 
company, and that better results were expected from the 
new company soon to be organized.^^ So that on the basis 
of de Blenac's statement it is not probable that a large 
number of slaves were ever imported into the islands by the 
Company of Senegal. 

All of this evidence points to the conclusion that the 
number of slaves imported into the West Indies by the 
Company of Senegal was much smaller than that for 
which bounties were purported to have been paid. The 
inference is natural that some fraudulent measures had 
been resorted to in order to collect bounties which were in 
reality not due. The point is of some importance because 
the conclusion here adopted shows that the success which 

78 Arch. Nat. Col., Cg, II, de Blenac to Colbert, July 13, 1680: 
"Depuis seize mois il n'est venu dans toutes les Isles ny a St. Dom- 
ingue que 600 a 700 n^gres." 

79 Arch. Nat. Col., C9, I, Memoire par de Pouan9ay, 1681. 

80 Ibid., Cg, II, Patoulet to Colbert, August 14, 1680. 

81 Bib. Nat. MSS., fonds francais, 11315, fol. 133, the king to 
Patoulet, May 4, 1681. 

300 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

M. Chemin-Dupontes attributes to the first Company of 
Senegal is fictitious. It means further that the efforts 
which Colbert made to supply slaves to the islands by the 
emplo^^ment of a commercial company, endowed with a 
monopoly, were not highly successful. This failure im- 
posed upon Colbert anew the burden of providing some 
means to supply slaves to the West India planters. 

A tentative company offered to enter into a contract, 
provided it be entirely exempt from the liabilities of the 
former company. This proviso was rejected by Colbert, 
who insisted that all the debts, contracted by the old com- 
pany since the arret of supersedeas of April 9, 1680, and 
in part those contracted before that date, be paid by the 
new company .^^ This retarded affairs for some months. 
But Colbert began to employ the same means which he had 
employed in the organization of the East and West India 
Companies, by informing certain parties that to partici- 
pate in the enterprise "would be a thing very agreeable 
to His Majesty," and promised "to unite the Domaine 
d'Occident to the new company. "^^ The result was that a 
company was formed composed for the most part of offi- 
cials of various ranks,^* "who entered it only for the sake 

82 Arch. Col., Cg, I, Memoir marked "La Compagnie dii Senegal," 
and endorsed "Envoye a M. Morel, le 20 aoust 1685." 

83 Ibid. 

84 Arch. Col., Cg, I, Contrat de vente du privilege, habitations, effets 
de la Cie. du Senegal et cote de Guinee, July 3, 1681. The original 
members are given as follows: 

"Claude d'Appougny, conseiller. Sec. du Roy, Maison de couronne 
de France et de ses finances et Guillaume de Kessel, . . . Conseiller 
du Roy, maitre ordinaire en sa chambre des comptes. 

"Guillaume Manager, conseiller du Roy, directeur general du Dom. 
Roy. d'Occid. 

"Rene de Larre . . . Conseiller, secretaire du Roy, receveur gene- 
ral de finances a Caen. 

"Paul Acere, ecuyer, Sieur des Forges. . . . 

"Jean Massoit, le jeune, Marchand a la Rochelle demeurant k 
present a Paris. 

301 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

of pleasing the king and Monseigneur Colbert. "^^ The 
name of only one merchant appeared in the list of stock- 
holders. The point is worthy of notice, because it shows 
that the merchant class had not been attracted by the 
enterprise and that Colbert was forced to browbeat enough 
officials in order to form a company to which he wished 
to commit the performance of an important task in his 
plan of building up the commerce of the West Indies. 

By a contract of July 2, 1681, the new company agreed 
to assume 1,010,015 livres of the debts of the old com- 
pany and in return it received all the latter's effects and 
privileges.^^ Letters-patent were issued in the form of an 
edict in this same month of July, 1681.^^ A complete 
monopoly of trade was accorded on the same terms as to 
the former company. 

A capital of only 600,000 livres was subscribed by the 
new stockholders, because it was hoped that this sum, 
together with the cargoes of returning vessels, which were 
upon the sea, would be sufficient to satisfy pressing obliga- 
tions and to meet the expenses of carrying on trade.^^ 

The directors chose J. Massoit, the younger, a stock- 
holder, to manage the company's affairs at La Rochelle; 
a new director, Dancourt, was sent to Goreef^ du Casse 

"Jean Faure, ecuyer, Prieur de Valfrey et de Notre Dame, depuis 
Serviant. , 

"Jean du Casse. 
"Claude Ceberet." 

85 Ibid., Estat des affaires de la Cie. du S6n6gal et costes d'Afrique 
en Oct., 1687. "La plupart de ceux qui la composent n'y etant entrez 
que pour plaire au Roy et a feu Monseigneur, votre pere." The mem- 
oir was addressed to Seignelay, the son and successor of Colbert. 

86 Arch. Col., Cg, I. 

87 Moreau de Saint-M6ry, I, 356-359. 

88 Arch. Col., Cq, I, "La Cie. du Senegal," 1685. 

89 An account of Dancourt's voyage is to be found in Les Voyages 
du Sr. le Maire aux iles canaries, Cap Verd, Senegal et Gambia, 
Paris, 1695. Bib. Nat., G, 33098. No record has been found of an 
agent having been sent to the coast of Guinea. 

302 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

was placed in charge of affairs at Martinique, du Clerc at 
Guadeloupe and Pinel at St. Christopher.^" A special 
appeal was made to the intendant Patoulet to take meas- 
ures to improve the quality of sugar, complaint being 
made that sugar lately arrived from Martinique was 
saturated with syrup and sold for three livres per hun- 
dredweight less than the sugar from the other islands.^^ 
The company promised to furnish an abundance of slaves, 
if he would do so. 

No material has been found which enables us to trace 
the company's activity during the first years of its exist- 
ence, but the company appealed to the king in 1683 to 
protect it against a contraband trade in slaves being 
carried on in the islands, and an ordinance was issued on 
September S3, 1683, which read in part as follows: 

"His Majesty being informed of the damage which the 
Company of Senegal is suffering from the fact that the inhabi- 
tants of the islands of America and St. Domingo trade with 
the inhabitants of the Main and with the Caribs for slaves, 
captured from the English and Dutch, and wishing to main- 
tain the company in the enjoyment of the privileges which he 
has granted to it alone of importing slaves into the islands, has 
forbidden and forbids by these presents all of his subjects to 
buy negroes from the said natives or to import them into the 
French islands of America and the coast of St. Domingo, under 
penalty of confiscation of negroes and of vessels and of a fine 
of 1000 livres."92 

It is very probable that this ordinance attempted to stop 
the contraband trade in slaves of which the directors had 
complained to Patoulet in the previous year.^^ 

90 Bib. Nat. MSS., fonds fran9ais, 11315, fol. 152-153, the directors 
to Patoulet, October 22, 1682. 

91 Ibid. 

92Moreau de Saint-Mery, I, 386. 

93 Bib. Nat. MSS., fonds fran9ais, 11315, fol. 152. 

303 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

In a memoir dated August 14, 1684, it was asserted 
that the company had at that time nine vessels en voyage 
and four others which would be ready to sail some time 
before the month of October. Of these thirteen vessels, 
four were to carry negroes to the West Indies, three to 
bring cargoes from Senegal to France, and six to fetch 
cargoes of sugar from the islands. Besides these vessels, 
one had already carried a cargo of 290 slaves to St. 
Domingo and still another would carry 100 negroes to 
Cayenne. "If all of these vessels," added the memoir, 
"arrive happily at their destination, a sufficient number of 
slaves will be furnished to the planters."^ 

It seems reasonably certain, however, that the company 
did not import 2000 slaves annually to the islands, as it 
had contracted to do, for a memoir was written in 1684 to 
explain why it had not done so. The memoir is anonymous 
and undated, but it was very probably written by d'Ap- 
pougny or one of the other directors, and it is easy to 
fix the date of 1684 from internal evidence. 

"Two reproaches are made against the company," it said, 
"one that it is weak and cannot develop its trade as it should, 
the other that it does not furnish to the islands of America the 
number of slaves necessary to satisfy the terms of its con- 
tract. ... In regard to the latter it seems that the reproach 
against the company is well founded, because the new company 
in succeeding the old assumed the obligation of importing 
2000 negroes annually. The following considerations should be 
taken into account: (1) The promise was originally made on 
the supposition that this number of slaves could be sold in 
the islands and that a failure to carry out the promise imposed 
no penalty; (2) it is very easy to show that the present com- 
pany has imported into the islands many more negroes during 
the past three years than was done during the six preceding; 

94 Arch. Col., Cg, I, Memoire de la Cie. du Senegal, August 14, 
1684. 

304 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

(3) it is a fact well known by all those who are well acquainted 
with the affairs of the islands that not more than 1200 negroes 
should be imported^ if prompt payment is desired^ for if this 
number be surpassed^ a risk of a total loss or of not being paid 
for a long time must be taken. . . . [In support of this^ the 
intendant^ Patoulet^ was quoted to the effect that if 2000 slaves 
were imported into the islands^ more than one-half and almost 
two-thirds of the sugar produced would be required to pay 
for them] ; (4) the company has found by actual experience 
that the reasoning of M. Patoulet is sound, not only as to 
importing 2000 slaves, but also a smaller number, for, having 
imported about 1200 slaves annually, it finds that the sums 
due it have accumulated so rapidly that at the commencement of 
the present year, 1684, they amounted to 6,000,000 pounds of 
sugar, and that the year preceding even three of its vessels 
were unable to obtain enough sugar for cargoes, one being 
forced to return empty. "^^ 

It is to be remarked that in neither of these memoirs is the 
claim even made that the company had ever tried to 
import 2000 slaves a year into the colonies, that, in fact, it 
is distinctly stated that only about 1200 had been sent 
there annually. One is therefore somewhat surprised to find 
the assertion made by Labat that "the company had not 
failed to meet its obligations, for it had sent to the Amer- 
ican colonies 4561 negroes in less than two years and a 
half." 

Labat states that the directors of the company made 
this assertion in a protest against the arret of September 
14, 1684, which took away from them a large part of their 
grant to confer it upon the new company of Guinea about 
to be organized.^^ No record has been found among the 
papers of the company of Senegal of any such assertion. 

95 Arch. Col., Cg, I, Memoire de la Compagnie du Senegal et coste 
d'Afrique sur le droit qu'elle a de faire seule le commerce, etc. 

96 Labat (Le Pere J. B.), Nouvelle Relation de I'Afrique Occident- 
ale, edition of 1722, I, 27-28. 

305 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

A recent writer^'^ has shown that Labat was not only guilty 
of plagiarism in writing the Nouvelle Relation, but also of 
careless handling of his material. It is possible, and even 
probable, that we have here but another case of inaccuracy 
on Labat's part. The fact that we have two memoirs, both 
of 1684, in agreement as to the company's activity, is 
rather conclusive against the accuracy of Labat's state- 
ment. 

The company had certainly made progress over its 
predecessor by importing a larger number of slaves into 
the islands, but it had not kept pace with the needs of 
the planters. Patoulet stated in August, 1680, that Mar- 
tinique alone had need of 1000 slaves per year for the next 
two years, and 1200 or 1300 for the third year. Now, 
Martinique was the most productive colony of all at the 
time and doubtless needed the greatest number of slaves, 
but both Guadeloupe and St. Christopher were well culti- 
vated and must have needed many. The demand for slaves 
at St. Domingo was increasing. The amounts owed the 
first Company of Senegal by the planters of the several 
islands on June 30, 1681, gives a clue, perhaps, to the 
distribution of its trade and consequently some idea of the 
relative numbers of slaves which they demanded. The 
statement of debts owed the company at that time shows 
67,018 liv. Is. owed by planters of Martinique, 47,466 liv. 
8s. by those of St. Christopher, 30,214 liv. 17s. 6d by 
those of Guadeloupe and 30,065 liv. 12s. by those of St. 
Domingo. ^^ By making use of these figures to establish 
a proportion, it would not, perhaps, be far wrong to say 
that if Martinique needed 1000 to 1200 slaves annually, 
the others combined needed at least 1500 to 1800, making 
a total of 2500 to 3000 slaves for them all. 

97 P. Cultru, Histoire du Senegal du XF© 8iMe a 1870. 

98 Arch. Col., Cq, I, Estat gen. des eflfets de la Cie. du Senegal, 
June 30, 1681. 

306 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

From these estimates it seems very probable that the 
second Company of Senegal was importing only about 
enough slaves to satisfy the demand of Martinique alone 
and hence was not satisfying the total demand in the 
islands. A letter written by Patoulet from Dunkerque on 
October 18, 1684, seems to point clearly to this same 
conclusion. "I have urged," he wrote, "some merchants 
of Dunkerque and of Lille to undertake to import from 
Guinea into the islands 1000 slaves annually on terms much 
more advantageous to the king than those which are being 
proposed at Paris." Patoulet added that full liberty to 
all Frenchmen to import slaves would be beneficial to the 
islands.^ No such suggestions would have been made, if 
the Company of Senegal had been furnishing an adequate 
supply of slaves. A still stronger piece of evidence is to 
be found in the arret of September 12, 1684, which revoked 
the monopoly of trade for that part of the company's con- 
cessions lying between the Gambia and the Cape of Good 
Hope. The act is explicit in giving the reason for such a 
step: 

"Whereas His Majesty has been informed that the company 
has not only not satisfied the contract of importing 2000 
slaves annually into the islands^ but has imported even so few 
that most of the planters are planning to abandon the Wind- 
ward Islands for the coast of St. Domingo and other places, 
a thing which would destroy both the colonies and the trade 
thereof; besides that as the concession made to the company 
in the letters-patent of June, 1679^ which gave it the monop- 
oly of trade for the whole coast of Africa from Cape Verde 
to the Cape of Good Hope, is too vast, it has not been able to 
equip enough vessels or furnish enough funds to carry on the 
trade of both Senegal and the coast of Guinea . . . the king, 
being in his council, has revoked and revokes by these presents 

99 Arch. Nat, Mar., B3, 45, fol. 115, Patoulet to Ambleteuze, Octo- 
ber 18, 1684. 

307 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

the privilege accorded to the Company of Senegal by the 
contract of March 21, 1679."^°° 

The monopoly of the company was henceforth limited to 
trade on the coast from Cape Verde to Gambia, trade on 
the coast between the Gambia and the Cape of Good Hope 
being left open to all Frenchmen. The period of leaving 
this latter trade open to all was of short duration, for 
letters-patent were issued in the month of January (1685) 
to the Company of Guinea, which granted it a monopoly 
of trade on the coast from Sierra Leone to the Cape of 
Good Hope, and conjointly with the Company of Senegal, 
a monopoly of slave trade in the French West Indies .^°^ 

Thus the history of the slave trade during the ministry 
of Colbert falls into three distinct periods: (1) 1661-1668, 
during which slaves were supplied to the planters by the 
Dutch; (2) 1669-1675, during which Colbert attempted 
to direct the energy of the West India Company to the 
trade and to stimulate both the company and private 
traders, by removing export duties on all articles used in 
the trade, and by providing a liberal bounty of thirteen 
livres per head on all slaves imported into the islands ; and 
(3) 1675-1685, during which the slave trade was placed 
under a monopoly, granted successively to Oudiette 
(1675), first Company of Senegal (1679), the second 
Company of Senegal (1681), and finally conjointly to the 
last named company and the Company of Guinea (1685). 

In no one of these periods had French enterprise shown 
itself equal to the task of satisfying the needs of the 
planters. The development of the islands was probably 
somewhat retarded as a consequence, but the policy pur- 
sued by Colbert had brought a distinct increase to French 
commerce. Many new trading posts had been founded on 

100 Moreau de Saint-Mery, I, 400-401. 

101 Moreau de Saint-Mery, I, 409-414. An account of the formation 
and history of this company will be found in a later volume. 

308 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

the coast of Africa, trade relations had been definitely 
established and the ways of the slave trade known. The 
basis had been laid for the building up of a prosperous 
trade. 



309 



CHAPTER XIV 

Colonial Imports — Food- Stuffs 

ONE of the most pressing problems in the maintenance 
of prosperous colonies in the West Indies was to 
furnish an adequate supply of food-stuffs for both master 
and slave. This became more and more true as the large 
sugar plantations supplanted the small tobacco farms and 
as the larger planter with many slaves replaced the small 
farmer with his small number of indentured servants. 

In their early history the planters of the French West 
Indies produced a large share of their own food supply. 
Maurile de St. Michel, in describing the life of the colonies 
in 1646, remarked: 

"Here^ instead of bread made from wheat, we eat bread 
made from the cassava plant which is very common and 
abundant. Instead of beef we eat lamantin, which is a sort 
of sea cow caught along the shore. Instead of chicken^ we eat 
lizards, from which a very good soup is made and the meat of 
which is very delicate. I have often eaten them. . . . One 
of the principal articles of food is peas which grow here in 
abundance. I have seen many kinds, Roman peas, haricots 
brought from Virginia by the English, peas from Angola in 
Africa, which resemble our lentils. I have also seen large 
beans. The ordinary dinner of the average man consists of 
pea soup, cassava bread seasoned with red pepper, lemon juice 
and a small piece of bacon. "^ 

With the exception of bacon, all the articles of this menu 
were produced in the islands and the planter was almost 
independent of foreign food supplies. 

As trade increased, however, the planter found it 
much more advantageous to expend the labour of his slaves 

1 Maurile de St. Michel, op. cit., 31, 64. 

310 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

upon the production of sugar and tobacco and to barter 
these commodities to traders for food supplies. Pelleprat 
remarked in 1655 that "the grapevine was exceedingly 
productive in the islands, bearing fruit almost uninter- 
ruptedly," and that, if cultivated, three harvests could be 
gathered yearly and excellent wine made. "But," he 
added, "the planters of America find more profit in the 
production of tobacco and of sugar than in that of grapes. 
It is true that the traders of Europe supply them, so that 
there is an abundance of wine and flour in the islands."^ 
Du Tertre stated that observing days of abstinence was 
exceedingly difficult in the islands and was not practiced 
by many families. "This is not because the seas are not 
full of fish, but because every one is so occupied with his 
plantation that it is only the well-to-do who have a savage 
or a negro to send a-fishing."^ 

It was then not so much a question of what the planters 
might and could produce to supply themselves with food, 
as of what they found it to their interest to do. The law 
of larger returns for amount of labour expended guided 
very naturally the course of production on the plantations. 

The ordinary bread, both for master and slave, was 
made from the cassava plant, which flourished in the 
islands. The root of the plant was pressed so as to remove 
the poisonous juice and then made into a small loaf and 
cooked.* Only the richest planters ate bread made from 
flour imported from Holland and France and some of them 
preferred cassava bread.^ The demand for European 
flour was great only when the crop of cassava was ruined 
by storms or drouth, as in 1670.^ It seems to have 

2 Pelleprat, o'p. cit., 5-8. 

3 Du Tertre, II, 458-459. 

4 Pelleprat, p. 5. 
5Du Tertre, II, 457. 

6 Arch. Nat. Col., C7, I, du Lion to Colbert, March 29, 1670, and 
ibid., Cg, I, de Baas to Colbert, March 22, 1670. 

311 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

increased somewhat during the second half of Colbert's 
ministry, due no doubt to the increasing number of rich 
planters/ But no evidence has been found to show that 
the importation of wheat flour ever became permanently 
important or was made the subject of legislation by Col- 
bert. With the exception of salt beef and bacon, this is 
true also of all other articles of food which were exported 
to the islands in only very small quantities.^ 

But the importation of salt beef became a matter of 
immense importance. De Baas stated that salt beef was 
more essential to the welfare of the islands than any other 
commodity "because it is the meat fed to the slaves and the 
consumption of which is so great that 30,000 barrels 
(6,000,000 pounds) are not sufficient."^ The same governor 
stated in 1672 during a period of scarcity of salt beef that 
the slaves would starve, unless some measures were taken 
to guarantee a supply .^° Du Tertre tells us that it was the 
custom for the planter to obtain from the ships which came 
to trade in the islands a supply of salt beef, of which he 
retained a part for his own table and the remainder he 
distributed to his slaves at the rate of about one-half 
pound a day for each,^^ whereas de Baas stated that it was 
the custom to feed the slaves on "three kinds of roots, 
potatoes, yams and cassava," to which was added two 
pounds of salt beef per week for each working slave.^^ 
Only the rich had fresh meat for their own table.^^ Salt 
beef was thus the common meat food of slave and master. 

7 Arch. Nat. Col., Cg, I, de Baas to Colbert, June 36, 1675. 

8 The cargoes sent out from Nantes in 1673 and 1675 contained 
only small quantities of flour, biscuits, prunes, olive oil, stockfish 
and codfish. Arch. Dept., Loire Inf., B, 1, 4, "Declarations de Sorties," 
passim. 

9 Arch. Nat. Col., Cg, I, de Baas to Colbert, February 28, 16T3. 

10 Ibid., November 20, 1672. 

11 Du Tertre, II, 457. 

12 Arch. Nat. Col., Cg, I, de Baas to Colbert, November 20, 1672. 

13 Ibid. 

312 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

The demand for it increased in proportion as the number 
of planters and slaves grew. It was, therefore, impera- 
tive to provide an adequate supply. 

Previous to the ministry of Colbert and during its open- 
ing years, this supply had always been obtained in Ire- 
land and imported by Dutch and French traders. These 
traders not only went to the Irish coast for cargoes of 
beef, butter and horses, but bought "under the name of 
Irishmen, a certain number of acres to serve as a pasture 
for cattle, some of which they killed, salted and carried 
to the West Indies."'' 

After the Dutch had been excluded from the trade of 
the islands, Nantes and La Rochelle, especially the former, 
became the principal entrepots for Irish beef. Paul Par- 
fouru, late archivist of the archives of He and Vilaine, has 
called attention in a very interesting article'^ to the large 
number of Irish at Nantes and to the close relations be- 
tween Ireland and that port during the eighteenth cen- 
tury. Unfortunately his article has very little to say 
about commercial relations. We have enough evidence, 
however, to state that commercial relations between Ire- 
land and Brittany became important even during the 
ministry of Colbert.'^ Trade with Ireland, besides furnish- 
ing a valuable article of export for the West Indies, proved 
very profitable. A memoir written by some merchants at 
Nantes stated that the trade yielded a profit of forty-three 
per cent.''^ 

14 Arch. Nat, Col., Cg, 2nd series, I, Memoire contenant les avis et 
sentiment de diff. capit., etc., 1661. 

'^5 Annales de Bretagne, IX, 534-533, Les Irlandais en Bretagne 
aux XVIIe et XVIIIe Siecles. 

16 The cargoes of vessels sailing to the islands contained large quan- 
tities of Irish salt beef. Thus La Marie, a vessel of thirty-five tons, 
sailing from Nantes on May 7, 1673, carried fifty-seven barrels of 
Irish beef in her cargo and the Ste. Anne, ninety tons, sailing on July 
3, took 322 barrels. Arch. Dept., Loire Inf., B, 1, "Decl. de Sorties." 

17 Arch. Nat. Mar., B7, 496, fols. 118-119, M6moire des march, de 

313 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

But it was not in accordance with the mercantihst idea 
to permit the importation of such an important commodity 
from foreign markets. The ideal solution would have 
been to obtain a food supply for the West Indies from a 
temperate zone colony within the empire. The compara- 



Nantes sur le commerce d'Irlande, 1690. Included in the memoir is 
an estimate of the profit to be gained on the cargo of a vessel of 100 
tons. The outgoing cargo was to be composed as follows: 

67 tons of salt ....... 540 livres. 



860 livres. 

400 livres. 
1,300 livres. 
1,900 livres. 



10 tons of wine of Anjou 
10 tons of wine of Nantes 
10 tons of brandy of Nantes . 
3 tons of cloth, paper, hats, etc. 

100 5,001 livres. 

Insurance on cargo at sixteen per cent . . 800 livres. 

Interest on capital eight months at four per cent 200 livres. 



6,000 livres. 
The cargo would sell in Ireland 

for 16,500 livres. 

Deduct for cost of freight . 4,000 livres. 

Deduct for commission . . 800 livres. 4,800 livres. 



With this sum could be bought for return cargo: 
30 tons of salt beef in 240 barrels at 9 livres per 

barrel, F. O. B 

3 tons of tallow ...... 

5 tons of butter at 15 livres the hundredweight 

2 tons of beef hides 

35 tons of wool ...... 

Commission and other expenses 



11,700 livres. 



2,160 livres. 

936 livres. 

1,500 livres. 

480 livres. 

6,000 livres. 

624 livres. 



11,700 livres. 
15,400 livres. 



This cargo would yield at Nantes . 
Deduct : 

Capital 6,000 livres. 

Freight from Ireland . . 4,000 livres. 

Insurance on cargo . . . 1,872 livres. 

Expense of unloading . . 928 livres. 12,800 livres. 



Which represents profit of forty-three per cent 

314 



2,600 livres. 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

tively early and rapid development of the New England 
and middle colonies made possible such a happ}^ solution 
for the British West Indies. Colbert attempted to find in 
French Canada the equivalent of the British continental 
colonies for the French West Indies. As early as Septem- 
ber 27, 1664, he wrote to de Tracy who was at Guade- 
loupe : 

"Order being established in the islands^, as it is now^ it will 
prove a great advantage, if, in the course of a year as you 
hope, trade can be established between them and Canada by 
sending to the islands fifteen or sixteen vessels with cargoes 
of staves, hoops and headings for hogsheads which will find 
a ready market there and by sending, after the land has been 
cleared, cargoes of wheat flour, dry-salted eels, codfish and 
other fish."!^ 

The establishment of trade between Canada and the 
West Indies seems to have been one of the cherished plans 
of Talon, who became intendant of Canada in 1665. In 
a letter of October 27, 1667, he informed Colbert that he 
had associated himself with a merchant in a plan to send 
a ship belonging to the West India Company with a cargo 
of salted fish, peas, lumber and other articles to the 
French West Indies "in order to make an experiment and 
open the road to a trade which the inhabitants of Canada 
have as yet not attempted. "^^ In a memoir of November 
10, 1670, he stated that Canada was producing a surplus 
of wheat, vegetables and fish, and that he had "laden this 
surplus on three vessels, constructed in Canada, to be 
carried to the West Indies, with the hope that this north- 
ern part of America will be able to furnish great aid to the 
southern part." 

18 Arch. Nat. Col., Cg, 2nd series, I, Colbert to de Tracy, September 
27, 1664. 

19 Thomas Chapais, Jean Talon, Intendant de la Nouvelle France, 
p. 383. 

315 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

"I hope," he said, "that the trade which I am opening up 
will prove of mutual benefit to the inhabitants of Canada and 
to the planters of the islands. My plan is for vessels to take 
a cargo [of food-stufFs] hence to the islands, thence a cargo 
of sugar to France and then to bring back here a cargo of 
merchandise suited to our needs. The realization of this plan 
will prove very advantageous to His Majesty's empire, for, 
in case of war, the Antilles can be supplied from Canada with 
food-stufFs and manufactures and they will thus not be made 
to suffer from having their supply cut off from Europe. In- 
asmuch as this consideration appears to me to be of some 
importance, my own feeling is that in order to encourage the 
inhabitants of Canada to construct vessels and employ them 
in this trade, it would be wise for His Majesty to offer a 
larger bounty than that which he offers to his other subjects 
for buying or constructing vessels, and in addition to reduce in 
their favour import duties on sugar which they bring from the 
islands."20 

Colbert replied to this letter by saying that the king 
was delighted to learn that Canada was not only in con- 
dition to support herself, but even to send food supplies 
to the French West Indies. 

"Inasmuch as His Majesty has furnished such large sums 
of recent years with a view of building up commerce between 
these two parts of his empire, there is nothing to which you 
should pay greater attention than to strengthen and to encour- 
age the efforts which have been made this year in Canada to 
establish trade with the islands and to persuade the inhabitants 
to construct or buy vessels for the establishment of this trade. 
It is certain that there is no better means to make them pros- 
perous and increase their numbers. I have not failed to render 
an account to His Majesty of the three vessels constructed in 
Canada and sent last year with cargoes to the West Indies. 

20 Arch. Nat. Col., Cu (Canada), III, fol. 94, Memoire sur le 
Canada joint a la lettre de M. Talon, November 10, 1670. 

316 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

The commencement of this commerce has proved very agree- 
able to His Majesty."^^ 

As to Talon's demand that a special bounty be granted 
for the construction of vessels in Canada, Colbert re- 
plied : "I am very glad that the inhabitants of Canada are 
beginning to apply themselves to shipbuilding. Although 
those which you note are rather small . . . yet you may 
grant the bounty provided for in the arret, of which I 
am inclosing you a copy."^^ As to the reduction on sugar 
imported into France from the West Indies by Canadian 
vessels, Colbert extended to them the benefits of the reduc- 
tion, made by the arret of December 10, 1670, on colonial 
sugar, from four livres to forty sous the hundredweight.^^ 
Instructions were given to de Baas in 1668 to do every- 
thing to encourage trade with Canada.^* Likewise, Pelis- 
sier was instructed to study the problem of establishing 
this trade. The latter submitted a memoir to Colbert, 
under date of December 10, 1670, suggesting that ships 
should plan to sail from Quebec by November 1, or No- 
vember 11 at the latest, for the islands and pass thence 
to Bordeaux, La Rochelle, Nantes or to one of the chan- 
nel ports, where a return cargo would be taken to Can- 
ada.^^ Blenac, governor-general of the islands, and Begon, 

21 Arch. Nat. Col., B, 3, fol. 22, Colbert to Talon, 1671 (exact date 
not given — Clement, III, 2, p. 511, gives date of February 11). 

22 1 have not been able to determine whether or not Colbert pro- 
vided a special bounty by an arrU of which I have found no record. 
It is more than probable, however, that the bounties here accorded 
were none other than those granted to ship builders in France, for in 
the margin of the memoir in which Talon demanded the special 
bounty is written in Colbert's hand: "Les graces que S. M. accorde 
sont si grandes qu'elles ne peuvent etre augmentees. II faut faire 
pour ces batimens reduction de quarante sols sur le sucre." Arch. Nat. 
Col., Cii, III, fol. 94. 

23 Arch. Nat. Col., B, 3, fol. 124 verso. 

24 Arch. Aff. Etrang., Doc. et Mem., Amerique, V, 237. Instruc- 
tions to Sieur de Baas, September 15, 1668. 

25 Arch. Nat. Col., C^, III, Memoire touchant le commerce du 

317 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

intendant, in a joint memoir to Colbert under date of Feb- 
ruary 13, 1683, stated that they were trying to encourage 
the planters to carry on trade with Canada, because they 
"could obtain there salted meats of better quality and 
cheaper than those of Ireland, as well as flour, peas, salted 
fish and lumber. "^^ 

A short time after Colbert's death, all duties were 
removed from sugar-cane brandy, sugar, tobacco, cotton, 
indigo, and other products imported into Canada from 
the French islands and from salted meats, peas, flour, 
fish, lumber, and other articles imported into the islands 
from Canada.^'^ The encouragement of trade between the 
two groups of colonies continued to be a policy of the 
government throughout the reign of Louis XIV.^^ 

These eff^orts yielded very meagre results. Talon lost 
two of the vessels sent to the islands in 1670, of which 
the estimated value with cargoes was 36,000 livres.^^ An 
intendant of the islands stated in 1691 that others who 
had made attempts to carry on this trade had made no 
profit.^'' 

There were several obstacles to the success of the trade. 

Canada did not produce a sufficient quantity of food- 

stuflTs or lumber to make the trade of large importance, 

nor was there a sufficient demand in Canada for West 

India products to make an independent trade between the 

Canada aux Isles Antilles fran9aises de I'Amerique, December 15, 
1670. 

26 Arch. Nat. Col., Cg, III. 

27 Arch. Nat. Col., B, 11, fol. 70, Extrait des Reg. du con. d'Etat, 
April, 1685. 

28 The history of this policy will be told in a succeeding volume. 
See Arch. Nat. Col., Cg, IV, Dumaitz de Goimpy to Seignelay, Decem- 
ber 18, 1686; ibid., V, de Blenac and de Goimpy to the king. May 8, 
1688; ibid., B, 24, Instructions to Desnos, February 9, 1701; ibid., B, 
31, letter to d'Aguesseau, December 5, 1708, etc., etc. 

29 Arch. Nat. Col., C^, III, fols. 274-379, M6moire du Sieur Patou- 
let, January 25, 1672. 

30 Arch. Nat. Col., Cg, VI, letter from Dumaitz, February 16, 1691. 

318 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

two groups of colonies possible.^^ It was necessary to 
establish a three-cornered trade between Canada, the West 
Indies and the mother country .^^ This meant a long and 
difficult voyage at great risks. A trader undertaking it 
had to wait a year for any returns from his capital.^^ 
Besides the British North American continental colonies 
furnished a much more accessible and much cheaper sup- 
ply of food-stuffs. The petition of the sugar refiners of 
Guadeloupe and Martinique in 1681, quoted above,^* for 
permission to establish a trade with these colonies is most 
significant. 

Thus both Colbert and his successors failed in their 
efforts to obtain an adequate supply of food-stuffs for the 
West India planters by establishing trade with Canada. 
But Colbert was not willing to remain idle in presence of 
the fact that such a large part of that food supply came 
from Ireland, a foreign country. In 1670, he began to 
exclude Irish beef from importation into the islands and 
to substitute French beef. On October 27, he wrote to 
Brunet, one of the directors of the West India Company, 
who was at that time at La Rochelle, as follows : 

"I note from your letter the efforts which you have made to 
carry out the instructions which I gave you, and particularly 
those concerning the purchase of beef in France to export to 
the islands instead of that of Ireland. As you know how very 
much at heart I hold this matter, you will understand why I 
am so happy to learn that you are hopeful of succeeding. . . . 
Bend your energies to the task and rest assured that you can 
do nothing which would bring me more pleasure than the suc- 
cess of the enterprise. "^^ 

31 Arch. Nat. Col., Cg, V, Memoir by de Bl^nac and Dumaitz, May 
8, 1686. 

32 Ibid. 

33 Ibid., IV, Dumaitz de Goimpy to Seignelay, December 18, 1686. 

34 Chapter IX. 

35 Depping, Correspondance, III, 522. 

319 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

In order to induce the West India Company to devote 
special attention to the importation of French beef into 
the islands, he offered the directors a bounty of 12,000 
livres for the importation of 4000 barrels during the year 
1671.^' 

To the objection that French beef was too dear, Col- 
bert replied that it was necessary to convince traders that 
it was of superior quality and he added: 

"In order to force merchants who trade in the islands to 
buy French beef^ you may forbid them to use He de Re as an 
entrepot for Irish beef. In that case you have need of an arret 
of the conseil d'etat to do so, let me know and I shall send one 
to you promptly. "^^ 

Such an arret was published on August 17, 1671, which 
formally annulled the right of entrepot in France for 
"beef and other meats brought from Ireland."^ This was 
followed by a royal ordinance which forbade the importa- 
tion into the islands of all foreign beef and bacon under 
penalty of confiscation thereof and 500 livres fine for the 
first offense and of bodily punishment in case of repeti- 
tion.^^ A supplementary arret of December 21, 1671, 
granted the liberty of exporting to the islands all Irish 
beef actually on hand, if it were done before January 13, 
1672.*° Finally a bounty of four livres per barrel was 
granted on all beef salted within the kingdom and ex- 
ported to the West Indies.*^ 

36 Ibid., p, 523, same to same, November 13, 1670. 

37 Ibid., p. 527, Colbert to Brunet, February 26, 1671. 

38 Moreau de Saint-Mery, I, 230. 

39 Arch. Nat., Gj, 1313, arret of November 4, 1671; Moreau de 
Saint-Mery, I, 253. 

40 Arch. Nat. Col., B, 4, Ms. 1-2; Arch. Aff. Etrang., M6m. et 
Doc, France, 2007, fol. 12 verso. 

41 Arch. Nat. Col., B, 4, fols. 4-5; Moreau de Saint-Mery, I, 259. 
Ordinance of January 13, 1672. In order to claim this bounty the 
captains were obliged to deposit a certificate, properly signed in the 

320 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

There is but very little evidence to show that French 
traders made many efforts to take advantage of the 
bounty offered for salting beef in France and shipping 
it to the islands. The West India Company made some, but 
it has been shown above that it was too near bankruptcy 
to accomplish any important results. The cargoes of only 
a few vessels sailing from Nantes contained French beef 
and then the quantities were small.*^ In 1675, two years 
after the restoration of the privilege to export Irish beef 
to the islands, the quantities of French beef sent to the 
islands were still small.*^ 

De Baas showed opposition to the policy from the first. 

islands, certifying that the beef had been landed there. Ibid., fol. 22 
verso. 

42 Thus Le David, 240 tons, captain, Chapelain, whose passport was 
registered on August 3, 1673, had in her cargo 23 one-quarter barrels, 
and La Notre Dame de Mont Carmel, 150 tons, captain, Castellier, 
July 3, had 64 barrels. Likewise, the cargo of La Montague, 300 
tons, captain, Hotman, had 179 barrels. The rest of the vessels for 
the year carried either Irish beef or none at all. Arch. Dept., Loire 
Inf., Decl. de Sorties, B, 1, and 2. There is one case. La Marguerite, 
50 tons, captain, Leroy, where the cargo contained a small quantity of 
beef from Hamburg. 

43 Of the ten vessels sailing for the islands from the port of 
Nantes in that year, the following is the record so far as beef con- 
tained in their cargoes is concerned: 

Jan. 10, L'Esperance, 200 tons, Capt. Mezard, 

Jan. 10, St. Franqois, 120 tons, Capt. Gabillard, 

Jan. 18, L'Africaine, 250 tons, Capt. Bernard, 

Jan. 22, La Montagne, 300 tons, Capt. Allard, 
Oct. 12, St. Bernard, 80 tons, Capt. D'Arquistad, 
Jan. 23, La Louise, 40 tons, Capt. Lelois, 

Feb. 16, St. Pierre, 200 tons, Capt. Marston, 
Mar. 14, La Tartaune, 30 tons, Capt. Joubert, 
Oct. Q, St. Nicolas, 60 tons, Capt. Coillot, 

Dec. 23, Le Charles, 130 tons, Capt. Dubois, 

Total, 434 bbls. 697 bbls. 

Arch. Dept., Loire Inf., Decl. de Sorties, B, 3 and 4. 

321 



Beef 

French Irish 


70 bbls. 


11 bbls. 


391^4 bbls. 


5 bbls. 


30 bbls. 


200 bbls. 


274 bbls. 


142 bbls. 


20 bbls. 


75 bbls. 


— bbls. 


70 bbls. 


— bbls. 


112 bbls. 


— bbls. 


18 bbls. 


— bbls. 


64 bbls. 


3/4bbls. 


— bbls. 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

On receiving notification of the arret excluding Irish beef, 
he wrote to Colbert: 

"I shall obey orders, Monseigneur, but permit me to say 
that a supply of beef is more necessary to the islands than that 
of any other commodity, for it is the meat which is fed to the 
slaves. The consumption of it is so great that 30,000 barrels 
are not enough to satisfy the annual demand. I am not sure 
that France can furnish such a large quantity, and even if it 
could, the beef would have to be sold at double the price of 
Irish beef."** 

After nearly a year of trial of the new regulation, the 
same governor wrote again: 

"If the supply of salt beef fails, the planters will be without 
the services of their slaves. The stronger slaves will become 
robbers and runaways, and the weaker, the women and chil- 
dren, will grow faint and die, as they are already beginning 
to do. ... I must say to you, with your permission, Monseig- 
neur, that as beef is the meat given to slaves, a supply of it is 
absolutely necessary, if they are to be kept at work. It is 
impossible for French traders to bring a sufficient quantity 
from France, as the supply there is small and costs so much 
that beef, which has been selling here for 300 pounds of sugar 
per barrel, will cost 800. . . . None of the traders is im- 
porting any into the islands and there is none to be had here. 
The planters are murmuring because they see no means of 
feeding their slaves, who detest fat pork and eat it only by 
compulsion. . . . The slaves are forced to work twenty out of 
every twenty-four hours. If, then, these miserable wretches do 
not have beef to eat, how is it possible for them to endure so 
much work by eating only potatoes, yams and cassava bread? 
If Irish beef is not imported, it is certain that they will not 
be fed on French beef. ... I confess, Monseigneur, that I 
have a great deal of weakness in the matter of carrying out 
your orders, for slaves are human beings and human beings 

44 Arch. Nat. Col., Cg, I, de Baas to Colbert, February 33, 1672. 

322 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

should not be reduced to a state which is worse than that of 
cattle."*^ 

De Baas added a postscript to say that he had been forced 
to interrupt the work of fortifying the harbour of Port 
Royal on account of not having a supply of beef and that 
he would have to discontinue the work, until some was 
brought from France, or until he could send to Barbadoes. 
A month later he wrote that beef and other provisions had 
become so scarce at St. Croix that the governor was sick 
and some of the chief planters had died.*^ One official 
reported that he had seen planters at Guadeloupe "swear- 
ing upon bended knee and with tears in their eyes to the 
governor that it had been more than a year since they 
or their families had had a morsel of meat to eat."*^ 

De Baas seems to have taken the law into his own hands 
and, in spite of strict orders and instructions, permitted 
trade with the foreigner to relieve suffering caused by 
the scarcity of beef. Thus he permitted the planters at 
St. Croix to trade witR the Danes during six months.*^ 
He permitted two Jew merchants of Martinique to fetch 
a cargo of food supplies from Barbadoes,*^ and likewise 
four English vessels to trade at Guadeloupe and Martin- 
ique. Among the latter was "a ketch coming from the 
city of Boston. "^*^ Colbert rebuked de Baas for his con- 
duct,^^ but he withdrew, nevertheless, the prohibition to 
import Irish beef. 

A royal ordinance was proclaimed on May 10, 1673, 
which stated that as the existence of a war had rendered 
commerce by sea difficult, and traders had ceased to salt 

45 Arch. Nat. Col., Cg, I, de Baas to Colbert, November 20, 1673. 

46 Ibid., de Baas to Colbert, December 28, 1672. 

47 Arch. Nat. Col., Cg, I, du Clerc to Colbert, January 20, 1675. 

48 Arch. Nat, Col., Cg, I, de Baas to Colbert, December 28, 1672. 

49 Arch. Nat. Col., Cg, I, de Baas, February 6, 1674. 

50 Arch. Nat. Col., Cg, I, du Clerc to Colbert, January 20, 1675. 

51 Ibid., B, 6, fol. 32, Colbert to de Baas, May 15, 1674. 

323 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

beef and to export it to the islands, and as the planters of 
the said islands might suffer as a consequence, "His Maj- 
esty has permitted and permits to all French traders to ex- 
port and sell in the said islands beef purchased in foreign 
countries in the same manner as was the custom to do 
before the ordinance of November 4, 1671."^^ The ordi- 
nance seems to have produced a good effect, for de Baas 
wrote shortly afterwards : "I believe that I should tell you 
that the abundance of meat is so great in the islands that 
this year a barrel of beef sells for 350 pounds of sugar and 
a barrel of bacon for 450 pounds, whereas the price of the 
former was formerly 800 pounds and of the latter was 
1200 pounds."'' 

Even after the close of the war, Colbert did not return 
to the fight. The intendant, Patoulet, suggested in 1680 
that the planters be forced to raise cattle and that "His 
Majesty should announce that after a period of three 
years the importation of Irish beef would not be per- 
mitted."'* The reply made to this suggestion is instruc- 
tive in showing that Colbert had learned by experience 
that some things, which he thought desirable from the 
standpoint of the interests of the state, were, nevertheless, 
impossible of realization. "His Majesty does not think 
it wise," he wrote, "to prohibit the importation of Irish 
beef and Madeira wine into the islands. The suggestion 
which you make to compel the planters to devote them- 
selves to the raising of cattle, by declaring that the impor- 
tation of Irish beef will not be permitted after a period 
of three years, does not seem practicable, for the lands 
which have been cleared are along the seashore and pro- 
duce only cane. Thus there would be no land suitable for 

52 Moreau de Saint-Mery, I, 270. 

53 Arch. Nat. Col., Cg, I, de Baas to Colbert, June 26, 1675. 

54 Arch. Nat. Col., Cg, 2nd series, I, Memoire par Patoulet, Decem- 
ber 20, 1680. 

334 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

the pasturage of cattle. "^^ Instructions were sent to de 
Blenac under the same date to admit Irish beef as had 
been the custom since 1673.^ 

Patoulet himself placed an order with Allaire, a mer- 
chant of La Rochelle, for 500 barrels of Irish beef at 
twelve livres the barrel.^^ 

Irish beef continued to maintain its place of importance 
in the trade of the islands, for Gastines, the commissioner 
of the marine at Nantes, stated that the basis of all car- 
goes sent to the islands from that port was Irish beef.^^ 
When an import duty of five livres per hundredweight 
was laid in France on Irish beef by an arret of June 29, 
1688, some merchants at Nantes, interested in the com- 
merce of the islands, met and drew up a memoir of protest, 
asserting that the duty was excessive, as it represented 
a duty of 100 per cent ad valorem and that, if maintained, 
the traders of Nantes and the West India planters would 
sufFer.^^ 

It is certain, therefore, that Irish beef continued, 
throughout the ministry of Colbert, to be a most impor- 
tant article of food for the slaves of the French West 
Indies. The attempt of Colbert to prevent its importa- 
tion between November 4, 1671, and May, 1673, proved 
futile. 

55 Bib. Nat. MSS., fonds frangais, 11315, Colbert to de Baas, May 
4, 1681, and also Arch. Nat. Col., B, 9, fols. 12-23, April 30, 1681. 
5S Arch. Nat. Col., B, 9, fols. 1-12. 

57 Bib. Nat. MSS., fonds fran9ais, 11315, fols. 19-22, Anthoine Al- 
laire to Patoulet, October 29, 1679. 

58 Arch. Nat. Mar., Bg, 65, fol. 492, Gastines to Seignelay, July 20, 
1688. 

59 Arch. Nat. Mar., B^, 495, fol. 198, Memoire sur le boeuf sale 
d'Irlande, June 29, 1688. 



325 



CHAPTER XV 

Colonial Imports — Live Stock, Lumber^ 
Manufactured Goods 

T I iHE introduction of the cultivation of sugar-cane in 
^ the French West Indies brought with it an increased 
demand for live stock. De Poincy, the governor of St. 
Christopher, stated in 1640, that the lack of water power 
would have to be supplied by the employment of horses 
or oxen to turn the sugar-cane mills. ^ This was actually 
done, for de Rochefort asserted in 1658, that five of the 
six sugar-cane mills operated by that governor were 
turned by oxen or horses brought from Cura9ao.^ Later, 
Dutch and French traders maintained pastures in Ire- 
land for raising cattle, some of which were shipped to the 
West Indies as live stock to turn the sugar-mills.^ Nac- 
quart, in his plan of 1663 to establish a company to carry 
on trade with the West Indies, proposed to include in the 
cargoes of each vessel, "twenty-five or thirty horses of 
the kind that are ordinarily sent from Amsterdam to the 
islands and that cost from sixty to eighty florins and sell 
for 2500 to 3500 pounds of sugar, according to quality."* 
He also proposed that "while the company's ships were 
waiting in the islands for return cargoes, one or two of 
them be sent to Cura9ao and Bonayre for cargoes of 
asses and horses."^ 

1 Arch. Col., F2, 15, Letter, November 15, 1640. 

2 Du Tertre, II, 289-290. 

3 Arch. Nat. Col., Cg, 2nd series, I, Memoire contenant les avis et 
sentiment de diflF. capit., 1661. 

4 Arch. Nat. Col., Cg, 2nd series, I, Proposition au Roy d'une 
Nouvelle Compagnie a establir, etc., 1663. 

5 Ibid. 

326 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

Cura9ao remained the principal source of supply even 
after the beginning of Colbert's ministry, for de Baas was 
instructed by the West India Company in 1668 to admit 
Dutch ships from Cura9ao, bringing slaves and horses, 
and he admitted them freely until the close of 1669.^ 
Furthermore, du Lion, the governor of Guadeloupe, com- 
plained in 1669 that Cartier, the general agent of the 
West India Company, was monopolizing the supply of 
horses "imported by the Dutch from Cura9ao," in order 
to sell them at the exorbitant price of 2500 to 3000 pounds 
of sugar for horses and from 3000 to 4000 pounds for 
mares/ Finally, Temericourt, governor of Marie Ga- 
lante, informed Colbert that he had sent a small vessel to 
Cura9ao for a cargo of slaves and horses.^ 

But news reached Guadeloupe in 1670 that the Dutch 
West India Company had forbidden, for two years, the 
exportation of horses from Cura9ao.^ Du Lion then asked 
that permission be granted for Jean Vaulit, a Dutch 
inhabitant of Guadeloupe, to bring from Flushing a 
cargo of "good Norman horses, lumber and other things 
of which the colonies are in need." "It would be," he 
said, "an advantage for the colony, if he brought a cargo 
of Norman horses, because they are much stronger than 
those which we have been receiving from Cura9ao."^° We 
learn from the same governor in a letter of July 25 that 
the agent of M. Formont at Guadeloupe was expecting a 
cargo of mares from Ireland and Norway.^^ 

Thus the French islands were dependent upon foreign 
markets for their supply of live stock. But Colbert re- 
garded this fact as an evil and made efforts to remedy it. 

6 Arch. Nat. Col., Cg, I, de Baas to Colbert, December 22, 1669. 

7 Arch. Nat. Col., Cj, I, du Lion to Colbert, December 1, 1669. 

8 Arch. Nat. Col., C7, I, December 14, 1669. 

9 Arch. Nat. Col., C7, I, du Lion to Colbert, May 5, 1670. 

10 Ibid. 

11 Ibid. 

327 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

He instructed de Baas on March 25, 1670, not to admit 
under any circumstances slaves or horses brought by for- 
eigners or imported from foreign countries/^ At the same 
time he instructed the West India Company to devote spe- 
cial attention to the importation of live stock into the 
islands/^ He attempted to force the West India trader to 
find a supply in France. A royal ordinance was proclaimed 
on December SO, 1670, which required every vessel going 
to the islands to take two mares or two cows or two she- 
asses. A promise to do so was made the condition of 
obtaining a passport.^^ 

What definite results these regulations attained, the 
writer is unable to say, but it is to be noted that du Lion 
complained in 1672 of the exorbitant price demanded by 
the West India Company for horses of Poitou. This 
would seem to imply that the company imported some 
horses from France. France, however, did not have a 
supply of good horses, for Vauban noted the fact near the 
close of the century .^^ It would seem to imply that horses 
offered for sale were exceedingly scarce. At any rate, we 
know that by 1680 the French planters were again receiv- 
ing live stock from the foreigner. Patoulet stated in one 
of his letters to Colbert that he had succeeded in estab- 
lishing trade in horses and mules with the Spaniards of 
Porto Rico,^^ and de Pouan9ay stated in the following year 

12 Arch. Nat. Col., B, 2, fol. 19 verso. 

13 An account of this will be found in Chapter VII. 

14 Arch. Nat. Col., B, 2, fol. 145. A slight modification in the 
regulation was made on January 22, following, by which vessels of 
100 tons or less were allowed to substitute two servants for each mare, 
cow or she-ass. Ibid., 3, fol. 8 verso; Moreau de Saint-Mery, I, 207. 

15 Vauban, Oisivetes, I, 92. "II y a encore une raison en France 
qui empeche qu'il ne s'y trouve que tres peu de bons chevaux, c'est que 
les paysans sont trop pauvres pour les pouvoir nourrir et attendre 
quatre on cinq ans pour s'en defaire; il les vendent ordinairement a 
dix huit mois ou deux ans ou les font tirer ou porter presqu'aussitot, 
ce qui les empeche de croitre et les ruine de forte bonne heure." 

16 Arch. Nat. Col., Cg, III, Patoulet to Colbert, December 26, 1680. 

328 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

that live stock was being imported into St. Domingo from 
the Spanish colonies.^^ 

It seems probable that the efforts of Colbert to find 
within the empire a supply of live stock for the West 
India planters proved futile, as they had in the case of 
salt beef. 

A supply of lumber was necessary in the West Indies 
for building purposes, for repairing ships and in form of 
staves, hoops and headings for making sugar barrels. Du 
Tertre remarked during his sojourn at St. Christopher 
that a supply of lumber was obtained from the Dutch at 
Saba.^^ He notes also the presence in the islands of wood- 
choppers and dressers of lumber, and adds the comment 
that they demanded exorbitant prices for their lumber.^^ 
But the return for labour was greater on the plantation 
than in the forest and the islands relied upon the foreigner 
for a supply of lumber which they needed. 

But Colbert was unwilling to let this continue. Thus, 
in his instructions to de Baas of September 15, 1668, is 
to be found the following passage: "The thing which is 
lacking most in the islands and of which there is a very 
great and pressing need, is lumber for the construction of 
vessels and the making of sugar-barrels. As Canada is 
well supplied with timber . . . Sieur de Baas will exert 
his efforts to persuade the inhabitants to undertake to 
obtain a supply by trade with Canada. "^*^ He had pre- 
viously instructed Talon, the intendant of Canada, to 
encourage the same trade. The story has been told else- 
where of how these efforts proved unfruitful.^^ 

17 Arch. Nat. Col., Cg, I, Memoire du Sieur de Pouan^ay concernant 
la coste de St. Domingue envoye a M. Colbert, January 30, 1681. 

18 Du Tertre, II, 453. 

19 Ibid., p. 454. 

20 Arch. Aff. Etrang., Mem. et Doc, Amerique, V, 237, September 
15, 1668. 

21 See Chapter XIV. 

329 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

After 1669 the supply of staves, hoops and headings 
for barrels, in part at least, seems to have come from the 
ports of France. The few cases found in the admiralty 
records of the several ports, where the cargoes of out- 
going vessels are given in detail, show that nearly all of 
them took these articles to the islands.^^ But France was 
not able to satisfy for a long time the growing demand of 
her West India islands for these articles, for she was 
compelled in the eighteenth century to admit their impor- 
tation from the British North American colonies. 

The principal articles of manufacture imported into 
the islands were cloth, of qualities varying from a coarse 
grade, used for making shirts, breeches and short skirts 
for the slaves,^^ to the finest grades, used by the more pros- 
perous planters, clothing, hats, shoes, utensils for the 
farm and household, caldrons and copper vessels of vari- 
ous sizes, and implements used in the sugar-mills. 

After Colbert had excluded the Dutch who had been 
accustomed to furnish these articles, he removed one by 
one the restraints which had long discouraged the French 
traders from exporting them to the islands. In the first 
place, he granted to the West India Company, by an arret 
of May 30, 1664, exemption from half the duties ordina- 
rily levied on exports from France.^* He removed all such 
duties both for the company and for private traders by an 
arret of June 4, 1671.^^ Exemption from all export 

22 Arch. Dept., Loire Inf., B, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, passim. La Tartane, 30 
tons, sailing from Nantes on March 14, 1674, took staves for 130 
barrels, 28 bundles of hoops, 2 barrels nails, etc. L'Africaine, 250 tons, 
sailing on January 18, took staves and headings for 900 barrels, and 
36 bundles hoops. L'Esperance, 200 tons, sailing January 10, took 
dressed lumber and staves, hoops and headings. 

23 Pey fraud, op. cit., 226. The master was required by the twenty- 
fifth article of the Code noir of 1685 to furnish yearly to each slave 
"deux habits de toile ou quatre aunes de toile." 

24 Moreau de Saint-M6ry, I, 114-115. 

25 Arch. Nat. Col., B, 3, fols. 127-128. This was re-enacted on 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

duties on goods sent to the coast of Guinea to be used in 
the slave trade was granted on September 18 of the same 
year.^^ Finally, by a royal ordinance of June 9, 1670, 
duties levied in the islands on goods imported from France 
were abolished.^^ As an explanation of this last action, 
Colbert wrote to de Baas as follows : 

"The custom which has been followed up to the present of 
levying duties on incoming and outgoing cargoes was a very 
good practice for the time when foreigners and only a few 
Frenchmen carried on this trade, but at present, when the 
foreigners have been entirely eliminated and only French 
traders remain, the custom must be abolished. "^^ 

Colbert thus removed all the barriers which had im- 
peded for two generations the trade between the mother 
country and her colonies. Henceforward the way was 
perfectly free. Cargoes of manufactured goods could be 
exported to the islands free from all duties. The French 
traders took advantage of this fact and built up a profit- 
able trade with the West Indies.^^ 

November 25. Arch. Nat., AD,vii, 3, and Moreau de Saint-Mery, I, 
255-256. 

26 Arch. Nat. Col., B, 3, fols. 129-130, and Moreau de Saint-Mery, 
I, 242. 

27 Moreau de Saint-Mery, I, 194. 

28 Clement, III, 2, p. 478, April 9, 1670. 

29 The following will illustrate the relative amount of manufac- 
tured articles in cargoes taken from Nantes: Le Charles, 130 tons, 
Dubois, captain, took "1th. vin Nantais, 1 boite verres ouvrag6s, 1 
bal. couverture et toile, 1 balle papier, 20 caisses couteaux et oustils, 
1 ballot selles a cheval, 5 paq. marchandises, 1 caisse chapeaux, 3 bal. 
toile fa9on Bilbao, 1 quart toile, 3 ballots droguets, 1 1-4 barrique 
mercerie et soies, 1 caisse d'espees et toile, 300 barrils en botte, 5 
quarts lard, 1 caisse savon, 57 quarts farine, 2 bar. pigalles, 1 caisse 
fayence, 6 quarts biscuits, 3 quarts boeuf du pays, 6 bar. huile d'olive, 
4 quarts huile de poisson, 150 feuillards de cercles, 3 bar. 1 quart 1 
ballot souliers et estoffe." Arch. Dept., Loire Inf., B (Registre de 
Sorties), 4, December 23, 1675. 



331 



CHAPTER XVI 

Conclusion 

THERE are some obvious, but at the same time funda- 
mental principles which underlay the whole of Col- 
bert's colonial commercial policy. First of all, he consid- 
ered the chief end of establishing colonies to build up 
trade. He instituted the practice of subsidizing colo- 
nial enterprises with no other purpose than that of creat- 
ing an over-sea commerce. Colonies should contribute to 
this end by becoming markets for the manufactures of the 
mother country and for other articles brought by her 
traders, and by furnishing raw products which might be 
used either as a supply to her manufacturing industries 
or as articles of trade with other nations. In the second 
place, he considered colonies as the exclusive property of 
the mother country. Foreigners should not be allowed to 
profit from them, either by being allowed to import even 
the articles which the mother country did not produce or 
which her traders could not or did not supply, or by being 
permitted to take away even the surplus products for 
which there was no market in the realm. As a corollary 
to this was the principle that the growth and expansion 
of a colony were only desirable when they had been made 
possible by a strict exclusion of foreigners from all profit 
therein. Finally, the interests of the colonies should be 
subjected to those of the mother country. Wherever they 
came into conflict, the former should always be sacrificed 
to the latter. 

In the application of these principles, as we have had 
occasion to see in the preceding chapters, Colbert formu- 
lated many regulations. Those which he made to keep out 
the foreign trader, together with the measures which he 

332 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

took to insure their enforcement, caused much suffering 
to the planters and checked, at least temporarily, the 
development of the islands. The wisdom of forcing such a 
sudden change from a regime of Dutch to that of French 
trading may be seriously questioned. The suggestion 
made by Formont, in his memoir of 1662, to effect this 
change gradually, by permitting, for a few years, trade 
with foreigners under a regime of preferential treatment 
to French ships, would undoubtedly have proved less rev- 
olutionary and less burdensome to the colonies. It might 
have saved them from the long state of unrest and rebellion 
which prevailed from 1665 to 1670, for French traders 
proved unable to satisfy all the needs of the islands and 
the Dutch might have been utilized advantageously, for a 
time at least, in aiding them. This was especially true of 
a supply of slaves and live stock. The directors of the 
West India Company clearly recognized the wisdom of this 
and freely admitted into the islands Dutch ships bringing 
such a supply. As late as 1668, it will be recalled, they 
instructed de Baas to admit them. Colbert, however, w^as 
not willing to tolerate such an exception to the strict 
principle of excluding all foreigners. The result was, as 
we have seen, that the planters were forced not only to 
discontinue the clearance of new lands, but also were unable 
to replace slaves that died, and hence were unable to main- 
tain the former level of production. 

The desire to exclude all foreigners from profit in the 
island trade led Colbert to go to extremes. A case in 
point is to be found in his efforts to exclude Irish beef 
from the islands. Irish beef not only offered an article 
for profitable trade between Nantes and Ireland, but also, 
as an article of export to the islands, yielded a good mid- 
dleman's profit to French traders. It was, to say the 
least, somewhat an exaggeration of mercantilist principles 
to attempt to force its production in France, where the 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

cost was much greater, and to disregard the suffering of 
the hungry planters and of their starving slaves. It must 
be added, however, that the short experiment which was 
made convinced Colbert of the error of his way and that 
he never tried afterwards to carry out this policy. An- 
other example of extremes to which he went was his refusal 
to permit the exchange of rum and molasses — two waste 
products of the sugar industry which could not be mar- 
keted in France — for New England food-stuffs and lumber, 
of which the mother country could not furnish a sufficient 
supply. Events proved that this exchange was so profit- 
able that the French government was forced to make defi- 
nite provisions to permit and encourage it. 

Colbert's plan to make the islands absolutely independ- 
ent of all foreign aid and to reserve the profit of their 
development entirely to the French could have proved 
permanently successful only by building up what might 
be termed an ideal colonial empire. Such an empire would 
have required four essential parts to make it complete, 
namely, the mother country, temperate zone colonies. West 
India colonies, and trading-posts on the coasts of Africa. 
In general, the mother country should furnish a supply 
of manufactured articles of all descriptions, and a suffi- 
ciently large market for the products of the West India 
colonies, as well as an abundance of vessels and of capital 
necessary for the development of shipping and commerce ; 
the West India colonies should produce such articles as 
sugar, tobacco, indigo, cotton, ginger, dye-woods, and 
other articles for which there was always a profitable 
market in Europe; the temperate zone colonies should 
yield a supply of food-stuffs, live stock and lumber, suffi- 
cient to satisfy all the needs of the West India colonies 
and be a good market for the manufactures of the mother 
country; and finally, the trading-posts of the coast of 
Africa should be able to supply a sufficient number of 

334 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

slaves to satisfy the needs of the planters in the West 
Indies. 

It was generally true of all West India colonies that 
their exports to Europe far outweighed their imports. 
This was so, because the consumption of European manu- 
factures was relatively small and because in most cases 
European countries did not produce a surplus of lumber, 
live stock or food-stufFs sufficiently large to satisfy the 
needs of the planters. The balance of trade with the 
mother country was therefore always in their favour. It 
was by this balance that they gained a means of buying 
in other markets a supply of the articles most essential to 
their welfare and progress. 

Exactly the opposite was true of the temperate zone 
colonies. They imported much from and exported little 
to Europe. They produced, in general, articles which 
were produced in the mother country and for which it 
offered them no market. They were consequently forced 
to find a middle market where their commodities could be 
exchanged, either for letters of credit, or for commodities 
which could be marketed in the mother country. It was 
only in this way that they could meet the balance of trade 
against them. They found this middle market in the West 
India colonies, which needed an abundance of the very 
articles they offered, and could give them in exchange the 
letters of credit against the mother country or commodi- 
ties which they could use to settle their bills in Europe. 

The same thing was true of the trader at the coast of 
Africa. His cargo of slaves could be readily exchanged 
in the same way with the West India planter. 

An ideal empire, so to speak, would have been one in 
which all of these four parts were sufficiently productive 
to supply the needs of the others and sufficiently pros- 
perous to furnish a market for their commodities and in 
which a balance was maintained between the several parts. 

335 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

No such empire ever existed. The British had very pro- 
ductive West India and southern colonies, as well as pros- 
perous northern temperate zone colonies. But the devel- 
opment of the latter was too rapid for the former and the 
balance was destroyed. The northern colonies were forced 
to seek, outside of the empire, larger and more profitable 
markets. The French empire had productive West India 
colonies, but was very weak in its temperate zone colonies 
and in trading-posts on the coast of Africa. Colbert's 
efforts to stimulate the development of trade between 
Canada and the West Indies, and to build up the slave 
trade at the coast of Africa indicate that he was awake to 
the importance of this fact. 

We have had occasion to see that his efforts to build 
up the slave trade bore some fruit, but that they were not 
sufficiently successful to prevent a serious check to the 
normal development of the islands. We have seen also 
that the development of Canada was so slow and its mar- 
kets so distant and inaccessible, that trade with it proved 
both unimportant and unprofitable to the West India 
planter. But in spite of these two very important facts, 
Colbert persisted in enforcing his policy of excluding all 
foreigners. The only statistics which have been found for 
1669-1683, the period in which the foreigners were ex- 
cluded so rigourously, rather indicate that as a conse- 
quence the development of the islands was retarded. Thus 
the total population of the French colony of St. Chris- 
topher in 1671 was 8120, of which 4468 were slaves, in 
1682 it was 7278, of which 4301 were slaves, showing a 
decrease in both white and slave population.^ In Guade- 
loupe the total population in 1671 was 7477, of which 
4167 were slaves, and in 1684 it was 8161, of which 4954 
were slaves.^ The increase for thirteen years was thus 

1 Arch. Col., Gi, 471, Recensement de St. Christophe, 1671, 1682. 

2 Ibid., pp. 468, 469, Recensement de la Guadeloupe. 

336 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

very slight. In St. Domingo alone does the development 
seem to have been rapid. Its population was 1500 in 
1669,^ 6648 (2102 slaves) in 1681.^ But it was exactly 
at St. Domingo that Colbert's efforts to exclude the for- 
eigner were not successful. We have had occasion to see 
that they were trading freely with the Dutch in 1670 and 
again in 1676. The inference is natural that the other 
islands suffered from the enforcement of his policy. 

Colbert would have replied to this by saying that it was 
better for the development of a colony to be less rapid and 
to retain the profit thereof for the mother country, than 
for it to be more rapid and to let the foreigner share in 
the profit. He remarked, in fact, in a letter to a colonial 
administrator that he should not be surprised, if the en- 
forcement of the regulations against the foreigner resulted 
in ''quelques inconvenients'' to the planters.^ "I know very 
well," he wrote to another, "that these innovations [the 
regulations against foreign traders] will prove at first 
somewhat irksome, and that people who do not see beyond 
the present good or ill prove rather difficult to control, 
when they are forced to make some real sacrifice, but it is 
precisely at such times that reason, justice and, if neces- 
sary, force, should be employed to make them submit."^ 

There are, perhaps, many other features of Colbert's 
policy which modern economists would be inclined to criti- 
cise severely, such as his tendency to pay little heed to 
the larger economic interests of the colonies by placing 
the sale of their tobacco in the hands of a monopoly, which 
destroyed the industry in the Windward Islands and seri- 

3 Charlevoix, II, 82, Memoire par Ogeron, 1669. 

4 Arch. Nat. Col., C9, I, Denombrement gen. de I'isle de la Tortue 
et Coste de St. Dom. mai, 1681; Arch. Col., G^, Recensement de St. 
Domingue. 

5 Clement, III, 3, p. 484, letter to Pelissier, June 21, 1670. 

6 Arch. Nat. Col., B, 3, fol. 135, letter to de Baas, December 21, 
1670. 

337 



THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF COLBERT 

ously hurt it at St. Domingo, or by subjecting colonial 
sugar to the mercy of French refiners which brought a 
period of distress from 1670 to 1679, and finally by pro- 
viding no means to prevent French traders from demand- 
ing exorbitant prices for their wares during the period 
of transition, before there were enough of them for com- 
petition to insure fair prices. 

But one redeeming feature of Colbert's whole commer- 
cial policy, which makes one pardon many a fault, was the 
fact that it was eminently patriotic. Colbert worked inde- 
fatigably for the interests of France and of her people. 
Personal interests, the interests of commercial companies 
and of the colonies were all subjected to sacrifices which 
would insure the realization of his larger plan to increase 
the wealth of the nation and to lift France to a position of 
real and abiding power. 

It had another, as M. Pigeonneau has pointed out: 
"Good or bad in theory, in conformity or not with the 
principles of economy, Colbert's policy had one merit which 
was more valuable than many: it was successful."^ Col- 
bert had found the French in 1661, at the beginning of 
his ministry, in possession of some rich West India colo- 
nies, but he saw their whole profit going to enrich the 
enterprising traders of Holland. Only a few straggling 
French vessels, three or four in 1662, out of a total of 
150, he said, were finding their way to these colonies. At 
his death in 1683, he had driven the Dutch from the field 
and more than 200 French vessels were trading annually 
at Martinique, Guadeloupe and St. Domingo. He had 
awakened the ports of La Rochelle, Bordeaux and Nantes, 
especially, to new life, and the West India trade became 
henceforth a source of much profit to their merchants and 

7 La Politique coloniale de Colbert in Annates de I' E cole des Sci- 
ences Pol, 1886, pp. 487-509. 



TOWARD THE FRENCH WEST INDIES 

traders and served as a base of their whole commercial 
development in the eighteenth century. 

It is curious to note that in 1664 Colbert viewed with 
much scepticism the enthusiasm of de Tracy as to the pos- 
sibilities to be realized in the development of the West 
India colonies. He wrote in the margin of his letter, 
dated July 2 of that year: "He (de Tracy) exaggerates 
the great advantages which the nation may derive from 
these colonies."^ In reality their development proved to 
be the most valuable colonial asset which France pos- 
sessed and contributed more to her commercial prosperity 
than any other single branch of trade. And it was in this 
trade, established after a long and determined fight, that 
Colbert made his most permanent contribution to the com- 
merce of France. 

8 Arch. Nat. Col., Cg, I, D6peche de M. de Tracy de I'isle de la 
Martinique, July 2, 1664. In the margin in Colbert's hand, "II 
exagere les grands avantages que I'estat pent retirer de ces establis." 



339 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 

The manuscript material for the history of the French 
West Indies prior to the ministry of Colbert, treated in 
Chapter I of the present work, is very meagre. This is 
to be explained by the fact that these islands were in the 
hands either of private commercial companies or of pro- 
prietors throughout the period. The ministries of Riche- 
lieu and of Mazarin were only indirectly connected with 
their administration. The few documents which remain 
from the official relations of the gc :;mment are to be 
found principally in Paris, at the Foreign Office in vols. 
IV and V of the section of its archives. Memoir es et Docv^ 
merits, Amerique. Their preservation at the Foreign Office 
is to be explained by the fact that during this period the 
administration of the colonies fell within the duties of the 
Secretary of Foreign Affairs. Little has remained to us 
from the private papers of the Company of St. Christo- 
pher (16^6-1635) and the Company of the Isles of Amer- 
ica (1635-1648). From those of the latter company there 
does remain a register of the minutes of the meetings of 
its directors. It is noted below under series F2 of the 
Archives Coloniales. The private papers of the several 
proprietors who held the islands from 1648 to 1664 seem 
to have completely disappeared. This loss is all the more 
deplorable because the "Fouquet papers," which undoubt- 
edly contained most valuable material, have also been lost. 
Attention has been called in Chapters I and II to the 
important role which Nicolas Fouquet played in colonial 
affairs, and Du Tertre notes the existence of his papers. 
(See Du Tertre, I, passim, and Dampierre, pp. 210-212.) 
The chances of finding the "Fouquet papers" seem slight 
and the great gaps in the manuscript material for the 

341 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 

period will probably remain unclosed. Fortunately, we 
have some excellent contemporary chronicles, travels and 
histories which cover the period. A list of them is given 
below and a critical estimate of their authors and of their 
value will be found in Dampierre. (See below.) The most 
important of them all is the general work of Du Tertre, 
which records the history from the beginning to the year 
1667. The more deeply and carefully one studies the 
period and attempts to analyze Du Tertre's work, the 
greater grows his admiration for that historian. His 
history is based upon a careful and impartial study of 
the best contemporary material, contains an abundance of 
documents, cited textually, and has an enhanced value 
from the fact that its author knew the West Indies from 
travel and residence in them. 

For the period from the ascension of Colbert to power, 
in 1661, to the formation of the West India Company in 
1664, which we have preferred to call the period of prep- 
aration, our manuscript sources are confined to a few 
documents at the Foreign Office (noted below under Mem, 
et Doc, Amerique, V) and at the Colonial Office (noted 
below under series Ci4, Cayenne), relating to the forma- 
tion of the Company of Cayenne, and to a few memorials 
addressed to Colbert during the years 1660-1663, and 
preserved in the second series of the correspondence of 
Martinique of which a list is given below. 

For the period of the rule of the West India Company 
(1664-1674), there is a wide gap in our source material 
occasioned by the disappearance of the company's regis- 
ters and private papers. Prolonged research has failed 
to find a trace of them. Their loss is irreparable. For the 
years 1664-1669, we are forced to rely upon Du Tertre 
(to the year 1667), upon Moreau de Saint-Mery (Loix 
et Constitutions, see below) and upon a few memorials and 
letters addressed by the directors of the company to Col- 

342 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 

bert. A list of the more important of the last named will 
be found below under the series F2 of the Archives Colo- 
niales. It will be seen that the list includes also documents 
for the period 1669-1674. To the knowledge of the writer 
these papers have never been made use of before. The loss 
of the company's papers is less serious for the years 1669- 
1674, because in the former year Colbert came officially 
in charge of colonial affairs and began at once to direct 
both the policy of the company and the trend of affairs in 
the West Indies. He placed all students of the West 
Indies under lasting obligations to him by commanding the 
preservation both of his own correspondence and of that of 
the colonial governors, intendants and other officials. 

The material thus preserved by Colbert constitutes our 
richest collection of source material for the period 1669- 
1683. It is to be found today at the Archives Nationales, 
having been deposited there by the Minister of the Colo- 
nies in the spring of 1910. Research is long and difficult 
from the fact that neither a catalogue nor a calendar has 
ever been made. A very summary inventory in manu- 
script is the only aid to guide one to the various series and 
dates of volumes. Pains have been taken, therefore, to 
give elsewhere in this bibliography enough data about the 
material to make it easy for a student to find it readily. 

To supplement this valuable collection we have yet 
another in the Archives Coloniales, namely, the Collection 
Moreau de Saint-Mery, consisting of 287 volumes. (A 
short sketch of Moreau de Saint-Mery will be found in 
Dampierre, pp. 192-194, and in a paper read by the 
author of the present work before the American Philo- 
sophical Society of Philadelphia and to be found in the 
proceedings of that society for April, 1912.) The char- 
acter of the collection is shown by the data given below 
and is such that it offers to the student of French West 
India history a mine of information. 

343 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Colbert apparently retained among his own private 
papers many official documents which are most important 
for a study dealing with any phase of his ministry. In 
the Salle de MSS of the Bibliotheque Nationale are to 
be found two large collections of Colbert's papers, the 
one known as the Cinq Cents de Colbert, and the other, as 
the Melanges de Colbert. Research in either of these 
collections is difficult, but is indispensable. 

The intimate relations existing between the history of 
the marine and of the colonies render it obligatory for the 
investigator to consult the large and rich collection of 
documents deposited some years ago at the Archives Na- 
tionals by the Minister of the Marine. This is espe- 
cially true, because the administration of the colonies 
remained in the hands of the Department of the Marine 
until 1892. 

Our researches in the ports of France which carried on 
trade with the West Indies have been on the whole dis- 
appointing. In many cases the admiralty records have 
completely disappeared. This is especially true for Rouen, 
Havre and Dieppe. Only unsatisfactory fragments have 
remained at La Rochelle, while at Bordeaux there are 
many wide gaps in the material. At Nantes alone was the 
reward great for many days of patient work. In the case 
of the last three ports, the material found has been tabu- 
lated below and the results utilized in Chapter X above. 

This study has been based in large measure upon the 
manuscript material thus briefly described. Collections of 
printed documents, such as Moreau de Saint-Mery, Loix 
et Constitutions des colonies frangaises de VAmerique sous 
le Vent and of printed official correspondence such as the 
publications of Clement, Depping and Boislisle (see below) 
have been found convenient for a more careful study of 
many documents found in manuscript. Dessalles, Histoire 
generate des Antilles, the only general history of the 

344 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 

French West Indies which we have, may be used as a his- 
torical guide. Dessalles' work is based upon the study of 
some of the material in the Archives Coloniales referred to 
above, but it was evidently hastily written and its value 
is much decreased by the failure of the author to cite his 
sources. Moreover, it treats economic and commercial 
questions only very superficially, a fact which has con- 
siderably reduced its utility for this work. The same 
criticism holds good for Sidney Daney's Histoire de la 
Martinique and Jules Ballet's La Guadeloupe. Of the 
general works on Colbert, those of Clement and Joubleau 
are the most valuable. Neither of them treats, however, 
the question of Colbert's colonial policy except in its 
broadest outlines. Benoit du Rey has attempted a special 
study on Colbert's colonial policy, but it is very superficial 
and inadequate. The author gives no evidence of having 
ever darkened the door of the Ministry of the Colonies to 
find material. Peytraud's UEsclavage aux Antilles frang- 
aises avant 1789, is the most serious monograph which has 
been written on any subject connected with the history of 
the French Antilles. It is to be regretted, however, that 
M. Peytraud attempted to prove a thesis and was not con- 
tent to use his valuable data to write a real history of 
slavery in these islands. M. Chemin-Dupontes in his Les 
compagnies de colonisation en Afrique occidentale sous 
Colbert, has presented a short, but valuable study of the 
West India Company ^nd of the two companies of Senegal. 
In regard to the former company, M. Chemin-Dupontes 
apparently overlooked the very important documents at 
the Colonial Office and we have been compelled to disagree 
with him in some of his conclusions as to the two last named 
companies. Malvezin's Histoire du commerce de Bordeaux 
is the only work treating the history of any of the several 
ports engaged in the West India trade that is of much 
value. It is a work of sound scholarship. 

345 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Of the remaining works included in the bibliography 
below, there are none of immediate value for our subject, 
but they have been referred to for their indirect value, 
which will be readily understood from their titles. 

Bibliographies 

There is only one bibliography, properly speaking, for 
any part of the period covered by this study, namely, 
Jacques de Dampierre, Essai sur les sources de Vhistoire 
des Antilles Frangaises (1492-1664), Paris, 1904, being 
vol. VI of Memoires et Documents puhlies par la societe de 
VEcole des Chartes. 

Manuscript Sources 

archives coloniales 

(Deposited at the Archives Nationales. Referred to in notes 
as Arch. Nat. Col.) 

Serie A. Actes du pouvoir souverain. Edits et arrets, vol. 24 
(1 669-1715). A register of regulations of the conseil d'etat, 
of the conseil souverain of Martinique^ incomplete and 
lacking order in the arrangement of documents. 

Serie B. Correspondance generale, Lettres envoyees. Regis- 
ters of letters written by the Minister of the Marine to gov- 
ernors^ intendants, naval officers^ etc., in regard to colonial 
affairs. 

Vol. 1 (1663-1669), vol. 2 (1670), vol. 3 (1671), vol. 4 
(1672), vol. 5 (1673), vol. 6 (1674-1675), vol. 7 (1676- 
1678), vol. 9 (1679-1682), vol. 10 (1683). 

Serie C. Correspondance generale, Lettres regues. Bound 
volumes of the original letters and memorials received from 
colonial governors, intendants, and other officials. The 
documents are arranged according to their date and locality 
from which they came. 

346 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 

C7 {Guadeloupe) , vol. 1 (164*9-1670), contains only three 
documents of importance for this study prior to 1669, 
namely, two letters from du Lion, the governor of Guade- 
loupe, of April 8 and May 11, 1665, and one of February 
17, 1666. The remainder of the volume contains du Lion's 
correspondence for 1669 and 1670. 

Vol. 2 (1671-1673) and vol. 3 (1674-1691) contain du 
Lion's correspondence and that of his successor, Hinselin, 
as well as that of de Temericourt, governor of Marie Ga- 
lante. 

Cs {Martinique) , vol. 1 (1663-1676), is of capital im- 
portance as it contains the interesting letters of de Baas, 
governor-general of the islands from I668 to 1676. The 
date of the first letter preserved is December 26, 1669- After 
that date his correspondence seems to have been preserved 
with but few gaps. The volume contains also two interest- 
ing memoirs, one by Gabaret, commander of the three ves- 
sels sent in 1670 to drive Dutch traders from the islands, 
the other, by Pelissier, whose mission to the islands in 1670 
is treated in Chapter VI. For the years anterior to Decem- 
ber 26, l669j, the volume contains an important memoir of 
1663 addressed by d'Estrades to Colbert, an ahxege of the 
letters written by de Tracy from Martinique in 1664, and 
some extracts of letters written by de Baas in May, 1669, 
to the West India Company. Vol. 2 (1677-1680) and vol. 
3 (1681-1684) are chiefly important for the correspond- 
ence of de Blenac, de Baas's successor, and of Patoulet, the 
active and intelligent intendant-general of the islands. 

Cg {Martinique) , 2™^ Serie. A collection of miscellaneous, 
unbound documents in cartons, classified chronologically and 
relating to the history of Martinique. Carton 1 (1635-1689) 
contains a number of documents referred to in Chapters I 
and II of the present work. Among them the following are 
the most important: Reglement de M. de Tracy pour le 
gouvernement, police et commerce de la Martinique, 17 mars 
1665; Relation des Isles de I'Amerique Antilles en I'Estat 
qu'elles estoient I'annee 1 66O ; Memoire contenant les avis et 
sentiments de difFerents capitaines de navires voyageurs et 

347 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 

autres sur les moyens de former des etablissements a TAmer- 
ique meridionale^ I66I ; Memoire du Sieur Formont pour 
montrer Futilite du commerce des Isles et les moyens de le 
bien etablir^ 1662; Proposition au Roy d'une nouvelle com- 
pagnie a establir pour les Isles fran9aises de lAmerique par 
le Sieur Nacquart^ 1663; Relation de ce qui s'est passe aux 
Isles de lAmerique, 4 avril 1667; Memoire du Sieur Bellin- 
zani sur le Commerce des Isles, 12 mars 1672 ; Memoire pour 
M. Begon par M. Patoulet; and four letters from de Baas 
bearing dates of March 4, September 21, 1670, January 14, 
1671, and August 28, 1674. 

C9 (St. Domingue) , vol. 1 (1664-1688), contains many 
interesting letters and memoirs from the hand of Ogeron 
and of Pouan9ay, the governors of St. Domingo from 1664 
to 1683. 

C9 (St. Domingue), 2™" Serie. Carton 1 (1666-1710) 
contains a number of memoirs and miscellaneous letters re- 
lating to St. Domingo. 

Cio (lies diverges) . A series of twenty-four cartons con- 
taining miscellaneous documents, classified chronologically 
and relating for the most part to the small Windward 
Islands. 

Cio (St. Christophe). Carton 1 (1627-1689) contains 
many documents concerning the relations of the English 
and French at St. Kitts. Of special interest are two mem- 
oirs of 1679 entitled: Memoire particulier presante a M. le 
Chevalier de St. Laurent, gouverneur pour le roy de St. 

Christophe et Isles adjacentes, par Cloche directeur du 

Dom. Royal d'Occident dans les Isles de lAmerique pour 
I'interruption du negoce etranger, etc., and Estat ou est I'lsle 
de St. Christophe au sujet de Tinterruption du commerce des 
Etrangers. 

Cio (La Grenade). Carton 1 (1654-1724) contains the 
passport of the Dutch trader, Drik Jansen, whose case is 
discussed in Chapter IX. 

Cii (Canada). Vols. 4 and 5 contain some letters and 
memoirs from the hand of Talon, the intendant of Canada, 

348 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 

which concern the eiForts made to establish trade between 
Canada and the West Indies. 
Serie F. Services divers (464 registers, 41 cartons). 

F3 (Collection Moreau de Saint-Mery, 287 vols.). 

Vols. 18-20 (1635-1790). Historique de la Guadeloupe. 
A carefully chosen and arranged set of documents bearing 
on all phases of Guadeloupe's history. Vol. 18 covers the 
period 1635-1758. 

Vols. 26-38 (1635-1801). Historique de la Martinique. 
Vol. 26 covers the period 1635-1722. 

Vol. 39. Description de la Martinique. 

Vols. 52-53 (1627-1784). Historique de St. Christophe. 
Vol. 52 deals with our period. 

Vol. 63. Description de Tabago. 

Vols. 64-65. Historique de Tabago (1645-1788). 

Vols. 67-72. Instructions aux Administrateurs (1665- 
1788). Vol. 67 deals with period 1665-1701. 

Vols. 96-101. Description de la partie frangaise de St. 
Domingue. 

Vols. 102-105. Description de la partie espagnole de St. 
Domingue. 

Vols. 132-155. Notes historiques sur St. Domingue par 
Moreau de Saint-Mery. 

Vol. 157. Administration des Isles sous le Vent. 

Vols. 16 1-1 63. Culture, manufactures des Colonies. 

Vols. 164-202. Historique de St. Domingue (1492-1806). 
Vol. 164 (1492-1685). 

Vols. 221-235. Code de la Guadeloupe (1635-1806). 
Vol. 221 (1635-1699). 

Vol. 236. Recueil des Lois particulieres a la Guadeloupe 
(1671-1777). 

Vol. 237. Description historique de la Guadeloupe (1687- 
1812). 

Vols. 247-263. Code de la Martinique (1629-1784). Vol. 
247 (1629-1672) and vol. 248 (1673-1685). 

Vols. 269-281. Code de St. Domingue (1492-1789). Vol. 
269 (1492-1720). 

349 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 

(At the Ministere des Colonies, rue Oudinot, Paris. Referred 
to in notes as Arch. Col.) 

Serie C^. Compagnie du Senegal. A series of unbound mem- 
oirs, letters, accounts, etc., of the first two Companies of 
Senegal. Carton 1 (1588-1690). 

Serie C14. Correspondance generate, Lettres regues, Cayenne. 
Vol. 1 contains much interesting material concerning the 
organization and history of the Company of Cayenne which 
has been utilized in Chapter II. 

Serie F2. Compagnies de Commerce avant 1715. A series 
consisting of nineteen cartons and containing some precious 
fragments which remain from the papers of various com- 
mercial companies of the seventeenth and eighteenth cen- 
turies. The following are of importance for our study. 
Carton 15. Compagnies des Isles de VAmerique et Com- 
pagnies des Indes Occidentales. This carton, together with 
F2, 17, contains the most important documents which remain 
to us of the West India Company's papers. The most impor- 
tant found in this carton are the following: Memoire des 
Directeurs de la Cie. des Indes Occidentales pour rehdre 
raison a Mgr. Colbert de leur conduite et luy faire con- 
noistre I'estat ou se trouve ladite Compagnie (1665) ; Mem- 
oire sur I'estat veritable ou se trouve la Cie. des Ind. Occid. 
(1666); Memoire Important pour la Cie. des Ind. Occid. 
pour faire connoistre le besoin quelle a d'estre soutenue 
(1667) ; Memoire sur I'estat des aiFaires de la Cie. des Ind. 
Occid. (November, 1667) ; Estat des vaisseaux qui restent a 
la Cie. des Ind. Occid. (November, 1667) ; Memoire de ce qui 
a este fait pour I'etablissement et conduite de ladite Com- 
pagnie et de ce qu'il reste a faire presentement (by Becha- 
meil, January 15, I668) ; Extrait du Memoire sur I'estat de 
la Cie. des Ind. Occid. Cie. d'Occident a este fort avant- 
ageuse au Roy et a I'estat, etc.; Proces Verbaux de l67S et 
de 1674. 

Carton 17. Compagnies des Indes Occidentales, Edits, 
ordres du Roy, Memoires, 1661^-1716, 1722. This carton 
contains about sixty documents relating to the history of 

350 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 

the West India Company up to its dissolution in 1674 and 
many more for the period of its liquidation. Besides manu- 
script copies of many edicts^ arrets and ordinances, the most 
important of which were published by Moreau de Saint- 
Mery in his Constitutions et Loix des Colonies frangaises de 
VAmerique sous le Vent, vol. I, the most important docu- 
ments for our study are the following: Contract d'acquisi- 
tion de la Martinique vendue par le Sieur Dyel d'Enneval 
a la Cie. des Ind. Oc. (August 14, 1665); Memoire de la 
Cie. des Ind. Oc. sur I'etat ou elle se trouve et les secours 
qu'elle attend du Roy (1665) ; Memoire des Directeurs de la 
Cie. des Ind. Occid. a Colbert (1665) ; Memoire pour les Isles 
(1665); Memoire de ce qui doibt estre paye par les soub- 
straittans des taxes faicts pour la descharge des recherches 
de la Chambre de Justice dans les generallitez de ce Roy- 
aume a la Cie. des Ind. Oc. (May, 1666) ; Ordre ou juge- 
ment du conseil prive du Roy d'Angleterre sur la requeste 
de la Cie. des Ind. Oc. de France touchant les navires pris 
avant la declaration de la guerre; Estat present des affaires 
de la Cie. des Ind. Occid. de France (May, 1666) ; Memoire 
sur les besoins des Isles et Terreferme de I'Amerique et la 
necessite de pourvoir a la seurete des vais. de ladite Com- 
pagnie, etc. (1665) ; Memoire de I'estat present des Isles et 
de ce que la Cie. peut faire pour leur conservation (par M. 
Bechameil, 27 janv. 1667) ; Memoire des pieces touchant les 
navires pris par les Anglais avant la declaration de Guerre 
sur la Cie. des Ind. Oc. de France (l667); Sommaire des 
Matieres contenues en ce Memoire sur lesquelles Mgr. doit 
prononcer (1667). 

Vol. 18. Histoire abregee des Compagnies de Commerce 
qui ont este etahlies en France depuis I'annee 1626 avec la 
collection generale de tous les privileges qui ont este 
accordes depuis 166 Jf. tant a ces differentes Compagnies qua 
la Compagnie perpetuelle des Indes, etc., par le Sieur 
Dernis employe dans les Bureaux de ladite Compagnie, 
1742, pp. 515. (A bound volume in manuscript.) 

Vol. 19. Ordres du Roy et autres Expeditions de la Cie. 
des Isles de VAmerique, de 16S5 a 16^7 avec les Actes 

351 



BIBLIOGKAPHY 

d'assemhlees tenues par cette compagnie pour ce qui con- 
cerne ses affaires particulieres depuis 1635 jusquen IGJfS. 
For full description see Dampierre^ p. 219- It is a bound 
volume in manuscript of 5l6 pages and has been used in 
the preparation of Chapter I above. 
Serie F. Commerce des Colonies. Carton 1 (1663-1747) con- 
tains one memoir of interest: Memoire des moyens qu'il fau- 
droit tenir pour empescher aux estrangers le negoce des Isles 
de I'Amerique et de I'utilite qui en reviendroit a la France 
(1663). 

ARCHIVES DE LA MARINE 

(Deposited at the Archives Nationales and referred to in notes 
Arch. Nat. Mar.) 

Didier-Neuville, Etat Somrnaire des Archives de la Marine 
anterieures a la Revolution, Paris, 1898. 

Inventaire des Archives de la Marine, Serie B, Service gene- 
ral, PariSj 1885-1904. The first six volumes have appeared. 

Serie A3. Vol. 1 (1182-1671), vol. 2 (1672-1784). A chron- 
ological list of edicts, declarations, arrets, ordinances, etc., 
concerning the marine, commerce and the colonies. 

Serie B2. Correspondance generale: Lettres envoy ees, ordres 
et depeches. Vols. 7, 9, 14, 23, 26, 29-31, 34, 36, 38, 40 and 
51. This collection is of importance for our subject be- 
cause it contains many letters addressed to intendants and 
commissioners of the marine resident in the ports of Havre, 
Dieppe, St. Malo, Nantes, La Rochelle and Bordeaux and to 
other officials in regard to colonial affairs. 

Serie B3. Correspondance generale. Lettres regues (1628- 
1789). Vols. 7-10, 13, 15-17, 19, 27, 28, 31, SS, 35, 39, 42. 
It has been noted elsewhere in this bibliography that the 
departmental archives are exceedingly meagre in material 
throwing light upon the commercial relations of the several 
ports with the West Indies. This fact renders the letters 
written by the intendants and admiralty officials of those 
ports all the more valuable. It is these letters which may be 
consulted in this series. 

353 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Serie B4. Campagnes 1572 a 1789. Vols. 5-9 contain mate- 
rial relating to campaigns in the West Indies. Vol. 5 con- 
tains some interesting material on the war with Holland 
(1672-1676). 

Serie B7. Pays Strangers, Commerce et Consulats (1261 a 
1789). The series contains many interesting letters and 
memoirs to and from consuls and merchants in regard to 
matters of trade. It is especially rich for the latter half 
of the reign of Louis XIV for memoirs on the Spanish- 
American trade. These memoirs almost invariably contain 
material of interest on the West Indies. Vol. 207, 209, 
485-488 have been consulted with profit for the period of 
Colbert's ministry. Vol. 209 contains a memoir of espe- 
cial interest entitled, Memoire sur le commerce d'Espagne 
aux Indes et voyages des Flottes, by de Bellinzani (Jan- 
uary 19, 1679). It was written at the command of Colbert 
for the instruction of de Seignelay, his son and successor. 

ARCHIVES NATIONALES 

Serie AD. This series contains some material of prime impor- 
tance to our subject. Divisions vii and xi contain the most 
complete collections of legislation concerning the colonies 
which we have found. 

Carton AD,vii, 2 A. Colonies en general (1667-1789). 
Contains many edits, ordonnances, arrets, etc., concerning 
commerce. 

Carton AD,vii, 2A, 3. Canada, St. Domingue, traite des 
negres, troupes coloniales (1667-1789). 

Carton AD,vii, 3. Edits, arrets, lettres-patentes, police et 
traite des noirs (1670-1785). 

Carton AD,vii, 5. Galeres et gardes-cotes (154-7-1786). 
Carton AD,ix, 384-386. Compagnies des Indes et du 
SenSgal (166^-1787). 

Carton AD,xi, 9- Commerce en general (1617-1688) ; 
37-40, Grains et farines (1569-1789) ; 
48, Sucres (1660-1786) ; 
48-51, Tahac (1629-1789). 

353 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Serie G7, 1312-1328. Domaine d'Occident (1673-1714-). The 
Domaine d'Occident was a revenue farm created at the disso- 
lution of the West India Company with the right to collect 
taxes and duties in the islands. Its papers contain the his- 
tory of the liquidation of the West India Company and 
contain material which throws light upon the operation of 
the laws of trade. Cartons 1312-1316 cover the period of 
our study. 

ARCHIVES DU MINISTERE DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES 

Inventaire sommaire des Archives du Department des Af- 
faires Etrangeres, Memoires et Documents, 2 vols., Paris, 
1892-1893. 

Memoires et Documents, Amerique, vols. IV (1592-1660) and 
V (166 1-1 690) contain many documents relating to the his- 
tory of the West Indies during the seventeenth century. 
The guide, whose title is given above, is easily accessible in 
all large libraries and makes it unnecessary to give a list 
of these documents. Attention must be called to the fact, 
however, that vol. V contains the letters-patent and the list 
of stockholders of the Company of Cayenne, which have been 
utilized in Chapter II, as also the instructions of de Tracy of 
November 19, 1663, and the extremely interesting letter and 
memoir of Pere Plumier on conditions at St. Domingo in 
1690. 

Memoires et Documents, France, vols. 1991, 1992, 1993, 2018, 
all contain memoirs of interest on West India trade. Vol. 
2017 contains a table of edicts, arrets and ordinances con- 
cerning trade (1619-1759). 

BIBLIOTHEQUE NATIONALE, SALLE DE MSS 

Charles de la Ronciere, Catalogue de la collection 4^8 Cinq 

Cents de Colbert, Paris, 1908. 
Collection des Cinq Cents de Colbert. 

Vol. 126. Registre contenant diverses expeditions et 

depesches dont les minutes sont de la main de Monseigneur, 

354 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 

1666-1667. This register apparently belongs to the series 
of registers described above under Archives Coloniales, B, 
and Archives de la Marine, B2. Why it was retained in this 
private collection, we have not been able to find out. 

Vol. 199. Inventaire general et description de tous les 
vaisseaux appartenans aux sujets du Roy en I'annee 166 Jf., en 
consequence d'un arrest du Conceit royal des ^nances donne 
au rapport de M. Colbert. The title is self-explanatory. 
The volume is of capital importance in revealing the con- 
dition of the merchant marine at the beginning of Colbert's 
ministry. Only a relatively small part of the material has 
ever been utilized. 

Vol. 201. Remarques faictes par le Sieur Arnoul sur la 
marine d'Hollande et d'Angleterre dans le voyage qu'il en 
-fit en I'annee 1670 par ordre de M. Colbert. 

Vol. 203. Recueil de pieces et memoires sur la marine, le 
commerce maritime et les manufactures, 1515-1664-. 

Vol. 204. Registre de depeches et correspondance de 
Colbert concernant le commerce exterieur et interieur (1669) 
contains, especially, letters to Colbert de Croissy, French 
ambassador at London, in regard to the surrender of St. 
Christopher. 

Vol. 207. Recueil d'arrets du Conseil d'Etat, du Conseil 
de Commerce et de privileges concernant les manufactures, 
1661-1669. 

Melanges de Colbert. A valuable collection of papers and 
letters addressed to Colbert. The catalogue (in manuscript) 
for the collection is entirely too summary and is of small aid 
to research. Another is in preparation and will be pub- 
lished shortly. Letters addressed to Colbert by diiFerent 
directors of the Company of Cayenne and of the West India 
Company, such as Bechameil, Matharel and Bibaud, and 
by colonial administrative officers, such as de Chambre and 
du Lion, and by officials in France, such as Bellinzani and 
Colbert de Terron, are to be found in vols. 103-114, II6 bis, 
118 bis, 121, 122-124. 

Collection Margry relative a I'histoire des colonies et de la Ma- 
rine frangaise. (Nouvelles acquisitions, 9256-9510.) A large 

355 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 

collection of miscellaneous documents, some originals, some 
copies, relating to the history of the French colonies. For 
a short notice and criticism of Margry and of his plans see 
Jacques de Dampierre, Essai sur les sources de I'histoire des 
Antilles frangaises, li92-166i, pp. 178 fF. Vols. 9318- 
9336 relate to the Antilles and to the coast of South Amer- 
ica. For the most part we have found only copies of docu- 
ments of which the originals had already been studied in 
various other depositories of Paris. Vol. 9325 is an excep- 
tion, as it contains some biographical data concerning 
Ogeron, governor of St. Domingo. Vol. 9326 is a copy of 
Histoire de St. Domingue par de Beauval Segur, a history in 
manuscript which was probably written shortly after 1750. 
Fonds frangais, vols. 8990-8992. Memoires pour Vhistoire de 
I'isle de St. Domingue par le Pere J. B. Le Pers, Jesuite. A 
most interesting discussion as to the relations and relative 
merits of this work and of Charlevoix, L'histoire de VIsle 
espagnole is to be found in H. Lorin, De prcedonihus Insulam 
S. Dominici celehrantihus and in J. de Dampierre, op. cit., 
pp. 158 IF. 

Vols. 11315-11318. Correspondance de Patoulet (1679- 
1685). Special attention has been called in Chapter XII to 
the important work which Patoulet did in the islands as 
intendant from 1679 to 1681. Letters addressed to him 
during his sojourn in the islands are of both interest and 
importance. These volumes contain among others original 
letters from Seignelay, de Blenac, governor-general of the 
French West Indies^ and Anthoine Allaire, a merchant of La 
Rochelle. The letters from the last named are of unusual 
interest in throwing light on some of the practical problems 
of trade, as Patoulet seems to have carried on regular trade 
in colonial products with Allaire. 

ARCHIVES DEPARTEMENTALES 

Archives departementales de la Gironde (at Bordeaux). Of 
the admiralty records for the port of Bordeaux, the following 
volumes have been examined: 

356 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Serie B. Registres d' entrees, vols. 150 (1640-1643)^ 151 
(1643-1645), 153 (1661), 154 (1667), 155 (1669), 156 
(1670), 157 (1672), 158 (1682), 159 (1684). 

Registres de sorties, vols. 181 (1649), 182 (1651-1653), 
183 (1663), 184 (1671), 185 (l672), 186 (1673), 187 
(1682), 188 (1683). 
Serie C. Chamhre de Commerce de Guienne, vol. 940. Some 
correspondence concerning armaments for the American 
colonies. 

Carton 1649. Correspondence of the intendants of 
Guienne ... in regard to the duty of three per cent on 
sugar (1649-1772). 
Archives departementales de la Charente Inferieure (at La 
Rochelle). Unfortunately the Admiralty registers for the 
port of La Rochelle seem to have been lost. Only a frag- 
ment of a register bearing the date 1682-1696, classified as 
B, 235, has been found. A large number of unclassified 
papers consisting of passports, lists of crews, certificates of 
inspection of vessels, still remain and contain valuable data, 
but they are in such wild disorder and were so damaged by 
dampness before being deposited in their present locality 
that it is almost impossible to conduct any satisfactory 
methodical researches. The task proved too gigantic to 
search at haphazard through all the mass of unclassified 
papers. Some of them were examined and the results are 
stated in Chapter X above. Unfortunately the archives of 
the Chamber of Commerce of La Rochelle do not bear dates 
anterior to 1719. 
Archives departementales de la Loire Inferieure (at Nantes). 
Leon Maitre, Inventaire sommaire des Archives departe- 
mentales anterieures a 1790, Loire Inferieure, Series C et D, 
Nantes, 1898. 

The Admiralty records for the port of Nantes offer a 
rich unexplored field. They are very complete for the sec- 
ond half of Louis XIV's reign. It was apparently planned 
to keep four sets of registers: one for vessels coming (1) 
from other ports of Brittany ("province"), (2) from ports 
of France outside of Brittany ("hors province"), (3) from 

357 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 

foreign ports ("etranger")^ and (4) from colonial markets 
(''long cours"). Records of sailings were to be kept after 
the same classification. Registers were also kept of declara- 
tions made by captains or proprietors of vessels for the pur- 
pose of obtaining passports. In actual practice this classi- 
fication was not followed for it is not very unusual to find the 
sailing or arrival of a vessel engaged in colonial commerce 
("long cours") entered in a register bearing the title "hors 
province" or "etranger." 

Unfortunately for the present study the registers of sail- 
ings have not been preserved for the period anterior to 1673, 
nor the registers of arrivals anterior to 1694. 
Serie B, 1. Registre d'enregistrement des passe-ports pour 
province, hors province et Stranger (January-May, 1673). 

Ibid., 2. Idem (May 10, 1673 — 5 March, 1674). 

Ibid., 3. Declaration de Sorties, Stranger (1674^-1675), 
including registration of passports for ports of France, for- 
eign European ports and colonial ports. 

Ibid., 4 (1675-1677), 5 (l677-l679), 6 (1679-1685). 
Idem. 

ARCHIVES DE LA CHAMBRE DE COMMERCE DE NANTES 

(Leon Maitre's Inventaire sommaire referred to in the preced- 
ing section includes under series C an admirable catalogue 
of these archives.) 

Serie C, 722, 1652-1791. Cies. des Indes Occidentales et de 
St. Domingue. 

Ibid., 724, 1671-1789. Edits, ordonnances . . . portant 
reglements pour Ventree et la sortie des Marchandises venant 
des Isles frangaises de VAmerique et du Canada . . . listes 
d' arrets concernant les isles d'Amerique de 1665 a 1714, etc. 

Ibid., 730, 1670-1789. Industrie et commerce des sucres 
raffines. 

Ibid., 733 and 734, 1671-1790. Contain many documents 
concerning the production, refining and commerce of sugar. 

Ibid., 735, 1670-1789. Commerce exterieur avec les isles. 

358 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Printed Sources 

collections of laws, letters, memoirs and other con- 
temporary documents 

Petit de Vievigne (Jacques), Code de la Martinique, St. Pierre 

(Martinique), 1767. 
Moreau de Saint-Mery, Loix et Constitutions des Colonies 

Frangaises de I'Amerique sous le Vent, Paris, 1784-1790, 6 

vols. Vol. I. 
Clement (Pierre), Lettres, Instructions et Memoires de Col- 
bert, Paris, 1861-1882, 10 vols. Vol. Ill, part 2. 
Depping (G. B.), Correspondance Administrative sous le regne 

de Louis XIV, Paris, 1850-1851, 4 vols. 
Boislisle (A. M. de), Correspondance des controleurs generaux 

des finances avec les intendants des provinces, Paris, 1874- 

1897, 3 vols. 
Breard (Charles et Paul), Documents relatifs a la marine 

Normande et a ses Armements aux XVP et XV IP siecles 

pour le Canada, I'Afrique, les Antilles, le Bresil et les Indes, 

Rouen, 1899- 

CONTEMPORARY CHRONICLES, HISTORIES, ETC. 

Bouton (Le Pere Jacques), Relation de I'etablissement des 
Frangais depuis Van 1635 en Visle de la Martinique I'une 
des Antilles de VAmerique, Paris, 1640. 

Coppier (Guillaume), Histoire et Voyage des Indes Occident- 
ales, Lyon, 1645. 

Pacifique de Provins (Le Pere), Relation du Voyage des Isles 
de VAmerique, Paris, 1646. 

Du Tertre (Le R. P. Jean-Baptiste), Histoire generale des 
isles de St. Christophe, de la Guadeloupe, de la Martinique 
et autres dans VAmerique, Paris, 1654. 

Idem., Histoire generale des Antilles habitees par les Fran- 
gois, Paris, 1667-1671, 4 vols, in three. It is to this edition 
that all references are made in the notes. 

359 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Pelleprat (Pierre), Relation des PP. de la Compagnie de 
Jesus dans les Isles et dans la Terre Ferme de VAmerique 
Meridionale, PariS;, 1655. 

St. Michel (Maurile de). Voyage des Isles Camercanes en 
VAmerique qui font partie des Indes Occidentales, Mans, 
1652. 

Rochefort (Cesar de), Histoire naturelle et morale des An- 
tilles de VAmerique, Rotterdam, 1658. Second edition, 1665. 
It is to the latter that references are made. 

Biet (Antoine), Voyage de la France Equinoxiale en Visle de 
Cayenne entrepris par les Frangais en Vannee MDCLII, 
Paris, 1664. 

Recueil des Gazettes: nouvelles ordinaires et extraordinaires, 
Paris. Files consulted for years 1664-1675. 

La Barre (Lefebvre de). Description de la France equinoctiale 
cy-devant appellee Guyanne, Paris, 1666. 

Ibid., Relation de ce qui s'est passe dans les Isles et Terre 
Ferme de VAmerique, Paris, 1671, 2 vols. 

Delbee (le Sieur), Journal du Voyage du Sieur Delbee, com- 
missaire general de la Marine aux Isles, dans la coste de 
Guinee pour Vetahlissement du commerce en ces pays en 
Vannee 1669, in vol. II, 347-494, of preceding. 

Savary (Jacques), Le parfait negociant, Paris, l675. 

SPECIAL WORKS ON COLBERT 

Joubleau (Felix), Etude sur Colbert, ou Exposition du Sys- 

teme d' Economic Politique suivi en France de 1661 a 1683, 

Paris, 1856,2 vols. 
Clement (Pierre), Histoire de Colbert et son administration, 

Paris, 1874, 2 vols. 
Neymarck (Alfred), Colbert et son temps, Paric, 1877, 2 vols. 
Pigeonneau (H.), La Politique Coloniale de Colbert in Annales 

de VEcole des Sciences Politiques, 1886. 
Benoit du Rey (E.), Recherches sur la politique coloniale de 

Colbert, Paris, 1902. 
Chemin-Dupontes (Paul), Les Compagnies de colonisations en 

Afrique occidentale sous Colbert, Paris, 1903. A reprint 

360 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 

with revision and many additions of the article which ap- 
peared in the Questions Diplomatiques et Coloniales of 
October 15, 1899, under the title of L'Afrique Occidentale 
sous Colbert. 

SPECIAL WORKS ON THE ANTILLES 

Charlevoix (Pierre-Fran9ois-Xavier), Histoire de VIsle Espag- 
nole on de St. Domingue, Paris^ 1730-1731, 2 vols. 

Labat (Le R. P.), Nouveau Voyage aux Isles de VAmerique, 
Paris, 1722, 6 vols. 

Ducoeurjoly (S. J.), Manuel des Habitants de St. Domingue, 
Paris, 2 vols. 

Renouard (Felix), Statistique de la Martinique, Paris, 1822, 
2 vols. 

Malo (Charles), Histoire d' Haiti depuis sa decouverte jusqu'- 
en 182 Jf, Paris, 1824. 

Placide (Justin), Histoire politique et statistique de Vile 
d'Haiti, Paris, 1806. 

Boyer-Peyreleau (E. E.), Les Antilles Frangaises particuliere- 
ment la Guadeloupe, depuis leur decouverte jusquau ler 
janv. 1823, Paris, 1823. 

Daney (Sidney), Histoire de la Martinique depuis la colonisa- 
tion jusqu'en 1815, Fort Royal (Martinique), 1846, 6 vols. 

Dessalles (Adrien), Histoire Generate des Antilles, Paris, 
1847, 5 vols. 

Margry (Pierre), Belain d'Esnambuc et les Normands aux 
Antilles, Paris, 1863. 

Idem., Origines Frangaises des Pays d'outre-mer, Les Seig- 
neurs de la Martinique, three articles in Revue Maritime et 
Coloniale, vol. 58, pp. 28-50, 276-305, 540-547. 

Ballet (Jules), La Guadeloupe, Renseignements sur I'histoire, 
la flore, la faune, la geologic, la mineralogie, V agriculture, le 
commerce, Vindustrie, etc., Basse Terre (Guadeloupe), 1890- 
1902. Five volumes have appeared. It is to be complete in 
twelve. 

Guet (Isidore), Le colonel Frangois de Collart et la Mar- 
tinique de son Temps, Vannes, 1893. 

361 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Idem., Origines des Petits Antilles . . . 1609-1 674, a series of 

articles which appeared in the Revue Historique de I'Ouest, 

1897-1899. 
Lorin (Henri), De Prcedonibus insulam Sancti Dominici cele- 

brantibus sceculo septimo decimo, Paris, 1895. 
Peytraud (L.), L'Esclavage aux Antilles Frangaises avant 

1789, Paris, 1897. 
Saint- Yves (G.), Les Campagnes de Jean d'Estrees dans la 

mer des Antilles, 1676-1678, Paris, 1900. (Reprint from 

the Bulletin de geographie historique et descriptive, no. 2, 

1899.) 
Idem., Les Antilles Frangaises et la Correspondance de Vln- 

tendant Patoulet, Paris, 1902. A short pamphlet (Bib. Nat. 

Lk. 12, 1516), giving an account of the correspondence in 

Bib. Nat. MSS., Fonds fran9ais, 11315, referred to above. 
Vaissierre (Pierre de), Saint-Domingue {1629-1789), La So- 

ciete et la vie Creoles sous VAncien Regime, Paris, 1909- 

SPECIAL WORKS ON THE SEVERAL PORTS ENGAGED IN THE WEST 
Il^DIA TRADE 

Malvezin (Theophile), Histoire du Commerce de Bordeaux 

depuis les Origines jusqua nos jours, Bordeaux, 1892, 4 

vols. Vol. II. 
Garnault (Emile), Le Commerce Rochelais au XVIIP Steele, 

La Rochelle, 1887-1891, 3 vols. Vol. II. 
Le Beuf (E. B.), Du Commerce de Nantes, Son Passe, Son 

Avenir, Nantes, 1857. 
Parfouru (Paul), Les Irlandais en Bretagne aux XVI P et 

XVIIP Siecles, article in Annates de Bretagne, vol. IX, 

524-53^. 
Maitre (Leon), Situation de la Marine marchande du Comte 

de Nantes d'apres Venquete de 166 Jf, in Annates de Bretagne, 

vol. XVII, 326-343. 
Gabory (Emile), La Marine et le Commerce de Nantes au 

XVIP Siecle et au Commencement du XVIIP, 1661-1715. 

(Reprint from Annates de Bretagne, XVII, 1-44, 235-290, 

341-398.) 

362 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Augeard (Eugene), Etude sur la Traite des Noirs avant 1790 
au point de vue du Commerce Nantais, Nantes, 1901. 

Borely (A. E.), Histoire de la Ville du Havre, Havre, 1880- 
1881, 3 vols. 

SPECIAL WORKS ON ARTICLES OF COMMERCE 

Boizard (E.) et Tardieu (H.), Histoire de la Legislation des 
Sucres, 1664-1891, Paris, 1891. 

Sabatier (Antoine), La Ferme du Tahac, Lille, 1905. (Re- 
print from the Bulletin de la Societe archeologique, histo- 
rique et artistique, November, 1905.) 

GENERAL WORKS 

Savary (Jacques), Dictionnaire Universel de Commerce, Paris, 

1732, 4 vols. 
Veron de Forbonnais (F.), Recherches et Considerations sur les 

Finances de France depuis I'Annee 1595 jusqu'a I'annee 

1721, Basle, 1758, 2 vols. 
Gouraud (Charles), Histoire de la Politique commerciale de 

la France et de son Influence sur le Progres de la Richesse 

publique depuis le Moyen Age jusqu'a nos Jours, Paris, 

1854, 2 vols. 
Duval (Jules), Les Colonies et la Politique coloniale de la 

France, Paris, 1864. 
Segur-Dupeyron (P. de), Histoire des Negotiations commer- 

ciales et Maritimes aux XVIP et XVIIP Siecles, Paris, 

1872-1873, 3 vols. 
Berlioux (Etienne-Felix), Andre Briie ou VOrigine de la Col- 
onic Francaise du Senegal, Paris, 1874. 
Marcel (Gabriel), Le Surintendant Fouquet, Vice-Roi de 

VAmerique. (Reprint from the Revue de Geographic, 1885.) 
Norman (C. B.), Colonial France, London, 1886. 
Pigeonneau (H.), Histoire du Commerce de la France, Paris, 

1887-1889, 2 vols. 
Deschamps (Leon), Histoire de la Question Coloniale en 

France, Paris, 1891. 
Vignon (Louis), L'Expansion de la France, Paris, 1891- 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Leroy-Beaulieu (Paul), De la Colonisation chez les peuples 
modernes, Paris, fifth edition, 1902. (A sixth edition ap- 
peared in 1908.) 

Bonnassieux (Pierre), Les grandes Compagnies de Commerce, 
Paris, 1892. 

Chailley-Bert (J.), Les Compagnies de Commerce sous I'Ancien 
Regime, Paris, 1898. 

Martin (Germain)^ La grande Industrie sous le Regne de 
Louis XIV, Paris, 1899- 

GaiFarel (Paul), Les Colonies Frangaises, Paris, 1899. 



364 



INDEX 



Acadia, sugar refiners of Guadeloupe and Martinique propose 

•establishment of trade with 220 

Africa, Dutch on western coast of, 388; French West India Com- 
pany's possessions on, 388; ceded to private company, 388; 
du Casse appointed governor at western coast of, 289; 
monopoly of Company of Senegal in, 293. See also Company 
of Senegal, Company of Guinea, Slaves, Slave trade, etc. 

Alou, Sieur de 1', sent to St. Christopher in command of troops, 
136. 

Andre, Jean, Baron de Woltrogue, associated with Carolof in 

Slave trade 118 

Antigua, attacked by French, 139; capture of, 139; trade of Sieur 
Cartier with, 157; trade with Dutch, 207. 

Ardres, W. I. Co. sends vessels to trade with king of, 167; king 
grants privileges of slave trade, 167. 

Arguin, captured by du Casse 289 

Baas, de, succeeds de Clodore at Martinique, 152 ; governor-general 
of the French West Indies, 155; accused of favouring trade 
with Dutch, 158; complains of W. I. Co.'s price of slaves, 162; 
letter to Colbert regarding supply of salt beef, 175; receives 
instructions from W. I. Co. concerning trade with foreigners 
(1668), 184, 188-189; commanded by Colbert to enforce 
strictly regulations against foreign traders, 186; receives 
letters from Colbert concerning same, 187, 187-188, 190, 191; 
warns Colbert exclusion of foreigners will bring suffering to 
planters, 189; writes Colbert of case of trade with foreigners, 
190-191 ; complains of de Gabaret's severity toward Dutch 
traders, 197, 198; writes sarcastic letter to Colbert concerning 
same, 198-199; promises to be severe with Dutch, 199; com- 
ments upon effect of de Gabaret's sojourn in W. I., 200; 
appealed to by Ogeron for aid at St. Domingo, 202; receives 
letter of encouragement from Colbert, 207; instructed to 
maintain patrol against foreign traders, 208; permits provi- 
sions to be brought from Martinique and rebuked by Colbert, 
210; correspondence concerning trade with foreigners dis- 
cussed, 210-215; trades with Dutch at Curagao, 211-212; 
accusation against discussed, 212-215; character, 215; dis- 

365 



INDEX 

likes private traders and favours W. I. Co.'s monopoly, 237; 
receives letters from Colbert concerning same, 228-229; com- 
plains of high prices demanded by French traders, 228; 
receives instructions regarding freedom of trade, 232; com- 
plains of varying policy, 232; writes of overproduction and 
depreciation of sugar, 267; writes concerning establishment 
of refineries, 272; receives instructions regarding same, 273; 
writes in regard to slave trade, 287; comments upon impor- 
tance of salt beef, 312; instructed to encourage trade with 
Canada, 317; opposes Colbert's policy of excluding Irish 
beef, 321-323; permits trade with English, 323. 

Barbadoes, trade of French with, 191; provisions imported into 
Martinique from, 209; indentured servants at, 282; trade with 
permitted by de Baas, 323. 

Bayonne, duties imposed upon sugar at 267 

Bechameil, a stockholder of Company of Cayenne and of W. I. 
Co., 80; becomes director of latter and specially charged by 
Colbert with management, 83; reports plans of company, 83- 
84; receives news concerning Dutch and West India trade, 
84; suggests plan to send supplies to West Indies, 85; writes 
of urgency in sending vessels, 102; plans to send 200 soldiers 
to Martinique, 109; appeals to Colbert for aid. 111; asks for 
convoys, 113; suggests closing subscriptions, 152; favours 
private traders, 153-154; explains company's failures and 
advocates reforms, 156. 

Begon, intendant, writes joint memoir with St. Laurent concern- 
ing trade with foreigners 223 

Beinchk, Jacob, in command of Dutch squadron, attacks Marie 
Galante, 246; attempts to win over colony at St. Domingo, 
246 and note 72; destroys French vessels at Petit Goave, 246. 

Bellefond, Villant de, makes treaty for W. I. Co. on coast of 

Guinea 285 

Bellinzani, writes memoir concerning W. I. trade, 244; letter con- 
cerning monopoly of tobacco, 254; sketch of official career, 
connection with W. I. Co. and trade, dishonesty, indictment 
of Jacques Savary against, death in Bastille, etc., 298-299. 

Berruyer, a director of Company of the Isles of America 23 

Berthelot, a director of Company of Cayenne and of W. I. Co., 
68, 75, 80, 83. 

Blenac, de, governor-general, receives instructions regarding 
trade with foreigners at St. Christopher, 192, 218; arrives at 
Martinique, 218; proposes treaty with English at St. Christo- 
pher regarding trade, 218; ordered to exclude foreign trad- 
ers, 219; issues ordinance in regard to same, 219-220; writes 
Colbert concerning, 223; at St. Domingo, 255; estimates num- 

366 



INDEX 

ber of slaves imported, 300; encourages trade with Canada, 
317-318; instructed to admit Irish salt beef, 325. 
Bibaud, a director in Company of Cayenne and W. I. Co., 66, 77, 
83; writes Colbert in regard to state of latter company, 77-78. 

Boisseret, de, instructed by Houel to purchase Guadeloupe 42 

Bonaire, proposal to establish trade in live stock with 56 

Bouchardeau, Sir, assists in organization of Company of Cayenne. .64 
Bordeaux, development of trade with West Indies, 1650-1683, 236- 
238; exports to West Indies, imports from, 238; admiralty 
records of, 236-237 and bibliography; tonnage and log of 
vessels engaging in W. I. trade, 237-238; sugar refineries at, 
239; trade with West Indies interrupted by Dutch war, 244- 
245; duties imposed upon sugar at, 267; importance of W. I. 
trade in eighteenth century, 238-239. 
Boston, a ketch from trades at Martinique, 210; trade with pro- 
posed by colonial refiners, 221 ; character of settlers accord- 
ing to French, 222. 

Bouchet, a director of W. I. Co 83 

Boutet, Claude, granted monopoly of tobacco in France 225 

Bounties, offered on French salt beef, 209, 320; on slaves, 286. 

Bourg, du, sent to coast of Guinea by W. I. Co 165-168 

Brandy, article of export from Bordeaux, 238; from La Rochelle, 
240; Nantes, 241; made from sugar-cane and exported from 
West Indies to Canada, 318. 
Brazil, cassonades imported into Provence from, 263; duties on, 
266. 

Breda, treaty of 142 

Brunet, a director of W. I. Co., correspondence with Colbert, 173, 
174, 175; buys salt beef and live stock for W. I. trade, 175, 
319-320. 
Buc, du, clerk of W. I. Co., encounters rebellion at Martinique. . . .92 

Buccaneers, on northern coast of St. Domingo 202 

Butter, Irish, article of export from Nantes 241 

Cacao, cultivation of at St. Domingo instead of tobacco 258 

Cadiz, vessel from Nantes calls at on way to Martinique 219 

Cuhuzac, in command of a fleet to protect French at St. Christo- 
pher, 18; forces English to respect treaty, but leaves colony 
at mercy of Spaniards, 19. 

Calle, de la, chief agent of W. I. Co. at Martinique 133, 157 

Canada, occupied by W. I. Co., 118; trade of company with, 112, 
116; assets of company in, 146; efforts to establish trade 
between West Indies and, 220, 221; cultivation of tobacco 
forbidden in, 252; Colbert attempts to find supply of lumber 
in, 329 ; explanation of failure of trade, 318, 319. 

367 



INDEX 

Canonville, district of Martinique, scene of rebellion 106 

Cape Verde Islands, trade of W. I. Co. with 86, 116, 131, 146, 148 

Caribs, Colbert urges incitement of against the Dutch, 198; slave 
trade with, 303. 

Carolof, makes contract with W. I. Co. for slave trade, 117, 285; 
terms of contract and privileges, 118; sent to Guinea by W. I. 
Co., 165; establishes trade relations with king of Ardres, 167; 
arrives at Guadeloupe with cargo of slaves, 172. 

Cartier, Sieur, general agent of W. I. Co. in islands, 156; proves 
corrupt, 157; accepts bribes from Dutch traders, 157, 212, 
285, 327. 

Casepilote, district of Martinique, scene of rebellion 104 

Cassonades, see Sugar. 

Cassava, planted at Cayenne, Q5', cultivation of abandoned at 
Martinique, 261; bread made from as food, 310, 311, 312. 

Casse, du, appointed governor of Senegal, captures Arguin from 
Dutch, occupies Goree, quells rebellion on coast, 289; services 
to Company of Senegal, 292; in charge of company's affairs 
at Martinique, 303. 

Cayenne, French settlement at, 2; population of in 1660 and 1664, 
Q5, 67; first expedition of Company of Cayenne to, 77; trade 
of W. I. Co. with, 86, 112, 131, 147, 148, 177; captured by 
English, 142; governor ordered to enforce regulations against 
foreign traders, 185; trade with Bordeaux, 237; recaptured 
by French, 247; slave trade at, 304. 

C6rillac, de, proprietor of Grenada, 44; cedes It to W. I. Co., 73, 
74, note 8. 

Champigny, cedes possessions to W. I. Co 73 

Chambre, de, general agent of W. I. Co., writes of first fleet, 
85-86; sails for West Indies, 86; at Martinique, 89; Guade- 
loupe, 90; St. Christopher, 91; writes of scarcity of provisions 
at Guadeloupe, 99; opinion regarding rebellions at Martin- 
ique, 107; superintends removal of English from St. Christo- 
pher, 127; assists in regulating trade at Martinique, 138; 
recalled, 156. 
Chemin-Dupontes, statements regarding W. I. Co. refuted, 75, 
119; quoted, 292; estimates number of slaves imported by 
Company of Senegal, 296; same discussed, 297-298. 
Clodore, de, governor of Martinique, sails for West Indies, 86; 
inauguration, 87; puts down rebellion, 92-93; character, 93; 
commended by Colbert and company, 94; pacifies spirit of 
rebellion, 101-102; grows alarmed, 102; crushes rebellion at 
Martinique, 104-106; prepares for war with English, 124; 
quells another rebellion in Martinique, 132-135; aids in regu- 
lating trade, 138; fights at Antigua, 139; dispute with de 



INDEX 

La Barre, 140; commands at St. Pierre, 141; returns to 
France, 152. 
Colbert, on condition of French commerce, 2; plans inquest of 
1664, 2; estimates number of vessels in merchant marine of 
France and other countries, 2-3; official career and activity 
sketched, 7-8; decides to organize East and West India Com- 
panies, 9; attitude toward same, 10; authorizes many com- 
mercial companies, 12; attitude toward, 12-13; problem in 
West Indies, 50-51; alarmed over affairs at Martinique, 58; 
sends de Tracy to reclaim West Indies for crown, 58-59; 
commends de Tracy for conduct, 61 ; approves plan to organ- 
ize Company of Cayenne, 62, 66; plans W. I. Co., 68; letter 
to German princes concerning company, 71, note 5; appealed 
to by W. I. Co., 78; forces subscriptions to both companies, 
79 ; appeals to king to support both, 79 ; subscribes personally 
to W. I. Co., 81; task assigned company, 83; frames legisla- 
tion to exclude Dutch traders, 83; provides small source for 
company, 98; authorizes company to borrow, 98; opens royal 
treasury, 102-103; partially successful in excluding Dutch, 
108; subscribes liberally to W. I. Co., 109-110; receives mem- 
oir concerning company, 116-117; plan of uniting East and 
West India Companies, 122; neglects W. I. Co. during war, 
144-145; makes partial provision of funds, 145; subscribes 
funds, 147; opposes continuance of Dutch trade in islands, 
150; also restoration of proprietary rule, 150; attitude to- 
ward W. I. Co. at close of English war defined and discussed, 
151-154; has company declare first dividend, 156; instructions 
to de Baas, 156; correspondence with Pelissier, 159; instruc- 
tions to same defining duty of W. I. Co., 159-161; policy of 
complete freedom of trade to all French traders, 160; advises 
encouragement of early marriages, 160; urges reduction of 
amount of sugar produced in islands, 161; instructs Pelissier 
to favour private traders, and exclude foreign traders, 161 ; 
correspondence with Pelissier, 161; urges colonies to engage 
in commerce, 162; orders census made, protects private trad- 
ers, considers means of perfecting manufacture of tobacco 
and sugar, orders price of slaves lowered, 162; appreciates 
private traders, restricts W. I. Co.'s commerce, reasons for 
same, 163; decides to abandon company, 164, 175, 176; plans 
slave trade with Spaniards, 171; attempts to exclude Irish 
salt beef from W. I. trade and correspondence with Brunet, 
173-175; orders de Tracy to exclude Dutch traders, 182; 
refuses to compromise, 184; forbids W. I. Co. to grant pass- 
ports to foreigners, 183; reserves right of granting passports, 
184; commands all governors to enforce regulations against 

369 



INDEX 

foreign traders, 185-186; correspondence with de Baas on 
same, 186, 188, 189, 191-192, 197-198, 214-215; commands W. 
I. Co. to supply slaves and live stock, 190; plans trade with 
Spanish Main at Grenada, 192; exceptions regarding foreign 
trade, 192-193; meaning of system of excluding foreigners, 
193; explains why trade with Spaniards should be prohibited, 
193; decides to maintain patrol in islands, 195; urges drastic 
measures against Dutch and explains, 198; replies to objec- 
tions of English, 199-200; protests against conduct of Dutch 
traders at St. Domingo, 203; orders de Gabaret to quell 
rebellion and destroy Dutch vessels at St. Domingo, 203; 
commends Ogeron, 205 ; successful in fight against Dutch, 206- 
207; refuses special privileges to colonial ships, 208; fails in 
attempts to exclude Irish beef from islands, 208-210; rebukes 
de Baas for trade with English, 210; rebukes du Lion for 
insubordination and conduct, 213-214; censures de Baas, 214; 
unable to prevent trade with English at St. Christopher, 218; 
refuses to honour claims of Dutch and rebukes Patoulet for 
failure to enforce regulations, 219; rejects proposal of trade 
with New England, 222; results of fight against foreign trad- 
ers, 223-224; policy regarding freedom of trade defined and 
discussed, 225-236; forces reduction of taxes levied on private 
traders, 225-226; grants passports to private traders, 226; 
protects their freedom and removes restrictions of trade, 228; 
writes de Baas concerning same, 228-229; attitude toward 
monopolies defined and discussed, 229 ff. ; key to understand- 
ing colonial policy, 233-236; rise of private trader, 236; re- 
sults of work at Bordeaux, La Rochelle and Nantes, 239 ff.; 
tariff of 1664, 251; legislation regarding tobacco, results, 
251 ff.; builds up sugar refining industry in France, 262-263; 
aids enterprise personally, 262; high duties on foreign refined 
sugar, 263-266; writes concerning same, 266; offers drawback 
on French refined sugar, 262; wishes destruction of Dutch 
refiners, 269; attitude toward limiting production of sugar 
defined, 268-269; toward re-exportation of raw sugar, 269- 
271 ; policy toward colonial refiners, 273 ff. ; results of, 279- 
280; encourages importation of indentured servants, 282; 
plans for slave trade, 286; creates monopoly for same, 288; 
protects Company of Senegal, 295; attitude toward reorgani- 
zation of company, recruits stockholders, 301; results of 
policy regarding slave-trade, 308-309; efforts to build up 
trade between Canada and West Indies, 315-317; failure 
explained, 319; fight against Irish salt beef, 319-320; failure 
and refusal to renew fight, 323-325; efforts to supply live 
stock and lumber from Canada futile, 329; removes restraints 

370 



INDEX 

on trade, 330; principles underlying colonial policy, 332; 
criticism of, 332-339; general results, 338-339. 

Colbert de Terron, intendant at Brouage, and Company of the 
North, 12; becomes stockholder in Company of Cayenne and 
W. I. Co., 80; warns Colbert of de La Barre's character, 
129; receives letter from Colbert, 226. 

Commerce, state of in France, 1-6; Colbert's policy regarding, 
7 ff. ; attempts to establish with West Indies, 36-40 ; state of, 
46-50; further plans to establish with West Indies, 53, 55; 
state of, 110-111, 113, 142, 148, 156, 157; W. I. Co. attempts 
to establish with Guinea, 165-173; regulations governing, 185; 
with West Indies traced statistically, 236 ff. ; state of, 244- 
247; between Canada and West Indies encouraged, 318. 

Companies, Commercial, Colbert's attitude toward, 12 ff., 233. See 
also Company of Cayenne, Company of the Isles of America, 
Company of the Levant, Company of the North, Company of 
the Pyrenees, Company of Senegal, West India Company. 

Company of Cayenne, plan of organization approved by Colbert, 
62; chief object, 63; stockholders, 66; letters-patent and first 
expedition to Cayenne, 66; makes treaty with Dutch, 67; 
serves as basis for W. I. Co., 75-77, 83. 

Company of Guinea, organizadon and privileges 308 

Company of the Isles of Aflgjeyica, organization, letters-patent 
and work, 23-24; promotes cultivation of sugar-cane, 31-35; 
attempts to build up trade and results, 36-40; failure and 
causes, 40-43; sells islands to proprietors, 42. 

Company of the Levant, organization 12-13 

Company of the North, established by Colbert, 12; authorized to 
charter vessels from W. I. Co., 176. 

Company of the Pyrenees, organized by Colbert 12-13 

Company of St. Christopher, organized, 15; letters-patent, 16; 
sends vessels to St. Christopher, 16-17; appeals to Richelieu 
for protection against Dutch traders, 22; failure, 23. 

Company of Senegal, buys W. I. Co.'s possessions in Senegal, 
178; equips vessels at Dieppe, 243-244; urged to establish 
sugar refinery at Martinique, 275; history, 288-298; trade 
in Africa, 289; appoints du Casse governor, 289; makes con- 
quests, 290; contracts to furnish slaves to West Indies, 291; 
character, personnel and capital, 292; enlarged, 292; terms 
of contract, 293; activity, 293-294; losses and misfortunes, 
294-295; unsuccessful efforts to prevent bankruptcy, 295; 
supposed bounties paid to, 296; number of slaves carried to 
West Indies, 296-301 ; reorganization, 301 ; capital and privi- 
leges, 302; establishes agents, 303; number of slaves imported 
into West Indies, 304-308; failure to satisfy contract and 

371 



INDEX 

reasons, 304-305, 307; debts owed to, 305; monopoly partly 
revoked, 308-309. 

Contraband trade, see Foreign trade. 

Cotton, cultivation ordered in islands, 30; cultivated at Cayenne, 
65; imported at Bordeaux from West Indies, also at Nantes, 
238, 242; cultivated instead of tobacco, 258; proves less prof- 
itable than sugar-cane, 261; cultivation encouraged by Col- 
bert, 269. 

Curasao, proposal to establish trade in live stock with, 56; sends 
oxen and horses to West Indies, 189, 326, 327; slave trade 
with Spanish Main, 192-193; with French, 285-286; exporta- 
tion of live stock forbidden, 327. 

Currency, tobacco serves as 250 

Cussy, de, succeeds de Pouan9ay, as governor of St. Domingo ...257 

Dalibert, a director in W. I. Co 83 

Darriet, a merchant of Bordeaux, engaged in W. I. trade 238-239 

Dartiagne, convicted of illicit trade 190 

Delbee, Sieur, records expedition to Guinea and facts concerning 

slave trade 165, 169 

Desirade, becomes a proprietary, 43; ceded to W. I. Co., 73. 
Dieppe, trade with West Indies, 236, 242-243; Company of Sene- 
gal equips vessels at, 243-244; trade in indentured servants, 
281. 
Domaine d'Occident, revenue farm, 178; attempts to exclude for- 
eign traders, 215-216; plan to unite with Company of Senegal, 
301. 

Drawbacks, on sugar refined in France 264-265 

Dunkerque, trade with West Indies 157 

Dupas, Sieur, judge at St. Christopher, orders confiscation of 

foreign merchandise 216 

Dutch, as carriers and traders in France, 3; success in trade with 
East Indies, Baltic, West Indies, etc., 9; begin trade at St. 
Christopher, 20-22; service as traders, 21; trade with French 
colonies becomes regular, 22-23, 29; importance, 39-40; settle 
St. Martin conjointly with French, 43; control trade with 
French islands, 45-50; explanation of superiority as traders, 
48-50; yield Cayenne to French, 67; barred from French 
islands by Colbert, 83; attempt to embarrass W. I. Co., 84- 
85; furnish capital for sugar mills at Guadeloupe, 91-92; sell 
vessels to W. I. Co., 94; cry of Vive Us Hollandais! raised 
at Martinique, 101; suspend trade with French colonies, 108; 
trade with W. I. Co., 113; aid Guadeloupe, 125; permitted to 
trade in West Indies, 138, 150; aid French in war, 140; 
opposed by Colbert, 150, 153; bribe officials in order to trade, 

373 



INDEX 

157; sell slaves to French, 162, 172; trade in Guinea, 166- 
168; attempt to prevent W. I. Co. from trading with king of 
Ardres, 168; slave trade with Spaniards, 171; Colbert renews 
fight against, 182 ff.; carry on illicit trade, 184; St. Eustatius 
specially watched by Colbert, 186-187; continue to import 
slaves and live stock, 188; prohibited from doing so, 189- 
190; contraband trade at St. Eustatius, 191; trade with Span- 
ish Main, 192-193; Colbert's long fight against, 195-224; 
instructions to de Gabaret, 196; captured by French patrol, 
196-197; Colbert plans to drive from West Indies, 198, 199- 
200; stir up rebellion at St. Domingo, 201 ff. ; affected by de 
Gabaret's sojourn in West Indies, 206-207; de Baas trades 
with Curacao, 211-212; trade with French islands, 212-215, 
217, 218-219; driven out, 223; obtain raw sugar at St. Malo 
and Nantes, 240; prey upon French commerce, 244; war, 
244-248, 288; attack French West Indies, 246-247; emigrate 
from Brazil to Guadeloupe and cultivate sugar-cane, 260; 
import slaves into French islands, 283-286; surrender Goree 
and Arguin to French, 288-289. 
East India Company, organized, 8; importance, 9-11; subscrip- 
tions, 79; enjoys monopoly, 231. 

Embargo, laid in ports of France 245 

English, manufacturers of woollens, 1 ; driven from Tortuga by 
French, 29; trade with French at St. Christopher, 91; capture 
vessels of W. I. Co., 108, 110-111; war declared, 124; defeated 
at St. Christopher, 126-127; blockade St. Christopher, 139; 
fleet arrives in West Indies, 139; attacked by French at 
Antigua, 139; attacked by de La Barre's fleet, 140; attack 
St. Pierre, 140-142; obtain control of sea and capture Cay- 
enne, 142; contraband trade, 157; on coast of Guinea, 166, 
168; smuggling at Nevis, 191; protest against French regu- 
lations, 199; permitted to sell cargoes at Guadeloupe and 
Martinique, 209; trade with, 215, 217, 218; reject treaty 
offered by French at St. Christopher, 218. 

Eon, Jean, quoted 1, 3, 5-7 

Esnambuc, Pierre d', sets sail for West Indies, 14; decides to 
found colony at St. Christopher, 15; returns to France and 
obtains permission, 16; founds colony, 17; seeks aid in 
France, 18; fights valiantly against Spaniards, 19-20; flees, 
but returns, 20; decides to abandon colony, but aided by 
Dutch and remains, 21; makes settlement at Martinique, 27; 
death, 40. 

Estrades, Count d', writes Colbert of state of Martinique 56-57 

Estrees, Count d', vice-admiral in command of squadron in West 
Indies, 195, 220, 247; recaptures Cayenne and takes Tobago, 

373 



INDEX 

347; plans to attack Curasao, but shipwrecked, 247; captures 
Goree, 288, 292. 

Fermiers generaux des aides, subscribe to W. I. Co., 81 ; make 
loan to same, 99, 145. 

Filibusters, on northern coast of St. Domingo 202 

Flour, article of export from French ports to West Indies, 238, 
240, 242, 311-312. 

Food-stuffs, scarcity in West Indies, 45 ; efforts to provide supply, 
116; increasing demands for, 224; scarcity at Martinique, 
261; food of planters, 310; supply at first obtained in islands, 
310; legislation concerning, 310-325; cargo sent from Canada, 
315; efforts to obtain regular supply in Canada, 318-319. 

Foreign Commerce, prohibited at St. Christopher without pass- 
port, 22-23; forbidden by Company of Isles of America, 37; 
prevalent in French West Indies, 38-40; under proprietary 
rule, 46; at St. Christopher, 91; ordered stopped by Colbert, 
162; regulations, 182-194; arrit of June 12, 1669, 184-185; 
instructions to governors, 185-186; royal ordinance, June 10, 
1670, 187-189; Colbert insists on enforcement, 188-190; de 
Baas protests, 189; case at Martinique, 190; permitted in two 
cases, 192-193; with Porto Rico forbidden, 193; patrol main- 
tained in French islands, 195; Dutch vessels seized, 196-197; 
English protest against regulations and receive explanations 
from Colbert, 199-200; de Gabaret's mission and results, 195- 
200, 206; rebellion at St. Domingo, 205-206; not eliminated, 
207; patrol maintained, 208; ordinance of July, 1671, govern- 
ing colonial ships, 208; with English, 209-210; in poultry and 
live stock, 211; de Baas' correspondence, 210-215; cases, 
211-214; French traders complain of competition, 214; cor- 
ruption of officials, 212-215; regulations of 1677, 215-216; 
difficulties of enforcement at St. Christopher, 216-218; Col- 
bert's instructions, 219; ordinance of October 11, 1680, 
against, 219-220; squadron on patrol duty, 220; Colbert 
refuses to permit trade with New England, 221-222; results, 
223-224; Dutch furnish slaves to French, 283-286; Colbert 
interferes, 286-287; cases, 323, 326. 

Formont, de, discusses W. I. trade, 83; and W. I. Co., 176; trades 
in West Indies, 243. 

Fouquet, Nicolas, and colonial affairs 23, 52 

Francois, Francois, director Company of Senegal ..288, 291, 296, 29T 

Freedom of trade, Colbert's policy, 225-236; defined, 229; results 
attained, 248; Colbert's definition, 277. 

French, and manufacture of woollens, 1; and shipping, 2; fail 
to meet Dutch competition, 49; fight English at Martinique, 

374 



INDEX 

140-142; and slave trade, 168; relations with English at St. 
Christopher, 217-218, 284. 

Gabaret, de, in command of three vessels on patrol in West 
Indies, 195; importance of mission, 196; Colbert's instruc- 
tions, 196; captures Dutch vessels, 196-198, 200; effect of 
work, 200; sent to quell rebellion at St. Domingo, 202-205; 
explains causes of rebellion, 205-206; results attained, 206. 

Gazette, as source of information 95, note 28 

Ginger, cultivated in West Indies, 211; imported at Bordeaux and 
Nantes, 238, 242; cultivated at Martinique, 261; Colbert en- 
courages cultivation, 269. 

Gor^e, captured from Dutch by French, 288; occupied by du 
Casse, 289. 

Grenada, possession of du Parquet, 43; sold to de Cerillac, 44; 
ceded to W. I. Co., 74, 90; Colbert plans contraband trade 
with Spanish Main, 192; trade with Dutch, 196, 197. 

Guadeloupe, settled by French, 25; early history, 25-27; cultiva- 
tion of sugar-cane, 34-35; revenue from, 42; estimated value 
of production, 42; becomes proprietary, 43; partially ceded 
to W. I. Co., 73; W. I. Co. inaugurated, 90; state of in 1665, 
99 ; arrival of cargo of slaves, 172 ; trade with foreigners, 190, 
209; scarcity of meat, 209, 323; trade, 237-238; tobacco 
staple product, 250; establishment of sugar refineries, 272- 
274; slaves imported by Dutch, 284, 286; W. I. Co. sends 
cargo of slaves, 287; debts owed Company of Senegal, 306; 
supply of live stock, 327; population, 336. 

Guinea, trade with, 112, 116, 117-118, 148, 164, 231, 285; W. I. Co. 
attempts to organize slave trade, 286; description of trade, 
286 ff. ; trade freed from restraints, 293. 

Harman, Sir John, commands English fleet in attack upon Mar- 
tinique 140-141 

Havre, trade with West Indies, 236, 242-243; trade in indentured 
servants, 281. 

Hides, imported at Bordeaux from St, Domingo 238 

Holland, see Dutch, Foreign trade, etc. 

Honfleur, trade in indentured servants, 29; trade with West 
Indies, 242-243. 

Houel, Charles, takes charge of plans to cultivate sugar-cane at 
Guadeloupe, 33-34; governor of Guadeloupe, 34; raises sugar- 
cane, 36; selfish administration, 42; becomes joint proprietor 
of Guadeloupe, 43; sent to France to answer for conduct, 62; 
refuses to cede possessions to W. I. Co., 73-74. 

375 



INDEX 

He de Re, entrepot for trade in Irish beef 174, 320 

Indentured servants, numbers sent from Normandy and Brittany, 
29, 281; early importance, 45-46; form of contract, 281; 
prices, 281; devices to seduce, 281; Colbert attempts to arrest 
decrease, 282-283; reasons for failure, 283. 

Indigo, cultivation encouraged, 31; cultivated at Cayenne, 65; 
rate of transportation, 103-104; cultivation forced by low 
price of sugar, 211; imported at Bordeaux and Nantes, 238, 
242; slight importance as colonial commodity, 249; culti- 
vated instead of tobacco at St. Domingo, 258; Colbert 
encourages production, 261. 

Ireland, supplies salt beef to French West Indies, 173, 208, 241, 
313; supplies live stock, 189; Colbert attempts to interrupt 
trade with, 209-210, 319-320; French and Dutch traders 
maintain pastures in, 313; trade with Nantes and La Ro- 
chelle, 313-314, 325 ; suffering in West Indies from interruption 
of trade with, 322; Colbert restores trade with, 323; Colbert 
refuses Patoulet's suggestion to prohibit trade with, 324. 

Jacquier, director of W. I. Co 83 

Jamaica, smuggling trade with 306 

Janon, consul at Middleburg, employed by W. I. Co 94, 113 

Jansen, Drik, arrested at Grenada for illicit trade, 196; released, 

197. 
Jews, at Cayenne 65 

Knights of Malta, proprietors at St. Christopher 43 

La Barre, de, see Le Febure. 

Labot, quoted and refuted 305-306 

Lagny, de, relation to Company of North 12 

La Rochelle, trade with West Indies, 38, 236, 239-241; Colbert 
favours traders of, 240; tonnage of vessels engaged in West 
India trade, 240; merchants complain of tobacco monopoly, 
256; trade in indentured servants, 281; entrepot for Irish 
beef, 313. 
La Sabliere, de, stockholder in Company of Cayenne and W. I. 

Co 80 

Laubiere, de, lieutenant-governor of Martinique 93, 105, 136 

Le Febure de La Barre, and colony at Cayenne, 60-64 ; plans com- 
mercial conquest of French West Indies, 64; statement re- 
garding capital of Company of Cayenne, 76-77; explains 
employment of inexperienced clerks, 87-88; advises de Clo- 
dore concerning rebellions, 107; urges W. I. Co. to send 
strong fleet to islands, 129; put in command, 129; character 

376 



INDEX 

and conduct, 129-130; arrives at Martinique, 137; aids in 
regulating commerce, 138; attacks Antigua, 139; captures 
Montserrat, 139; withdraws to St. Christopher, 140; accuses 
de Clodore of disobedience, 140; accused of cowardice, 140; 
returns to Martinique and fights with English, 140. 

Leogane, rebellion at 302 

Levasseur, leads colony to settle Tortuga and becomes governor, 
29; character of administration, 41. 

Lion, du, placed in command of Guadeloupe, 62; made governor 
by W. I. Co., 90; complains of scarcity of supplies and ves- 
sels, 99-100; fights English at Antigua, 139; charges corrup- 
tion in trade, 157; complains of high prices charged by Pelis- 
sier, 162; accuses de Baas of corruption, 212-213; character, 
213-214; plans establishment of sugar refinery at Guade- 
loupe, 273; asks permission for cargo of live stock to be 
brought from Holland to Guadeloupe, 327. 

Live stock, furnished by Dutch, 157; price at Martinique, 162; 
trade of W. I. Co., 164, 175 ; supplied by foreign traders, 184, 
188; ordinance of December 20, 1670, 190-328; raised in 
French islands, 211; Colbert rejects proposal to obtain sup- 
ply at Boston, 221-222; increasing demand, 224, 326; raised at 
St. Domingo, 258; regulations, 326-329; imported from 
Curasao, 326, 327; price, 326; exportation forbidden at 
Curasao, 327; imported from Porto Rico, 328; inadequate 
supply in France, 328; price, 328. 

Lumber, need of supply in West Indies, 329; partially obtained 
in France, 330. 

Madeira Islands, trade with 130, 148 

Manufactures, principal articles of, imported into West Indies, 

330; regulations governing exportation to islands, 330-331. 
Marie Galante, becomes proprietary, 43-44; ceded to W. I. Co., 
73, 90; attacked by Dutch, 246; slaves imported from 
Curasao, 286, 327. 

Marseilles, establishment of sugar refinery at 262 

Martinique, settled by French, 27; early history, 27-28; planters 
ordered to raise cotton, 30; cultivation of sugar-cane, 31-33, 
35; becomes a proprietary colony, 43; importation of slaves, 
45; corrupt administration, 57; arrival of W. I. Co.'s fleet, 86- 
87; discontent with the company, 88; oflBlcial inauguration of 
W. I. Co., 89-90; rebellion, 99-106; causes and significance, 
105-108; another rebellion, 132-135; supplies arrive, 135, 136; 
petition of planters regarding trade, 137-138; attacked by 
English, 140-141; de Baas becomes governor, 152; price of 
slaves, 162; arrival of cargoes of slaves, 170-171; cases of 

377 



INDEX 

smuggling, 190; de Gabaret maintains patrol, 196; provisions 
imported from English, 209, 210; scarcity of salt beef, 210; 
trade with Bordeaux, 23T-238; attacked by Reuyter, 245; 
low price of sugar, 245; tobacco first staple product, 250; 
cultivation of sugar-cane becomes chief industry, 260; sugar 
refineries established, 272-275; number of slaves imported, 
1654, 284; Dutch import slaves, 286; lack of slaves, 300, 306; 
scarcity of salt beef, 322-323. 

Matharel, stockholder in Company of Cayenne and W. I. Co., 
80, 83, 85. 

Menjot, stockholder in Company of Cayenne and W. I. Co., . .80, 176 

Molasses, exportation to France unprofitable, 220; estimated 
value, 220; price, 221; proposal to market in New England, 
222. 

Monopoly, granted to W. I. Co., 70; Colbert's attitude toward 
principal of monopoly, 229 ff. ; of sale of tobacco farmed 
out, 252, 255 ; granted to Company of Senegal, 288, 293 ; prob- 
ably granted to Oudiette, 290; granted for slave trade, 302; 
of slave trade granted conjointly to Company of Senegal 
and Company of Guinea, 308. 

Montserrat, captured by La Barre, 139; Dutch trade with, 207. 

Muscovado, see Sugar. 

Nacquart, Sir, proposes to establish company for trade with 

West Indies 55 

Nantes, trade with West Indies, 38, 219, 236, 241-242; exports to 
West Indies, 241; imports from West Indies, 241; develop- 
ment of trade, 243; export colonial raw sugar to Holland, 
which angers Colbert, 240-241 ; privileges of trade withdrawn 
and restored, 241; import duties upon colonial sugar, 313; 
trade with Ireland, 313; ships salt beef to West Indies, 321 
and notes 42 and 43, 325. 

Nevis, fight with French, 139-140; smuggling trade with French, 
191; trade with Dutch, 207; trade with St. Christopher, 217. 

New England, trade with, 191, 210; proposal to trade with, 224. 

Nymwegen, treaty of 219, 248, 289 

Ogeron, governor of St. Domingo, vainly tries to assert W. I. 
Co.'s authority, 91; encounters revolt, 201-205; explains causes 
of rebellion and suggests remedies, 205-206; appeals to Col- 
bert for aid, 245 ; proposes establishment of colony in Florida, 
203; leads freebooters to cultivate soil, 251. 

Olive, de 1', makes settlement at Guadeloupe 25-27 

Olive oil, exported from Nantes to West Indies 241 

378 



INDEX 

Orange, Guillaume d', sent to explore Guadeloupe, Martinique 

and Dominica 25 

Otterinck, governor of Curasao, corresponds with de Baas 212 

Oudiette, Jean, farmer of Domaine d'Occident 2Q0^ 291 

Parquet, du, shows courage in fighting Spaniards, 19; in com- 
mand at Martinique, 27 ; character and administration, 28, 41 ; 
becomes proprietor of Martinique, St. Lucia and Grenada, 
43. 

Passports, W. I. Co. forbidden to issue to foreign traders, arvH 
September 10, 1668, 183; king reserves right to issue, 184- 
185; regulations concerning, 185, 226, 228, 328. 

Patoulet, intendant, receives special instructions to prohibit for- 
eign trade, 219; rebuked by Colbert for violating instruc- 
tions, 219; approves plan to establish trade with New Eng- 
land, 221-222; writes concerning tobacco industry, 254; ex- 
plains low price of sugar, 272; plays important role in build- 
ing up sugar refineries, 274; personally interested in refinery, 
275; trades with merchant of La Rochelle, 275, 325; states 
advantages of refining industry in West Indies, 277; protests 
against favouritism for home refiners, 279; estimates number 
of slaves needed at Martinique, 306; suggests raising of live 
stock in islands, 324. 

Pelissier, director of W. I. Co. sent to West Indies, 152; charged 
with duties of intendant, 158-159; receives full instructions, 
159-161; spends two years in islands, 161; correspondence 
with Colbert, 161-162; writes memoir concerning West India 
trade, 163; arouses complaints, 172, 175; receives further 
instructions from Colbert, 189-190, 192; plan for trade with 
Canada, 317. 

Plessis, du, settles Guadeloupe conjointly with de I'Olive 35-26 

Pi^ce d'Inde, defined, 297 and note 70. 

Poincy, de, governor-general sends expedition to take Tortuga, 
28-29; makes agreement with English to limit production of 
tobacco and issues ordinance, 30, 250; cultivates sugar-cane, 
36, 260; trades with Dutch and attempts to monopolize trade, 
39; character, 40; refuses to obey company and heads rebel- 
lion, 41 ; victorious, 41 ; sends colony to St. Martin, 43 ; orders 
attack on Spaniards and occupation of St. Croix, 43-44; large 
slave owner, 45, 284. 

Population, see Martinique, Guadeloupe, St. Christopher, etc., etc. 

Porto Rico, trade with 193, 328 

Pouan^ay, de, governor of St. Domingo, writes regarding tobacco 
industry, 254, 257, 258; complains of lack of slaves, 300; 
succeeded by de Cussy, 257. 

379 



INDEX 

Private traders, permitted to trade by Company of Isles of 
America with conditions, 39-40; number in West Indies in 
1668, 153; Colbert's attitude toward, 153; passports granted 
freely to, 154; attitude of W. I. Co. toward, 154; Colbert 
issues instructions for protection of, 160-163; share monopoly 
of slave trade, 172, 287; increase, 175, 176, 180; favoured by 
Colbert, 225-226; entire W. I. trade entrusted to, 225; insolent 
according to de Baas, 226-227; defended by Colbert, 237; 
regulations favouring, 228-229; Colbert defines policy toward, 
229; rapid rise of, 236; distribution in several ports of 
France, 236 ff. ; little interest in slave trade, 287, 288 ; ex- 
cluded from trade with Africa, 293. 

Rambouillet, de, stockholder in Company of Cayenne and W. I. 

Co 75 

Refineries, sugar, number increases in France, 207; established at 
Bordeaux, 239; at Rouen, 243; Colbert urges increase of, 262- 
263; Colbert furnishes part of capital, 262; number in France 
in 1683, 263, note 11; proportion of raw sugar required, 264; 
enjoy monopoly of colonial sugar, 271; Colbert encourages 
establishment in West Indies, 272-275; first established, 272; 
role played by Patoulet, 274-275; results, 276; advantages of 
refining sugar in West Indies shown, 278; in West Indies sub- 
jected to increased import duty, 278; new establishments for- 
bidden in West Indies, 278-279; in France favoured, 279; ex- 
port refined sugar, 280. 

Reuyter, attacks Martinique 245 

Richelieu, aids organization of Company of St. Christopher, 15; 
sends protection to colony, 18; subscribes to Company of 
Isles of America, 23. 

Roissey, Urbain de, sets forth with d'Esnambuc to found colony, 
14-16; joint command at St. Christopher, 17; joins de RaziUy 
for expedition in Irish Sea, 18; cowardice and imprisonment 
in Bastille, 19. 

Roucou, cultivation encouraged, 30; at Cayenne, 65; cultivated at 
Martinique before 1660, 261; imported at Bordeaux, 238; 
never important, 249. 

Rouen, trade with West Indies, 236, 242-243; two refineries, 262; 
special tax on sugar, 265, 267; special drawback on refined 
sugar, 265. 

Rum, no market in France, 220; proposals to market in New 
England, 221-222. 

St. Bartholomew, settled by French, 43; becomes possession of 
W. I. Co., 90. 

380 



INDEX 

St. Christopher, settled by French, 14; early history, 18-22; 
cultivation of tobacco, 30; cultivation of sugar-cane begun, 
35-36; becomes possession of Knights of Malta, 43; slaves, 
45; trade with Dutch, 48; ceded to W. I. Co., 90; opposition 
to company, 91 ; French defeat English and gain whole island, 
126-127; state, 132; blockaded by English, 139; harvest dam- 
aged by storm, 143; illicit trade, 185, 196; trade with English 
permitted under conditions, 192; Dutch vessels captured, 197; 
attempts to prevent enforcement of regulations, 215-216; regu- 
lations, 217-218; trade with Bordeaux, 237-238; quality of 
tobacco, 250; excellent sugar, 260; slaves imported by Dutch, 
283; price of slaves, 284; debts owed Company of Senegal, 
306; population, 1671, 1682, 336. 
St. Croix, Spaniards driven from and occupied by French, 44; 

ceded to W. I. Co., 90 ; scarcity of food-stuffs, 323. 
St. Domingo, early French settlement, 29; granted to W. I. Co., 
90; opposition of colony, 91; trade with foreigners, 185; re- 
volt against W. I. Co., 201-205; causes, 205-206; de Gabaret 
attempts to quell rebellion, 203-205; trade with Bordeaux, 
237-238; Dutch attempt to win colony, 247; tobacco staple 
product, 250-251; memorial of planters regarding monopoly 
of tobacco, 255; conditions at, 257; average production of 
tobacco, 1683-1688, 258; regulations concerning indentured 
servants, 282; slave trade, 300, 304, 306; trade with Spaniards, 
329; population, 337. 

St. Eustatius, trade with French 186-187, 191, 196, 207, 217 

St. Laurent, fights against English at St. Christopher, 126-127; 
chosen to succeed de Sales as governor, 128; prevents revolt, 
132; tries to prevent foreign trade, 217; writes memoir on 
foreign trade, 223. 
St. Lucia, settled by French and becomes possession of du Par- 
quet 43-44 

St. Malo, trade with West Indies, 236, 240, 242-243 ; import duties 

on sugar, 267; trade in indentured servants, 281. 
St. Marthe, governor of Martinique, convicted of illicit trade . . . .215 
St. Martin, settled conjointly with Dutch, 43; ceded to W. I. Co. . .90 

St. Thomas, import duties laid on sugar from 266 

Saints, the, settled by colony from Guadeloupe 43-44 

Sales, de, governor of St. Christopher 123, 126 

Salt beef, lack of supply in French West Indies (1665), 99; at- 
tempt to provide, 116; trade of W. I. Co., 173-175; supply 
ordinarily obtained in Ireland, 173, 313; Colbert decides to 
exclude Irish, 174, 208, 319; arrH of August 17, 1671 and 
royal ordinance of November 4, 1671, 320; price of French 
beef, 174; bounties offered by Colbert, 320; results, 175, 209- 

381 



INDEX 

310, 321; suffering in islands, 310; price, 217, 322-324, 325; 
importance as food, 312-313; proposal to obtain supply at 
Boston, 221-222; trade between Ireland and Nantes, 313; 
attempt to obtain supply in Canada, 318; Colbert restores 
privilege of exporting Irish, 323; results, 324; protests 
against import duty of 1688, 325. 

Salt pork, forbidden to be imported from foreign countries, 219- 
220; exported from La Rochelle, 240; from Nantes, 241; as 
food, 310; price, 324. 

Senegal, W. I. Co.'s trade with, 112, 116, IIT, 146. See also Com- 
pany of Senegal. 

Shipping, state of in France, 49-50. See also Commerce. 

Slaves, at St. Christopher in 1625, 283; imported by Dutch in 
1635, 283; imported into Guadeloupe for cultivation of sugar- 
cane, 33-34, 284; cheaper than indentured servants, 283; price 
in 1643, 1646, 1654, 284; number in French West Indies in 
1655, 44, 284; growth of trade, 45; profit in trade estimated 
by de Tracy, 284; number in Dutch settlement at Cayenne, 
65; W. I. Co. makes contract for supply, 117-118; price in 
sugar, 162; Dutch supply Spaniards, 171; supplied to French 
by Dutch, 184, 188, 196, 285-286; increasing demand, 224; 
W. I. Co, ordered to supply, 164; company's efforts, 165-173, 
285 ff. ; expedition to Guinea and description of trade, 165 ff. ; 
contract with king of Ardres, 169; W. I. Co. sends two car- 
goes to West Indies, 169-170, 171, 286, 287; trade encouraged 
by Colbert, 172; trade opened to private traders, 226; private 
traders show little interest, 287; import duty removed, 286; 
bounties offered, 286; log of a vessel engaged in slave trade, 
171; loss in transportation, 171; Colbert plans to supply 
Spaniards, 286; price, 172, 286; arrival of cargoes at Guade- 
loupe, 172; numbers regulated at St. Domingo, 282; fed on 
salt beef, 208; history of trade, 283-309; scarcity in 1675, 
287, 290; monopoly created, 231, 288; Oudiette's contract, 
290; Company of Senegal makes contract, 291-293; bounties 
and price, 293; number imported by company, 296-301; sup- 
posed bounties paid, 296; sold at Guadeloupe for Bellinzani, 
299; piece d'Inde defined, 297, note 70 ; numbers imported, 300 ; 
imported from foreigners, 303; second Company of Senegal 
makes contract, 304-308; numbers imported by company, 304- 
305; numbers required, 306; failure of company to satisfy 
contract, 307; monopoly shared by Company of Guinea and 
Company of Senegal, 308; results of Colbert's efforts, 308- 
309; condition of slave labour at Martinique, 322-323; popu- 
lation, 1671, 1684, 336. 

Smuggling, see Foreign commerce. 

383 



INDEX 

Spaniards, attempt to destroy French colony at St. Christopher, 
18-19; driven from St. Croix, 44; trade with Dutch, 171; 
Colbert plans to sell slaves to, 171; trade with Spanish Main 
planned, 192-193; trade with Porto Rico forbidden, 193; fur- 
nish live stock to French, 328, 329. 

Sugar, history of production in French West Indies and legisla- 
tion concerning, 260-280; plans to cultivate sugar-cane in 1640, 
31-32; successful, 33-36; causes for slow progress, 36; be- 
comes chief product in Windward Islands, 250, 258; influence 
upon planters, 44; Colbert estimates quantity produced, 45; 
of French West Indies refined in Holland, 54; import duty 
in France, 54; drawback on refined, 70; rate of transporta- 
tion to France, 103-104; as currency, 162, 172, 175, 250; ex- 
ported from several islands, 260, 261; profit, 261; imported 
from Holland and Brazil into Provence, 263; import duty on 
foreign refined, 239, 263; drawback, 265; special duties and 
drawbacks at Rouen, 265; duties, 266; price in 1665, 118; 
trade with Dutch, 157; overproduction and depreciation, 
267; Colbert's instructions to Pelissier concerning same, 161, 
268; price in France (1670), 267; perfecting manufacture, 
269; exported from France, 207; price at Martinique, 211, 
245; freed from export duty in West Indies (ordinance of 
June 9, 1670), 228; imported at Bordeaux, 237-239; exported 
from Nantes and St. Malo to Holland, 240, 242; imported 
at Rouen, 243; Colbert's attitude toward re-exportation of 
raw sugar, 269-271; re-exportation forbidden by arrU of 
1684, 271; low price in France (1679) and causes, 271; refined 
at Guadeloupe, 272; growth of colonial refineries, 272-275; 
duties on refined in colonies, 273-274; rise in price (1679), 
276; benefits of refining, 276-278; arret of April 18, 1682, 
278; results, 279-280; increase of production, 280; freed from 
import duty in Canada, 318. See also Refineries. 

Talon, intendant in Canada, tries to build up trade with West 
Indies, 315-317; sustains losses, 318. 

Temericourt, governor of Marie Galante 327 

Thoisy, de, appointed governor-general, but defeated by de 

Poincy 41 

Tobacco, history of cultivation and trade, 249-259; early produc- 
tion at St. Christopher, 30; excellent quality, 250; staple, 36, 
250; depreciation and agreement with English to limit pro- 
duction, 30, 250; as currency, 250; exported to Holland, 54; 
import duties in France, 54, 251, 252; cultivation at Cay- 
enne, Q5\ rate of transportation to France, 103-104; cargo 
arrives at Dunkerque, 109 ; imported into France, 157, 162, 



INDEX 

171, 183, 238; cultivation becomes secondary in Windward 
Islands, 350; remains staple in St. Domingo, 351; cultivation 
in France restricted, 252; forbidden in Canada, 252; monop- 
oly of sale in France, 252-253; results, 253-255; monopoly 
renewed, 255; re-exportation permitted, 256; estimated pro- 
duction (1674), 258; results at St. Domingo, 258; freed from 
import duties in Canada, 318, 

Tortuga, English expelled and French settlement made, 28-29; 
rebels against W. I. Co., 91; trade with, 146, 177; Dutch trade 
with, 201. 

Tobago, captured by French 247 

Tracy, Alexander Prouville de, mission to America, 59; character 
and duties, 59; administration, 60; commended by Colbert, 
61; restores order, 62; inaugurates W. I. Co., 88-90; corre- 
spondence, 261; estimates profit of slave trade, 285. 

Trade, see Commerce, Foreign commerce. 

Treillebois, Sieur de La Rabesnieres, de, commands squadron in 

West Indies 151, 195 

Trezel, makes contract to cultivate sugar-cane in West Indies, 
31-33, 35, 39. 

Warner, Sir Thomas, governor of English at St. Christopher . . .17-18 
West India Company, preparation for organization, 68; establish- 
ment, 68 ff. ; letters-patent analyzed, 70 ; administration, 71 ; 
resources according to Colbert, 71-72 and note; opposition 
by proprietors, 73-74; contracts with proprietors, 74 and note 
8 ; analysis of subscriptions, 75 ff. ; stockholders and directors, 
75 ff.; relation to Company of Cayenne, 75-77; real character, 
82; history, 1664-1665, 83-122; preparation for trade, 83; 
delay, 84; description of first fleet, 85-86 and note 9; inexpe- 
rience of clerks and explanation, 87-88; inauguration in West 
Indies, 89-90; agents and correspondents in France and Hol- 
land, 94; builds and buys vessels, 94; sends vessels to West 
Indies, 95, 99; discontent among planters, 90-92; revolt at 
Martinique, 98-99; state of finances, 1665, 96; borrows, 98- 
99; fails to supply needs, 99-100; complaints against, 101; 
receives aid from king, 102-103; sends vessels, 103; revolt at 
Martinique, 103-106; suits against at Dieppe and Rouen, 104; 
authority sustained by de Clodore, 106; de La Barre admits 
lack of success, 107; failure to meet conditions in West 
Indies, 108; sends out vessels, 108; receives cargoes, 109; 
financial condition November, 1665, 109; receives aid from 
king, 109-110; commerce embarrassed, 110; authorized to 
seize English goods, 110; awarded claims by British, 111; 
distribution of trade, 111-112; contracts for ships, 116; makes 

384 



INDEX 

contract for slave trade, 117; sends vessels to Canada, 118; 
state of trade. May, 1666, 114-115; summary of activity, 1664- 
1665, 115-121; directors suggest union with East India Com- 
pany, 121; history, 1666-1667, 123-149; financial condition at 
outbreak of war with England, 128; in control of St. Christo- 
pher, 128; sends fleet, 128-131, 135; sends more vessels, 136; 
permits Dutch to trade, 139; vessels in attack upon Antigua, 
139; losses from English attack at Martinique, 140-142; dis- 
astrous effects of war, 142-144; financial embarrassment, 144; 
statement November, 1667, 145-147; distribution of assets 
and value, 147; receives aid, 147; number of vessels, 147-148; 
prepares vessels for Cayenne, Cape Verde and Guinea, 148; 
history, 1668-1670, 150-164; attitude of Colbert after war, 
150-154, 235; shares trade with private traders, 153, 227; for- 
bidden to grant passports to Dutch, 153, 189-190; reforms in 
administration, 155; confined to wholesale trade, 156; first 
dividend, 156; commerce declines, 156-157; sends new agent 
to West Indies, 158 ; Colbert's instructions, 159 ff. ; commerce 
limited to certain articles, 163, 190; declines, 164; history, 
1670-1674, 165-181; sends vessels to Guinea and opens slave 
trade, 165-173; treaty with king of Ardres, 169, 285; trade in 
salt beef, 173-175; trade in live stock, 175, 189; dissolved by 
Colbert, 175, 176, 179; liquidation, 176-178; financial condi- 
tion, 177-178; reasons for failure, 179; service rendered, 179- 
181; revolt at St. Domingo, 201-205; sends refiners to West 
Indies, 273. 

West Indies, establishment of French, 14 ff. ; population, 1642, 
30; become proprietaries, 43; population in 1665, 44; condi- 
tion in 1664, 50-51; absorb attention of W. I. Co., 112; gov- 
ernor-general placed in command, 155; Colbert encourages 
increase in population, 160 ; trade with France, 236 ff. ; de- 
crease of trade with Normandy and Brittany, 243-244; culti- 
vation of tobacco, 250; storms, 295; trade by Company of 
Senegal, 296-301; trade with Canada, 315-316; causes for 
failure, 318-319; nature of trade, 335. See also Martinique, 
Guadeloupe, St. Domingo, etc., etc. 

Wine, article of export to West Indies at Bordeaux, La Ro- 

chelle, Nantes 238, 240, 241 



385 



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